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ABSTRACT
"HE HAD NO RIGHT": SEX, LAW, AND THE COURTS IN VERMONT, 1777-1920
SEPTEMBER 2000
HAROLD A. GOLDMAN, A.B., MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE
J.D., BOSTON COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF VERMONT
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Kathy L. Peiss
This is a social and legal history of the role played by Vermont's courts in
regulating sexual activity during the nineteenth and early twentieth century. It relies on a
quantitative and qualitative review of civil and criminal cases brought and disposed of in
four ofVermont's county courts, as well as the decisions ofVermont's Supreme Court.
Unlike urban areas that developed alternative administrative centers of regulatory power,
Vermont's rural county courts were its most important site of sexual discourse in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century.
Civil suits were brought by and on behalf ofwomen and girls for sexual
defamation, sexual assault, breach of promise to marry, and bastardy, along with suits
brought by fathers resulting from their daughters' seduction. Such suits had high success
rates and awarded large monetary damages. Judges and juries focused more on the harm
caused by uncontrolled male sexuality than on female moral transgressions. Men were
on notice that they would be punished for violating sexual norms, including unwanted
sexual advances.
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This study also examines how prosecutors, judges, and juries dealt with criminal
sexual offenses such as adultery and forcible and statutory rape. Supreme Court
decisions liberalizing the evidentiary requirements for a conviction coupled with concerns
about a surging divorce rate and flagging morality led to a dramatic increase in adultery
prosecutions after the Civil War. The state imprisoned himdreds ofmen and women for
this offense. In forcible rape cases, courts allowed evidence of prior sexual acts on the
part of the alleged victim to be used to impeach her credibility on the question of
consent, but they also made clear that the question of consent depended on the woman's
perspective. A man's perception that the sexual advance was welcome carried little
weight. The state also raised the age of consent from eleven to fourteen (1886) and then
sbrteen (1 898), leading to a surge in statutory rape prosecutions. As with forcible rape
cases, guilty verdicts were obtained in a large majority of cases. And as with civil cases,
judges and juries punished men for failing to control their sexual impulses.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
I first became interested in the history of sex, the law, and the courts while
working as an attorney in Vermont. Flipping through the pages of a digest ofVermont
Supreme Court decisions one day, I stumbled upon a heading entitled "Seduction." I was
immediately struck by the seeming incongruity of a word like "seduction" appearing in a
dry legal resource work. In my mind, the word conjured up images not of the law, but the
novels of Samuel Richardson. As I read the summaries of the Court's decisions, I was
fascinated to learn that Vermont law had allowed fathers to sue men for impregnating their
daughters out ofwedlock and that some fathers had availed themselves of this legal
remedy. While researching the subject for a seminar paper I realized that a broader work
on sex, law, and the courts in Vermont could be an important contribution both to our
understanding of the history of law and sexuality and the history ofVermont.
Scholars have created a growing body ofwork documenting changes in sexual
attitudes, practices, and regulation during the nineteenth century. In seeking to explain
these changes they have noted such influences as urbanization, the development of a
middle class, foreign immigration, rural influx, the changing role ofwomen, and the
growing importance of industrial wage labor. They have also documented how these
developments had wide-ranging and sometimes disparate effects on the definition and
regulation of sexuality. The nineteenth and early twentieth century saw the deployment of
a repressive Victorian sexual morality, the development of social purity campaigns,
restrictions on abortion, and the creation of interventionist state agencies. At the same
time, urbanization created space and opportunity for the exploration of alternative sexual
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meanings and practices and allowed various classes and races to mingle and to influence
and transform one another's sexual values. This scholarship has contributed greatly to our
understanding of the history of sexuality during this time.
However, gaps in our knowledge remain. For one thing, most of the work on
sexuality has focused on the urban environment. Because the city was the site where
dominant sexual values were challenged the most by phenomena like prostitution,
obscenity, and homosexuality, it was the city where reactions to these challenges were
most clamorous. But as late as 1920, halfof all Americans continued to live in rural
communities of less than 2500 people.' These people also struggled with the definition
and regulation of sexuality, but they continued to focus on the challenges heterosexual sex
had always posed to their society. These challenges included illegitimacy, adultery, and
rape. But rural society was itself undergoing change. Declining agricultural fortunes,
rural depopulation, social instability, increasing rates of divorce, illegitimacy, and venereal
disease, and the challenges these developments posed to family structure and gender roles
were topics of great concern in the countryside. Ifwe are to understand the story of
changing sexual values in America in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, an
exploration of these communities is necessary as well.
Historians seeking to understand how society comprehended and regulated sexual
activity have relied on a variety of sources and methodologies. Many scholars, influenced
by the New Social History and feminist and Marxist approaches have studied the attitudes
and contributions ofthose outside the traditional centers ofpower in
American life:
• In 1920 49 percent ofAmericans lived in communities ofless than 2500
people. Fifty-nine percent live,
in communities of 10,000 or less. Abstract ofthe
14'' Census ofthe United States, 1920 (Washmgton,
Government Printing Office, 1923), Table 14.
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immigrants, the poor, women, and sexual and ethnic minorities. Historians have relied on
diaries, letters, oral histories, and the artifacts of working class cultural production to
understand the sexual values of ordinary people and the effects of sexual regulation on
them.^ By contrast, other scholars, influenced by French thinkers like Michel Foucault,
have focused on the development and deployment of sexual discourse by institutions like
the medical and scientific community and government bureaucracies.^
As a result, scholars have shifted their gaze from traditional centers of authority
where sexuality was defined and regulated, such as the legal system. Yet in America, and
especially in rural America, the courts and law continued to play a vital role in defining
and regulating sexuality. For example, Vermonters were aware of the issues and debates
created by urbanization, immigration, and industrialization. Elite members of the society
also knew of the growing promise of administrative remedies to the challenges these
developments presented. But the processes driving the definition and regulation of
sexuality in more urban areas came much later to a largely rural state like Vermont.
Instead, during the nineteenth and early twentieth century, Vermonters focused on the
^ Examples include: Christine Stansell, City of Women: Sex and Class in New York. 1789-1860 (New
York: Knopf, 1986); Robert C. Allen, Horrible Prettiness: Burlesque and American Culture (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Kathy Peiss, Cheap Amusements: Working Women and Leisure
in Turn-of-the-Century New York (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986); George Chauncey, Gay
New York: Gender, Urban Culture, and the Making ofthe Gay Male World (New York: Basic Books,
1994); Timothy J. Gilfoyle, City ofEros: New York City, Prostitution, and the Commercialization ofSex,
1790-1920 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1992); Walter Kendrick, The Secret Museum: Pornography in
Modern Culture (New York: Viking, 1987).
^ Michel Foucault, History ofSexuality: Volume One: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York:
Pantheon, 1978); Thomas Laqueur, Making Sex: Body and Genderfrom the Greeks to Freud (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1990); Eve Kosofeky Sedgwick, The Epistemology ofthe Closet (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1990); Elizabeth Lunbeck, The Psychiatric Persuasion: Knowledge,
Gender, and Power in Modern America {Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
3
problems created by a changing agricultural society and in doing so, continued to look to
their law and courts as sources for the regulation of sexuality.
Furthermore, the legal model Foucault and other French thinkers had in mind when
they downplayed the importance ofjuridical institutions in the creation and enforcement of
sexual values was significantly different than that which existed in America. European
jurisprudence was centrally controlled, national in effect, and carried out by examining
magistrates vmder a Roman legal model. The Anglo-American legal system was
considerably different. With the exception ofthe Comstock Law (1873), the federal
government was largely a distant presence, little involved with the legal regulation of
sexuality before World War I. Juridical power was exercised at the state level, thus
creating space for a diversity of statutes and precedent. Unlike in European courts, local
juries determined the fate of the accused and often had the power to decide both legal and
factual questions. A common law system meant that judges' decisions became law, thus
making them an alternative source of law-making authority. Thus, particularly in rural
America, the courts were an important part of the story both in terms of their on-going
institutional power and the extent to which large numbers of people participated in their
operations.
Recently, historians and legal scholars have begun to examine the legal system and
its role in constructing and regulating sexuality. Much of the work that has examined law
and sex has taken a national approach. For example, some scholars have reviewed the law
of rape or seduction as a national phenomenon, relying heavily on the reported decisions
ofthe states' highest courts of appeal. In our Anglo-American legal system, unlike
the
continental model, law-making power is shared between the legislature and the appeals
4
courts. The decisions of a state's highest court (usually known as the supreme court or
the court of appeals) have the force of law. For this reason, the written decisions of these
courts have been collected, organized, published and widely distributed. As a result, it is
quite practical to review the decisions of all the states from any well-equipped law library
in the country.
These national surveys of the law's treatment of sexual matters are helpful in
exploring the broad contours of a sexual tort like seduction or a criminal matter like rape.
However, they are to a great extent ahistorical for the simple reason that no person living
in the nineteenth and early twentieth century ever experienced the law in the way these
works present it.
During this time, law was an intensely local phenomenon. Jurists in Vermont and
elsewhere did have some access to the decisions of other state supreme courts through the
work of commentators and their treatises. But then as now, state supreme courts had no
legal obligation to follow the decisions of other states' courts and feh free to distinguish or
ignore them. The attitude toward other states' precedents was summed up by RusseU Tail,
one ofVermont's leading judges and an early legal historian, who told lawyers that "he
had no liking for citations of cases from other states, but would rather they were
committed to the flames, for they are no authority here ... and are often found, like Swiss
troops, fighting on both sides."^
Ifthe situation at the Supreme Court level was independent-minded, vis-a-vis
national precedents, things at the trial court level were even more insular. In fact,
supreme
courts, including Vermont's, had a hard enough time getting trial judges to foUow their
'
"Memorial to Russell Taft," Proceedings ofthe Vermont Bar Association, vol. 6 (1902),
54.
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own decisions, which were binding authority. Furthermore, local juries exercise a
powerful role in the Anglo-American system in both civil and criminal cases. As any trial
lawyer knows, there is an enormous gap between the law in books and the law in action.^
Nineteenth and early twentieth century trial practice was a rough and tumble affair with
opposing counsel doing whatever they could get away with in order to see their clients
prevail. The extent to which judges allowed or disallowed these courtroom tactics
certainly affected the outcomes of cases-as did judges' own instructions to the jury.^
Finally, a national approach provides no useful information on how many of a
given type of case was brought, what the success rate was or what kind of damages were
awarded or punishment inflicted. Given all this, we can see that ifwe want to understand
how law really worked on real people, we must study it in the way it acted on them, that
is, as an almost entirely local and state phenomenon. This means studying the records of
local trial courts where people first brought their claims and where civil and criminal
defendants were judged by their peers. Such an approach is not easy and the difficulties
inherent in it may explain why such local studies, no matter how vital, have been so rare.^
' Roscoe Pound, "The Law in Books and the Law in Action," American Law Review 44 (1910): 12-36.
* For an eye-opening account of tum-of-the-century trial practice, see Francis L. Wellman, The Art of
Cross-Examinaiion (New York: Macmillan, 1904).
' Examples of local studies include Karen Dubinsky, Improper Advances: Rape and Heterosexual Conflict
in Ontario, 1880-1929 (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1993); Kathleen Ruth Parker, "Law,
Culture, and Sexual Censure: Sex Prosecutions in a Midwest Circuit County Court, 1850-1950" (Ph.D.
diss., Michigan State University, 1993); Mary Odem, Delinquent Daughters: Protecting and Policing
Adolescent Female Sexuality in the United States, 1885-1920 (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina
Press, 1995); Constance B. Backhouse, "Nineteenth-Century Canadian Rape Law, 1800-1892," in David
H. Flaherty, ed., Essays in the History ofCanadian Law, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press,
1983), 200-247; Barbara S. Lindemann, "To Ravish and Carnally Know: Rape in
Eighteenth-Century
Massachusetts," Signs 10 (1984): 63-82.
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Vermont's Legal System
Vermont's courts, like those of other states, consisted of multiple levels. At the
bottom of the court system were the local justice courts, presided over by locally elected
justices of the peace. These courts heard minor civil and criminal matters such as smaU
debt cases, civil and criminal assault and battery cases, and other petty matters. They also
had authority to bind over criminal defendants in more serious cases pending trial.
Appeals from these courts could be taken to the local county court. The records of the
justice courts have survived sporadically and not in sufficient numbers to permit a
systematic survey of these courts' operations.^
The second level ofjustice in Vermont were the county courts. These were courts
of general jurisdiction and with various exceptions over time, heard all criminal and civil
cases. Until 1825, they were presided over by judges elected by the state legislature and
aided by locally elected assistant judges. After 1825 the Supreme Court judges, also
elected by the legislature, presided over the county courts on circuit as well. More than
halfof the judges elected by the legislature were chosen from among its own members.
The highest court in Vermont was the Supreme Court. Until 1825, the Supreme
Court had overlapping jurisdiction with the county courts. Theoretically at least, a
plaintiff in a civil case had the right to two jury trials in the county court and then two
more in the Supreme Court. After 1825, the court became a true appeals court and no
longer oversaw jury trials when sitting en banc in its capacity as a court of review.^
« For the operation of the justice courts, see Milo L. Bennett, The Vermont Justice:
Being a Treatise on the
Civil and Criminal Jurisdiction ofJustices ofthe Peace (Burlington, 1 864) and
Henry A. Harman, The
Vermont Justice and Public Officer (Rutland: Tuttle, 1905).
' For the structure and operation of the court system from the founding
period to 1920, see Samuel B^
Hand, "Lay Judges and the Vermont Judiciary to 1825," Vermont
History 46 (Fall 1978): 205-220; P.
This study examines both civil and criminal cases. Civil suits involved legal
disputes between private parties-seduction or breach of marriage promise for example. In
order to initiate a civil suit, the plaintiff would cause a declaration (i.e. a complaint) along
with a summons to be served on the defendant. The declaration contained various
allegations against the defendant and typically listed the amount ofdamages sought by the
plaintiff (knovm as the ad damnum). Oftentimes the plaintiff or his lawyer would be
required by rule of court to file a bond of thirty or fifty dollars to guarantee payment ofthe
defendant's costs and expenses in case the plaintiff" did not prevail. The defendant or his
lawyer would respond to the allegations contained in the declaration by admitting them,
denying them, asserting a defense or arguing that even if true they were insufficient in law
or form (this was known as a demurrer). Discovery would then commence, including the
taking of various depositions of the parties and witnesses. If the parties did not settle, the
case would be scheduled for trial in fi-ont of a jury or with the judge alone (this was known
as a bench trial) depending on the desire of the defendant. If the defendant failed to
respond to the complaint or participate in the proceedings, a default judgment in the
amoimt sought in the declaration would be awarded to the plaintiff". Similarly, if the
plaintiff failed to show up or file a required bond, he would be "non-suited" and the
Jeffrey Potash and Samuel B. Hand, "Litigious Vermonters: Court Records to 1825," Occasional
Paper
No 2 (Burlington: Center for Research on Vermont, 1979); Russell S. Taft, "The Judicial History of
Vermont " in William T. Davis, ed.. The New England States, Their Constitutional, Judicial, Professional
and Industrial History, vol. 3 (Boston, 1897), 1409-31; Frank L. Fish, "The Vermont
Bench and Bar," m
vol. 5 of Vermont the Green Mountain State, ed. Walter Hill Crockett (New York: Century History, 1923):
6-28.
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defendant awarded his costs. Non-suits were often entered in cases where the parties had
settled the case.'°
Criminal procedure was somewhat different since the state was the party bringing
the charges. The man responsible for prosecuting criminal defendants was the state's
attorney who was elected annually in each ofVermont's fourteen counties. State's
attorneys were often young men at the beginning of their legal careers and some lawyers
and judges complained about their lack of experience. In difficuh criminal cases, the
state's attorney might be assisted by a local lawyer brought in for the purpose and paid by
the state. Criminal defendants in serious cases who could not afford a lawyer would have
one appointed by the court. The lawyer's fees and other expenses of the defense were
paid from the state treasury."
Originally a criminal prosecution for serious crimes could only be brought upon an
indictment handed down by a local grand jury. After 1839 however, state's attorneys
could bring prosecutions by information (a sworn statement alleging the crime) for all
crimes where the maximum prison sentence was seven years or less. In more serious
cases, the prosecution still had to be initiated by indictment. In 1898 authority to
prosecute by information was extended to all cases in which the maximum prison sentence
was twenty years or less. In 1904, the Legislature permitted prosecutions for all crimes
not punishable by death or life in prison to be brought by information and created the
Nineteenth-century legal practice was notoriously complicated and relied heavily on pleading causes in
proper form. Vermont did not give up this old feshioned form pleading until 1915, much later than
almost any other state. 1915 Vt. Acts 90. For a review of civil pleading and procedure, see James Gould,
A Treatise on the Principles ofPleading in Civil Actions (Burlington, 1849) and Bennett, The Vermont
Justice.
" Proceedings ofthe Vermont Bar Association, vol. 7, no. 1 (1904), 74-79; Vermont Statutes. 1894, §
1900 (Burlington, 1894).
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position of Attorney General. His office was tasked with overseeing the state's civil and
criminal legal business. The ability to bring most criminal charges by information after
1 898 greatly expanded the power of the state's attomeys while reducing that of local
people who had controUed prosecutions for most serious crimes through the requirement
of indictment by grand jury proceedings.*^
The records produced by civil and criminal cases take several different forms.
First, there are the pleadings themselves, the actual complaints, answers, motions,
indictments, informations, and other papers filed by the parties. During the period under
study these documents were collected at the termination of a case by the clerk of court,
folded into small bundles, tied tightly with a string, placed in wooden crates with the other
pleadings from that term or year and then nailed shut. Over time, these pleadings have
been scattered to the winds. Many have been destroyed, some have ended up in private
hands, or in public and private archives. Some others were sent to the state's public
records office where they were poorly microfilmed and then thrown, completely out of
order back into boxes. In a few cases, the pleadings remain on site at the county
courthouses. The inconsistency of preservation and the practical difficulties of unboxing,
untying, unwrapping, surveying and then re-packaging tens of thousands of the pleadings
made them an impractical source for a comprehensive survey of the courts' activities. In a
few cases where suits of interest had been found by other means and the pleadings exist
and could be located, I have used them to supplement our knowledge of a particular case.
Revised Statutes. 1839 (Burlington, 1 840) Chapter 1 02 § 1 ; 1 898 Vt. Acts 46; 1 904 Vt. Acts 64. Some
lawyers called for the abolition of the grand jury altogether. "Address of Charles Hogan," Proceedings of
the Vermont Bar Association, vol. 5, no. 1 (1898), 85-99.
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riic second type ol" record produced by Ihe courts were Uie clerk s tlockel U>oks.
1 liese conlain briel entries niade by the elerk ol (lie action taken on a case at each lerni ol
court. Typically each county court kept a separate docket lx>ok lor each of the two terms
ofcourt held per year. While the docket Ixmks ol the Supreme and County Courts are
mostly intact, they iirc inconsistent from county io county in identifying the civil or
criminal cause ol action in each case. The thoroughness and consistency ol entries varies
widely Irom county to county. In sonic counties the causes are identified with great
consistency over a period ol filly or seventy years, in others, for much shorter periods of
time. Docket entries are especially useful in uiulei standing the courts' handling of criminal
matters, since they list every criminal case brought, including those in which the
prosecutor ehose not to go forward allcr an information or indictment had been filed.
This allows us to know, for example, how many rape cases were brought but never
prosecuted. This is valuable information allxMt incomplete. I have processed all of the
docket entries and where appropriate make reference to them.
Hie final source of information about the courts' activities are the clerks^ record
lH>oks. I hcse are large leather-l>ound volumes of from 600 to 1200 pages each.
Handwritten until the late nineteenth century, they contain et)pies of the original complaint
in each case, tlie dcfendaiU s answer or defense, the mode of trial if one was held, the
verdict, and punishment or damages handed down. Ueciiuse they arc records of hnal
actions taken in cases, they do omit some important information. Particularly in criminal
cases, they do not record those cases which were dismissed by prosecutors or the courts
Ix'fore going to trial or plea. I'urthermore, they do not always identify the criminal or civil
:s of action with enough specificity to classify it. Although they are not entirelycause
1
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complete, these volumes are the single best resource for analyzing the activities of the
courts and this study relies heavily on them.'^ (See Figure 1
.)
Unfortunately, unlike the opinions of the state supreme courts, trial records are not
organized by subject matter. Instead, the entries appear chronologically beginning in the
eighteenth century with volume one and proceeding, volume by volume to the end of the
study period for each county. As a resuU, the only way to locate cases of interest is to
begin at page one, volume one, and read through every single civil and criminal case
brought in each county over the entire time period of the study.
The Four Counties
I chose to look at the records of four ofVermont's fourteen counties: Addison,
Orange, Rutland, and Windsor. I sought a combination of those which had intact and
accessible records and which represented a cross-section of the Vermont experience and
would provide sufficient data for analysis. The four counties chosen are contiguous.
Together they make up the middle third of the state and represent both its most populous
and wealthy regions and some of its most intensely rural areas. (See Figure 2.)
Windsor was the most populous ofVermont's counties during the first half of the
nineteenth century. Vermont's early industrial development (particularly mills, machine
tools and railroad yards) was concentrated in the towns of Windsor, Springfield, and
•3 The record books identify every cause of action in Orange and Windsor Counties
from the late
eighteenth century to 1920. The Addison County record books become reliable in 1827
and Rutland
County's records, supplemented with judgment files located at the courthouse, are reliable from 1
838
onward.
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Figure 1. Sample Entry from Clerk's Record Book (Reduced Size)
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White River Junction. The county seat at Woodstock was a center for law, for banking,
and for medical education. The county's population began to decline after 1850 and by
1 870 Windsor had been surpassd by Chittenden and Rutland counties in the west-mostly
as a result of the growth of the cities of Burlington and Rutland respectively. By 1920
there were fewer people living in Windsor County than there had been one hundred years
before.''' (See Table 1.)
Rutland County experienced rapid growth in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century. But ahnost all that growth was centered around the city of Rutland, where about
half the population of the county lived. The city became a center for banking,
transportation, and marble extraction. However, outside the city, the county was mostly
rural and its villages and small tovsTis also lost population during the course of this study.
Addison and Orange Counties had their best days behind them by 1 850. Intensely
rural, they had seen a boom and then bust in sheep raising. Those who had gotten to the
counties early and established themselves could expect a reasonably comfortable life on
An early but copious history of the county and its principle towns is Lewis Cass Aldrich and Frank R.
Hohnes, eds.. History of Windsor County Vermont (Syracuse, 1891). More recent treatments of the
county's early history are contained in William J. Gihnour, Reading Becomes a Necessity ofLife:
Material and Cultural Life in Rural New England 1 780-1835 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press,
1989); Randolph Roth, ne Democratic Dilemma: Religion, Reform, and the Social Order in the
Connecticut River Valley of Vermont, 1791-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); and T.
D. Seymour Bassett, The Growing Edge: Vemont's Villages, 1840-1880 (Montpelier, Vermont Histoncal
Society, 1992), 49-85.
A general history of the county, its principal towns, and industries is H. P. Smith and W. S. Rann, eds..
History ofRutland County (Syracuse, 1 886). The urban nature ofthe
population growth can be seen by
comparing the population figures for Rutland Town and the county as a whole. For
example, m 1900
Rutland County's population was 44,209 ofwhich 12,149 people or 27 percent
lived in the town of
Rutland hi 1920, the county's population was 46,213 ofwhich 21,155 people
or 45 percent lived m and
around the City of Rutland. If one removes the population growth
which occurred in and around the city,
the county, like the others studied, actually lost population
during this period.
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Table 1
Population of Addison, Orange, Rutland, and Windsor Counties, 1791-1920
COUNTY 1791 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840 1850
Addison 6,420 13,417 19,993 20,469 24,940 23,583 26,549
Orange 7,663 18,238 25,247 24,681 27,285 27,873 27,296
Rutland 15,590 23,813 29,486 29,975 31,294 30,699 33,059
Windsor 15,740 26,944 34,877 38,233 40,625 40,356 38,320
TOTAL 45,413 106,225 109,603 113,358 124,144 122,511 125,244
COUNTY 1860 1870 1880 1890 1900 1910 1920
Addison 24,010 23,484 24,173 22,277 21,912 20,010 18,666
Orange 25,455 23,090 23,525 19,575 19,313 18,703 17,279
Rutland 35,946 40,651 41,829 45,397 44,209 48,139 46,213
Windsor 37,193 36,063 35,196 31,706 32,225 33,681 36,984
TOTAL 122,604 122,288 124,723 118,955 117,659 120,533 119,142
Source: William Doyle, The Vermont Political Tradition and Those Who Helped Make It
(Montpelier: William Doyle, 1994).
the farm or in the small towns and villages that dominated the landscape. Large numbers
ofyoung people however could not find access to land or opportunities and
left for the
west. Addison and Orange Counties, like Windsor, and the area outside of
Rutland Town
all experienced major declines in population during the second half of the nineteenth
century. This pattern was one repeated throughout all of
Vermont during this period,
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An early comprehensive history of Orange County is
Hamilton Child, Gazetteer ofOrange County, VT..
I7T2-I888, Part 1 (Syracuse, 1888) and for Addison County
see H P. Smith,
'
^'^'^Z^^^'^;"
^
.
Counn' Vermont (Syracuse, 1 886). Work by modem historians
on the towns of Chelsea (Orange County)
STSdXbv^, Shoreham and Cornwall, (Addison County) provide valuable msightmto
developments in
S^e copies Tmselves. hLi S. Barron, Those Who Stayed
Behind: Rural Soaety in mneteenth-Century
~W(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); P.
^.f^y]^^^^^^^ '^1
District Patterns ofCommunity Development and Religious
Activity 1761-1850 (Brooklyn. Carlson
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Sources and Methodology
Taken all together, I processed some 160 volumes of clerks' record books and
several hundred more volumes of clerk's docket books totaling some 200,000 pages of
mostly handwritten records. I exammed every civil and criminal case appearing in these
volumes. I recorded any case involving violent crime (including assaults, attempted rape,
rape, statutory rape, attempted murder, and murder), any case for the violation of sexual
prohibitions (incest, bigamy, adultery, lewdness), any civil case involving defamation,
violence, or sexual infractions (seduction, bastardy, breach of marriage promise,
alienation of affections, civil ravishment), and every divorce (including the causes alleged
and the grounds for granting them). Information about these cases was entered into a
database.
I supplement the data contained in the record books and pleadings with
information contained in several dozen complete trial transcripts which I was fortunate
enough to discover in various courthouse vaults and basements. Some of these transcripts
were still sealed in their original packages and had never been opened. These sources are
particularly important in showing how the power ofjudge, lawyer, jury, precedent, and
statute tugged and pulled on one another as Vermonters sought to use their courts to
define codes of sexual conduct, enforce those codes, and punish men and women who
transgressed them.'^
Publishing, 1991). Roth's Democratic Dilemma also explores nineteenth-century society in Orange
County
as well as Windsor.
Because of the prohibition against double jeopardy, the only transcripts of criminal
trials we have were
created by defendants appealing their convictions. State v. Damon, 2 Tyl. 387 (
1 803).
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Though the trial courts exercised a good deal of independence, they nevertheless
fit into a legal system shaped and defined at the state level. The actions of the trial courts
were, to some extent, constrained by the common law as interpreted and handed down by
the Vermont Supreme Court and by statutes passed by the legislature. An understanding
of their operation would not be complete without also understanding the broader legal
universe in which they existed. Furthermore, an examination of these state-wide legal
sources serves as a check to make sure the four county data are not anomalous, but
instead reflect a reality experienced across the state.
The decisions of the Supreme Court were binding on the trial court judges and
provided guidance on many issues. As we shall see, the court's thinking on many of these
matters evolved as the century progressed. This evolution in turn affected the operations
of the trial courts. In Vermont the appeals court had a particularly direct hand in the
actions of the trial courts. Vermont had no intermediate appellate court to hear appeals
fi-om the county court. Furthermore, its Supreme Court judges presided over the trial
courts as well during most of the period of this study. Each judge would preside at the
county court during its term, and then return to the county v^th his brother judges to hear
appeals fi-om cases at the sitting of the Supreme Court on circuit. Judges did not however
hear appeals fi-om cases on which they had served as the trial judge. Thus, in seeking to
understand sex and law at the trial level, we need to understand the precedential context in
The county courts had their own cadre ofjudges prior to 1825, between 1850 and 1857, and after 1905.
Taft, "The Judicial History of Vermont," 1409-1431; 1824 Vt. Acts 19; 1849 Vt. Acts 40, repealed 1856
Vt. Acts 7; 1906 Vt. Acts 63. Subject to rare exception. Supreme Court judges were prohibited from
sitting on appeals from their own trials after 1 850.
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which it took place. I therefore weave the decisions of the Supreme Court into my
discussion of activities at the trial level.
The courts were bound by civil and criminal statutes passed by the legislature. The
legislature had authority to control the operation of the courts in terms ofjurisdiction and
administration. Because of this, my research also included a systematic review of all laws
passed by Vermont's legislature from 1779 through its 1921 biannual term. All statutes
touching on the operation of the courts, the rights ofwomen, marriage and divorce, and
sexual matters were also entered into the database. These sources too must be considered
in trying to imderstand the universe of sex and law as Vermonters would have experienced
it during the period under study.
In addition to the decisions of the state Supreme Court and the statutes passed by
the legislature, other sources supplement the four county data. Incarceration rates for
adultery and rape and rates of illegitimacy and divorce demonstrate the state-wide nature
ofmany of the trends discovered at the county level. I have also surveyed the treatises on
law produced by local lawyers and judges as well as those most commonly relied on by
Vermont's jurists in their pleadings and opinions. Finally, the proceedings of the Vermont
Bar Association, founded in 1878, and published annually, contain valuable formal and
informal commentaries on Vermont law and practice and are an important resource for
understanding how the legal system operated and how the state's judges and lawyers
thought about their role in it.
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Historical Context
The events examined in this study took place in a broader historical context, as
Vermont progressed from an unsettled wilderness to independent republic, to statehood
and beyond. While this is intended to be a close study of the courts and sexuality, it is
necessary to set that study into the broader context ofVermont history.
Vermont was settled last of all the New England states. Conflict between the
French and British and their respective Indian allies meant that European settlement could
not begin in earnest until after 1759. After that, settlers from western Connecticut and
Massachusetts poured into the state. Initially part of the Province ofNew York,
Verraonters declared their independence from the crovm and New York in 1777. Deeply
democratic in spirit (if not always in reality) the new republic was the first to grant
universal manhood suffrage and the first to abolish slavery. By 1791 Vermont joined the
union as the fourteenth state.''
Early settlement took place rapidly and by 1800 the population had grown to over
150,000. While initial settlers did well, most ofthe decent land and best opportunities had
been taken by the early nineteenth century. The opening of the Champlain and Erie Canals
in the 1820s facilitated the movement ofVermont goods to ports and urban markets,
particularly in New York. But it also allowed far cheaper agricultural produce to flood
back toward the east, making Vermont's small hill farms less and less competitive.
The politics of the founding period are discussed in detail in Michael Sherman, ed., A More Perfect
Union- Vermont Becomes a State, 1777-1816 (Montpelier: Vermont Historical
Society, 1991); H.
Nicholas Muller III and Samuel B. Hand, eds.. In A State ofNature: Readings in
Vermont History
(Montpelier, Vermont Historical Society, 1985); William Doyle, The Vermont
Political Tradition and
Those Who Helped Make It (Montpelier, William Doyle, 1992); Robert E. Shalhope,
Bennington and the
Green Mountain Boys: The Emergence ofLiberal Democracy in Vermont,
1760-1850 (Baltmiore, Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1996).
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The agricultural difficulties posed by Vermont's terrain and constant and
increasing competition offered by the West manifested themselves in three broad and
related trends which characterized the Vermont experience throughout the nineteenth and
early twentieth century. These were rural depopulation, a sense of decline, and a strong
instinct for reform. Though many areas of the country experienced similar challenges,
they were feh especially keenly in Vermont. There are several reasons for this. For one
thing, Vermont was so overwhelmingly rural and agricultural. The most rural state in the
Northeast, it was the only New England state with no port on the Atlantic and no
corresponding urban center or urban elite. Though it did have a small industrial and
mining base, these operations were small compared to the agricultural sector. This meant
that the shifting agricultural tides affected almost all Vermonters no matter where they
lived in the state and at all institutional levels.^"
Vermonters did not take the challenges posed to their agricultural livelihoods lying
down. After disease, bad weather, and mid-western competition made grain production
less and less economically viable, Vermont farmers switched to sheep farming. The land
was more suited to the production of grazing animals, and mills in southern New England
provided a growing demand for wool. As a result the state experienced an incredible
sheep boom between 1 820 and 1 840. By 1 840 there were 1,681 ,000 sheep in Vermont,
almost six sheep for every man, woman, and child. Though many people prospered,
the
heep trade actuaUy increased the trend of out-migration since it
was far less labor
or
For example, in 1850, only three percent ofmen and women
aged sixteen or over were factory or
railroad workers in the Comiecticut River Valley which was the
main site ofVermont s industrial
development. Roth, Democratic Dilemma, 270. As late as 1920, 70
percent
f^^^";^^ ^'J^^^^^
Lmmiities ofless than 2500 people. In neighboring New Hampshire,
only 37 percent of the population
did. Abstract ofthe 14" Census ofthe United States, 1920,
Table 15.
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intensive than crop agriculture. Prices began to decline after 1840-the result of increased
western competition and tariff uncertainties. Except for a brief spike during the Civil War,
sheep farming declined dramatically by the end of the century when it was replaced by
dairy farming.^'
The intensity of these trends in Vermont was also due to the sheer rapidity with
which they were experienced. When Vermont was created in 1777, every other New
England state already had 150 years ofhistory behind it. Vermont, in contrast was
entirely new. Its founders were not exaggerating when they asserted in their declaration
of independence from both New York and Britain, that they were "at present without law
or government, and may be truly said to be in a state of nature." The sense that
Vermonters were creating something entirely from scratch and the rapidity with which that
society boomed and then seemed to decline weighed particularly heavily and spurred them
to seek answers in reform.
Initially the response to Vermont's problems took the form of spiritual
revitalization and moral and political reform. Although these responses were widespread in
the antebellum period, Vermont was exceptional in the intensity with which it adopted
existing reform movements. The state experienced the Second Great Awakening with
enormous enthusiasm. Historian Randolph Roth claims that in the first half of the
nineteenth century, Vermonters had the highest rates of church attendance in the
Protestant world, with some eighty percent of the population regularly attending services.
^' Vermont's agricultural history is detailed in Edwin C. Rozwenc, Agricultural Policies in
Vermont,
1860-1945 (Montpelier, Vermont Historical Society, 1981) and Harold Fisher Wilson,
The Hill Country of
New England: Its Social and Economic History in the Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries (Montpeher,
Vermont Historical Society, 1947).
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They belonged to a myriad of denominations. The state also embraced temperance and
antislavery with gusto. Statewide prohibition was passed in 1852 and the state remained
dry until 1904 after Vermonters approved a local option law.^^
Beyond their support for these well-known religious and moral movements,
Vermont is also notable for the extent to which it supported preexisting fringe movements
and spavmed numerous others. William Miller, who predicted the end of the world in
1 843 and then went on to found the Adventist Church, was raised in Putney. Joseph
Smith and Brigham Young were both bom in the state. John Humphrey Noyes, the
founder and leader of the experimental Oneida Community, was bom in Brattleboro and
set up his first community in Putney. It is interesting that both Smith and Noyes promoted
radical procreative arrsingements as a key component of their alternative communities.^^
Vermonters also looked to politics as an engine of reform from early on. Vermont
was the only state to vote for anti-Masonic presidential candidate William Wirt in 1832
and elected an anti-Masonic governor to office four times between 1831 and 1835. The
state went dry in 1 852 and remained so for fifty-two years, before adopting a local option
law in 1902. The Republican Party was founded nearly simultaneously in Vermont and
Michigan in 1854. Vermonters remained so loyal to the party that between 1854 and
1962, no Democrat was ever elected to state-wide office. Support for the cause of union
and anti-slavery was so strong in the state that more than ten percent of the state's total
^ 1902 Vt. Acts 90. Robert Ludlum's Social Ferment in Vermont, 1791-1850 (New York: AMS Press,
1939, 1966) remains an influential introduction to the topic. More recent works include
Potash,
Vermont 's Burned Over District; Roth, Democratic Dilemma; and Shalhope, Bennington and the Green
Mountain Boys. Roth's figures for church attendance were provided in his opening remarks at
the
biennial symposium of the Vermont Historical Society, Montpelier, Vermont, September
1999.
^ Ludlum, 238-275.
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population served in the Civil War. Vermont was second only to Michigan in per capita
numbers killed-an astonishing 1.6 percent of the state's total 1860 population.^''
The period after 1870 was a difficuh one for Vermonters. Pioneering social
historian Harold Fisher Wilson famously proclaimed the years 1870 to 1900 as the
"winter" of the Vermont experience. More recent analysis has challenged that paradigm,
arguing that some parts of the state were more correctly characterized by a period of
stabilization rather than decline. Regardless of the reality, most historians agree that the
perception of decline was very real. Population fell, whole hill tovms were abandoned,
their buildings fell into ruin and were consumed by encroaching forest. Wool prices
declined and Vermonters were forced, again, to remake their economy, turning to dairy
farming and the production of bulk milk, butter, and cheese-products better able to
compete with midwestem production.^^
The sense of decline experienced by Vermonters focused not only on the
economic, but also on the very Yankee society they had created. There was a sense that
the rural, close-knit communities that had not yet actually disappeared were descending
into corruption and immorality. Declines in the birthrate, sky-rocketing divorce rates,
venereal disease, men wandering from place to place looking for work or simply
tramping, and the movement of French Canadians into the towns and onto marginal hill
farms led Vermonters to fret about social and cultural degeneration.^^
Doyle, 128-202; Howard Coffin, Full Duty: Vermonters in the Civil War (Woodstock, Vt.: Countryman
Press, 1993), 356.
" Wilson, 97-210; Barron, 26-30; Rozwenc, 1-4.
" Nancy L Gallagher, Breeding Better Vermonters: The Eugenics Project in the Green
Mountain State
(Hanover- University Press ofNew England, 1999). Gallagher's work includes a comprehensive
discussion of most of these themes. During the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century Vermont s
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The society also felt under pressure because of perceived changes in the role of
women. Young Vermont women had been leaving home for the factories of southern
New England since the 1 820s. But the trend accelerated throughout the nineteenth
century as farms failed, as local manufacturing increased, and as demand for female
industrial labor grew.^'' One commentator writing on this trend in 1 859 asked why any
young woman would want to remain on the farm when they remembered "their worn out
mothers."^^ Vermonters' extraordinarily high rate of male participation in the Civil War
meant that women had to take on responsibilities previously reserved for men, particularly
in agriculture. Of the 34,000 men who left the state to fight in the war, half never
permanently returned to the state-a loss of five percent of the state's entire population.^'
Responding to a changing social and economic order, married women gained increased
rights to own property in their own name and control their own wages. Vermonters
worried about the implications of all of these changes.
Vermont's lawmakers (both its legislators and its judges) were deeply involved in
creating these changes and responding to them. The legislature had concerned itself with
the legal status ofwomen fi-om the very beginning. My own survey of every statute
jails and the House of Correction were filled with hundreds of people who had been arrested for tramping.
In 1883-1884 there were fifty people in the House of Corrections for tramping. Ten years later the figure
was 120. By 1906 it was 210. See the "Reports of the Officers of the State Prison" and "Reports of the
Officers of the House of Correction" in Vermont Legislative Documents and Official Reports and Vermont
State Officers ' Reports published biannually by the Secretary of State's office.
" See Deborah P. Clifibrd, "Vermont 'Mill Girls,'" in We Vermonters: Perspectives on the Past, ed.
Michael Sherman and Jennie G. Versteeg (Montpelier: Vermont Historical Society, 1992), 219-224;
Wilson, 139-152.
J. G. Holland, Farm Life in New England (Boston, 1 858), quoted in Wilson, 72 and n. 70.
" Wilson, 72-74.
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passed between 1779 and 1921 reveals that Vermont's legislature enacted at least 175
public and private statutes dealing with women, women's rights, women's issues, and the
law of marriage and divorce during this period. But the pace greatly accelerated during
mid-century, with 136 (78 percent) ofthose statutes passed between 1850 and 1921 and
101 (58 percent) passed between 1870 and 1921/°
At the same time, Vermont's divorce rate began to skyrocket. The rate more than
doubled between 1860 and 1900 and by 1920 it was five times the rate it had been sixty
years before.^' In addition, the rate of illegitimate births reported to the State Board of
Health quadrupled between 1860 and 1920 at a time when the population was both
stagnating and aging^^ (see figures 3 and 4).
By 1 869, formal agitation for female political rights began. In 1 880, responding to
declining rural populations, the General Assembly gave women the right to vote and hold
ofiSce in local elections. But these changes-employment ofwomen outside the home,
^° As early as 1779, the legislature passed a statute prohibiting the sale of an heiress's lands without her
consent whether the property was acquired before marriage or while under coverture. The earliest statute
granting expanded legal rights to married women came in 1 846, when the General Assembly granted
feme sole status to women whose husbands were imprisoned. 1846 Vt. Acts 31. For the 1779 act see
Allen Soule, ed.. Laws of Vermont, vol. 12 o{ State Papers of Vermont (Montpelier: Secretary of State,
1964), 146.
" The figures per 100,000 are as follows: 1860 (30); 1870 (50); 1880 (39); 1890 (46); 1900 (68); 1910 (104);
1920 (153). Twenty-Third Report ofthe State Board ofHealth (Montpelier, Tuttle, 1921), 222-225.
^2 The ratio of births to deaths fell dramatically from 1.45:1 in the 1870s to 1.21:1 in the 1880s and 1.26:1
in the 1890s and then recovered slightly in the first and second decades of the twentieth century (to 1.3:1
in both decades). "State Registration Tables: 1857-1921," in Registration Report ofthe State Board of
Health (Montpelier, 1922), 222-225. By 1900 21 percent of Vermont's inhabitants were fifty years of age
or older as compared to 13 percent for the nation as a whole. Wilson, 141-142. This trend
continued to
1920. Paul Dunham, "Population Trends and their Implications on Government in Vermont,"
(unpublished manuscript prepared for the Government Research Center, University of Vermont, 1963),
6.
Copy at Special Collections, University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont. Thousand
ofyoung men and
women migrated out ofthe state from 1840 onward. In 1861 out of480,00
people bom in the state,
168,781 resided outside its borders. G. G. Benedict, Vermont in the
Civil War, A History, vol. 2
(Burlington, 1888), 791.
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Married Women's Property Acts, and local voting and office holding-were motivated not
by a desire to increase female autonomy, but by other social and economic imperatives.
And in fact, efforts to increase women's economic, legal, and political autonomy for their
own sake were met with tremendous resistance and ridicule-even from official quarters.
Out-of-state suffiagists noted the particularly hostile environment in Vermont on
questions of political rights for women for example."
The challenges posed to Vermont society by all these developments were met with
various responses at the local and state level. One was the development and deployment
of an effiisive rhetoric celebrating Yankee values that continues to this day. No gatherii^
ofVermonters was complete without a summation of aU that made Vermont a bastion of
small-town republican values-whether a meeting of the state's physicians, lawyers, or
most famously, the old home week celebrations which began in the 1890s in response to
the declining fortunes ofVermont's villages and towns. In deploying this rhetoric,
"
In 1869 suffragists proposed an amendment to the Vermont constitution which would permit women to
vote in state elections. The amendment was rejected at a constitutional convention by a vote of 23 1 to 1,
but not before the state's Council of Censors had considered an amendment to allow women to serve in
the state militia, a move that it admitted was "for the purpose of trying the effect of ridicule upon the
claim ofwoman suffrage." Paul S. Gillies and D. Gregory Sanford, eds., Records ofthe Council of
Censors ofthe State of Vermont (Montpelier: Secretary of State, 1991), 680. Later attempts to win
suffrage were often met with behind the scenes political chicanery and parliamentary derision. For
example, in 1900 a petition was presented by the Woman Suffrage Association to the Senate to exempt
women from taxation (on the basis that they were being taxed without representation). The presiding
officer ofthe Senate referred it to the Committee on the Insane. Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B.
Anthony, and Matilda Joslyn Gage, History of Woman Suffrage, vol. 3 (Rochester, 1886), 383-389.
Three
contiguous acts were passed by the General Assembly in 1880 impacting on women's rights. The
first
two gave women the right to vote in local elections and to hold local offices. The third
allowed married
women conducting businesses in their own names to sue and be sued in all matters connected
with those
businesses. 1880 Vt. Acts 103, 104, 105.
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Vermonters were building on a long tradition of self-congratulation and sense of
exceptionalism extending back to the founding era.^"*
There was also a new response, reflecting new realities-direct intervention by state
institutions created by the legislature. The move to dairy farming for example had been
encouraged by a coherent scheme of statutory experimentation by the legislature and the
support of a nascent agricultural bureaucracy operating from Montpelier and the state
university in Burlington. State intervention to shore up faltering local institutions,
especially schools and road maintenance, also began in the late nineteenth century.^^
When it came to matters ofwayward sexuality, family breakdown, and its effects
however, the state was slower to respond with administrative remedies. A growing state
bureaucracy, armed with detailed data compelled from the courts and towns by legislative
mandate in the 1 850s, documented the effects of extra-marital sexuality including
increasing rates of illegitimacy and divorce (and its causes, including large numbers of
adultery claims). The Board of Health and Vermont's medical community were well
aware of the existence of gonorrhea and syphilis. Henry Holton, secretary of the Board,
and the man responsible for compiling its biennial reports was chairman of the AMA's
Committee on Prophylaxis of Venereal Disease. William Warren Townsend, another local
doctor, was a member of the American Society of Sanitary and Moral Prophylaxis.
Townsend, who performed entrance physicals on inmates at the state's House of
" For a treatment of the old home week phenomenon in Vermont see Dona Brown, Inventing New
England: Regional Tourism in the Nineteenth Century (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press,
1995), 135-167.
« See Rozwenc generally for the change to dairy farming. On early efforts to centralize
control of
traditionally local functions, see Samuel B. Hand, Jeflfrey D. Marshall, and D.
Gregory Sanford, "'Little
Republics': The Structure of State Politics in Vermont, 1854-1920," 53 Vermont
History (Summer 1985):
141-166.
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CDrrcclions in Rutland, rcporlcd that 83 percent ol the adult males admitted a prior
history of venereal disease. While these men hailed Irom "the so-called lower strata ol
society," he warned Vermouths doctors to take no comfort in that tact since "venereal
micro-organisms, gentlemen, are no respecters of persons, and they attack the high and
lowly ofsocicty alike." lownsend told t>ran epidemic ofsyphilis in a small village oftwo
thousand people traced to two young women who had slept with soldiers they had met in
Burlingtt)!!. Townsend claimed io have traced the spread of the disease to several do/.en
others in the village. In other cases, whole schools had to be closed due to gonorrhea
outbreaks and whole families were riven by syphilis. By 1895 Vermont's medical journals
were cautioning that syphilis had become so widespread that it could not always be
blamed on licentiousness. In 1007, a Vermont doctor cited a medical authority who
claimed that eighteen to thirty percent of pregnant women had gonorrhea. lie did not
challenge the claim.^''
1 hough the state was active in gathering information on these phenomena, direct
interventions at the intimate family level by state agencies and their agents did not begin in
earnest until just before World War I. Historian Nancy (lallagher has shown how
eugenical thinking then came to dominate all of Vermont's administrative reform efVorts in
these areas during the 102()s. It was only at this stage that the state began to experiment
with increasingly powerful public institutions of control including the creation of a state
school for feebleminded children ( 1912), juvenile courts (1912), the Vermont C'onlerence
Williani Warrcii lowiisciui, "Venereal Disease in Vermont," Transactions of the VcnnonI Slate
Medical Socictv for the Year /W9 (lUirlington, I ree IVess, 1910), 66-75; yennont Medical Monthly, vol.
9 (Mareli 1903), 70; (Jallaglier, 58; Vermont Medical Monthly, vol. 1 (January 1X95). 24; Vermont
Medical Monthly, vol. 9 (DecenilKr 1907), 295.
31
of Charities and Corrections (1915) the Department of Public Welfare (1917), and the
Probation Board (1917). A sterilization law was also proposed in 1913, but did not pass
untU1931."
Thus, there was a fifty-year gap between initial bureaucratic data gathering and
documentation of these problems and the formation of agencies exerting direct
surveillance and control of intimate family and sexual life. As a result, official
responsibility for policing sexual activity and punishing those who violated norms of
sexual behavior and family life fell to the state institutions which had always handled it in
the past-the Vermont Supreme Court, the legislature, and the local county courts. In
dealing with these issues, the legal institutions did not focus on prostitution, pornography,
or homosexuality, as happened in more urban areas. Rather, in the face of threats to a
communal and agricultural society, they sought to protect women and girls fi^om
aggressive male sexuality, shore up marriage and the family, encourage respect for the
authority of parents (and especially fathers), and contain the threat that sexuality posed to
these institutions.
Goals of This Study
In presenting this work, it is my intent to provide a comprehensive legal history of
sexuality in Vermont tracing its development from the founding period to the 1920s.
However, the rapidity of change in the way in which many of these issues were perceived
and handled by the legislature, prosecutors, the courts, and the parties after approximately
1 865 led me inexorably to emphasize that period in the work. If the study seems weighted
Gallagher, passim.
32
toward the second half of the period it is because the pace of historical change in the law
was weighted there too.
In Chapter 1, 1 discuss the civil remedies that were available for attacks on a
woman's sexual reputation or for physical or sexual assaults on her body as well as the
redress available to her for breach of marriage promise or out ofwedlock pregnancy.
Chapter 2 examines the development and application ofthe tort of seduction in the state,
demonstrating the Supreme Court's changing attitudes toward the nature of the injiuy to
fathers and daughters. In Chapter 3, 1 examine criminal prosecutions for adultery showing
how the Court's liberalization of the elements ofproof and a surging divorce rate led to
dramatic increases in the prosecution and imprisonment ofmen and women who had sex
with persons other than their spouses. Chapter 4 explores the application ofrape law in
the state, paying particular attention to the question of character evidence and consent. In
Chapter 5, 1 document the state's decision to raise the age of consent for girls from eleven
to fourteen (1 886) and then to sixteen (1 898); I show how this move greatly expanded the
amount of sexual activity now within the purview ofthe criminal law and how the
increased age of consent was mostly used to prosecute much older men from having sex
with very young girls. Lastly, in Chapter 6, 1 conclude by showing how Vermont's courts
were probably the most important site for explicit discussions of sexuality in the state and
how legal proceedings forced thousands of ordinary Vermonters to participate in or
witness the creation of narratives of errant sexuality and come to terms with their
implications for Vermont society.
This is a foundational study of the courts and their operation in matters regarding
sexual behavior and its consequences. This work is not an exploration ofthe sex lives of
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Vermonters. Nor, for the most part, is it about their attitudes toward sex and sexuaUty.
Instead, it remains tightly focused on how one institution-the courts-handled sexual
matters. My main goal is to begin the process of exploring a legal system as it was
actually experienced by the people who lived it. Since we have almost no information on
this subject, my work is concerned with answering some basic, but crucial questions.
What kinds of civil and criminal cases involving sex did Vermont's courts hear? How
many of those cases did they hear and what were the outcomes? How were the issues
framed by the law and how were those issues explicated at the trial and appellate level?
How did the operations of the court change over time with regard to these kinds of cases?
Why did the courts' operations change and what might those changes mean? This
information is necessary to understand precisely how the courts defined, chaimeled, and
regulated sexuality. Generating the data necessary to answer these questions comprises
the main contribution of this work.
I have sought to keep this work within the narrow confines described above for
two reasons. First, a broader analysis which seeks to explain the inter-relationship of
court and society, while important, cannot be attempted until we have at least a basic
understanding of the judicial and legal process, and the identification of actual cases and
parties. Second, I believe we must be very cautious in assuming that materials created by
the legal process tell us about the actual sexual experience or
sexual attitudes of ordinary
Vermonters.
The reason for this has to do with the complexity of the law and the way
in which
it must simultaneously serve so many masters and values.
It is true that the search for
truth is a major value assigned to criminal and civil process. But it is
only one of several
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often conflicting values inherent in our system. Tradition, the adversarial process, and
constitutional and common law imperatives often conspire to limit the discovery of that
truth. For example, during the first half of the period of this study, the parties who best
knew what happened in a civil case-the plaintiff and defendant-were prohibited from
testifying. As interested parties, their urge to perjure themselves was considered so great
that the courts refused to expose them to such temptation.'* Husbands and wives could
not be witnesses for or against one another in civil or criminal proceedings, lest the
sanctity and privacy of the marital union be breached. Until 1 876 this was true even when
they sought to end that union by divorce on grounds of intolerable severity or wilful
desertion.^' The general prohibition continued even after the couple's marriage had ended
by divorce or death."" Constitutional prohibitions against self-incrimination meant that a
criminal defendant could reftise to answer questions under oath. But statutes would not
permit her to testify on her own behalf even if she wanted until 1 866."' Hearsay rules
meant that a key technique used by humans to understand their world-statements made by
one person and then reported by another-were off limits."^ In addition, almost all the
This common law rule was reversed by statute in 1852. 1852 Vt. Acts 13.
" In 1876 the legislature permitted husbands and wives to testify against each other in divorce cases in
which intolerable severity or willful desertion had been alleged. This privilege was extended to all divorce
cases in 1882. 1876 Vt. Acts 77; 1882 Vt. Acts 67.
^ French v Ware, 65 Vt. 338 (1892); State v. Phelps, 2 Tyler 374 (1803) (in prosecution for being found
in bed with a woman other than his wife, former wife not permitted to testify that she
saw husband in bed
with another woman during their marriage). Subject to exception, the marital privilege exists to
this day.
Vt R Evid 504 By the 1 860s, lawyers understood that there was an exception to the marital
secrets rule
in prosecutions for wife beating. Bennett, 340-34 1 ; Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on the
Law ofEvidence
(Boston, 1860), 489-490.
Vermont Constitution, Chap. 1, Art. 10 (1793); 1866 Vt. Acts 40.
« Subject to exceptions, this remains the law today. Vt. R. Evid. 803-804.
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parties participating in the proceedings did so under compulsion or the threat of
compulsion. Lawyers constructed their cases not to root out the truth, but to win and in
so doing, they were constrained by the various conflicting values imposed by the legal
system.
For these reasons, we must be extremely carefiil about the conclusions to be drawn
from the discourse created and reported by these sources. They tell us how lawyers and
witnesses presented this information to judge and jury, they even allow us a glimpse of the
values those people thought judges and juries held and, in the case oflawmakers like
judges and legislators, the values they thought the law should promote. Furthermore, the
creation of sexual meanings and the regulation of sexual activity in the legal system
undoubtedly played a role in defining the actual sexual experiences of ordinary people and
meanings they ascribed to them. And the actuality of sexual experience does come
through in some ofthe sources examined here. But the extent to which these sexual
narratives tell us what really went on in the minds, hearts, and bedrooms ofVermonters
must be tempered by the highly mediated context in which they were produced. We
should be careful in studying this material that we understand its shortcomings in this
respect-not only for accuracy's sake, but out of fairness to the actors, long dead, who can
no longer speak for themselves.
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CHAPTER 1
WOMEN, THE COURTS, AND CIVIL REMEDIES
FOR PHYSICAL AND SEXUAL VIOLATIONS
Introduction
Josiah Brown died in the spring of 1 829 leaving his wife and children destitute.
Seeking to support herself and her family, Ursula Brown sought out housekeeping jobs.
She claimed to have found one paying good wages, but lost the job when her in-law
WilHam Brown started telling people that Ursula was "an old whore," who had had more
than one bastard child and that she had become impregnated on July 4'*', after the death
of her husband Josiah. Ursula sued William claiming $1 00 in lost wages on account of
his slander. The parties agreed to have the dispute heard by referees who found in favor
of Ursula and awarded her fifteen dollars in damages-the equivalent of several months
wages.'
That Ursula Brown would have turned to the courts for vindication of her right
to her sexual reputation in 1830 is not so surprising. Vermonters had been a litigious
people fi-om the start and by 1 830 already had a long tradition of looking to the courts to
make things right. Even in the 1 760s and 1 770s when Vermont was an unsettled
wilderness nominaUy under the control of the Province ofNew York, participation rates
in court processes were extremely high. As the only source of institutional
authority in
the area now constituting northeast Vermont for example. New York's Gloucester
' Brown v. Brown, Orange County Court, June 1830 Term, vol. 12, p.
188-190. Vermont s unpublished
court materials are divided between the county courthouses, the
Public Records Center m Middlesex, the
State Library in Montpelier, and Special Collections at the University
of Vermont. Please see the
bibliography for flirther details. All subsequent citations are to
Vermont court decisions unless
otherwise indicated.
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County Court served both a judicial and executive fiinction.^ And, from the earliest
date, county courts were places where both women and men could seek vindication for
interferences with their right to physical safety, good sexual reputation, and the
consequences of sexual misbehavior.
Since Gloucester County was dominated by men preceding their families or by
entire family groups, there were few women in the county with independent legal status
during the 1770s.^ Thus, women appeared rarely in the earliest court records from the
pre-Vermont period. For example, the names of only three women appear in the records
of the Gloucester Coimty Court between 1770 and 1774 and only two ofthem appeared
as parties. However, the circumstances under which the two women do appear are
instructive. Both found themselves in court over matters ofwayward sexuality and its
consequences. The Overseer of the Poor for the town of Mooretown brought an action
on behalfofRebecca Martin in an action for bastardy against Hezekiah Silloway in 1773,
But her baby had been bom ten months after the date of the claimed impregnation. As a
result, the court not only found for the defendant, but a grand jury then indicted Martin
for whoredom and issued a warrant for her arrest. A year later, Elizabeth Thurston and
2 The earliest Vermonters turned to their courts in great numbers. For example, in Gloucester County
(the least settled area of the state comprising what is today the entire northeastern quarter of Vermont),
the names of approximately 80 percent of the county's aduh male population appear in the court's
records during its four-year existence from 1770 to 1774. Forty percent of the adult male
population
participated as plaintiflfe, court oflBcers, persons seeking licenses, or witnesses. Eighteen
percent
participated as plaintiffe in civil cases. Hal Goldman, "The Gloucester County Court, 1770-1774: A
Hard Look," paper presented at a symposium sponsored by the Vermont Historical Society
and the
Vermont Judicial Historical Society, Montpelier, Vermont, June 1995. Copy in the
possession of the
author The original records of the Gloucester County Court are located at the
Orange County Superior
Court Chelsea, Vermont. A copy is located at Special Collections, University of Vermont, Burlmgton,
Vermont The records are also reproduced (with minor errors) in "Gloucester
County Court Records,"
Proceedings ofthe Vermont Historical Society, 7925-/925 (Bellows Falls, Vt.:
Tuttle, 1926), 141-189.
' Jay Mack Holbrook, Vermont 1771 Census (Oxford, Mass.: Holbrook
Research Institute, 1982), Table
12.
38
Nathan Noyes were indicted for illicit cohabitation with persons other than their spouses.
Their partners, though named in the records, were not indicted.''
Vermonters placed a high value on communal peace and the rule of law.
Historian Randolph Roth has shown that Vermont and New Hampshire have historically
had very low rates of violent crime compared to the rest of the nation.^ While
Vermonters were no angels, this early tradition of looking to local courts for civil and
social order, the cultural intolerance for lawlessness and self-help, and a constitutional
giiarantee that every person in the state was to find a remedy "by having recourse to the
laws, for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive in person, property, or character"
meant that fi-om the earliest period Vermonters understood their courts both as centers
of governmental power and as places in which they could seek civil redress for injuries.^
Vermont's courts provided a civil and criminal remedy for every possible
violation of a woman's right to good sexual reputation and to be fi-ee fi-om unwanted
physical and sexual abuse. On the criminal side, a woman could initiate prosecutions for
assault and battery, gross lewdness, attempted rape, and rape. These approaches will be
discussed in later chapters. On the civil side, a woman could sue for sexual defamation,
bastardy, breach of marriage promise, alienation of affections, assault and battery, civil
"
"Gloucester County Court Records," 159-160, 190.
5 Randolph Roth, '"Blood Calls for Vengeance!' The History of Capital Punishment in Vermont,
Vermont History 65 (Winter/Spring 1997): 10-25.
' Vermont Constitution, Chapter 1, Article 4 (1786). The language was repeated in the 1793
constitution which continues to govern the state today.
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ravishment, and, £ifter 191 1, for seduction when part of a marriage promise case/ Thus,
with the exception of marited rape^, these criminal and civil causes of action provided
multiple and sometimes overlapping remedies for women who were physically or
sexually assaulted or who were harmed by the consequences of out-of-wedlock sexual
activity or smears on their sexual reputation. Women (and sometimes their husbands,
parents, or guardians) brought suits and prosecutions for all of these violations. Judges
and juries were extremely responsive to these causes of action—success rates and
damage awards were very high.
Sexual Defamation
Vermonters living in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries
were deeply concerned about their neighbors' character and talked about that character a
great deal. At no point during this period was there any particular societal taboo on the
public discussion of morals in general and sexual character in particular. The period of
the state's founding was accompanied by the adoption of Connecticut's strict Puritan
legal code with its prohibitions on all manner of sexual deviancy and the provision of
severe punishment for their violation. The waves of religious revival and reform that
^ Because married women could not sue in their own names, they were unable to bring alienation of
affections suits until after the common law disabilities on their ability to sue in their own names
were
lifted. Nieberg v. Cohen, 83 Vt. 28 1(19 14). Thus, the first case of a woman suing for alienation of
affections did not appear in the four counties until 1899. Knapp v. Wing, Rutland County Court,
September 1899 Term, vol. 55, p. 585-588.
^
The concept of marital rape, while undoubtedly very real to women who experienced it, did not
exist
in the law before the twentieth century. Rebecca M. Ryan, "'The
Sex Right': A Legal History of the
Marital Rape Exception," Law and Social Inquiry 20 ( 1 995): 94 1
- 1 00 1
.
However, as this study makes
clear women did have a criminal and civil remedy for brutal treatment
received at the hands of their
husbands in the form of assault and battery prosecutions and divorces
granted for mtolerable severity
including sexual brutality. Women successfiilly pursued both remedies.
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swept Vermont during the first half of the nineteenth century had personal morality
(including sexual morality) at the center of their message. Newspapers detailed the
problems of loose morals, fornication, and profanity. Some denominations sought to
have the names ofmen soliciting prostitution printed in local papers. In their daily lives
people gossiped about sexual matters and intimate personal details were often known by
the entire community.' Three examples from the beginning, middle, and end of this study
demonstrate the public nature of this phenomenon as well as its ubiquity.
In 1 827 Swanton native Alice Fisk wrote her brother Zoroaster two letters
describing life in the small upstate New York farming town of Oxford, where she had
gone to earn her teaching certificate. Her brother was the Collector of Customs back in
Vermont. It is clear from her letters that Alice, a spirited young woman, had left
Swanton under the whiff of scandal as a result of a conflict with a man named Stephen
Brown. She told her brother that despite all her difficulties, life in Oxford was better
than it was in Swanton where she had to suffer under "a continual ding of slander." In
her description of life in Oxford, Alice lamented her straightened circumstances and the
snobbery of the people around her--a snobbery she felt was undeserved given their
sexual behavior.
You must be rich in this place or you can be nothing, I don't believe there
ever was a place where there were so many whores & whoremasters in
this world . . . that is if I have been rightly informed, & I presume I have.
^
Jeffrey M. Potash, Vermont's Burned Over District (Brooklyn: Carlson Publishing, 1991), 164 (Baptist
Association's efforts to print names ofmen soliciting prostitution in the newspaper); David M. Ludlum,
Social Ferment in Vermont, 1791-1850 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1939), 19-21 (problems
of loose morals, fornication, and profanity discussed in newspapers and by reformers);
Randolph Roth,
The Democratic Dilemma: Religion. Reform, and the Social Order in the Connecticut
River Valley of
Vermont, 1791-1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Robert E. Shalhope,
Bennington
and the Green Mountain Boys: The Emergence ofLiberal Democracy in Vermont.
1760-1850
(Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
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the first young ladies I have been told, make use of a certain thing called
dilldoes one of them was found in the street, and advertised it belonged
to a family of the name of Short the very first young ladies in the place,
and notwithstanding all that there is no body good enough to speak to
them, if Susan's girls have nothing else to boast of they stand the fairest
in reputation of any girls I know.
Alice then turned to the men of the town "a shiftless set the whole of them." She
described a lawyer, an old bachelor, who, though good in business "never thinks of the
women and never goes anywhere." She then related an anecdote she had heard about
him. He had traveled to New York with two friends. Knowing nothing ofwomen
"having never reveled in the pleasures of Venus," his friends take him to "one of those
houses^ The bachelor agreed to pay them five dollars on the condition that he would
get "a chance to see a certain thing.'' He went with them and "procured them the much
desired sight, so after looking it all over and examining it closely," the bachelor
proclaimed that the sight was "well worth the money, well worth five dollars."
In her next letter to Zoroaster, Alice elaborated on the "villainy" of Stephen
Brown and her certainty that as soon as she returned to Swanton she would hear the
"ding, ding" of slander against her. She also noted Zoroaster's objection to her
remaining in Oxford because of "the morals of the place." But Alice assured him that the
morals did not bother her since "I don't go any where or see any body except at school."
The circumstances of the family she was staying with were such that no one came to call
upon her. She then launched into an elaborate account of an alleged adulterous sexual
relationship (between her tormentor, Stephen Brown, and a Mrs. Hoffman) back in
Swanton. Alice explained that because she knew of the affair the parties had spread
malicious gossip about her. Alice told Zoroaster not to worry. "If 1 live, she [Hoffrnan]
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shall have an opportunity of clearing herself or being proved guilty ... for I will not bear
so much from the bitch."'^
Other, more public examples of such talk abound. In 1878, the Bennington
nev^spapers breathlessly reported on the adulterous affair of Ellen Hall and local lawyer
John Beebe. Ellen's husband John was the son ofVermont Govemor Hiland Hall.
Beebe was married and had two children. The marriage ended in divorce with Ellen
branded an adulterer and stripped of her children. Beebe was disbarred and the two fled
the state. The demand for the account had been so high, that the papers obligingly
reprinted it one week later.*' A year later, the Addison County Journal ran a piece about
a local probate judge and his adulterous affair vnth a local farm wife,'^
In 1904 the Brandon Ledger ran a series of letters alleging an adulterous affair
between two local residents. In 1913 the Fair Haven Era printed the following attack
on a local businessman:
There is a furniture dealer in this city who ought to be tarred and
feathered and then ridden out oftown on a rail. He has a fine wife and
four little children but for all of this persists in keeping an "affinity" at his
home in spite of the protests of his wife whom he abuses in a brutal and
scandalous manner. While at Lake Bomoseen a short time ago outsiders
had to interfere while he was beating his wife whom he had thrown to the
floor of the cottage.*^
" Alice Fisk to Zoroaster Fisk, 20 July 1 827 and 1 9 August 1 827 Fisk Collection, Box 1 , Folder 2, Vermont
State Archives, Montpelier, Vermont (emphasis in the original). 1 would like to thank Christie Carter at
the State Archives for calling this correspondence to my attention.
"
"The Bennington Scandal," Vermont Gazette, 12 July 1 878 and "The Bennington Scandal," Bennington
Banner, 5 December 1 878.
''Addison County Journal, 31 October 1879.
" Fair Haven Era, 4 September 1913.
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These examples provide important evidence about attitudes toward sexual
reputation as well as the extent to which such reputation was the subject ofwidespread
discussion. For example, Alice Fisk's letters tell us much about the role of informal
sexual discourse in early nineteenth century rural society. Fisk was an educated
middling-class stranger to Oxford occupying a position on the edges of its social life.
Yet she quickly learned of various intimate sexual matters involving the townspeople.
She was also well aware ofuntoward relationships back home in Swanton. Many of
these things she learned from others.
The Fisk letters also show how important reputation was in these small rural
communities. Alice felt she had been exiled from Swanton on account of unspecified
gossip which seems to have been sexual in nature. She felt she could not return. She
was bemused that the leading ladies of Oxford had such high status despite their sexual
immorality, while her friend Susan's girls, who stood "the fairest in reputation," had so
little.
Nonetheless, the respectable and the famous were not immune to the fallout of
such sexual gossip either. Governor Hall made sure that his son's divorce hearing was
heard in "secret" but he could not protect the family or his son from the coverage of both
local newspapers.'" The local probate judge could not escape the public eye. The
editors ofthe Fair Haven Era were so outraged by the adultery and violence of the
furniture dealer-who, with his maid and summer cottage was part of the respectable
June Barrows, "An American Chronicle, Part 1," (unpublished manuscript, Park-McCuilough House,
North Bennington, Vermont, n.d.), 925-934.
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middle class, that they advocated vigilante justice-a rare action for responsible leaders
of the community to take.
The examples make two things clear. First, sexual reputation was important to
Vermonters. Second, their sexual behavior was subject both to surveillance, comment,
and censure, including legal censure. When, in 1 877, Orren Taft claimed that Priscilla
Hartshorn was a whore, that he had had sex vnih her before, and could any time he
wanted, Priscilla and her husband claimed that as a result of Taft's statements she had
not only "been and is exposed to disgrace," but was now "liable to be exposed to a
criminal prosecution for the crime of adultery.""
Because of the serious nature of these allegations and the potential for social and
even criminal sanctions that accompanied them, such charges were a dangerous game
for Alice Fisk and the rest. If Vermonters were prepared to question the sexual
character of their neighbors, their targets were prepared to make them pay for it.
Throughout the period under study, Vermonters regularly sued those who called their
character-sexual or otherwise-into question. Most of these case were successftil and
jury verdicts could be very large.
"Defamation" is the legal cause of action brought against one who uses words
which call into question the honor or reputation of another. The tort'' of
defamation
encompasses both spoken words (slander) and written words (libel), hi
general slander
had to allege the commission of a crime involving moral
turpitude to be actionable, but
" Hartshorn v. Taft, Windsor County Superior Court, December
1 877 Terni, vol. 32, p. 594.
A tort is a civil wrong-an injury done to one's person
or property^ At cornrnon
^^J^^^^^
actions as trespasses, nuisances, assaults, and
defamation among others. W.lham Blackstone,
Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland, vol. 3 (London, 1768),
1
1
/.
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a libel was actionable even if it simply exposed one to public ridicule. In order for the
plaint iir to have a cause of action the words had to be "published" (that is, shared with a
third party). The truth of the statement could be a defense to the action. I'hc law of
defamation was complex and rile with exceptions which could favor one party or the
other in speciiic cases, fhis unpredictability meant that it was risky to speak or write
insultingly of one's neighbors.'^
I have uncovered 105 suits for defamation brought between 1790 and 1920 in the
four counties. Seventy-one involved suits by men over non-sexual allegations or
allegations which could not be identified. Thirty-four were brought by or on behalf of
women or could be identified as alleging sexual misconduct. Men tended to sue for slurs
on their honesty in business and court proceedings. Common male causes were i'or
allegations of perjury, counterfeiting, fraud, and theft. This is not surprising. The
business practices of the day relied heavily on the issuance of notes and law suits
concerning those notes were the most common cause of action heard by local courts.
The credit worthiness of those notes and successful collection on them both relied on the
reputation oi the maker. A bad reputation for honesty was devastating for a man's
ability to obtain necessary credit."*
Some women sued for non-.sexual delamation and some men did sue for slurs on
their sexual character. Women were tar more likely to sue over sexual matters. They
were less involved in business and credit for one thing thus reducing opportunities for
Colby V. Reynolds, 6 Vt. 489 (1834); Torrey v. Field, 10 Vt. 353 (1838); Vnderhill v.
Welton, 32 Vt.
40 (1859); James Kent, Commentaries on American Law, vol. 2 (New York, 1827), 12-22.
C'hrislophcr Clark, The Roots ofRural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, HHO-im) (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1990), 214-220.
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this type of defamation. Sexual reputation was important to both men and women in
Vermont. But given a female's already subordinate legal and economic position in
society, an attack on her sexual reputation was potentiaUy a far more devastating
injury-devastating enough to engage in the public trauma of a defamation case. If the
large awards women won in these cases are any indication, judges and juries felt that
defamation worked a greater harm to plaintiffs when it touched on sexual reputation in
general and the sexual reputation ofwomen in particular.
Since married women could not sue civilly in their own names for injuries done to
them until 1 884, many cases were brought by husbands in their own name or by married
couples for defamation of the wife's sexual character.'^ Others were brought by men for
defamation of their daughters. A review of a few of these cases gives us a sense of the
kind of injuries heard by local courts.
The earliest was a case by Ezra Sylvester against Alexander Plumley over a tussle
in the plaintiffs house in 1798. His young daughter had been ejected from the room and
his wife called a whore. The arbitrator who heard the case determined that both the
plaintiff and defendant had been equally to blame for the physical confrontation, but the
defendant's use of the term "whore" could not be excused and so awarded Sylvester ten
" The rules of coverture prevented married women from suing in their own names, they had to be joined
by their husbands in order to bring suit. However, upon their death, the right to sue did not remain in
the husband, but passed to her estate. Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275 (1 873). Women won the right to the
sole and separate use of personal causes of action inherited by them during coverture in 1867. They
gained the right to sue and be sued in their own name for torts occurring during marriage in 1 884.
1 867
Vt. Acts 21; 1884 Vt. Acts 140. Thereafter married women suing in tort did not
join their husbands in
the action. Story v. Downey, 62 Vt. 243 (1890).
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dollars.^^ In 1 831 Isaac and Minerva Rawley sued Alanson Wright over various
allegations he had made about Minerva, He said that she had gotten pregnant by another
man, had killed the baby to prevent others from seeing that it did not look like her
husband, and that she had given birth to puppies (i.e., committed bestiality). The jury
found Wright liable for defamation as to the adultery and illegitimacy charges and
awarded the couple $200. In 1 877 Horace and Priscilla Hartshorn sued Orren Taft for
claiming that Priscilla was a whore and that he could have sex with her anytime he
wanted. As a result ofwhich, she "has been and is exposed to disgrace, and is rendered
liable to be exposed to a criminal prosecution for the crime of aduhery." That case was
settled. In 1 884 William and Jane Chase sued Cyrus Lovell for calling Jane "a black
whore,'' challenging her chastity, and accusing her of being a prostitute. The jury found
for the plaintiffs, but awarded only one cent in damages.
In addition to husbands bringing suits on behalf of their wives, fathers also sued
to protect their daughters' reputations. In 1806, Ebenezer Jewett told people he had
seen young Thankful Salter having sex with a dog. Her father sued him and won
$500-one of the largest tort verdicts in Orange County in the first half of the century.
In 1 844 Arvilla English's father Josiah sued Benjamin Chase on her behalf after he
claimed to have begotten her with a bastard child. The case was settled.^^
^° Plumley v. Sylvester, Windsor County Court, September 1798 Term, vol. 15, p. 219-222.
The census
of 1 800 shows that Ezra had two daughters, one ten or younger, the other between ten
and sixteen. We
do not know which one was involved. Heads ofFamilies At the Second Census ofthe
United States
Taken in the Year 1800, Vermont (Montpelier, Vermont Historical Society,
1938).
2' Hartshorn v. Tafi, Windsor County Court, December 1872 Term, vol. 32, p. 594;
Chase v. Lovell,
Windsor County Court, May 1884 Term, vol. 34, p. 288-291.
Salter v. Jewett, Orange County Court, December 1806 Term, vol. 7, p.
347-349; English v. Chase,
Orange County Court, December 1844 Term, vol. 15, p. 613.
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Some women brought suits in their own names to vindicate their sexual
reputation. These suits were concentrated at the end of the period under study. I have
already described Ursula Brown's successful suit against her in-law William in 1830. In
1 859 Hannah Underbill sued George Welton for telling people she was a whore. The
jury found for Hannah and Welton appealed. Slander, in order to be actionable, required
an allegation that imputed both moral turpitude and criminal behavior. Since prostitution
was not iUegal, Welton argued that there could be no lawsuit for merely imputing a lack
of chastity. The Court agreed that calling a woman a whore was not in and of itself
slander (i.e., slander per se), but ifHannah could show that the statement caused her
special pecuniary damages, she could prevail. Since she had shown that the statement
had caused her "grief and anxiety" and that that anxiety had caused her lost time and
rendered her less capable of attending to her daily business, she had shown special
damages and could maintain her suit. The Court afiOrmed the jury's award of $183."
In 1892, Lizzie Carpenter sued Ezra Willey in the Orange County Court for
calling her a whore and for saying she had committed adultery with a local minister who
was boarding with her and her husband. The jury found for Carpenter and awarded her
$679. The same year, however, Melissa Leighton sued her brother-in-law Erastus
Thayer for calling her a "common strumpet," "a whore," and an "adulterous
streetwalker," and alleging that she ran a whorehouse. At trial Thayer introduced
evidence that Leighton actually did run a whorehouse. The jury found for Leighton, but
" Underhill v. Welton, 32 Vt. 40 (1859); Underhill v. Welton, Orange County Court, June 1858
Term,
Docket No. 38, Public Records Center, Middlesex, Vermont.
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awarded her only one dollar in damages-an indication perhaps of its opinion as to the
value of her reputation.^'*
Cora Porter was the servant referred to by the editors of the Fair Haven Era in
their claim that John Steams W£is a wife beater and adulterer and ought to be tarred,
feathered, and driven out oftown on a rail. She sued the editors in 1913 for defamation
and won $500. Steams prevailed in his suit as well, winning a $500 jury verdict the
same year. A year later, Mary Pullinen sued Liisa Lookso for telling people that the
reason she could not get pregnant was because "she uses lots of men." A jury awarded
Pullinen thirty-seven dollars.^'
Overall, cases alleging any kind of defamation had high success rates. Of the 105
cases brought in the four counties, 68 percent resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff.
Another 14 percent were settled or discontinued by the plaintiff. Eighteen percent of the
cases resulted in a defense verdict. The average damage award for all such cases was
$163. Though all such suits had high success rates, cases involving attacks on a woman
or girl's sexual reputation or suits brought by women in their own names for non-sexual
defamation had the highest success rates and the highest damage awards. Suits brought
by men over non-sexual allegations had the lowest success rates and the lowest average
damages. Suits brought by men for vindication of their own sexual reputations were
about as successful as non-sexual cases brought by men, but the damages were higher,
though still not as high as those attained in the female cases (see Table 2). It is a
Carpenter v. Willey, Orange County Supreme Court, May 1892 Term, vol. 20, p. 453; Leighton v.
Thayer, Rutland County Court, March 1892 Term, vol. 50, p. 232-238.
25 Porter v Metcalfet ai, Rutland County Court, September 1914 Term, vol. 61, p.
232-236; Stearns v.
Turner et al, Rutland County Court, March 1914 Term, vol. 61, p. 80-92;
Pullinen v. Lookso, Rutland
County Court, March 1916 Term, vol. 61, p. 663-666
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Table 2
Success Rates for Various Defemation Suits in the Four Counties
Subject Total Guilty Settled/Discontinued' Not Guilty Avr. Damages
Male PlaintiflF 7P 48 (68%) 8(11%) 15 (21%) $139^
(Non-Sexual)
Male Plaintiff 12 8 (67%)' 1 (9%) 3 (25%)' $163'
(Sexual)
Female 14 1 1 (79%) 2 (14%) 1 (7%) $221'
(Sexual)
Female 8 4 (50%) 4 (50%) 0 (0%) $273*
(Non-Sexual)
Total 105 71 (68%) 15(14%) 19(18%) $163*^
' This includes cases that were settled by the parties, discontinued, or where a non-suit was entered for
the plaintiff Non-suits could indicate a settlement, but it is impossible to tell from the records.
^ There were a total of 73 such suits, but in 2 the outcomes could not be determined,
^ N=43. Ifwe include the 5 cases where one cent in damages was awarded, the average decreases to
$122.
Includes 1 guilty verdict by stipulation.
' Includes 1 directed verdict later affirmed by the Supreme Court.
* N=6. Ifwe include 1 case where one cent in damages was awarded, the average decreases to $140.
^ N=10. Ifwe include 1 case v^ere one cent damages were awarded, the average decreases to $201.
'*N=4.
^ N=63. Ifwe include the 7 cases where one cent damages were awarded the average decreases
to $147.
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measure of the success rate of suits involving women or women's sexual reputation that
even though such suits represented only 21 percent of all such cases brought, they
represented six of the top ten damage awards for all suits.
In Vermont sexual reputation was important enough to fight for. Allegations of
sexual impropriety were so damaging that plaintiffs felt free to argue mental injury and
even physical harm as a result of these statements and juries £ind judges were willing to
acknowledge and compensate them.^^ Given their success rates, the courts looked
favorably upon these suits and it would appear that injury to sexual reputation-whether
that of a man, woman, or child, was viewed as more damaging, and thus deserving of
higher awards than injuries to a man's non-sexual reputation. But sexual defamation was
only the first level of civil injury for which Vermonters (including women) could seek
redress in the courts. As with defamation, juries and judges viewed injuries to women
and girls, especially those harmed by sexual violation, in a particularly punitive light.
Civil Assault
In the four counties studied, I uncovered fifty-seven civil suits for assaults on
women and girls between 1794 and 1920 out of a total of 246 civil assault cases brought
during this time (23 percent). Defendants in these female cases were almost always
male. Women were sole defendants in only three of the fifty-seven cases. In four more
cases women were named as defendants along with their husbands.
^ After being called a whore, Hannah Underbill declared that she was "greatly
injured and enfeebled in
both body and mind, and was caused much anxiety, trouble and dejection of
spirits, insomuch that she
was deprived of much sound sleep and repose, and was greatly grieved, and
was also prevented and
disabled from pursuing and following her accustomed duties and labors
with the strength and health that
she otherwise would have enjoyed." Vnderhill v. Welton, 32 Vt. 40 (1859)
(emphasis omitted).
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Twenty-four lawsuits were brought by women in their own names. Another
twenty-four involved suits brought by husbands or husbands and wives for assaults on
the wife. Nine were brought by parents (usually but not always by fathers) for assaults
on minor daughters.
Though single women brought suits in their ovsoi names as early as 1 836, most of
these actions were concentrated toward the end of the period under study v^th twenty-
two being brought from 1865 onward and twelve being brought after 1900.^^ This was
similar to the pattern of defamation suits with eleven of the fifteen cases brought by
women in their ovm names coming after 1 876. This roughly coincides with married
women's acquisition of the right to sue in tort for injuries done to them in 1 884.^^ The
success rate for women bringing suits in their own names was high. Of the twenty-four
suits brought, women prevailed in sixteen or 67 percent. One case was dismissed after
the defendant paid a settlement of $175. Another case was settled by a stipulation.
Three cases were non-suited, two of which likely resulted in settlement since no costs
were awarded to the defendant. In only three cases did women lose at trial. Ifwe count
the settled cases as successftil outcomes, the success rate climbs to 83 percent. Awards
for women suing in their own names were far higher than the overall average for all civil
cases. The average award for women suing for assault in their o\m names was $218^^
(see Table 3).
"
Suits for civil assault were brought by women in their own names in 1836, 1849, 1865 (3), 1873, 1875,
1878, 1886, 1888 (2), 1893, 1902 (2), 1904, 1906, 1911, 1912, 1913, 1914(2), 1915(2),
1920,
2» 1884 Vt. Acts 140. This permitted married women to sue and be sued in their own
names.
This figure omits one award to a woman ofone cent in damages. Ifthat result
is included the average is
$204.
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Table 3
Civil Assault Cases in the Four Counties
Subject Total Guilty Settled Not Guilty Non-Suit Avr.
Award
Female Plaintiff 24 1 6 (67%) 2 (8%) 3 ( 1 3%) 3 ( 1 3%) $2 1
8
Husband/Couple
(Assault on Wife)
24 17 {7l%f 0 (0%) 3 (13%) 4 (17%) $186'
Parent
(Assault on Daughter)
7 (78%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 2 (22%) $3 1 4'
Male PlaintifF
(Assault on Male)
188' 147 (78%)' I (1%) 29 (15%) 1 1 (6%) $ 99'
Totals 245 187 (76%) 4 (2%) 34 (14%) 20 (8%) $127*
' N=16. This figure omits 1 award to a woman of one cent in damages. If that result is included the
average is $204.
^ Includes 1 case in which the defendant defaulted and judgment was entered.
* N=l 5. In 3 cases the court awarded only one cent in damages. Ifthose results are included, the
average is $155.
'»N=7.
^ There were a total of 1 89 such cases, 1 outcome was unknown.
'Includes I default judgment.
^N=133. I have omitted an anomalous award of$5000 to a male plaintiffin 1912. Ajury found
Simeon Flibotte liable for biting Isaac Mayo's ear off. This award exceeded any other granted in a civil
assault case by more than $3800. Mayo v. Flihoite, Rutland County Court, September 1912 Term, vol.
60, p. 394-396. If 9 cases in which one cent damages were awarded and 1 case in which 50
cent
damages were awarded is added, the average is $93.
* N=171. Ifwe include awards of less than one dollar the average is $1 17.
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Between 1816 and 1895 twenty-four cases were brought by husbands or married
couples for injuries done to wives/" Seventeen resulted in victories for the plaintiffs (71
percent). In only three cases were the defendants found not guilty. In four other cases
the plaintiffwas non-suited two ofwhich were likely settlements. As with suits brought
by women in their own names, very few involved female defendants (only five-two of
which accused other couples of assault). Awards on average were also smaller than in
cases brought by woman in their own name-$l 86-though still higher than the overall
average for all civil assault awards.^'
Nine suits involved parents or guardians bringing suit for assaults on minor girls.
Seven (78 percent) resuhed in guilty verdicts. In the remaining two cases the plaintiff
was non-suited-one ofwhich at least was probably a settlement. Average damages were
very high-SSM.^^
When compared to civil assault cases involving male victims brought between
1794 and 1920, suits involving assaults on women had success rates close to those of the
men. Of the 1 88 civil assault suits involving male victims, plaintiffs prevailed in 78
percent— 1 1 percent higher success rate than that experienced by single female plaintiffe
(67 percent) and 7 percent higher than married female plaintiffs (71 percent) and the
same rate as that of suits brought on behalf of minor daughters. The chief difference
between suits involving male victims and female victims was the amount of damages.
Suits for civil assault were brought by married couples in 1 8 1 6, 1 8 1 9 (2), 1 828, 1 843, 1 847, 1851,1853,
1854, 1858 (2), 1861, 1864, 1867, 1868, 1873, 1874, 1875, 1878 (2), 1884, 1885,
and 1887 (2).
"
In three cases the court awarded only one cent in damages. Ifthose results are included,
the average is
$155.
" The year of the suits brought on behalf ofminor females and the damage awards: 1849
(nonsuit), 1867
(nonsuit), 1870 ($36), 1870 ($500), 1872 ($497), 1897 ($2), 1912 ($1050), and 1914 ($104).
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The average award in cases involving male victims of assault and battery was
$99-considerably lower than the payout for female victims in such suits.'^
The courts' more generous treatment of cases involving women is also
demonstrated when we compare the figures in those cases to the overall totals for all
assault cases. During the entire study period, the average award for all civil assault
cases was $127.^'' The average award for cases involving female victims was almost
twice that-$235. This trend existed throughout the study period with average awards
for women exceeding the overall average during every part of the study period.^^
Furthermore, though suits involving awards to female victims comprised only 20
percent of all awards, female victims made up five out often of the highest damage
awards and eight out of the highest twenty awards for the entire period.
Civil assaults on women and girls ranged from scuffles and hair pulling to
serious beatings and sexual assaults. Women and girls and husbands and guardians
used civil suits to seek redress for these sexual assaults throughout the nineteenth and
early twentieth century. The most serious of these assaults involved actual rapes and
were sometimes designated as "civil ravishment" actions, though legally they were all
considered actions for assault and battery. There were five reported decisions
"
In calculating the average awards for men, the overall
average awards and the average awards for the
period 900-1920, 1 have omitted an anomalous award of
$5000 to a male plamt.ff m 1912. A juiy found
si Flibotte 1 able for biting Isaac Mayo's ear off. Their award exceeded any other panted m a cml
LTauk ca^e by more than $3800 Mayo v. Flibotte, Rutland County
Court, September 19 2 Term, yoL 60,
^ 394-396 hi nbe suits the plaintiffwas awarded
only once cent damages and m another 50 cents. If those
suits are included the average is $93.
"
If we include awards of less than one dollar
the average is $117.
-Average overall awards for each period and the
average for female victims ^e ^-n ^esp-t^
1796-
1849 ($71; $269); 1850-1869 ($100; $177);
1870-1899 ($99; $152); 1900-1920 ($284, $344).
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sexual assault claims brought as civil rather than criminal cases in Vermont in 1872,
1880, 1890, 1919 and 1921 and at least five unpublished decisions among the four
counties. There were another eleven cases brought as civil assaults which contained
allegations of a sexual nature, but did not rise to attempted rape or rape.
The Supreme Court's decisions in the reported cases allow us to trace the
contours of suits brought by or on behalf ofwomen and girls for sexual assault. These
decisions plus the outcomes in the unreported cases make clear that the courts provided
women a place where they could seek and receive redress for assaults on their physical
and sexual safety. Furthermore, the courts did not seem to be institutionally hostile to
such claims.
Alexander v. Blodgett (1872) arose out of an alleged sexual assault on Mary
Alexander, aged fifteen, by Royal Blodgett. Blodgett worked for Mary's father, Charles
Alexander, and had been living with the family. Alexander was a fanner and up and
coming member of Guilford society. Elected to the legislature in 1876, his biography in
the Legislative Directory noted that he had served as town constable, tax collector, and
justice of the peace, in addition to holding "all the usual town offices."" Charles's
daughter, Mary Alexander, aged fifteen, claimed that she had been sexually assaulted by
Royal Blodgett in her father's bam. Blodgett exposed himself to her then grabbed her
shoulders and tried to lift her dress. Mary told him to "desist" and that ifhe did not she
would tell her father. A few days later, while her parents were out, Blodgett told her he
The reported cases in Vermont are Alexander v. Blodgett, 44 Vt. 476 ( 1 872); Parker
v. Coture, 63 Vt
155 (1890); Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589 (1880); mANiebyski v. Welcome, 93 Vt. 418 (1919)
and 9t
Vt. 504(1921).
" Vermont Legislative Directory, /S7<5-7577 (Montpelier, 1876), 362.
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wanted to do the same thing to her again. He chased her around the kitchen, held her,
exposed himself and again tried to lift her clothes. Mary told her mother who told her
father. Blodgett continued to work and live in the household for another year before
being fired. He went to work for a business rival of Alexander's and it was then that
Charles Alexander brought suit against Blodgett for the assault on his daughter.
Blodgett denied that the assaults had ever taken place.
After the evidence had been presented, the trial judge, Jonathan Ross, charged
the jury on the law of assault and assault and battery. In the case of the first incident in
the barn, Ross told the jurors that if Blodgett had merely exposed himself and 'Vent
towards her, supposing it was in accordance with her wishes, and laid hands on her
supposing it was not against her wishes and desire, that would not amount to any assault
there." As for the second incident in the kitchen Ross instructed the jurors that:
when he pursued her, (which would evidently indicate that she didn't
desire him to come near her and take hold of her,) if he did take hold of
her, it would amount evidently to an assault and battery. On the second
occasion if he exposed himself, and she knew what his desire was, and he
went towards her, and she did not flee from him, and evidently gave him
license, perhaps it would be virtual consent, (emphasis in the original)
The jury then returned a verdict for the defendant and Alexander appealed.
Judge Hoyt H. Wheeler began the Supreme Court's opinion with a ringing endorsement
of the right of persons to be fi-ee from fear of an assault. "The plaintiff had a right to
absolute security against any attempt to violate her person," he wrote, and "any
invasion
of that right was unlawful, and if proceeded with so far as to interfere
with her person
was actionable." Though the trial judge had correctly stated the law for assaults
generally, according to Wheeler, he had failed to take into account
the sexual nature of
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the case before him. Wheeler focused on that part of Judge Ross's instruction that so
long as the defendant thought Mary desired his attentions his exposing himself, coming
towards her, and putting his hands on her could not be an assault and battery. He
rejected this, noting that for a 'Virtuous woman or girl" there could be no more grievous
personal injury than what the defendant attempted to do to her and what mattered was
not what Royal Blodgett thought, but what Mary Alexander perceived.
If the defendant exposed his person and went toward the plaintiff in her
sight at all, it was unlawfiil. If he did so when he was near enough or
proceeded in that manner till he got near enough to her to indicate a
purpose to violate her person, and to justly put her in fear that he would
do so, he was guilty of an assault upon her. What he supposed about her
wishes or desires would make it none the less an assault unless she
directly gave him the right to suppose so. He had no right to make any
attempt in that direction without her express and direct consent, and
that, too, first had and obtained. Ifhe proceeded at all without suchfree
andfull consent, it was at his own risk, (emphasis added).
No touching was required to prove the sexual assault according to the Court
because the mere "imposition of the fear and the influence it would have upon her
movements and feelings would constitute an actionable injury to her." Further, she had
no obligation to flee from him in order to sustain her claim since she might stay without
consenting "and if she did so it should not be taken against her." The Court reversed the
defense verdict and returned the case to the trial court.^^
A related case, and one that shows the Court's soUcitude for the use of civil
process both to compensate women for such injuries and punish their
tormentors, came
in 1880. Sarah NeweU, a young blind girl, came to J. C.
Whitcher's house once a week
"
Alexander v Blodgett, 44 Vt. 476 (1 872). The courts' emphasis on
the issue of consent m Blodgett is
odd given the feet that defendant never raised a consent
defense. We do not have the transcript of th.s
case but it is possible that Blodgett argued consent as
an alternative defense to non estfactum. Th.s
may explain why the issue was raised at all.
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to teach his daughters music. After the lesson she was provided lodging for the night in
a room ofher own provided by Whitcher and his wife. One evening, Whitcher entered
her room, sat down on her bed, leaned over her, and repeatedly solicited sexual favors
from her. Sarah rebuffed him, dressed, and sat up for the rest of the night. She sued
Whitcher for his actions and recovered a $225 jury verdict, including $100 in punitive
damages. On appeal, Whitcher argued, among other things, that what he had done could
not constitute an assault on Sarah, since he had merely sat on her bed, leaned over her
and asked her for sex. There had been no touching, nor a threat of such touching.
Whitcher' s lawyers argued that "acts that may embarrass and distress do not necessarily
amount to an assault."
The Court, in an opinion written by Timothy P. Redfield, disagreed. The
approach by Witcher was an assault, Redfield wrote, because of its nature and the nature
of the victim. The defendant sat on her bed in the middle of the night, leaned over her
"with the proffer of criminal sexual intercourse," an act which would "excite the fear and
apprehension offeree in the execution of his felonious purpose." The whole act was in
Redfield' s words 'Hmlawfiil, sinister, and wicked." His outrage at Whitcher showing,
Redfield explained that the act of "stealing stealthUy into the bed-room of a virtuous
woman at midnight to seek gratification of criminal lust, is sufficiently dishonorable and
base in purpose and in act" under any circumstances, to say nothing of such an assault
directed at someone like Sarah, "a poor, blind girl under the protecting care of very
man
who would violate every injunction of hospitality, that he might dishonor and ruin at his
hearthstone this unfortunate child, who had the right to appeal to him to defend her
from such outrage."
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own
Having determined that Whitcher's actions were a civil assault, Redfield turned
to the final matter ofthe appeal-the question of damages. The trial judge had instructed
the members of the jury that ifthey found that Whitcher's actions had so fiightened and
shocked Sarah as to injure her health, as she had claimed, then they could award
compensatory damages for that injury. Whitcher's lawyers argued that if his acts would
not have injured a person of "ordinary nerve and courage" then there could be no
recovery. The Court, without citation to authority, held that the defendant's position
was true only where acts, harmless and innocent in themselves, became wrongfiil by the
manner in which they were done. Under such circumstances, the question ofhow an
ordinary person would construe them was the standard to be applied. However, the
Court simply carved out an exception for cases like this one. "When a married man
breaks into the bed-room of a chaste and honest woman at midnight, and proposes to her
sexual and criminal commerce with her, the act is wholly wrongful; the aim and purpose
is wrongful, and the act if perpetrated is criminal; and the party offending must answer in
damages for all actual injuries." The Court added, also without citation to authority, that
punitive damages were available as well.^^
As with Blodgett, the Court showed little patience with a defense based on the
defendant's perspective. Rather, men were on notice that soliciting women for sex was a
dangerous business and they had better not proceed unless they were absolutely certain
their offers were welcome. And, as we will see below, this was true not only in
cases in
which the plaintiff seemed to be a paragon of Victorian sexual virtue, but also
in cases
involving women with less sterling reputations.
Newell V. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589 (1880).
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Such cases raised another question for the Court. In a civil suit involving sexual
assault, what role, if any, could the plaintiffs sexual reputation play in the proceedings?
An opinion by the Supreme Court made clear that the alleged bad sexual reputation of
the female plaintiffwas not a bar to a civil suit for sexual assault. A bad sexual
reputation did not give men a free pass to assault women or provide them with immunity
from successfiil civil suits for violations ofwomen's bodies.
Parker v. Coture (1889) started out as a civil ravishment case in the Burlington
City Court. The plaintiff, a fourteen year-old girl, testified that the Defendant, Alex
Coture, came to her house when her parents were out. He grabbed her, tore open her
dress, grabbed her breasts, put his hands on her genitals, exposed himself to her and tried
to have sex with her. At trial, the defendant sought to introduce evidence that the
plaintiffdumped dish water out her window while nude, regularly urinated in her back
yard in plain site of his family, and that men and boys regularly addressed her in obscene
language without apparent offense and that she in turn participated in these offcolor
conversations. However, the defendant was unable to show that Parker had committed
prior unchaste acts or that she was of unchaste character. His purpose in introducing
such evidence was not to prove his innocence, but to reduce the damages if he was found
guilty. The trial court refused the admission of the character evidence and the jury
awarded her $100. The defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court agreed that evidence of a lack of chastity was relevant in
civil ravishment cases as to damages. Judge John W. RoweU likened civil ravishment
cases to cases of slander for imputing adultery or seduction. In cases
of slander for
adultery, he noted, a defendant might seek a reduction in damages
when it could be
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shown that "plaintiff was commonly reputed to be an unchaste and licentious man" prior
to the speaking of the slanderous words. Similarly, in a seduction suit, "the parent
recovers not only for loss of service but for wounded feelings." Thus, the defendant may
show "the loose character and conduct of the daughter."
Given these precedents, the Court held that the question of the plaintiff's
modesty was relevant to damages because "shock to the sensibility ofmodesty and
wounded feelings consequent thereon, constitute a peculiar and an important element of
actual damages and one of the principal grounds of awarding them" in cases involvir^
sexual assaults. The Court held that the plaintiff put her character in issue when she
"asks for damages on that score." "It cannot be said that a woman without modesty
would suffer as much from an assault of this kind as a woman with modesty; and if it
cannot be shown that the former has no modesty to shock, she is put on an equality with
the latter, and may recover for injury to that which she does not possess."^^
It is important to be clear about what the Court did and did not say in this case
and how it said it. First, the Court's choice of precedents to demonstrate the rule of the
case is interesting. The Court seemed careful to choose one example in which a man's
sexual character was impugned and another in which a woman's was. Second, the Court
did not say that bad sexual character was a bar to such actions, only that it could be used
in determining damages where the plaintiff sought compensation for the shock to her
modesty occasioned by the sexual nature of the assault. Though one might argue that
despite such limitations, the introduction of such evidence could prejudice the entire
Parker v. Coture, 63 Vt. 155, 156-157 (1890); Parker v. Coture,
Vermont Reports Briefs, 63,
(1890), Vermont State Library, Montpelier, Vermont.
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proceeding against the female plaintiff. But as we shall see, these cases were
characterized by a far more complex dynamic.
All of these issues came together in a civil ravishment case brought late in the
period under study. Anna Niebyski, a Polish immigrant from Galicia, claimed that
Thomas Welcome entered her house in late December 1917, grabbed her in front of her
two young children, C£irried her into another room, and raped her. Anna's husband, also
from Galicia, was out cutting wood at the time. The case generated two Supreme Court
decisions and was tried twice. It raised questions about both reputation and consent and
their effect on Vermont juries.
Welcome, aged sbrty-four, denied that anything sexual occurred between them.
At the first trial, he introduced evidence that Anna had an illegitimate child living in
Galicia. His intent was to reduce any potential damages she might claim for injury to her
modesty resulting from the rape. Anna denied his claim and her husband took the stand
and denied it as well. He also denied telling another Polish immigrant, one Tkorczyk,
about the illegitimate child. When the defense tried to put Tkorczyk on to impeach
Anna's husband, the plaintiff objected that his testimony went to a collateral matter. The
court agreed and sustained the objection.
Welcome had reputation problems of his own to contend with. On the stand, the
plaintiffs counsel asked him about a rape he had been prosecuted for several years
before in Greenfield, Massachusetts. Welcome explained that he had been acquitted.
Anna's lawyer then asked about the fiiends who had testified on Welcome's behalf at
that trial. The defense objected and the judge sustained the objection. But Anna's
lawyer ploughed ahead anyway asking ifWelcome had not bragged in front
of his wife
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about the rape and how he had paid ofif the witnesses to testify on his behalf. The
defendant again objected and the court again sustained it. The jury awarded Anna
Niebyski $4700 in damages, including $2700 in punitive damages. This was an
enormous verdict for the time."*' The defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court held that the defendant had a right to impeach the plaintiff's
witnesses on relevant matters to the case and thus the judge's refusal to allow Thorczyk
to take the stand was error. It also held that the defendant had been prejudiced by the
questions concerning Welcome's alleged witness tampering and that he deserved a new
trial. Welcome had also argued that the punitive damages were so excessive that they
violated the federal and state constitutions. His lawyers pointed out that the maximum
fine for a criminal rape was only $2000 or $700 less than what the jury had awarded
Aima Niebyski in punitive damages. The circumstances of the rape had not been nearly
heinous enough to warrant such a large award they argued.
There was no prolonged struggle. The affair . . . occupied but a few
moments. The woman was carried from one room to another and the act
consummated immediately. There was little, if any, bodily injury. She
was able to be up and about that night and prepare her husband's meal.
Later she complained of lameness or soreness of the back, but the
evidence also shows that she did not require medical attention, and that
she had previously suffered from a rheumatic trouble.
If this is the same argument Welcome's lawyers made to the jury, it may go part of the
way towards explaining the large damage award in the first place. In any case, the Court
By way of perspective, out of the thousands of civil suits documented in
my research m the four
counties only five had awards larger than the one in Niebyski with the
largest, $6800, commg m a
malpractice case in which the plaintiff lost his foot. That case included not
only permanent physical
disability, but also $1500 in medical damages alone. Clearly the Niebyski jmy was outraged.
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simply noted that the constitutionahty of punitive damages had been settled in the state
and refused to revisit the matter again in Niebyski.
On retrial, Anna Niebyski prevailed again, despite the introduction of
Thorczyk's testimony and despite the plaintiffs inability to bring up the matter of
Welcome's witness tampering. Only this time it awarded her $2000 instead of
$4700-still a huge verdict, but one clearly reflecting less outrage than that of the first
jury. The defendant appealed again. This tune he claimed that the judge's refusal to
instruct the jury on consent was error. Welcome's lawyers had asked the court to
explain that if the intercourse had been consensual, than the defendant could not be
liable for damages. The judge refused and instead phrased the instruction negatively,
tellmg the jurors that if they found by a preponderance of the evidence that Welcome
had laid his hands on Niebyski without her consent, than they were to find for the
plaintiff, but if not, they were to find for the defendant. When the defendant's lawyers
objected, the judge told them that if there had been any evidence to support the theory
of consensual intercourse, their objection might be well founded, but Welcome had
denied that any sexual activity had taken place at all. The Supreme Court held that the
42
judge's charge was sufficient and affmned the judgment.
The patterns discernible in the reported decisions-that bad reputation was
not a
bar to suit and sexual assault was taken seriously by
judges and juries-are confirmed by
the unreported civil cases brought within the four
counties. The earliest sexual assault
appeared in an 1 828 lawsuit brought by Easty and Sally
Back against eight men who
, ,
. „,
, 01 vt 4 1 8 n Q 1 QV Niebvski v Welcome, Vermont Reports Briefs 93(4), no. 57
;,?;;^5^Sr:95 V,' S^ll^^^^ v. ^./c... Ve™™ Repor. Briefs 95,6), „o.
86 (1922)
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broke into the house and assaulted Sally "in bed alone being found and then and there
other enormities did to her." We have to imagine what those "enormities" might have
been. The use of such euphemisms was common in pleadings like this. But pleadings in
other cases were more e5q)licit. These suits involved behaviors which ranged from the
defendant stalking the victim and using "vile language," to those in which he exposed
himself, to fondling, to attempted rape, and rape itself. I have identified sbrteen civil
suits that were explicitly sexual. The cases were brought in 1828, 1836, 1865, 1869,
1870, 1872, 1873, 1875, 1888, 1893, 1902, 1906, 1911, 1912, 1913, and 1920."' Again,
we see a pattern in which women's use of the courts to vindicate these rights is
concentrated after the Civil War. Eleven of these cases were brought by women in their
own names, three were brought by married couples, and two were brought by parents or
guardians on behalf ofminor girls. The average award was very high--$275 per case.
Unreported cases involving civil claims arising out of sexual assaults in the four counties are: Back v.
Parker et ai, Addison County Court, June 1828 Term, vol. 1 1, p. 130-134 (assault on woman in her bed
by eight men); Quackenbush v. Preston, Addison County Court, December 1836 Term, vol. 17, p. 273-
276 (stripped her naked, tarred and feathered her); Jones v. Baird, Rutland County Court, September
1865 Term, vol. 40, p. 789 (rape); Cutter v. Waterman, Orange County Court, September 1869 Term,
vol. 20, p. 572 (attempted rape); Smart v. Hitchcock, Windsor County Court, December 1870 Term, vol.
30, p. 623 (Defendant exposed himself and fondled her); Patrick v. Vaughn, Windsor County Court,
D^ember 1872 Term, vol. 31, p. 240-241 (exposed her private parts, handled them, and pulled her
about in a lewd manner); Morse v. Burroughs, Windsor County Court, December 1873 Term, vol. 31, p.
376 (indecent exposure, pulled her clothes off, and "other indignities did on her"); Mines v. Pease,
Windsor County Supreme Court, vol 10, p. 299-306 (rape, pregnancy); Hathaway v. Pottle, Rutland
County Court, September 1888 Term, vol. 49, p. 448-449 (forced hands under her clothes
and felt her
private parts); Ely v. Cannon, Rutland County Court, May 1893 Term, vol. 50, p. 612-613 (pushed her
around, made indecent proposals, put his hands on her); Chamberlain v. Putnam, Windsor County
Court, June 1902 Term, vol. 38, p. 31-32 (using vulgar and insuhing language and
sohcitmg her to have
intercourse); Hoole v. Tomlin, Addison County Court, June 1906 Term, vol. 35, p.
103-105 (rape);
Lillick V Hoag, Rutland County Court, September 191 1 Term, vol. 60, p.
161-163; Hier v. Bodette,
Addison County Court, June 1912 Term, vol. 35, p. 603 (stalking and calling
her vile names); Foley v
Dockham, Windsor County Court, December 1913 Term, vol. 39, p. 587-588
(threw his arms aroimd
her, kissed her on the face, intended to rape her); Lyon v. Severy,
Windsor County Court, June 1920
Term, vol. 40, p. 507-508 (rape, pregnancy).
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The average rises even higher—^to $305 per case—ifwe throw out a one cent damage
award from the Back case mentioned earlier.
The reputation of the woman was not necessarily an impediment. Harriet
Quackenbush sued after being stripped naked and tarred and feathered. She was
probably a prostitute. At a criminal trial for an assault on the house where she was
staying two years earlier, the defendants had sought to impeach the state's
witnesses
—
Quackenbush and another woman—on grounds that they were prostitutes
and therefore not credible. The court refiised to allow the character evidence and the
jury convicted. At the civil trial, the jury found her attacker guilty and awarded her
$400 damages in 1836.'^
In addition to those cases which explicitly alleged sexual assault, others had
sexual overtones to them and juries may well have taken this into account in their
verdicts. One has to read between the lines in such cases. Thus, for example, Mary
Chamberlain was ridden out on a rail "full of knots and nails" by three men. The court
found the assault to be wilftil and malicious and awarded $960 in damages—an
enormous sum in 1868. Other cases alleged assaults occurring during break-ins, or
involved horsewhipping and being dragged about. The physical nature of the assaults
and the large damages in these cases indicate the possibility of a sexual component."'
The criminal case was State v. Allen Smith et ai, Addison County Supreme Court, January 1835
Term, vol. "B.5," p. 151-154. The civil case vvas Quackenbush v. Preston, Addison County Court,
December 1836 Term, vol. 17, p. 273-276.
Vernal v Adams, Addison County Court, June 1858 Term, vol. 26 p. 563-564 ($300);
Chamberlain v.
Walbridge et ai, Windsor County Court, December 1868 Term, vol. 30, p. 318-321 ($960,
rode her out
of town on a rail); Priest v. Curtis, Orange County Supreme Court, March 1878
Term, vol. 20, p. 222
($93 broke into house and assaulted her); Waters v. Gilpin, Orange County
Court, June 1902 Term, vol.
23, p. 465 ($129, assault held to be willful and malicious); Rogers
v. Bigelow, 90 Vt. 41 (1915) ($863,
st^ck her with a horsewhip, laid hold of her and dragged her about).
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The civil assault data confirms patterns aheady noticeable in the defamation
cases. Women had access to civil causes of action to seek vindication for violations of
their bodily and sexual integrity. They used this access and could expect favorable
outcomes from these suits. Although the success rate for men was slightly higher,
women received much higher average damages in these cases. That the assault may
have been sexual m nature did not impede recovery, but in fact seems to have resulted
in higher damage awards. Furthermore, the Supreme Court at least seemed hostile to
the idea that women of poor reputation should not have access to the courts for
vindication of their right to physical and sexual autonomy. The poor reputation of a
woman could not excuse the actions of men who hurt women, but it could affect the
value of their civil damages where they sought compensation for injury to their sexual
sensibilities or reputations. The courts did not allow men to assauh women with
mipunity, even those with poor reputations. And perhaps most surprisingly, the
Supreme Court made clear that men approached women seeking sex at their own risk.
It was up to the woman to decide whether she had been
sexually assaulted, not the man,
Lastly, women, especially women suing in their own
name, seemed to have turned to
the court for vindication of their rights in greater
numbers after the Civil War.
Rrparh of Marriage Promise
Breach ofmamage promise suits provided an avenue for
single women to sue
who had engaged in moral or sexual promises and
then reneged or who had forced
them to have sex. Several of these suits
claimed that intercourse and pregnancy had
resulted. These cases were brought in
assumpsit (contract). The plaintiff had to show
men
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that a promise of marriage had been made by the defendant and that she had accepted it.
The defendant's failure to then enter into a marriage constituted the breach. While
some cases might present witness testimony or written evidence of an offer of marriage,
many did not. In these cases, jurors were asked to determine whether the plaintiffhad
reason to believe that an offer had in fact been made and accepted. Plaintiffs thus
sought to introduce evidence of courtship.
In its earliest case, the Supreme Court held that mere attentions paid by one
party to the other, even if long-standing and exclusive, were not sufficient in and of
themselves to establish a contract to marry. Instead, in the absence of an express
promise of marriage, it was the meaning of that attention that would decide the case. In
effect, this meant that it was entirely up to juries to determine whether a promise had
been made or not based on the circumstances of the case. Juries were thus confronted
with a variety of evidence, from discussions about fixing up the defendant's house in
preparation for marriage, to detailed discussions of the defendant's financial statements,
to a neighbor's testimony that the parlor lights went on whenever the defendant was at
the plaintiffs house-the regular use of this special room indicating, according to the
plaintiff, that courtship was under way."^
In a traditional society like Vermont in the nineteenth century, marriage was
vitally important to a woman. It meant the opportunity for her
to acquire the elevated
status afforded to married women, to start a family,
perhaps to have a home of her own.
It was also the single best way for a woman to attain a
measure of financial security.
- Munson v Hastings 12 Vt 346 (1839); Whitcomb v. Wolcott, 21
Vt. 368 (1849) (standard of proof and
ev^^LTofre~de^^^^^^ Luse):Z>... v. Lalor, 94 Vt. 103 (1920)
(discussion of fmances);
Clark V. Hodges, 65 Vt. 273 (1893) (parlor lights).
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Indeed, the extent to which women's self-definition and even base survival were tied to
marriage compared to those ofmen may explain why few men felt the need to bring such
suits and why those who did were so unsuccessful.''' Given the importance of marriage,
especially to women, all breach of marriage promise cases had at their heart the notion of
expectations dashed. When Annie Pollock found out that James Sullivan was not going
to marry her despite his promises (due partly to the fact that he was already married), she
sued him, declaring that as a result of his actions, she "has suffered great wrong and
injury and damage to her feelings and disappointment ofher reasonable expectations,
money value, and worldly advantages of marriage, permanent home, and advantage of
domestic happiness." Annie and her lawyers put a price on this damage: $3000.'** In an
opinion upholding the largest judgment ever awarded in such a case in the four counties.
Judge Fred M. Butler described the breach this way: "The contract is broken; fond hope,
so long and ardently cherished, has been forever dissipated, and the advantages she
might reasonably have anticipated are forever lost to her.""'
Breach ofpromise cases presented a variety of factual scenarios. Thomas
Ketcham was supposed to marry Anna Thatcher when he finished medical school.
Instead, he married Jane Horton. In 1855, a jury awarded Thatcher $1000 in damages.
Elizabeth Pattison came to work as a housekeeper for Hugh Williams in 1 882. When,
after ten years, he refused to marry her, she sued him for breach of marriage promise in
1 892. He paid her $100 to settle that claim. She sued him again in 1 896 arguing that he
Suits by men were so rare by the twentieth century that one Supreme Court justice described them as
possible "in theory." Stacey v. Dolan, 88 Vt. 369 (1914).
Pollock V. Sullivan, 53 Vt. 507 (1881).
^' Dyer v. Lalor, 94 Vt. 103 (1920).
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had promised her a house when she retired. A referee ruled that the 1 892 payment had
settled all disputes between them.^°
In another case the plaintiff argued that the parties had agreed to marry after a
trial run of keeping house together. William Forbes and Lucy Wells agreed that she
would keep house for him and his children with an eye towards marriage if things
worked out between thenx When Lucy married another man, Frank Morse, Forbes sued
her in 1 892. He pursued Wells and Forbes for several years, finally losing his case against
her for breach of marriage promise and against Morse for enticing Lucy away from
him.''
This last case notwithstanding, most suits were brought by women, most resulted
in big verdicts, and many involved pre-marital intercourse or eillegations that the female
plaintiff had had sex with another man. These last facts were no impediment to
recovery. In 1 839, Lama Ann Munson sued AppoUos Hastings for breach ofpromise.
He defended himself by arguing that she had had sex with another man. She denied it.
The jury believed her and awarded $ 1 385. Hastings appealed and won a new trial, this
time bolstering the evidence of Laura Ann's promiscuity with additional witness
testimony. She won again, this time recovering $1425." In 1866 Susan Lamphaere sued
Carlos Pitkin for seducing her, impregnating her, and then refusing to marry her,
Thatcher v. Ketcham, Rutland County Court, March 1854 Term, vol. 34, p. 66.; Pattison v. Williams,
Rutland County Court, September 1896 Term, vol. 53, p. 919-923.
" Forbes v. Morse, Rutland County Court, March 1 895 Term, vol. 52, p. 232-239; Forbes v. Morse, Rutland
County Court, March 1896 Term, vol. 53, p. 57-60.
" Mumon v. Hastings, 12 Vt. 346 (1839); Munson v. Hastings, Rutland County Court, April 1839
Terra, Docket No. 53. The two witnesses were later prosecuted for perjury and convicted. State v.
Davidson, Rutland County Supreme Court, February 1840 Term, vol. 110, p. 21-22.
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'Svhereby she has suffered great damage in her good name, fame and reputation and been
otherwise injured." Pitkin defaulted and the court awarded Lamphaere $750 in damages.
In 1 889 Lizzie Currier sued Joseph Richardson claiming that he had seduced her, had
intercourse with her, and then married another. The defendant agreed to have a
judgment for $750 entered against him. Mary Tripp had sex with Henry Cheney and got
pregnant. When he refused to marry her, she sued and won $2000 in damages in 1919."
In a similar type of case, Elnora Reed sued John Kimball in tort for fraudulent marriage.
Kimball took her to a man he said was a justice of the peace, but who was in fact not
authorized to perform marriages. She lived with Kimball for more than two years and
had two children with him before learning that the marriage was fraudulent and that
Kimball was married to another woman. He defaulted and the court awarded her $2000.
Kimball was also charged with bigamy and adultery and convicted of the latter in 1901
Oftwenty-three suits brought between 1805 and 1919 (all but two ofwhich
appeared after 1847) twenty (87 percent) ended in a positive result for the plaintiff.
Plaintiffs prevailed by jury (fifteen), court (two), referee (one), by default (one) and
" Susan Lamphaere v. Carlos Pitkin, Windsor County Court, May 1866 Term, vol. 29, p. 452-453; Lizzie
J. Currier v. Joseph N. Richardson, Windsor County Court, December 1889 Term, vol. 35, p. 275-282;
Mary E. Tripp v. Henry E. Cheney, Rutland County Court, September 1919 Term, vol. 62, p.
892-894.
^ Elnora Reed v. John F. Kimball, Orange County Court, December 1900 Term, vol. 23, p. 396-397;
State V Kimball, Orange County Court, June 1901 Term, Docket No. 1 111; State v.
Kimball, Orange
County Court, June 1902 Term, Docket No. 1 170. Kimball also makes clear that the
merger doctrme
did not apply in Vermont. Women could seek both civil and criminal vindication for sexual
wrongs
committed against them. See also State v. Damon, 2 Tyl. 387 (1803); Hoadiey v.
Watson, 45 Vt. 289
( 1 873) Hoadiey involved a non-sexual assault by a man on a
woman. Thus, the Vermont evidence
calls into question Lea VanderVelde's assertion that merger prevented
women from seeking redress m
the courts for sexual wrongs. "The Legal Ways of Seduction," Stanford
Law Review 4i (1996): m-
850.
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settlement (one). Onjy one case resulted in a not guilty verdict. Two cases resulted in
a non-suit by plaintiff—which may or may not have reflected a settlement. Damages
could be enormous. In sixteen of the seventeen cases in which damages were
ascertainable, the average award was $971 . This figure excludes an anomalous (because
enormous) judgment of $20,000 awarded to a female plaintiff in 1 91 9. If that figure is
included, the average rises to $2090. Only four of the twenty-three suits were brought
by men. Two of those suits resulted in defeults by the plaintiff, one resulted in the only
not guilty verdict, and one received an award of $25-the smallest damage award during
the period. In fact, when the male plaintiffs are stripped out of the data, the success
rates and average damage awards for female plaintiffs were even higher (100 percent and
$1034 respectively).
How can we explain both the success rates of these cases and the size of the
awards? It is clear that the cost of caring for illegitimate offspring was not a part of
these damages. For one thing, even in cases where the intercourse did not lead to
pregnancy, the female plaintiff recovered a large sum. Secondly, the cost of raising the
child was not an element of damages in a breach of marriage case. The appropriate suit
for such an injury was a bastardy proceeding. Women who became pregnant out of
wedlock could bring both a suit for breach of marriage promise and for bastardy. This is
what Mary Tripp did for example. In addition to the $2000 she won fi-om Henry Cheney
for breach ofmarriage promise, she recovered $300 for the costs she had incurred in
"Suits were brought in 1805, 1839, 1848, 1849, 1851, 1852, 1853, 1854, 1855, 1856,
1862, 1864, 1866,
1867, 1871, 1889, 1893, 1895, 1896(2), 1911, 1919(2).
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taking care of the child to the date ofjudgment plus $6.50 per week in child support until
the child's sixteenth birthday. Cheney's fickleness cost him dearly.^^
Instead of compensating women for the costs of raising a baby out-of-wedlock, it
seems clear that juries were in fact compensating women not only for the breach of
marriage promise but also for their seduction as well. Unlike many states, Vermont did
not technically permit women to sue for their own seduction, but this was an obvious
part of the damages in these suits. In 1 91 1 , the Supreme Court made this explicit in
Stokes V. Mason (191 1) a case in which the female plaintiff sought damages for
seduction as part of her breach of marriage promise case. The idea of allowing such
suits created a moral quandary for male lawmakers and feminists alike. On the one hand
it was unfair to allow a woman 'Ho recover indirectly what the law has emphatically and
consistently forbidden her to recover." She was forbidden to recover, according to the
Court, because in seduction, the man and woman were equally at fault both having
engaged in premarital sex. At the same time, unless she were allowed to plead her
damages on account of the seduction, she would be prevented fi-om showing all the
circumstances contributing to the "distress of mind which is an acknowledged element of
her damage."
The Court resolved the matter by distinguishing between consensual intercourse
which took place in the absence of the promise of marriage (i.e. seduction) and that
which took place within it. It admitted that this was not a strong distinction, for even if
the intercourse took place in the context of a marriage promise, the woman was
"nevertheless a responsible and consenting party to an immoral act." Nonetheless, this
Tripp V. Cheney, Rutland County Court, September 1919 Term, vol. 60, p.
892-894.
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distinction was the best the Court could do. In the case of seduction, the woman had no
right to claim damages for her wrongful behavior-only her father did. But in this case,
she had been impregnated based on a fraudulent promise and had a right to a complete
remedy for the damages sustained on account of the breach of that promise. The Court
recognized that the question "[might] not be entirely free from technical difficulties," but
that there was "an element ofjustice in this solution of it that cannot be gainsaid." The
Court ruled that a woman suing a man for breach of marriage promise could add her
seduction as an aggravation of her damages. That is, her agreement to engage in
intercourse and/or ensuing pregnancy, occurring as a result of a marital promise, was an
aspect of her damages and so should be allowed as part of the suit."
The late date of the Stokes decision notwithstanding, it is clear from the
unpublished cases that the seduction aspect of breach of marriage ceises had long been an
accepted aspect of damages in such suits. As early as 1 866 complaints in breach of
marriage promise cases had referenced the "great damage in her good name, fame and
reputation" suffered by women who had been impregnated and then jilted. That
complaint had even used the word "seduced." Other cases detailed the way in which the
breach had deprived plaintiffs of the "care, custody, control, aid, comfort and society" or
"aid, comfort, assistance and society" of their fiances. As we will see, this is also the
language of a seduction complaint.^* Thus, Stokes is yet another example in which the
Supreme Court confirmed the practice and values being applied at the county court level.
' stokes V. Mason, 85 Vt. 164 (1911).
Lamphaere v. Pitkin, Windsor County Court, May 1866 Term, vol. 29, p. 452-453; Ashley v. Tupper,
Windsor County Court, December 1867 Term, vol. 30, p. 128-13 1
.
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Nonetheless, breach of marriage promise cases posed cultural and theoretical
challenges to Vermont's legal system. Of all the causes of action examined in this work,
they featured the oddest and least compatible combinations of persons, venues, and
ideologies appearing in the courtroom. First, breach of promise cases were almost
always brought by that oxymoronic creature, thefeme sole, a woman who was also a
legally capable person. A female in the courtroom acting in her own capacity was
antithetical to the legal regime ofVermont and the nation, both in a technically legal
sense as well as in the more general sense of the masculine culture of the courtroom.^'
Second, these suits asked the courts to apply legal/contractual principles, normally part
ofthe public (male) world of business, to the private, intimate world of domestic
courtship. Third, in cases where premarital sex had taken place, judges and juries were
confronted with the paradox of awarding money to women who had had intercourse
outside of marriage. In order to assimilate these oppositional values, someone's
ideology had to give way.
Stokes summed up the tensions in these kinds of suits. The courts had to choose
between compensating women for wrongs done to them-that is treating women as they
did any other injured party turning to the court for reUef or using the law to shore up
gender and sexual expectations. The Stokes opinion was explicit about the difficulty of
the choices judges and juries had to make when confronted with these choices. But like
the other cases we have examined, breach of marriage promise cases demonstrate
an
5' Michael Grossman, "Institutionalizing Masculinity: The Law as a Masculine
Profession," in
Meaningsfor Manhood: Constructions ofMasculinity in Victorian America,
Mark Games and Clyde
Griflfen, eds. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990).
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inclination on the part ofjudges and juries to hold their noses and choose compensation.
As a result, is was men who ended up being punished for the violation of their sexual,
gender, and (sometimes) contractual obligations rather than women.
Bastardy
Bastardy too provided women with a remedy for the harm caused by sexual
assault or out-of-wedlock sexual activity—^the expense involved in raising a child. It did
so in a way which was completely non-judgmental about the circumstances of the
conception. It did not matter whether the conception resulted from a rape or from
volxmtary, non-marital sex. It is impossible to know how many of these pregnancies
resulted from forced sex and how many as a result of consensual sex, though we know
anecdotally that both situations resulted in bastardy suits. I have documented 142
bastardy cases in the four counties brought between 1784 and 1920 although there were
almost certainly more that were settled and not entered into the clerk's record books.
The suits are fairly evenly dispersed throughout the period with approximately ten cases
going to trial or verdict per decade.^ These cases had very high success rates. Ninety-
one cases resulted in a finding of guilt either by a judge, jury, or stipulation. Another
eleven were settled and discontinued and in eight others the court entered a default
judgment for the plaintiff. Taken all together this amounts to a 77 percent success rate.
Only fifteen cases resulted in a not guilty verdict (1 1 percent). In the remaining cases the
The dispersion of cases was: 1800s (5), 1810s (2), 1820s (13), 1830s (13), 1840s (1 1), 1850s (10),
1860s (9), 1870s (16), 1880s (9), 1890s (12), 1900s (15), 1910s (23). The very high figure for the
period 1910 to 1920 can be attributed to Addison County cases which appeared in the docket books as
being settled and discontinued thus indicating that more suits may well have been settled and not
entered into the clerk's record books.
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plaintiffwas non-suited, the case discontinued or dismissed-all of which could also
indicate a settlement. I could ascertain the award paid to the plaintiffby verdict or
settlement in ninety-one cases. The average award was $208 or several year's salary for
a young women employed as a servant or mill hand. Payments averaged between $100
and $200 through the 1860s. From the 1870s onward, the payments increased to
between $200 and $400 up to 1920 with some variation. Normally these payments were
divided into weekly, monthly or quarterly payments extending out over the customary
four years required by common law. Payment for the expense of raising the child during
its first four years was a real and tangible form of partial compensation which the law
provided on a no-feult basis to women who had been impregnated out of wedlock.^'
And it was truly a no-fault system. Vermont's trial courts and the Supreme
Court repeatedly rebuffed attempts by male defendants to smear the female
complainant's sexual character. Since the only question to be answered in bastardy
proceedings was paternity, the courts did not allow even the limited character attacks it
had begun to allow in rape cases where consent was an issue after 1855."
As early as 1832, Vermont's Supreme Court rejected an attempt by a defendant
to smear the female complainant's character. Parmelia Morse had testified that she had
In 1837 a female Vermont mill hand could earn as much as $3.15 per week less $1.25 for her board.
A house servant earned as little as one dollar per week. Deborah P. Clifford, "Vermont 'Mill Girls,'" in
Micheal Sherman and Jennie Versteeg, eds., tVe Vermonters: Perspectives on the Past (Montpelier,
Vermont Historical Society, 1992), 219-224. By the 1880s the salary was $5 for mill hands and $3 to $4
for a housekeeper. See discussion ofwages for women in Chapter 2. The highest payment in a
bastardy
case not adjusted for inflation was $678 awarded by the Rutland County Court in 1913 to Lydia
Fitzgerald, whose father Thomas had brought a separate suit for seduction and received $1200. Lydia
Fitzgerald v Patrick Connors, Rutland County Court, September 1913 Term, vol. 60, p.
708-710.
Lucius E. Chittenden, The Law ofBaron and Femme by Tapping Reeve,
2"' ed. (Burlington, 1 846), 277-
278.
" The case, State v. Johnson, 28 Vt. 512 (1856), is discussed in Chapter
4.
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been impregnated by John J. Pineo. Pineo's lawyer then sought to introduce evidence
that she had been "a common prostitute" prior to her impregnation. The plaintiff
objected to the evidence and the court agreed. It was excluded and Pineo found liable.
On appeal, Pineo's lawyers sought to justify the admission of sexual character evidence
by analogizing the bastardy proceeding to a rape trial. They argued that in a rape case,
the bad sexual character of the alleged victim might be shown in order to impeach her
credibility. The Vermont Supreme Court would not hold that such evidence was
admissible in a rape trial for another twenty-three years, so the defendant had to rely on a
Massachusetts case for this proposition. If such evidence was appropriate in a rape case,
Pineo's lawyers went on, "how much stronger the reason for its admission in a private
prosecution, and for her sole benefit, and when she testifies to her previous purity."
The plaintiff argued that only general evidence of character for truth could be
used to impeach a witness's credibility rather than specific questions about her sexual
reputation. Her lawyers also cited the Massachusetts Supreme Court, this time for the
proposition that sexual character evidence was immaterial in a bastardy proceeding, "the
witness's character for chastity being suflSciently impeached by her own confession" i.e.
that she had had sex out of wedlock.
The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff and upheld the verdict. The Court
made clear that evidence that Morse was a prostitute had nothing to do with her
competence as a witness. Though Chief Justice Titus Hutchinson did not explicitly
identify the real reason he believed the evidence had been introduced, he seemed angered
by the tactic, lecturing the defendant that if a woman were a prostitute that "can be no
test of the particular grade of confidence, that should be placed in her testimony.
There
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is a difference, in this respect, among persons of this character as well as others." If the
defendant wanted to challenge the credibility of a plaintiff in a bastardy case, he was
welcome to do so, but only by means of general evidence ofher character for truth
telling, and not by resort to specific sexual reputation evidence.
Hutchinson was not done however. He also challenged the plaintiff's use of the
Massachusetts case which had prohibited the use of sexual character evidence in bastardy
cases. In that decision, the Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that evidence of lack of
chastity was immaterial since the woman's condition akeady confirmed her loose morals.
Hutchinson rejected the logic of this argument too. Such a theory, he wrote:
supposes that none but common prostitutes are found in this situation.
This cannot be a correct supposition. Undoubtedly some are seduced and
ruined, with no connection with any but their seducer. The true reason is,
that such a reputation is no certain, correct test of truth. There is no way
to ascertain, how far the reputation of a prostitute affects her truth, but by
proving her character for truth.
In 1843, the Court heard an almost identical case. Spears v. Forrest. In Spears,
the defendant had sought to introduce evidence that the plaintiff lived in a brothel and
was "a notorious prostitute." The trial court had rejected the evidence and the defendant
had been found Uable. In his arguments before the Supreme Court, the defendant's
lawyer noted the decision in Morse eleven years before and sought to convince the Court
to overturn it. His argument before the Court dripped with sarcasm. He focused not on
any unfairness to his client but to other witnesses whom, he claimed were subject to
more probing inquiries on the stand. "The notorious and professional prostitution of the
female, for money, effectually prevents any discussion of the truth and veracity of such a
Morse v. Pineo, 4 Vt. 281 (1 832). The Massachusetts case was Commonwealth v. Moore, 3
Pick. (Mass.)
194(1825).
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person. The virtuous part of society, fit to be impeaching witnesses, shun her; and the
others only know her in her all-absorbing professional reputation. Yet, by this rule, the
reason why her truth and veracity are not called into question must be kept a secret fi-om
the jury." He urged the Court to adopt the Massachusetts rule that gave lawyers the
right to prove "notorious professional prostitution."
The Court rejected these arguments and upheld Morse. In his brief opinion, Milo
Bennett, who would prove to be a consistent critic of the use of specific sexual character
evidence in most judicial proceedings, flatly declared that evidence of prostitution was
not admissible to impeach the character of Esther Spears. After two direct decisions on
the point in the Vermont courts, "the question cannot be considered, with us, as an open
one, whatever the decisions may have been in some of our sister states."^
In general, the Supreme Court's ruling in Morse governed bastardy suits for the
rest of the century and beyond. Although the standard for character evidence in rape
cases would be somewhat loosened after 1855 the courts remained resistant to opening
the door for such evidence in bastardy proceedings. Thus, in 1848, the Court refiised to
allow in evidence that the plaintiff had sought out an abortion upon learning that she was
pregnant. The trial judge had excluded the evidence. In another opinion, Milo Bennett
explained:
It is quite obvious, that to have allowed the inquiry would have been
improper. Let the question have been answered as it might have been, the
answer could have had no tendency either to have proved or disproved
the fact, whether the defendant was the father of the child or not, - which
was the point at issue. If there were no other reason, why the question
« Spears v. Forrest, 15 Vt. 435 (1843).
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should not have been asked, this was sufficient. Certainly it could not be
claimed as proper matter by way of impeaching the witness.^^
It was Milo Bennett who would be the lone dissenter seven years later when the Court
decided to permit the introduction of specific sexual character evidence as a means of
impeaching the credibility of alleged rape victims.
Twenty years later the Court again reasserted the impermissibility of smearing the
sexual reputations ofbastardy plaintiflfs. Ella Luce, aged sixteen, had been taken in by
Sylvester Sterling and his wife ten years before and had taken their name as her own.
She testified that Sylvester had been having sex with her since she was eleven and that it
was he who had impregnated her. In Sterling v. Sterling (1 868), the defendant
unleashed the whole gamut of defense tactics against Ella. Evidence that Ella had sought
an abortion, had been sexually promiscuous, and had a bad reputation for truth were all
admitted by trial judge James Barrett and the defendant had been found not guilty. As
we will see, Barrett was particularly unwilling to respect clear precedent when it clashed
with his conservative moral beliefs and was seemingly hostile toward female plaintiffs in
sex cases.
In reversing Barrett, the Supreme Court reiterated its position against the use of
smear tactics in bastardy cases. The simple fact of the matter was that in bastardy cases
the only issue to be decided was paternity. That the plaintiffwas promiscuous, a
prostitute, or a would-be baby killer was irrelevant and could not mitigate damages. In
Sterling, Barrett had allowed in evidence of intercourse and familiarity with other men
that were out of time and thus could not possibly have led to Ella's pregnancy. The
Sweet V. Sherman, 21 Vt. 23 (1848).
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defendant's presumption-that if she had had intercourse with these men before, she
could very well have had intercourse with them later-was rejected by the Supreme Court
as resting on far too speculative a basis. As for the issue of abortion, the Court noted it
had long ago decided that such inquiries were irrelevant in bastardy cases, citing the
Sweet case discussed above. It reaffirmed earlier holdings that only general evidence of
character for truth telling were permissible in bastardy cases. The Court would continue
to resist eflforts to smear bastardy plaintiffs' reputations in the fliture.^^
In assessing the Court's holdings in bastardy cases, it is important to remember
that juries, judges, and society in general had an incentive to make sure that some man
was on the hook for the support of the child. After all, the impetus behind bastardy laws
was to prevent the woman and child from becoming a charge on the town. If a poor
woman refiised to bring a bastardy suit, and it was likely that the child would become a
charge on the town, the overseer of the poor could bring it on her behalf^' The Court's
holdings made it easier for plaintiffs or towns to win bastardy cases by denying
defendants a strategy that might move some judges and juries-smearing the sexual
character of the female plaintiff.
But practical considerations did not entirely govern Vermont's bastardy law.
Not all states foreclosed such strategies or foreclosed them so forcefully. Recall Chief
Judge Hutchinson going out of his way to distinguish Vermont practice from that of
Sterling v. Sterling, 41 Vt. 80 (1868). Thus see for example, Wilkins v. Metcalf, 71 Vt. 103 (1898).
In that case the Court held that it had been error to allow the defendant to testify that he had told his
father ten months before the alleged conception that he should not hire the plaintiff as a servant because
ofher character. The Court held that such evidence was too remote from any feet in issue in the case
and that it was "calculated to prejudice the complainant's case."
See for example Revised Laws of Vermont, 1880 § 2409 (Rutland, 1881).
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Massachusetts in the meaning to be given to the character of any woman bringing a
bastardy suit. Other states did allow the introduction of such evidence on the theory that
immoral or unchaste women were not credible or trustworthy. The Court's choices in
this matter reflected a broader theme running through much of its civil and criminal
jurisprudence. In evaluating the claims of parties, Vermont law tended to see women as
individuals first and gendered beings second. Generalized assumptions about gender did
figure prominently in determining the nature of the injury to women or girls and the
proper punishment for men. But in both theory and practice, judges and juries refused to
apply assumptions about gender to explain the specific actions of females except in rape
cases dealing specifically with the issue of consent.^*
Vermont's law differed in another important way. Unlike many other states,
including Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maine, and Massachusetts, the fact that a
woman had not named the putative father during her "travail" (i.e. during labor) did not
prevent her fi"om bringing her suit or testifying at the trial.^^
Allowing evidence of immorality or lack of chastity in bastardy cases was the exception. Nonetheless,
in addition to Massachusetts, some states did permit it. State v. Seevers, 108 Iowa 738 (1899); Short v.
State, 4 Del. 568 (1845); State v. Coatney, 8 Yerg. (Tenn.) 210 (1835); Sword v. Nestor, 3 Dana (Ky.)
453 (1835).
On the requirement oftravail statements, see Beals v. Furbish, 39 Me. 469 (1855); Bailey v. Chesley,
10 Cush. (Mass.) 284 (1852); Rodiman v. Hardy, 18 N.H. 431 (1846); Warner v. Willey, 2 Root (Conn.)
490 (1796). The theory was that in order to overcome the common law's prohibition against the
admission of interested party testimony there had to be some additional guarantee for the veracity of the
allegation. The trauma of childbirth was deemed sufficient since it was thought unlikely that a woman
would lie "in the time of her utmost peril, with the fear of death and judgment before her eyes."
Maxwell v. Hardy, 8 Pick. (Mass.) 560 (1829). Vermont's earliest bastardy statutes (adopted from
Connecticut law) contained the travail requirement. But after adoption of the 1793 constitution, the
requirement was dropped and in feet Vermont law prohibited examination of the woman until at least
one month after the delivery. 1 779 Vt. Acts 82; 1 787 Vt. Acts 2 1 ; Laws of Vermont (Rutland, 1 798),
191-196. The travail rule may seem odd to modem people, but interestingly, the law still makes
exceptions for otherwise inadmissible statements made in extremis, including the excited utterance and
dying declaration exceptions and exclusions to the hearsay rule. Vt. R. Evid. 803(2) and 804(2).
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Furthermore, though a town could bring a bastardy suit in a woman's name if she
refused to do so herself, bastardy still belonged to the woman and not the town. Under
Vermont law, if she died before bringing suit, the town could not bring the action in her
stead—it was personal to her. Where a woman had paid for the support of the child and
the town later recovered money from the father in a bastardy proceeding, Vermont law
required the town to pay it over to her as reimbursement for sums already expended.
Even in cases where a town had taken over the prosecution for bastardy from the woman
she did not become "a mere nominal party without interest," And no town could settle
the suit without her "consent and approbation." In other words, Vermont's bastardy law
was driven by something more than a purely utilitarian effort at getting local
communities off the hook for the cost of raising iUegitimate children.
Bastardy provided women the ability to turn to the state for determination of
paternity, to win child support, and to have the support order enforced. Judges could
and did require men to post bonds for the payment of support or hold them in jail for
failing to comply with their orders. Success rates and support awards were very high.
Vermont law discarded the harsher and more judgmental aspects of an earlier bastardy
law, even while other nearby states did not. Furthermore, while the law might not
compensate a woman completely for the damage of say, sexual assault or injury to her
sexual reputation caused by out-of-wedlock pregnancy, neither was it an exclusive
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remedy. Seduction and bastardy suits could be brought in tandem as could suits for
breach ofmarriage promise and bastardy. And they were.'"
Conclusion
Nineteenth-century Vermont law provided civil remedies to women and girls who
had been sexually dishonored, physically assaulted, impregnated or abandoned. Judges
and juries demonstrated a clear sympathy for plaintiffs bringing these suits and they
rewarded them with favorable verdicts and large damage awards. In crafting and
applying the law of this area, Vermonters had to choose among competing values. What
was more important, a female's right to be safe from sexual assault or a man's right to
assume a woman's sexual availability? What role, if any, could a female's reputation for
chastity play in a suit seeking compensation for sexual injury? Could a woman who had
consented to pre-marital sex seek compensation when that sexual bargain went awry?
These questions arose in the context of broader societal changes including women's
growing legal, economic, and political autonomy, a legal system less and less willing to
^° Haynes v. Sinclair, 23 Vt. 108 (1850) (introduction of evidence ofbreach ofmarriage promise and
cost of supporting illegitimate child in seduction suit was error since those causes of action belonged to
woman and could result in defendant being punished twice for the same wrong); Rollins v. Chalmers, 49
Vt. 515 (1877); Drake v. Town ofSharon, 40 Vt. 35 (1867); Sterling, 95. For examples of seduction and
bastardy cases arising out ofthe same transaction: Sarah Silver v. Solomon White, Windsor County
Court, March 1821 Term, vol. 13, p. 221 and Town ofNorwich v. Solomon White, Windsor County
Court, March 1821 Term, vol. 13, p. 194; Fidelia Rollins v. Albert Chalmers, Orange County Court,
March 1877, Supreme Court vol. 20, p. 213 and Samuel Rollins v. Albert Chalmers, Orange County
Court, March 1877, Supreme Court vol. 20, p. 248; Ada J. Stearns v. Leonard B. Adams, Windsor
County Court, December 1892 Term, vol. 35, p. 517-518 and Edgar H. Stearns v. Leonard B. Adams,
Windsor County Court, December 1892 Term, vol. 35, p. 537; Anna L Giles v. George Brothers,
Windsor County Court, December 1897 Term, vol. 36, p. 553-554 and Lemuel A. Giles v. George
Brothers, Windsor County Court, December 1898 Term, vol. 37, p. 192. Breach of marriage promise
and bastardy: Mary E. Tripp v. Harry E. Cheney, Rutland County Court, September 1919 Term, vol. 60,
p. 890-892 and Mary E. Tripp v. Harry E. Cheney, Rutland County Court, September 1919
Term, vol.
60, p. 892-894.
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bring extrinsic moral values to bear on contractual disputes, and a society facing a crisis
in rural life including growing rates of divorce, adultery, venereal disease, and
illegitimacy.
When it came to matters of physical safety, the right of an individual to be free
from violence trumped all other competing societal values. This is true whether one
looks at the outcomes of trials seeking vindication for individual rights or the opinions of
the Supreme Court defining the contours of those proceedings. Both trial and appellate
courts were protective to the exclusion of other important societal values. Vermonters
were intolerant of physical violence, regardless of the circumstances, a fact reflected in
their low rates of violent crime. Even gross and insuhing words spoken about one's wife
could not excuse an ensuing assauh. For example, in a series of cases decided during the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court repeatedly rejected attempts to create
a defense to suits for assault and battery based on the argument that the plaintiff had
instigated the attack by his use of harsh language. "The law abhors the use of force
either for attack or defense," the Court declared in an 1 883 opinion, "and never permits
its use unnecessarily." No words, no matter how gross or insulting could excuse an
assault and battery."^' Women benefitted from this absolutist position in that they could
expect the courts both to compensate them for injuries from physical and sexual assault
and to punish male assailants.
^' The quote is from Howland v. Day, 56 Vt. 318 (1883), cited in Goldsmith's Admr. v. Joy, 61 Vt. 488
(1889); see also Willey v. Carpenter, 64 Vt. 212 (1891). In Willey the defendant
had struck the plaintiff
after the plaintiffhad called the defendant's wife a "dirty little whore." He was awarded $50 by the
court Nathan R. Carpenter v. Ezra Willey, Orange County Court, December 1890 Term,
vol. 22, p.
595 In a separate action, however, the defendant's wife sued the plaintiff for
defamation and won a
jury verdict of $679. Lizzie Carpenter v. Ezra Willey, Orange County Supreme Court,
May 1892 Term,
vol. 20, p. 453.
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Other cases posed a greater challenge to the legal system, particularly when they
combined the incompatible themes of legally independent women and consensual sex
such as a breach of marriage promise case. In her intellectual history of consent, Pamela
Haag highlights the incoherency of these two concepts. Married women's property acts
greatly expanded the numbers ofwomen who were legally free actors. At the same time,
contract law underwent a dramatic change. It shifted from an earlier paradigm in which
judges and juries had been free to consider the moral, social, and cultural context of the
exchange in determining the rights of the parties, to one in which the intent of the parties
at the time of the bargain became the sole determinant of their rights. When the two
came together, particularly in a breach of marriage promise case, the legal system was
forced to make a choice between permitting women to have the same freedom of
contract as men, and hence allow themselves to bargain their bodies and demand
compensation when men did not uphold their end of the bargain, or sully the purity of
contract law by creating exceptions when it came to sexual matters involving women.'^
In both breach of marriage promise cases and in bastardy cases, the legal
system's answer was clear. Ifwomen could prove that a bargain was made or that the
man was in fact the father of the child, it was the man and not the woman who would
pay. That is, Vermont law made men pay for their actions. The evidence for this is
strong-whether in the high success rates and damage awards in these cases or the
Supreme Court's refusal to allow the woman's reputation or past immoral acts to be
used against her in pursuing these causes of action.
Pamela Haag, Consent: Sexual Rights and the Transformation ofAmerican Liberalism (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1999), 25-60. Haag's emphasis is on consent particularly with
regard to
criminal seduction, but she also addresses the issue of breach of promise and contract.
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In examining the interactions of law, women, and sex, many scholars have
focused on the way in which the system treated women. But what this initial
examination of the law in the civil area shows is that the legal system was concerned not
only with the behavior ofwomen but also with the behavior of men. Rather than reading
these cases solely as regulating female behavior, we might better understand them in the
way the historical actors did: suits against men for physical and sexual misbehavior and
its consequences. Rather than shoring up female gender and sexual expectations by
denying women access to the courts or severely restricting the viability of their suits
because of their past bad acts or bad reputations, the courts decided to focus on
compensating women for male misbehavior. As a result, it was male sexual and gender
expectations that came to the fore, and it was men who were punished for transgressing
them. These expectations for men included peaceful behavior towards everyone, but
especially towards women, containment of sexual passion, adherence to contract, and
payment of compensation for the violation of these norms. Men could not avoid these
responsibilities by pointing to the failure of others, especially women, to adhere to their
gender and sexual expectations, except to the extent that women sought compensation
for that particular aspect of damages. Thus, when faced with difficult problems such as
whether a woman's voluntary pre-marital sexual experiences should prevent her from
receiving full compensation for the injury of a breach of marriage promise, the Court
sided with full compensation despite the fact that in doing so, it sent a message contrary
to its obvious moral values about proper female sexual behavior.
The number ofwomen seeking compensation in their own names increased in the
second halfof the nineteenth century. This was likely due to a combination
of greater
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female autonomy, changes in the law making it possible for married women to sue in
their own names, and high success rates and damage awards. But women hardly flocked
to the courts to take advantage of the remedies they offered. The numbers for all these
actions except bastardy were small. Assuming that women were in fact attacked,
defamed, and jilted more often than these numbers suggest, what explains this paradox?
For one thing, in order to make suing worthwhile, various conditions had to be
right. The case had to have a good chance of succeeding. The defendant had to have
suflBcient wealth to pay any judgment, the plaintiffhad to have enough money to pay her
attorney's fees, post a $30 or $50 bond that was the norm in such cases, and she had to
be prepared to pay the defendant's costs ifhe prevailed. These factors ruled out the
bringing ofmany cases.
Furthermore, the courts were not an empowering paradise for women.
Nineteenth-century culture did not value female autonomy and rarely sought to
encourage it. Women faced a legal system created and run by men. Until 1 884, married
women had to rely on their husbands to bring their suits and many male plaintiffs, jurors,
and judges no doubt saw the suits as vindications not so much of their wives' or
daughters' rights, but of those of their husbands or parents. As we have seen,
particularly in the sexual assault cases involving young women, the rhetoric of male
responsibility emanating from the courts was often a paternalistic or Victorian one,
which presupposed female inferiority or helplessness.'^ It was thus a source of public
"
In Newell v. Whitcher, the judge made much of the vulnerability of the plaintiff" "a poor, blind girl
under the protecting care of very man who would violate every injunction of hospitality, that he might
dishonor and ruin at his own hearthstone this unfortunate child, who had the right to appeal to him to
defend her from such outrage." Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589 (1880). In Alexander v.
Blodgett, the
judge noted that there could be no greater harm to "a virtuous woman or girl" than a sexual assault.
Alexander v. Blodgett, 44 Vt. 476 (1872).
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discourse issuing from an important social institution, broadcast not only to male jurors
and spectators, but to powerful forces responsible for making law: lawyers, legislators,
and judge. Thus, it could be hobbling to women seeking greater sexual, social, and
political rights. Nonetheless, regardless ofthe motivation of those deciding these
questions, these suits help us define the realm of possibility for women in Vermont's
courts in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They made clear that women had
a right to physical and sexual safety and that they could seek vindication when they were
abused. Though sexual reputation was important and adherence to gender and sexual
norms expected, a woman's bad reputation would be used against her only when she
herself raised the matter by seeking damages for injury to it. The courts did not permit
the gratuitous use of reputation evidence. They also made clear that men would be held
responsible for transgression of society's sexual and gendered expectations ofthem and
that the woman's failure to adhere to hers would not excuse his. Rather than a desire to
increase female autonomy, Vermont's courts displayed a commitment to the rule of law,
the right to compensation for its violation, and an intent to punish men who violated the
gender and sexual expectations society had for them.
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CHAPTER 2
FATHERS, DAUGHTERS, AND
VERMONT'S CHANGING SEDUCTION LAW, 1827-1914
Introduction
On March 20, 1914, in open court, Thomas Fitzgerald was asked how the news
of his daughter's out-of-wedlock pregnancy made him feel. "Why," he said:
I cannot tell it. I cannot express it, it made me crazy for a while. 1 sold
my farm; I had bought a farm there and was getting along nice until this
happened and I wanted to get away so far, I never wanted to live around
there again in the world—why, I couldn't,--! can't express it. I can't
express my feelings.
Under further questioning, Fitzgerald admitted his humiliation on hearing of the
pregnancy in 191 1, a humiliation he had felt "ever since." Asked to describe how he felt
when he met people, Fitzgerald told the court that he did not even want to meet them at
alL'
Thomas Fitzgerald was suing Patrick Connors for the seduction of his daughter
Lydia. His lawyer, Joseph Jones, understood the importance of conveying to the twelve
men on the jury a father's sense of shame and dishonor upon learning the news that his
unmarried daughter had had intercourse with a man and become pregnant.
Such evidence of a father's shame and humiliation had not always been welcome
in Vermont seduction trials. Until 1 879 the Vermont Supreme Court had not allowed
such an inquiry. Vermont law had long given a father the right to bring suit against a
man who impregnated his daughter out of wedlock. But at common law the cause of
' Fitzgerald V. Connors, Rutland County Supreme Court, November 1914 Terra, vol. 127, p.
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action had been based on a father's loss of the value of his daughter's labor occasioned
by her pregnancy, rather than for his shame. The origins of the tort lay in the English
common law. Traditionally, when a master lost the services of his servant on account of
the actions of another, he had the right to sue for damages. This action per quod
servitium amisit was adapted in 1653 to apply to cases where daughters had become
pregnant out ofwedlock. This development was probably the result of clever lawyering.
Common law barred the testimony of an interested witness-and plaintiffs were the most
interested of witnesses. But without the woman's testimony seduction could not be
proved. Giving the cause of action to the father instead of the daughter allowed her to
take the stand and testify.^
In the nineteenth century, seduction law underwent dramatic change in form and,
some have argued, in meaning. State legislatures became increasingly active in
regulating seduction by statute during the mid and late nineteenth century. Some of
these changes abolished the common law requirement that economic loss be shown,
permitted the father to sue in the absence of a master-servant relationship, allowed the
woman herself to sue, or imposed criminal penalties against the seducer. The common
law also underwent modification in states like Vermont which did not pass legislation.
Both statutory and common law modification reflected a shift in the language ofthe
cause of action fi-om its technical origins as an economic tort to one that explicitly
' M.B.W. Sinclair, "Seduction and the Myth of the Ideal Woman," Journal ofLaw and Inequality 5
(1987)- 35-41- Jane E. Larson, '"Women Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit": A
Feminist Rethinking of Seduction," Columbia Law Review 33 (1993): 382-383. Lucius E. Chittenden,
The Law ofBaron and Femme by Tapping Reeve, 2nd ed. (Burlington, Vt., 1846), 292-293,
n. 1. "It is
one of the necessary fictions ofthe law that gives this right of action to
the parent or master, thereby
making the infent a competent witness. This is done that the wrong-doer may
not escape for want of
proof; the transaction being such an one, as, from the nature, is
susceptible ofproof only through the
parties to it."
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referenced the shame and dishonor suffered by a father and daughter as a result of her
intercourse and pregnancy.
Courts in Vermont and elsewhere had always been sympathetic to plaintiffe in
seduction cases and damage awards often reflected far more than the actual value of the
daughter's labor. In other words, the outcome of seduction suits had long recognized
that the harm to fathers was more than merely economic. Commentators had pointed
this out many years before courts and legislators began explicitly to acknowledge it. In
Vermont, beginning in the 1 870s and 80s, the Supreme Court became more willing to
articulate this harm rather than hide behind the economic fictions which had governed its
earlier decisions. As a result, the Court, through its opinions, became an active
participant in public conversations about the effects of deviant sexual behavior.
What was the Court's purpose in undertaking this greater role in fi-aming sexual
discourse? Scholars have put forth various theories as to why lawmakers such as judges
and legislators altered seduction law at this time. Legal historian M. B. W. Sinclair
argues that seduction reform reflected a repressive Victorian morality; a belief in an ideal
woman who was powerless to prevent her own seduction. Constance Backhouse looks
at specific legislation: Ontario's 1837 seduction statute which permitted a father to sue
his daughter's master when she had been seduced by him. Backhouse argues that
changes in Canadian seduction law reinforced feudal notions of property in humans.
Before these changes only the woman's master could sue in seduction and a father had
no protection when his daughter was seduced by another master-say the owner of a
house in which she worked as a maid. The new law was meant to shore up a father's
authority over his daughter at a time when industrialization was undermining traditional
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patriarchal control and women were leaving home in larger numbers.^ Martha Bailey
challenges Backhouse's critical view of the legislation since it ignores the salutary effect
ofthe law as a form of protective legislation, deterring masters from sexually exploiting
highly vulnerable servant girls/ This was not an issue under Vermont law since a father
could always sue a master for impregnating his daughter.^
Between 1827 and 1914, Vermont's Supreme Court heard six appeals involving
seduction. As in other states, the way the courts talked about the tort changed in
Vermont as the nineteenth century progressed. This chapter explores that evolution, sets
it in a wider historical context, and grapples with the questions it raises about our
understanding of sexuality' s relation to the law. But before proceeding with our inquiry,
we should &st understand exactly what the elements of seduction were.^
^ Constance B. Backhouse, "The Tort of Seduction: Fathers and Daughters in Nineteenth Century
Canada," Dalhousie Law Journal 10 (1986): 45-79.
' Martha J. Bailey, "Servant Girls and Masters: The Tort of Seduction and the Support of Bastards,"
Canadian Journal ofFamily Law 10 (1991): 137-162. Other scholars have used seduction as an
example ofhow the legal system inculcates attitudes about women and sex deep within the foundation of
the law. This, they argue, prevents women from obtainmg redress for criminal or civil violations of their
sexual autonomy. At the same time, others have explored the idea of reviving seduction and other civil
causes of action as a tool in the struggle for sexual autonomy. Lea VanderVelde, "The Legal Ways of
Seduction," Stanford Law Review 4S (1996): 817-901; Larson, "'Women Understand So Little . . .
;"
Leslie Bender, "The Use ofCommon Law to Further a Feminist Agenda," paper presented at the Five
College Women's Studies Lecture Series, South Hadley, Massachusetts, December 1996.
' Chittenden, 292. This was Tapping Reeve's position in 1816. He noted that 'Vhen a daughter is
bound out as an apprentice, living with her master, a rigid adherence to the idea that loss of service is
the ground of this action, would prevent the fether's recovery. But ifwe consider this action as really
having its foundation in another principle, to wit, the disgrace to the femily, it would be no objection to
the maintenance of this action, although the daughter should live as an apprentice to a
master."
' Seduction was eliminated by the legislature in 1973 along with the other so-called
"heart balm"
actions: alienation of affections, breach of contract to marry, and criminal conversation. 1973
(Adj.) Vt.
Acts 198.
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In Vermont, a plaintifiFhad to prove two elements to win a seduction case. First,
he had to show that the defendant "debauched and carnally knew" his daughter. Second,
he had to prove that he was thereby deprived of his daughter's services.^ This second
element invariably resulted from the daughter's ensuing pregnancy. At common law
pregnancy was not a required element of the tort, but damages were difficult to show
without it. In the absence of a pregnancy, the pleiintifif could not prove that the sexual
relations had interfered with his right to his daughter's services.*
We should not confiise our informal or literary notion of seduction with its
technical common law meaning. "Seduction" was simply the name given to a cause of
action which allowed a father to sue for the monetary loss caused by his daughter's out-
of-wedlock pregnancy. A shov^g of force or artifice was not required. Neither did the
' Seduction was pled as a trespass "on the case." A Vermont litigant had an alternative available to him
in the form of trespass vi et armis fVith force and arms") in which he alleged that the defendant had
''assaulted, debauched, and carnally knew" his daughter (emphasis added). "Force and arms" was
required language in a trespass action, but was often a fiction. Because the courts disagreed on which
form was the proper one, lawyers often pleaded both trespass vi et armis and trespass on the case in their
complaints. These forms of action are distinct from our more limited contemporary understanding of
trespass: an unauthorized breach of the boundaries of another's real property. John Henry Wigmore,
Select Cases on the Law of Torts, vol. 2 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1912), 23; Chittenden, The Law of
Baron and Femme, 293, n. 1. For examples ofVermont pleadings, see Haynes v. Sinclair, Chittenden
County Court, December 1850 Term, Writ No. 65, Chittenden County Court Records, Special
Collections, University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont; Rollins v. Chalmers, Orange County Supreme
Court, March 1879 Term, vol 20, p. 248-249; Davidson v. Abbott, Declaration, Vermont Reports
Briefe, 1, no. 41 (1880), Vermont State Library, Montpelier, Vermont; Fitzgerald v. Connors, Rutland
County Supreme Court, November 1914 Term, vol. 61, p. 59-60. Note that the complaints for trespass
on the case normally alleged that intercourse took place on numerous occasions
over long periods of
time indicating the probable consensual nature ofthe sexual relationship.
' M B W Sinclair, 37; Thomas Thomer and G.N. Reddekopp, "A Question of Seduction: The Case of
MacMillan v. Brownlee," Alberta Law Review 20 (1982): 450-452. In addition, practically
speakmg,
without a pregnancy the feet ofthe seduction would have been harder to detect by
the parent or the
community.
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daughter's consent vitiate the cause of action. Her actions were technically irrelevant.
Legally, seduction as a cause of action belonged to fathers, not daughters.^
Early Approaches
Vermont's first published decision involving seduction was the 1827 case of
Hubbell V. Wheeler. Benjamin Hubbell accused the improbably named Philander
Wheeler of debauching his daughter, getting her with child, and thereby denying him her
services. The jury awarded the plaintiff the large sum of eighty dollars. This sum
reflected only the value of services lost by the father fi-om the date of conception to birth.
It did not reflect the cost of raising the child which could have been pursued under a
separate action for bastardy. In addition, the woman would not have been incapacitated
during most ofher pregnancy. At this time, the average wage for a female servant was
less than one dollar per week.'" As we shall see, however, civil awards in seduction
cases were often very large. Philander Wheeler appealed.
The appeal hinged on a highly technical aspect of law. Wheeler had been
boarding with the Hubbell family at the time. The plaintiff had alleged that the defendant
had committed a trespass on the family home and in so doing had debauched and carnally
knew the daughter. As a result, the plaintiff pleaded seduction as an aggravation of the
trespass on the house, rather than as a separate action standing on its own. At trial, the
defendant had proved that he was boarding in the house, and thus he had permission (a
' Backhouse, "The Tort of Seduction," 60; M. B. W. Sinclair, 48-49.
This was the rate in 1 838. Deborah P. Clifford, "Vermont 'Mill Girls,'" in We Vermonters:
Perspectives on the Past, eds. Michael Sherman and Jennie Versteeg (MontpeUer: Vermont Historical
Society, 1992), 219-224.
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"licence") to enter it. Since he did not actually commit trespass, the plaintiffs entire
case had to fail, since he could not recover for aggravation of a trespass which had not
taken place. The defendant argued that the plaintiffhad an obligation under the rules of
pleading to specify exactly the cause of action so that he could defend himself against it.
And this was a correct statement of law. Instead, on dubious legal reasoning, the Court
placed the burden on the defendant of notifying the plaintiff of his intention to proceed
with the licence defense so that the plaintiff could amend his pleading. This ruling was a
gross departure from the standards of the day which required highly technical formal
pleading on the part of the plaintiff. Courts typically dismissed suits which failed to
comply with those formalities. Furthermore, the decision was contrary to other
authorities.
'
' Nevertheless, the Vermont Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
reasoning as well as the eighty dollar award. It further found Wheeler's actions to be
malicious and therefore prohibited him from escaping liability by taking the poor debtor's
oath. This was a typical example of the courts' bias in favor ofupholding plaintiff'
verdicts in seduction cases.
The Supreme Court's opinion is also distinctive for the matter-of-fact way in
which it discusses the seduction. Unlike later decisions, there is no discussion of
morality, no editorializing about the nature of the cause of action, no comments on the
betrayal of trust by the boarder welcomed into the home of the father-no discourse on
honor, no emphasis on injury to the daughter's reputation. The Court did not seek to
justify a ruling in the plaintiffs favor because of the moral wrong done to him,
but
instead, justified it on highly technical (if legaUy spurious) grounds,
upholding a large
"Chittenden, 293, n. 1.
99
verdict which bore little relation to the actual economic injury to the father. But the
result for the defendant was the same as it would be in later cases which did make use of
such language. The Court was sympathetic to the plaintiff and Philander Wheeler was
punished for his transgression.'^
On the Cusp of Change
Twenty-three years later, in 1 850, the seduction case of Haynes v. Sinclair gave
the Court an opportunity to recognize explicitly the importance of sexual morality to the
tort. The plaintiffs lawyer, Lucius E. Chittenden, sought to introduce sophisticated
theories into the case. He was uniquely positioned to do so, having completed his
commentaries to Tapping Reeve's important treatise on family law four years before.
Reeve's work, which relied on eighteenth century precedent, revealed the nature of the
legal fiction that had come to characterize seduction by the early nineteenth century. It
showed the extent to which the notion of shame and dishonor, rather than economic
harm, had come to dominate commentators' thinking by the early 19'*' century. The
injury to the father was not really about loss of physical service, but to the honor of a
family of which he was the head. Economic injury was a legal fiction Reeve wrote, "it is
scarcely an item in the account. The real ground for damages, is the disgrace of the
family" and given this, the issue of the "daughter's character for unchastity, her
connexion with another man is allowed to be proved; and, if satisfactorily proved,
although it does not lessen the damages for actual loss of service; for that will be the
" Hubbdl V. Wheeler, 2 Aik. 358 (1827).
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same, whether the daughter was, before that time, chaste or unchaste, yet it will render
the damages merely nominal."'^
To Chittenden, Reeve's work and the cases decided subsequent to it were an
invitation to litigate seduction in a way that explicitly referenced the issues of sexual
morality and family disgrace, and most important, how these harms worked an injury to
fathers. As a result, Chittenden framed the Haynes case around these issues. Chittenden
was lucky in having Milo Bennett as his trial judge. Bennett was sympathetic to female
plaintiffs and victims in sex cases. He had already successfully resisted attempts to use
sexual character evidence against female plaintiffs in bastardy cases in the 1 840s and
would fight a long, and ultimately unsuccessful battle to prevent the use of such specific
sexual evidence in rape cases after ISSS.*'*
At trial, Chittenden argued that the defendant's alleged promise to marry the
seduced woman should be admissible. The defendant objected strenuously, arguing that
such evidence was only admissible in a breach of promise to marry case brought by the
woman herself. To argue such evidence would unduly prejudice the defendant and result
in his being punished twice for the same wrong. Chittenden argued that the evidence
was admissible for the limited purpose of showing the way in which the defendant had
gone about seducing his victim. Bennett admitted this evidence with limiting instructions
Chittenden, 291.
The bastardy cases were Spears v. ForresU 15 Vt. 435 (1843) and Sweei v. Sherman, 21 Vt. 23 (1848).
The rape case was State v. Johnson, 28 Vt. 5 1 2 ( 1 856). Both cases are discussed in
detail in other
chapters.
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to the jury as to the purpose for which it could be used.'^ Chittenden also sought to
enter evidence of the daughter's chaste reputation and the good reputation of her family.
The defense objected to this evidence as well, arguing that damage to reputation had not
been part of the plaintifiPs complaint, and in the alternative that it could not be admitted
unless the defendant &st attempted to impeach her reputation-which he had not done.
Nevertheless, Bennett, admitted the evidence, instructing the jury that "they were
authorized to give damages for the mortification and wounded feelings of the plaintiff,
occasioned by the seduction, which it might well be supposed would be greater, than if
the daughter were of bad character." Finally, again, over objection, the judge also
allowed the introduction of evidence of the expense of maintaining the bastard child bom
of the seduction. The jury reached a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of
$300-again, a very large sum. This outcome was reversed on appeal.
Chittenden had attempted to introduce a legal discourse which had all the
trappings ofwhat some scholars have come to see as Victorian seduction. He sought to
admit evidence of chastity, family reputation, false promises; and, by focusing attention
on the bastard child, the extent to which the daughter's life had been ruined by the
defendant. Two influences are discernible in this approach. The first is the effort by
commentators to articulate the true legal harm to fathers
—
"mortification and wounded
feelings." The second influence is that of the seduction narrative—an attempt to give
literary seduction (where women were beguiled into having sexual relations against their
'^Bennett explained to the jurors that such a promise had a tendency "to prove an intimacy between th
parties, and an influence which the defendant might have acquired over the daughter by such
means,
and thereby render a seduction more probable than it might be under other circumstances."
Haynes i
Sinclair, 23 Wt. 108, 110(1850).
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better judgment and natural inclinations) legal effect.'^ The trial court was amenable to
both influences: injury to a father's feelings and the defendant's efforts to obtain sexual
favors with false promises of marriage. It is important to remember how far all of these
considerations were from theformal requirements of seduction. Common law seduction
did not care about consent, or reputation-these were irrelevant in a tort whose legal
concern was economic injury to the father.'' But as Tapping Reeve had pointed out in
his 1816 work and as Chittenden had reconfirmed in his 1 846 edition, everyone knew
these issues mattered. The question was whether the Vermont Supreme Court would
allow them to be spoken of at trial.
The answer in 1850 was still no. On appeal the Vermont Supreme Court ruled
that the admission of evidence of a promise to marry, of the daughter's chastity, and of
the expenses of child care was error. It reversed the trial court and ordered a new trial.
The Court's opinion is fascinating in its refusal to depart from the form of the older
seduction cause of action. First, the Court rejected the findings in Simon Greenleaf s
influential work on evidence as to the admissibility of a promise of marriage in seduction
cases. The Court undertook its own analysis ofthe cases cited by Greenleaf and held
that those cases did not support Greenleaf s conclusions. Next, the Court held that even
if such evidence had been properly admitted, the trial judge erred in instructing the jury
" On the widespread influence of the seduction novel in early Republican America see: Linda Kerber,
Women ofthe Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill: University
of
North Carolina Press, 1980), 241-243.
" Backhouse, "The Tort of Seduction," 60; M. B. W. Sinclair, 48-49.
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that such evidence tended to prove the seduction because it was simply 'too remote, to
justify its reception for such purpose."**
Next, the Court turned to the admission of character evidence supporting the
general reputation of the plaintiff and his family. The Court noted the plaintiflPs rationale
for introducing such evidence. "It is said, that the character of the daughter for chastity
is involved in the issue and therefore it may be supported by general evidence." But the
Court refused to allow such evidence. Only in cases where the daughter's character was
first impeached by the defense would evidence of the daughter and her family's
reputation be admissible. In other words, such evidence was only available when the
defendant first challenged the daughter's character. "Until this is done, she must rely
upon that general good character, which the law presumes every one to possess until it is
impeached."^^
This comported with American law. As a rule, U.S. courts were unequivocal in their refusal to permit
a promise of marriage into evidence in seduction suits. First, it prejudiced the defendant by introducing
a wrong (breach of marriage promise) for which only the woman could bring suit. Second, the promises
ofthe seducer were irrelevant to seduction, since it was the loss of services to the fether that was
technically at issue, not the daughter's consent to the sexual act. Despite the ubiquity of the seduction
narrative as cautionary tale, the Vermont Court refused to give it legal meaning—and, by prohibiting its
admission as evidence, prevented juries from doing so either until 1911 when it allowed such claims, not
in seduction suits, but as part of the damages in a breach of marriage promise case. See the discussion
ofStokes V. Mason, 85 Vt. 164 (191 1), in Chapter 1. On the relationship between marriage promise
cases and seduction, see M. B. W. Sinclair, 40, 46-4; Pamela Haag, Consent: Sexual Rights and the
Transformation ofAmerican Liberalism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 30-31, 35, 52-54.
It is unclear here how the Court conceived that non-chastity (or bad reputation) could be used as a
defense to seduction. There are several possibilities. It could be the defendant impeached her sexual
character to challenge her honesty, but Vermont did not recognize the use of sexual evidence
for this
purpose and never would. If the Court meant that non-chastity could be used to show that someone
else
had intercourse with the daughter and fathered the child, then this would comport with
the older notion
of the tort. Finally it could go to damages and that is how Milo Bennett thought it should be used.
Some state courts permitted a reduction in damages for loss of reputation where the
daughter's
reputation for chastity was poor. Regardless ofhow it might be used, the Haynes decision's intimation
that reputation evidence could be used at all was the exception in
America before the second half of the
century. M. B. W. Sinclair, 45 and n. 88.
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Finally, the Court ruled that the trial court's admission of evidence showing the
probable expense of caring for the baby was also error. The Court reasoned that the
defendant would be unable to insist that such funds be applied to the support of the child,
nor would the award exonerate the defendant from his obligations to support the child
under Vermont's bastardy law. The Court granted the defendant a new trial.^° While the
second trial also resulted in a plaintiffs verdict, the damages were reduced one-third, to
$200-although still a large sum.'^' It is difficult to know whether that lesser sum
reflected the removal of child care damages, evidence of a promise to marry, the issue of
reputation, or a combination of the three.
In Haynes v. Sinclair Lucius Chittenden had steeped himself in the new language
of seduction law. This language eschewed the older theory ofeconomic harm and
instead focused on injury to the father's feelings and a literary rather than legal seduction
narrative. Chittenden provided the Supreme Court with sufficient legal authority to
acknowledge the way commentators believed seduction truly harmed fathers. Since the
quality of that harm ("the mortification and wounded feelings of the plaintiff, occasioned
by the seduction") depended on the daughter's reputation (and the reputation of her
family), Chittenden was eager that the daughter herself appear and this is why he
implored Jacob Haynes to make sure his daughter was present to testify, and (probably)
why she was hesitant to do so.^^
Haynes v. Sinclair, 23 Vt. 108 (1850).
Docket Book of the Law Firm of Phelps & Chittenden, 1847-1854. Lucius E. Chittenden Papers,
Special Collections, University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont.
" Jacob Haynes to Lucius Chittenden, 15 March 1849, 21 May 1849, 17 January 1850. Lucius E.
Chittenden Papers, Carton 1. Special Collections, University of Vermont,
Burlington, Vermont.
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But the Vermont Supreme Court refused to treat the tort differently than it had in
the past. It was one thing to cram a set of facts into the old tort as the Court had done in
HubbelL It was quite something else to legitimate the introduction of new language into
the courtroom. By reftising to do so, the Court signaled its unwillingness to allow the
tort to be used as an overt means of engaging in a discourse about female sexual purity
and its value to a parent's reputation and peace of mind.^^
The Court's reticence did not reflect any kind of broad societal taboo on the
public discussion of sexual morals in general and the evils of seduction in particular. As I
note in Chapter 1 such discussions were common in Vermont during the nineteenth
century. Nor did it reflect an absence of sex talk in the courts themselves, as juries heard
numerous civil and criminal cases in which discussion of sexual matters was simply
unavoidable. As I have shown, sexual reputation was important and lawsuits to vindicate
sexual defamation could result in huge jury awards. In addition, Vermonters shared with
other Americans a penchant for reading novels, the most popular of which warned
women of the consequences of seduction. But the Supreme Court's decision meant that
seduction suits in the county courts would not provide an opportunity for such discourse
in 1850.^'
" The 1889 edition ofthe law report containing the Haynes case published by West Publishing Company
of St. Paul contains a lengthy note concerning the admissibility of character evidence of a woman's
chastity in both criminal and civil seduction cases. The note explains how long a woman who has
previously engaged in intercourse with another man must wait before such evidence can no longer be
used against her in a civil or criminal seduction trial. But, as we will see, by 1889 there was no longer
any question in Vermont about whether such graphic discourse was appropriate. In 1850, however, the
Supreme Court felt otherwise. Reports ofCases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court ofthe
State of Vermont, 2"' ed., vol. 8 (St. Paul, 1889), 34-35, n. 1.
William J. Gilmour, Reading Becomes a Necessity ofLife: Material and Cultural Life in Rural New
England, 1780-1835 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1989), 208, 214, 408 (on prevalence of
the novel in rural family libraries); Kerber, Women ofthe Republic, 241-243 (on widespread influence
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In Haynes, Vermont seduction jurisprudence was on the cusp of change. The
plaintiffs attorney and the trial court were prepared to make at least a rhetorical leap and
leave behind the older economic language that had characterized seduction in the past.
The Supreme Court was unwilling to go so far. But it did open the door slightly by
acknowledging that reputation evidence might have a role to play in the defense of such
actions. But how it could be used remained unclear. This lack of clarity on the role of
reputation in seduction suits reflected a broader ambivalence about the proper uses of
such evidence in civil and criminal matters.
In 1856 the Court decided State v. Johnson, an appeal from a rape conviction. In
justifying the use of specific sexual character evidence to impeach the credibility of a
rape victim on the question of consent, the Court analogized to seduction law. Judge
Pierpoint Isham relied on an English seduction case, Verry v. Watkins (1836), for the
proposition that on cross-examination ofthe daughter, defense counsel could ask her
about specific past acts of intercourse with other men. If she denied them then those
men could be called to testify in order to show that it was another man who had
impregnated her. Judge Milo Bennett, who dissented from Johnson and who sought to
limit the use of sexual character evidence in rape and bastardy cases, argued that Isham
had misinterpreted Verry. In seduction, a defendant could show that "the daughter has
been previously criminal with other persons," but only on the question of damages, not
to discredit her claim that she had been seduced by the defendant. Bennett's argument
ofthe seduction novel in early Republican America); E. J. Phelps, "The Age of Words," in Orations and
Essays ofEdward John Phelps: Diplomat and Statesman, ed. J. G. McCuUough (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1901), 462. Phelps, a national figure, was the most prominent lawyer in the state. In this
essay he warned against the dangers of such novels since they had the unintended efiect of spreading
immorality, creating false expectations in women, and causing wives to look to men other than their
husbands for perfection.
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was a reiteration of the position he had taken as trial judge in Haynes-Si position which
had been rejected by theM Court in that case. Both men's position also departed from
the general rule in other states. Other courts prohibited sexual character evidence as a
defense but did allow it in mitigation of damages, but only general reputation, and not
evidence of specific sexual activity. Nonetheless, both men indicated a growing comfort
level with the issue of reputation in seduction suits while continuing to disagree on how
that evidence could be used.'^'
The Tort Shifts
By 1 879, however, the Supreme Court clarified its position on the role of
reputation evidence. In that year, the Court heard an appeal resulting from Samuel
Rollins's claim against Albert Chalmers for the seduction of Rollins's daughter Fidelia.
The case was rather tragic, as Fidelia had died as a result of compUcations from the birth
of Chalmers's illegitimate child. The defendant requested a bench trial and the judge
found him liable for the seduction. At a trial for damages, the jury awarded Samuel
Rollins $841, ofwhich $241 was specified as punitive damages. The defendant raised
three issues on appeal, only one ofwhich is significant for our purposes.
At trial, the defendant argued that the judge could not instruct the jury on the
issue of the injury caused to the father's feelings, nor the disgrace that might be brought
" State V. Johnson, 28 Vt. 512 (1856); M. B. W. Sinclair, 45 and n. 88. The Verry case is reported at 7
Carr. and Payne 308; 173 Eng. Rep. 137 (1836).
Rollins V. Chalmers, 51 Vt. 592 (1879). The other two issues involved the court's refusal to allow the
defendant to argue his innocence of the seduction in the damages phase of the trial and its allowance of
evidence of the plaintiffs financial condition where the defendant had foiled timely to object to such
evidence. The Supreme Court upheld the trial court on both issues.
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upon him and his family on account of the seduction. The judge refiised the defendant's
request and charged that "in estimating the value of the daughter's service, the jury
might consider the shock to the plaintiffs feelings and sensibilities by the dishonor so
brought upon him, and that that much enhanced the value of that service~the relation
that was broken and dishonored."^' To this charge, the defendant objected. Following
the plaintiffs verdict, the defendant appealed the issue.
Interestingly, the defendant did not argue that such damages were inappropriate
in and ofthemselves, but instead asserted that the plaintiff had failed to plead them as
special damages in his complaint and was therefore prohibited from seeking them.^* In
other words, he made a technical legal argument against the introduction of the evidence
rather than an attack on the nature of the evidence itself Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court held that such damages did not have to be specially pleaded because, according to
the Court, such damages "are a natural resuh of the seduction, and need not be specially
declared for, and have for a long time, ifnot always, been recoverable." For this
proposition, the Court quoted from Greenleaf s Evidence, the same treatise that it had so
casually disregarded in the Haynes case twenty-nine years before.
The damages in this action are given, not only for the loss of service, but
also for all that the plaintiff can feel from the nature of the injury.
Therefore, if the plaintiff is the parent of the seduced, the jury may
consider his loss of the comfort as well as the service of his daughter, in
"Rollins V. Chalmers, 593.
^ Special or consequential damages are damages that arise as a consequence of the injury, but depend on
fects in addition to the fects of the injury itself In Rollins, the defendant was arguing that the loss of
service to the father comprised the actual damages. The loss of reputation was special or consequential
damages which could not simply be assumed by the impregnation, but were dependent on the
reputation
ofthe daughter or father and had to be specially pleaded and proved.
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whose virtue he can feel no consolation, and his anxiety as the parent of
other children, whose morals may be corrupted by her example?^
It is clear that the Court had now decided to embrace a different rhetoric of seduction.
No longer preoccupied solely by the economic harm caused by a daughter's pregnancy,
the Court now foregrounded the father's feelings. And it was more than just a father's
honor that had been impugned by the defendant's actions. By his behavior, the
defendant had tainted the relationship between father and daughter and between him and
his other children as well. Traditionally, the service that daughters had provided their
fathers was purely economic. But now, "in estimating the value" of that service, juries
were to take into account "the shock to the plaintiffs feelings and sensibilities by the
dishonor so brought upon him." Maintaining a virtuous reputation had now become the
daughter's "service" to her father. It lay at the heart of a relationship that the seducer
had left "broken and dishonored."
Supreme Court Judge Jonathan Ross, in upholding this language, elaborated on
this new service. The daughter's virtue provided the father with "comfort" and
"consolation." The seduction had potentially harmed his other children too, causing him
"anxiety" for their future as well. This is a critique of disturbed family relations almost
psychological in nature. In this case, sexual relations had led to Fidelia's death-the
ultimate severing ofthe father-daughter relationship. (Ross also authored the companion
decision which declared that Fidelia's bastardy suit against Chalmers was personal to her
Simon Greenleat; A Treatise on the Law ofEvidence (Boston, 1860) quoted in Rollins v. Chalmers,
596-597.
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and thus did not survive her death).^° This articulation of seduction's "true" harm
became increasingly widespread injudicial writing throughout the 1880s.
Take for example the charge made by Tennessee judge Howell E. Jackson to a
jury in an 1 887 seduction case. The charge was considered such a good statement of the
damages in a seduction trial that a copy of it was affixed as a note to the report of the
Rollins decision in the West Company's 1 891 edition of Vermont Reports. In his charge,
Judge Jackson noted how:
A father, of course, feels a consolation in the virtue of his daughter. All
right-thinking parents must understand that feeling. You may give the
plaintiffdamages in your discretion, up to the limit claimed in his
declaration, for the loss of that comfort and consolation which he had a
right to feel in the purity and virtue of his child. You may take into
consideration his loss of hope in the future of his daughter, and
compensate him for the same. You may award him damages, not only for
his mental anguish in the disgrace of his daughter, but for his anxiety as to
what is to become of her in the future. You may take into consideration
his feeling of anxiety as to the effect of that daughter's example upon his
other child. You may look to the loss to him and his family of social
standing and jjosition by reason of the daughter's disgrace. You may
consider his mortification, humiliation, and sense of dishonor.^'
Judge Jackson's charge combines a Victorian emphasis on female sexual purity with a
patriarchal concern about how one daughter's ruination harms not only herself, but her
Fidelia Rollins v. Albert Chalmers, 49 Vt. 515 (1877).
^' Barbour v. Stephenson, 32 F. 66 (Cir.Ct.KY, 1887), cited in Reports ofCases Argued and Determined
in the Supreme Court ofthe State of Vermont, 2"' ed., vol. 7 (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1891), 215-216,
n. 1 . Southern codes of sexual morality for white women were particularly rigid and male honor
particularly important. Mary Frances Berry, "Judging Morality: Sexual Behavior and Legal
Consequences in the Late Nineteenth-Century South," Journal ofAmerican History 78 (1991): 837-838
and n. 7; John D'Emilio and Estelle B. Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History ofSexuality in America
(New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 94-96; Mary E. Odem, Delinquent Daughters: Protecting and
Policing Female Sexuality in the United States. 1885-1920 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 1995), 35-37. Nevertheless, cases from other jurisdictions cited in the note express similar
themes. The fact that a St. Paul publisher included the charge in a note reproduced in every state's
edition of reports published by it speaks to the presumed universality of its sentiments.
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father and the rest of the children. In addition, there is something new here-the
destruction of the sentimental relationship between father and daughter. Judges were
publicly stating that seduction was no longer simply about economic service; in fact such
a view was described by Judge Jackson as a "relic of barbarism." Instead, it was about
lost innocence-and lost daughters.
This shift in language and emphasis posed theoretical diEBculties for lawmakers.
Civil lawsuits usually involve a dispute between two parties. The lines between them are
clearly drawn, on one side is the plaintiff, on the other, the defendant. Seduction is
complex because it involves three parties, the father-plaintiff, the seducer-defendant, and
the pregnant daughter. So long as seduction's focus was on the economic harm to the
father, the role of the daughter (her consent, her reputation, etc.) could, technically at
least, be ignored. Once the tort's emphasis shifted to the emotional value of the
father/daughter relationship, the daughter's behavior could no longer be glossed over.
Judges were faced with the difficulty of compensating fathers for the loss of comfort in
their daughters' virtue, without appearing to condone the daughters' sexual behavior.
There were two ways to handle this problenL One was to infantilize women by arguing
that they really could be "seduced," that is, talked into sex against their better judgment.
The other was to use judicial discourse to reemphasize the importance ofwomen
maintaining their sexual virtue-awarding damages to the father for the defendant's sexual
misbehavior while at the same time sending a message that the daughter's behavior was
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also inappropriate. In Vermont, the tension between the two approaches played out in
both the courts and the legislature.^^
For example, the other seduction case from this period, Davidson v. Abbott
(1 880), extended the values explained in Rollins to single mothers of adult working
daughters. In so doing, the case illuminated the conflict between compensating parents
while condemning their daughters' willing participation in sexual behavior. It also
demonstrated how some judges understood the tort in rigidly gendered terms.
Harriet Davidson had been abandoned by her husband during the 1 850s. Her
thirty-year-old daughter Helen had helped support the family from age fourteen by
working in local textile mills for five dollars per week. She lived with her mother and
sister and did chores around the house. In 1 878, over the course of a year and a half,
Helen had engaged in repeated intercourse with thirty-four year-old Elbridge J. Abbott at
his dry goods store in Hartford. She became pregnant and delivered a child in November
of that year. In her father's absence, Helen's mother sued for seduction. After the
plaintiff put on her case at trial, the defendant moved for a directed verdict in his favor.
The defendant argued that since Helen was of age, her mother had to prove that a
contract for her services existed. Since no evidence of contract between Harriet and
Helen had been shown by the plaintiff, she had not met her burden of proof and the judge
must direct the jury to find in the defendant's favor. The judge agreed,
33
" As I note in the chapter on statutory rape, Vermont's legislature debated these issues in the
context of
raising the age of consent from eleven to eighteen. They settled on fourteen-explicitly balancing the
desire to protect young girls against the need to hold older girls responsible for policing
their own sexual
behavior.
" Davidson v. Abbott, Plaintiffs Bill of Exceptions, Vermont Reports Briefe, 1, no. 41 (1880),
Vermont
State Library, Montpelier, Vermont. The 1880 Vermont manuscript census for
Hartford listed Elbridge
Abbott as a "retired dry goods merchant" living as a boarder in the home of a wool sorter
and his wife.
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In his opinion, trial judge James Barrett emphasized that the tort of seduction
rested on economic grounds: "that is what this suit is brought for, the loss of services."
Since no evidence was produced that showed "that relation that entitles suit to be
maintained for the loss of services," the plaintiff had not proven her case and the suit
must be dismissed. In other words. Judge Barrett was evaluating the suit based on the
old language ofeconomic injury rather than the newer notion of injury to honor and the
parent/child relationship. He directed the jury to find for the defendant and the plaintiff
appealed.^''
As noted above, seduction law was originally based on an adaptation of the law
of master and servant to the relationship between fathers and daughters. The cause of
action presumed that girls who had not yet attained their majority were their fathers'
servants. Fathers suing for seduction did not need to prove their minor daughters'
service as an element of the tort. In cases of aduh daughters such as that presented by
Davidson v. Abbott, the father typically had to show that the daughter performed some
labor for him. Traditionally, however, in keeping with the bias in favor of finding for
plaintiffs, as well as the understanding that the tort was really about more than mere
economic service, only the slightest services needed to be proved. In his notes to
Tapping Reeve's work on domestic relations in 1 846, Lucius Chittenden noted that in
such cases 'Ihe slightest acts of service are sufficient."-^^ Reeve himself noted this in
" Davidson v. Abbott, Judge's Order, Vermont Reports Briefs, 1, no. 41 (1880).
" Chittenden, 292-293, n. 1.
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1816, based on eighteenth century authorities. This had been the law for at least one
hundred years.^^
It is difficult to understand why Judge Barrett decided the question as he did.
His position was not supported even by cases decided in the eighteenth century. Nor
was it supported by the testimony of both Harriet and Helen, who had testified that she
paid her earnings to her mother, did chores for her, lived in the house and had done so
for fifteen years-evidence acknowledged by Barrett in his decision. Ironically, it was this
case, more than any other, that on its facts actually comported with the older economic
basis of the tort. To a struggling family, Helen's wages were vitally important. Her
incapacity posed a serious economic problem.
Then why did the judge take the drastic step of directing a verdict after the
plaintiffs case? Barrett could be hostile to female claimants in sex cases and was not
afi-aid to ignore settled law in order to impose his moral views on the parties appearing
before him. One contemporary commentator wrote that "inthetrialofcasesinthe
county court, his rulings were made more with reference to what he thought the law
ought to be than what it actually had been declared to be in the reports." Another made
it clear that Barrett controlled his juries through his summation of the facts during the
charge and thus juries seldom came in with verdicts contrary to his opinion of the case.
"Judge Barrett would control juries, but only in fiirtherance ofwhat he deemed to be just
and right."^'' Barrett was clearly troubled by what he saw as the consensual nature of the
Davidson v. Abbott, 52 Vt. 570 (1880).
"
Russell Taft, "The Supreme Court of Vermont, Part 4," 77ie Green Bag: An Entertaining Magazinefor
Lawyers 6 (March 1894): 138; Hoyt H. Wheeler, "Memorial Paper on James Barrett," Proceedings of
the Vermont Bar Association, 6 (1902), App. 42-43. Barrett's other cases- Sterling
v. Sterling, 41 Vt.
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relationship. In his recitation of the facts of the case the judge noted that Helen engaged
in intercourse with the defendant at his store "whither she voluntarily & without his
solicitation went."^^ Given her status as a factory worker, the absence of a father, and
her age, he may have been unable to conceive ofher as a dependent owing services-one
of the two elements necessary to make out a case for seduction under the old rule. But
the new language of seduction depended on harm to fathers-and Helen's father was
nowhere to be found. Without him, the new tort became less ideologically coherent.
Nonetheless the Supreme Court reversed him. It noted that all commentaries on
the subject made it clear that "proof of the most trifling acts of service, such as milking
the cows, or making tea for the plaintifif, wiU enable the plaintiff to maintain this action
for debauching the daughter." After reviewing various precedents on the subject. Judge
Isaac Redfield made it clear that the tort was no longer even about economic loss. "The
action in form is to recover damage for loss of service; but it has become well settled for
a century in England and this country, that the loss of service is slight and nominal in
most cases, and the recovery is had essentially for wounded feeUngs, dishonor, and
disgrace." Though the tort emphasized fathers, the Court was willing to include mothers
within its confines as well. The opinion also confirmed that in Vermont a daughter's
consent to sexual relations remained legally irrelevant. On remand, the parties settled the
case for an unknown amoimt.^'
80 (1868) and State v. Potter, 52 Vt. 33, 40 (1879)-are discussed in other chapters. Barrett served on
the Court from 1858 to 1880.
" Davidson v. Abbott, Judge's Order, Vermont Reports Briefe, 1, no. 41 (1880).
Davidson v. Abbott, 572-574; Davidson v. Abbott, Windsor County Court, December 1880 Term,
Docket No. 44.
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The rule that only trifling service was sufiBcient to sustain a seduction action may
have become "well settled," but that could not take away from the fact that such a rule
completely undercut the Court's past precedents regarding the tort of seduction. In
Rollins and Davidson we are witnessing the evolution of the common law. Judges were
explaining why the tort no longer required a showing of the economic underpinnings on
which it had been based. Commentators had long pointed out the fact that economic
service was irrelevant, but judges had continued to pay it lip service. Now, rather
suddenly, they felt sufBciently comfortable (or compelled) to explicitly cast it aside and
admit that the tort was really about "wounded feelings, dishonor, and disgrace" and had
been for a hundred years. Harriet Davidson's lawyer pointed this out in his briefto the
Supreme Court by noting that "in the modem cases the old idea of loss ofmenial service
has given way to more enlightened views. "^*^ Not only were courts and commentators
rejecting the legal fiction that had governed seduction for so long, but like Judge
Jackson's reference to "barbarism," they saw the explicit rejection of the economic basis
of the tort as a necessary step towards a more "enlightened" view of the real harm
seduction caused to fethers and daughters (or in this case, mothers and daughters)."'
^ Davidson v. Abbott, Plaintiffs Brie^ Vermont Reports Briefs, 1, no. 41 (1880) (emphasis in the
original).
The use of a barbaric/civilized discourse in discussions of sex and gender in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries was common in Vermont and elsewhere. In a decision interpreting Vermont's
married woman's property acts issued three years after Davidson, Judge Redfield Proctor likened the
condition ofmarried women prior to the passage of the acts as an "unreasonable disability which
barbarism had entailed upon them." Hubbard v. Bugbee, 55 Vt. 506, 508-509 (1883) cited in Lucy T.
Brown, "Married Women and Property Ownership in the Nineteenth Century: You Want to Own
Property? You Better Be Single, Dead, or Male," paper presented at a symposium of the Vermont
Judicial Historical Society, Rockingham, Vermont, June 1998. Copy in the possession of the author.
One advocate for an increased age of consent for girls described the campaign as a "culmination of
centuries of efforts in the rise from barbarism." Quoted in David J. Pivar, Purity Crusade. Sexual
Morality, and Social Control. 1868-1900 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1973). Historian Gail
Bederman explores the implications of the barbaric/civilized discourse for gender and racial
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It is important to recognize how difiBcult it was forjudges to simply discard old
language in favor ofnew in the nineteenth century. Judges were sensitive to the charge
that they exercised a political power beyond the easy reach of democratic government.
It was difiBcult for them to admit that they were in fact fashioning new law by
disregarding the old language. To understand the psychological tension inherent in this
process it is important to remember where this change was taking place. It was one
thing to adopt a new sexual discourse in a newspaper article, a sermon, or an advice
book. But in a common law system, the words of a judge's holding become the law.
Vermont's was a famously conservative court, wary ofmaking radical changes in the
common law. That they would do so indicates how compelling the need to protect these
relationships must have seemed to them.'*^
Perhaps what is most striking about this explicit change in articulated emphasis
on seduction was the extent to which it ran against powerful trends coming to dominate
common law judges' thinking about the economic value of relationships. At precisely
the same time that judges were telling the public that it was not mere economic loss but
morality that mattered most in seduction cases, they were working a revolution in the
law by eradicating morality as an issue ofjudicial concern in cases arising out of contract
and property disputes.
Early nineteenth-century courts had focused on the specific expectations of the
parties to a contract and felt no qualms about altering the contract between them to
construction in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century society in Manliness and Civilization: A
Cultural History ofGender and Race in the United States: 1880-191 7 (Chicago: University ofChicago
Press, 1995).
Berry, 838.
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guarantee its fairness. This reflected an earlier jurisprudence which situated itself within
a local moral economy. Legal historians such as Morton Horwitz, William E. Nelson,
and Arnold M. Paul have documented how courts came to strip moral considerations
from contract law as the rise of a national and impersonal industrial capitalism demanded
the imposition ofmore neutral and predictable principles of interpretation. In addition,
common law judges, under pressure from democratic elements, sought to clothe their
actions with the mantle of scientific objectivity and avoid the appearance of acting like
un-elected legislators. The result was that contract law became formulaic and the
intention of the parties as expressed within the four comers of the document
governed—regardless of the unequal bargaining power of the parties or the injustice
such a legal analysis might work. Thus, a worker with an annual contract who quit
before the year was up might receive nothing—a result which an earlier jurisprudence
would never have permitted. Judges also cast aside older remedies for violations of
public and private rights such as the injunction, in favor of the payment of monetary
damages. As a result, older notions of property rights, such as the right of an upstream
user not to have his land flooded by a downstream dam went unpunished, and often,
uncompensated."^ So powerful was the demand for contractual predictability that older
equitable principles which had protected the property of married women were dispensed
with and state legislatures, including Vermont, passed laws recognizing the legal
On these trends see Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation ofAmerican Law, 1780-1860 (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1977); William E. Nelson, The Americanization ofthe Common Law: The
Impact ofLegal Change on Massachusetts Society. 1760-1830 (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press,
1975); Arnold M. Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule ofLaw: Attitudes ofBench
and Bar, 1887-
1895 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960). Constance Backhouse writes that
despite these trends in
other areas ofAnglo-American law Ontario's lawmakers refused to deprive fathers of
their status rights
in their daughters. Backhouse, "The Tort of Seduction," 5 1
.
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contracts made by married women and granting them the right to their own wages,"^
But the development of a law stripped of its traditional moral voice created tensions and
inconsistencies when that new law touched women/^
In seduction law, judges in Vermont and across the country were articulating
legal theories of injury which ran against the grain ofthese changes in contract and
property law. Deciding damages based solely on economic harm to the father was seen
as barbaric since such damages focused on service rather than on what was truly
important to modem civilization-respect for proper domestic relations between fathers
and daughters and parents and children. Those injuries were dependent on the character
of the parties in each case, since a woman's chastity influenced the value of her
relationship to her father and thus the damages her father might receive. The courts'
apparent movement in separate directions on these issues indicates that they were willing
to subvert the law's new emphases when it came to protecting traditional sexual and
^ For Vermont, see generally, Lucy Brown. Brown's work is the best one to date on legislative
responses involving the rights of married women. My own survey of every statute passed between 1779
and 1921 reveals that Vermont's legislature enacted at least 175 public and private statutes dealing with
women, women's rights, women's issues, and the law of marriage and divorce during this period. The
pace greatly accelerated during mid-century, with 136 (78 percent) ofthose statutes passed between
1850 and 1921 and 101 (58 percent)) passed between 1870 and 1921. As early as 1779, the legislature
passed a statute prohibiting the sale of an heiress's lands without her consent whether acquired before
marriage or w^ile under coverture. The earliest statute granting expanded legal rights to married
women came in 1 846, when the General Assembly grantedfeme sole status to women whose husbands
were imprisoned. 1846 Vt. Acts 31; For the 1779 act see Allen Soule, ed.. Laws of Vermont in State
Papers of Vermont, vol. 12 (Montpelier: Secretary of State, 1964), 146.
Amy Dru Stanley juxtaposes the powerful symbolism of newly-freed slaves' right to contract v^rith the
disabilities imposed by the marriage contract. The contradictions in the two spurred feminists to seek
legal reform of marriage law. Amy Dru Stanley, "Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract
in the Age of Emancipation," The Journal ofAmerican History 75 (1988): 471-500. These
inconsistencies extended all the way to the U. S. Supreme Court. In 1905 the Court struck down
protective legislation which limited New York bakers to a ten hour day as an interference with the right
to contract. But in 1908 it upheld similar protective legislation aimed at female tavern workers in
Oregon. Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
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family roles. And they were willing to do so even if it meant limiting the more reform-
minded state legislatures."*^
The question ofthe legal status ofwomen occupied legislators' attention at
almost every session ofVermont's General Assembly from 1790 to 1920. Beginning in
the 1840s, the legislature began to reform the common law rules which prevented
married women from maintaining a legal and financial existence distinct from that of their '
husbands, but the legislative reforms liberalizing the rights ofwomen were often blunted
by judicial decisions limiting their effect/^ Thus, the Vermont Court's holdings in
seduction cases seem to comport with its conservatism in extending the new economic
reality of the law to married women.
In seeking to understand these changes, most recent scholarship on seduction has
fitted these legal developments into a broader Victorian context."^^ An earlier Republican
ideology had recognized the sexual natures ofmen and women and been comfortable
v^dth them so long as they were confined within marriage/^ Victorian rhetoric however
stressed that women were expected to be passionless and pure and as such, guardians of
sexual virtue. Men were seen as naturally sexually aggressive, though they were
expected to curb those instincts through self-discipline.^^ Thus, most writers on
Pamela Haag discusses these issues in the context of criminal seduction and breach ofmarriage
promise cases. Haag, 25-60. Haag's work was published after this chapter was written.
Lucy Brown, 14-20.
^ M.B.W. Sinclair's article charts these statutory and common law changes and argues that they reflect
changing notions of the "ideal female." In her article, Jane Larson applies a more thoroughly feminist
critique to the nineteenth century changes.
D'Emilio and Freedman, 42-48.
Larson, 389-390; D'Emilio and Freedman, 58-59.
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seduction see the changes in seduction law in the nineteenth century as a reflection of
this new Victorian sexual ideology. Beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century,
new seduction laws recognized "the prevailing sexual morality and economic reality that
made premarital sexual experience or single motherhood an obstacle to a woman's
chance to work and to marry and therefore a devastating social injury."^' A woman's
reputation for chastity had been technically irrelevant under the old property-based
common law cause of action. So too, was the issue ofher consent." However, once
sexual morality had been foregrounded as the gravamen" of the suit, the daughter's
reputation became fair game for defense attomeys-as did the issue of consent. A similar
dynamic developed in jurisdictions which allowed a woman to bring a seduction action in
her own name.^'*
The Victorian paradigm provides a neat explanation for the apparent changes in
seduction law during the nineteenth century. The shifting tort reflected the shifting of
" Larson, 386; M. B. W. Sinclair, 78. On the importance of virginity to a woman's prospects see Robert
M. Ireland, "The Libertine Must Die: Sexual Dishonor and the Unwritten Law in the Nineteenth-
Century United States," Journal ofSocial History 23 (1989): 27-44.
" Backhouse,"The Tort of Seduction," 60; M. B. W. Sinclair, 48-49.
*^The gravamen is the material part of the case. It is that aspect ofthe grievance lying at the heart of the
dispute.
'^Larson, 385-387; Karen Dubinsky, Improper Advances: Rape and Heterosexual Conflict in Ontario,
1880-1929 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 77-78; see also M. B. W. Sinclair, 78. This
was particularly true for statutes which made civil and criminal seduction available only to women of
"previously chaste character." Michael Sturma, "Seduction and Punishment in Late Nineteenth Century
New South Wales," Australian Journal ofLaw & Society 2 (1985): 76-82; Martha J. Bailey, "Servant
Girls and Masters: The Tort of Seduction and the Support of Bastards," Canadian Journal ofFamily
Law 10 (1991): 146-147; Thomer and Reddekopp, 455. One commentator argued that truly chaste
women would never give up their chastity. Thus, the only women who could sue under a seduction
statute would be those who chose not to be chaste-rendering the cause of action under the statute
illogical and pointing out just one of the theoretical challenges the shifting tort posed. Thomas B.
Waltrip, "The Claim of Seduction in Missouri: Parker v. Bruner, 686 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984),"
Southern Illinois University Law Journal 11 (1987): 457.
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societal concerns from economic control of daughters qua property to an emphasis on
female sexuality. But the chief problem with this explanation is that it ignores what I
would call the "objective" outcomes of seduction cases before the invention of Victorian
ideology. By objective measures, seduction did not change between 1790 and 1920.
Judges were sympathetic, plaintifis typically prevailed, and judgments were large. In the
six reported cases, the plaintifis ultimately prevailed in four. In the sixth, the father died
before judgment was rendered. In three cases for which we have figures, the damage
awards were very large. In other words, between 1800 and 1920, the rhetoric of the tort
had changed, but not the predictable outcome of the cases.
A review of unpublished trial court decisions reveals a similar result. We have
the records of twenty-two seduction cases brought in the trial courts between 1796 and
1914 (including the Hubbell, Rollins, and Davidson cases discussed above)." After the
1796 case, six cases were brought in the 1 820s. There then followed a long hiatus with
» Ashley v. Willis, Windsor County Court, March 1796 Term, vol. 3, p. 416-418; Silver v. White,
Windsor County Court, March 1821 Term, vol. 13, p. 22\\Juddv. Preston, Orange County Court, June
1822 Terra, vol. 1 1, p. 299; Hubbell v Wheeler, Addison County Suprerae Court, January 1827 Term,
vol. 4, p. 230-231; Spencer v. Spencer aka Lyon, Windsor County Court, January 1828 Term, vol. 14, p.
258-259; Adams v. Starling, Addis(Mi County Court, June 1829 Term, vol. 12, p. 104-106; Harrington v.
Ladd, Windsor County Court, March 1825 Term, vol. 14, p. 1; Hurlbut v. Nichols, Windsor County
Court, December 1858 Term, vol. 27, p. 493; Abbott v. Davis, Orange County Court, January 1866
Term, vol. 20, p. 454; Greeno v. Dicero, Rutland County Court, March 1876 Term, vol. 45, p. 566-567;
Rollins V. Chalmers, Orange County Supreme Court, March 1879 Term, vol. 20, p. 248; Davidson v.
Abbott, Windsor County Court, May 1879 Term, Docket No. 153; Kinney v. Flint, Orange County
Court, June 1880 Term, Docket Book 1, p. 207; Jennings v. Pineo, Windsor County Court, December
1882 Term, vol. 34, p. 165-166; Steams v. Adams, Windsor County Court, December 1892 Term, vol.
35, p. 537; Giles v. Brothers, Windsor County Court, December 1898 Term, vol. 37, p. 91-92; Crandall
V. Rand, Windsor County Court, June 1899 Term, Docket No. 1046; Billings v. Sinclair, Windsor
County Court, December 1902 Term, vol. 38, p. 89; Dickinson v. Eaton, Orange County Court,
December 1903 Term, vol. 23, p. 513.; Stacker v. Lewis, Windsor County Court, June 1906 Term, vol.
38, p. 437-438; Fitzgerald v. Connors, Rutland County Court, March 1914 Term, vol. 61, p. 58-61;
Wheeler v. Walker, Windsor County Court, June 1914 Term, Docket No. 4863.
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no suits found in the four counties until 1858.^^ After 1858 a few cases were brought
each decade thereafter up to 1914. No fiirther cases appear in the four counties after
that date through 1 920 and no reported decision from any county were ever published
again. Out ofthe twenty-two cases brought at the trial court level, twelve resulted in a
plaintiff's verdict. The defendant defaulted in another case and a judgment was awarded
to the plaintiff. In only three cases out oftwenty-two did the defendant prevail by
verdict: at the very beginning of the period studied (1796), in the middle (1879) and
towards the very end (1903). One of those defense verdicts (the 1879 Davidson case)
was directed by the Judge, reversed, and then settled for an unknown amount. Counting
the Davidson case, four other cases settled. The remaining three cases were
discontinued." Thus, in seventeen out oftwenty-two cases (77 percent), plaintififs
ultimately obtained a verdict in their favor or an out-of-court settlement. This success
rate and large damage awards were also experienced by seduction plaintiffs in Ontario at
this time.^* The fact that only three out of twenty-two suits resulted in a not guilty
verdict is particularly startling in the context of civil lawsuits in general, but not of cases
involving questions of sexual injury. As I note in the preceeding chapter, seduction, like
civil assaults on women (including sexual assaults), bastardy proceedings, and breach of
Dates of suits and amounts awarded to plaintiflfe: 1796, 1821 ($45), 1822 ($108), 1825 ($50), 1827
($80), 1828 ($214), 1829 ($23) (servant), 1858, 1866 ($308), 1876 ($300), 1879(2) ($841), 1880
(settled), 1882 ($300), 1892 ($25), 1898, 1899 (settled), 1902, 1903, 1906 (settled), 1914 (2)
($1200)($1500).
" This number includes one case discontinued by the plaintiff after his daughter lost her bastardy suit
against the defendant at the same term making a seduction suit a losing proposition. Giles v. Brother
Windsor County Court, December 1898 Term, vol. 37, p. 91-92; Giles v. Brothers, Windsor County
Court, December 1897 Term, vol. 36, p. 553-554.
Backhouse, "The Tort of Seduction," 76.
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marriage promise cases, had very high success rates—70 to 85 percent of cases resulted
in a recovery for the plaintiff. A clear social message was being sent by jurors in
seduction cases and, based on case outcomes, it was one that would remain consistent
during the century at least as far as juries were concemed. In a measure ofjudges' belief
in the seriousness of the offense, they often found the actions of the defendant to be
'Svillful and malicious." Such a finding prohibited the defendant fi-om relying on the poor
debtor's oath as a means ofescaping the judgment/^
Damages in these suits could be very high. The average award in the thirteen
cases for which we have figures was almost $384, a very large sum when we consider
that a servant girl's wages were as low as one dollar per week and a housekeeper's
between three and four dollars per week in the late nineteenth century.*^^ Furthermore,
See for example, Hubbell v Wheeler, Addison County Supreme Court, January 1827 Term, vol. 4, p.
liO-TiV^ Adams v. Starlings Addison County Court, June 1829 Term, vol. 12, p. 104-106; Rollins v.
Chalmers^ Orange County Supreme Court, June 1879 Term, vol. 20, p. 248; Greeno v. Dicero, Rutland
County Court, March 1876 Term, vol. 45, p. 566-567.
We can see how seduction damage awards reflected more than economic harm by comparing them to
suits involving the costs of female labor which did not have a sexual or femilial component to them.
Thus in suits by women against the estates of deceased men for housekeeping services performed by
them we find that the courts awarded women between three and four dollars per week for housekeeping
services such as cooking and cleaning in the late nineteenth century. Laura A. Thompson v. Estate of
Joshua Patton, Rutland County Court, March 1898 Term, vol. 55, p. 93-95 (four dollars per week for
services between 1866 and 1896); Annie Donnelly v. Estate ofDaniel Haher, Rutland County Court,
September 1897 Term, vol. 54, p. 655-657 (three dollars per week for housekeeping services between
1879 and 1895). Vermont law allowed minor sons to buy their time and obligation to pay over wages
from their fathers. In 1825, Joseph Chase bought his rights from his father for sixteen dollars per year.
Chase V. 2 Vt. 290 (1829). In 1857, Michael Bray gave up his right to his son's time and
earnings in exchange for some sheep. The boy was earning seven dollars per month. Bray v. Wheeler,
29 Vt. 5 14 (1857). Another way of looking at it is to compare an actual per quod case for loss of
services of a son or worker. I could find only three. In only one case was there a verdict for the
plaintiff. In that case a father sued when his son was severely injured by a firework. He claimed $100
in medical expenses and two months lost work. The jury awarded him $148. Bailey v. Andrews,
Windsor County Supreme Court, February 1 878 Term, vol. 1 1 , p. M. Two other suits were brought
under the /?^r^t/Oi/ cause of action. In Gagnev. Batease, Windsor County Court, June 1920 Term, vol.
40, p. 487-488, a fether sued for injuries to his son caused by the defendant. That suit settled after it
had
gone to the jury. In Conan v. Raymond, Windsor County Supreme Court, February 1827 Term, vol. 5,
p. 25, an employer sued for injury to his indentured servant. The defendant prevailed.
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pregnancy certainly did not incapacitate a woman entirely—if at all. Yet, a typical
complaint claimed that as a result of the seduction, the father had been denied the
services of his daughter from the date of conception to the date ofbirth—a claim which
flew in the face of nineteenth-century lived experience and which further reveals the
fiction of the seduction action. According to standard seduction pleading, the injury
began at the moment ofunauthorized conception—clear indication that the harm to the
father involved something more than loss of services. When a seduction case did not
involve a fether-daughter relationship the damages were much lower. Thus, in an 1 828
case brought by a plaintiff for the impregnation of his female servant, the jury awarded
only twenty-eight dollars. After requesting a new trial, the defendant was found liable
again. This time the jury awarded twenty-three dollars. Just six months before, in
neighboring Windsor County, a jury had awarded a plaintiff $214 in another seduction
case. But in that instance, the plaintiffwas a father, not an employer.^'
As early as the eighteenth century, commentators were aware that the
requirement of showing economic injury was a fiction. And, as has already been shown.
Tapping Reeve, vmting of seduction in 1816 (based on an analysis of eighteenth century
cases), concluded that loss of service was not the true rule of damages. Instead the real
ground for damages was the disgrace of the femily.^^ Thus, long before the enunciation
of a Victorian ideology, judges and juries knew that seduction was "really" about
disgrace and decided cases accordingly. Seduction litigation both before and after the
" Adams v. Starling, Addison County Court, June 1829 Term, vol. 12, p. 104-106; Spencer v. Spencer
aka Lyon, Windsor County Court, January 1828 Term, vol. 14, p. 258-259.
"Chittenden, 291.
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Victorian shift implicated questions of honor and a father's right to have control over his
daughter's sexuality. These issues greatly predate notions of Victorian sexual morality
and lay at the heart of any social order based on a patriarchal family structure.^^
It is easy to see how in the small communities that made up Vermont, such a
dynamic could also exist long before Victorian ideology washed over the rural landscape.
Evidence from Vermont reflects a broad social desire to punish those who interfered
with family relationships, reputation and sexual norms. Society regulated many sexual
behaviors ranging from seemingly consensual acts (seduction, adultery, and bastardy) to
entirely coercive ones (sexual assault and rape). Thus, seduction needs to be understood
not only in the context of a Victorian transition from the economic to the moral, but also
as an act of invasion by a stranger into the family which denied fathers their authority and
thereby injured the family's reputation. If one views seduction as part of a much older
patriarchal system which requires control over female sexuality, then the nineteenth-
century changes in seduction law appear to be merely a reinforcement of older ideals in
response to new challenges to male authority rather than a new development in sexual
relations between men and women.^ Such a theory has great explanatory power given
^ For an ancient example, see Edward M. Harris, "Did the Athenians Regard Seduction as a Worse
Crime than Rape?" Classical Quarterly 40 (1990): 370-377. Conventional wisdom has it that the
Athenians regarded seduction as a worse offense than rape. Rape was a short-term physical assault on a
woman. On the other hand, a seducer "could win a long-lasting mastery over her soul." To men who
were masters of their households and concerned with maintaining control over their daughters,
seduction posed a grave threat to their authority as masters and hence to their honor. Though Harris
argues that the Athenians did not regard seduction as worse than rape, he does not discredit the notion
that to some in a patriarchal society, seduction could seem a worse offense.
Backhouse, "The Tort of Seduction," 77-78.
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that the actual outcome of seduction cases changed little in terms of the size ofdamages
awarded or plaintiff success rate before and after the spread of Victorian values."
The Victorian paradigm and the patriarchal model provide powerfiil tools for
understanding seduction law during the nineteenth century. The Victorian model sees
changes in the law and explains them as reflecting new sexual values. In contrast, the
patriarchal model sees new law and explains it as reinforcing older notions in the face of
a changing social and economic order. This paradox can be explained ifwe recognize
that the important change in seduction in the nineteenth century was not in the outcome
ofthe cases, but in the discourse judges, lawyers and legislators now permitted in
prosecuting them. Juries awarded large verdicts in the eighteenth century and continued
to do so in the early twentieth. Judges were pro-plaintiff in seduction cases before the
eighteenth century and they remained so in the twentieth. The stability of these objective
measures of attitudes about seduction over time suggest that they did not change, but the
way judges and lawyers talked about seduction did. They were now willing to
acknowledge explicitly the importance of sexual honor and purity and to foreground
those values in the texts of their decisions and statutes. The language of decisions
shifted fi-om technical analyses which stressed the old formal requirements (such as
economic injury) to explications on shame, dishonor, sexual purity, and the relationship
between parents and daughters. Furthermore, in Vermont that discourse focused on the
way that the male defendant's impregnation of the daughter threatened the parent-child
" M.B.W. Sinclair notes the punitive nature of seduction cases as early as the eighteenth century, but
does not provide an explanation for it. M. B. W. Sinclair, 35-41. On changes in seduction law as a
reflection of older patriarchal attitudes clashing with new realities, see Backhouse, "The Tort of
Seduction," 45-80.
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relationship and the daughter's fiiture. Even though the results for the litigants remained
the same, the changes in seduction law altered the courtroom discourse—articulating
injuries to fathers and daughters that in the past had been understood, but went largely
unspoken.
I have already noted how perceived threats to traditional family life-including the
breakdovm of rural communities, rising divorce and illegitimacy rates, and increasing
opportunities for female autonomy-were on the minds of many ofVermont's
intelligentsia. These problems may have spurred Vermont's judges to talk more
explicitly about seduction's real harm to parents and families while continuing to
encourage the success of plaintiffs in their suits stemming from these transactions. Thus
it was Vermont's courts, rather than its legislature that gave women the right to sue in
their own names for seduction in 191 1 when the claim was part of a breach of marriage
promise suit.^
Fitzgerald v. Connors (1914), the sixth and last seduction case ever reported in
Vermont, reflects this dynamic.^^ Fitzgerald sought $10,000 for the seduction of his
daughter, alleging only $300 in expenses on account ofher pregnancy in addition to
unspecified damages for the loss ofher services. The jury returned a verdict of $1200.
**
Stokes V. Mason, 85 Vt. 164 (191 1). The case is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 1.
" The other seduction case was Davis v. Carpenter (1900). In that case the father had brought a
seduction suit against Carpenter, but had died before trial. Despite the feet that the daughter's mother
was now seekmg to continue the suit as administrator ofthe fether's estate, the Court characterized
seduction as a personal action like slander which could not survive the death of the father and dismissed
the suit. In a brief decision with no citation to authority, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's
decision. The Court's analogy to slander was telling since that tort is mainly concerned with injury to
honor and reputation rather than economic injury which always survived the death of the plaintiff. The
case shows the extent to which the old economic nature ofthe tort had been completely eradicated in
the
eyes of the courts. Davis v. Carpenter, 72 Vt. 259 (1900); Davis v. Carpenter, Brief of the
Defendant,
Vermont Reports Briefe, 72(2), no. 67 (1900).
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At trial, under direct examination, the plaintiffs lawyer, Joseph Jones, asked the
plaintiffhow his daughter's seduction had made him feel. The defendant objected to this
line of questioning as being irrelevant to the seduction action. The judge allowed the
questioning and Fitzgerald responded that he could not explain how it made him feel,
that he had to flee the town where he had lived, and did not want to meet anyone who
knew about it. The defendant sought a directed verdict on the issue of whether Lydia
Fitzgerald was in fact her father's servant since she worked outside the home and he also
argued that she was eighteen at the time the child was bom, thus increasing the plaintiffs
burden of proving she was his servant. The defendant's motion was denied by the
judge.^«
Finally, the defendant sought various charges to the jury which the judge also
denied. Instead, the judge told the jury that it could find for the plaintiff even if the
daughter worked outside the home as long as the evidence showed that the father had
the right to control her wages, even if he did not in fact choose to exercise this right.
The judge also charged the jury that if they came to the question of damages, "the
plaintiff was entitled to recover for the shock to his feelings and sensibilities, by the
dishonor brought upon him." To this the defendant also objected arguing that such
damages were special damages and needed to be pleaded specially, which the plaintiff
had failed to do.^'
Fitzgerald V. Connors, Rutland County Supreme Court, November 1914 Term, vol. 127, p. 185-186;
Fitzgerald V. Connors, Defendant's Bill of Exceptions, Vermont Reports Briefe, 88(3), no. 48 (1914).
Fitzgerald V. Connors, Defendant's Bill of Exceptions, Vermont Reports Briefe.
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After the verdict, the defendant moved to set aside the jury's verdict and get a
new trial based on the issues described above. The Supreme Court methodicaUy
disposed of the defendant's appellate issues. It was now clear that seduction defendants
had few options in defending these cases. Like other defendants before him, Patrick
Connors was left arguing old legal theories about master-servant relationships and
economic injury. And like other defendants before him, it was a ftitile task. Despite the
fact that Lydia Fitzgerald had been living seven miles away from home, kept all her own
wages, and was eighteen at the time of the delivery of her child, the Supreme Court
refiised to deem her emancipated and instead held that she was still her father's servant
and that the seduction worked an injury upon him. This was a gross departure from the
traditional law of seduction, but the Court was no longer paying much attention to the
legal issues that had once defined the tort, issues which the Fitzgerald court now
believed continued to exist for reasons which were "historical rather than logical."'"
One of the most significant aspects of the case is Thomas Fitzgerald's testimony.
In a case based on moral injury to the father, it was very important for him to
communicate precisely to the jury how the seduction of his daughter made him feel. But
Fitzgerald had great difficulty articulating it. And perhaps this was not a bad
development for the plaintiff in this case, because it let the jury know that the
defendant's actions had taken away this Vermont farmer's ability to speak and name.
Whether one views it from the point of view of patriarchy or republican citizenship, the
Fitzgerald V. Connors, Brief of Defendant, Vermont Reports Briefs; Fitzgerald v. Connors, 88 Vt. 365
(1914). Tapping Reeve wrote that once a daughter was of age and no longer living with her father,
no
action for seduction could lie. In his 1846 update of Reeve's work, Lucius Chittenden did not
contradict
this position. Reeve, 292.
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seduction ofThomas Fitzgerald's daughter had stripped him of a central part of his
definition and power; mute testimony to the threat seduction posed to masculine notions
of domestic and social order. Vermont's legal system made sure that Patrick Connors
paid the price for his transgression.''
Conclusion
Writing in 1940, Lord Thankerton noted that "the action for seduction as known
to English law has itself had an unsatisfactory development. . . ." Another commentator
criticized it as "among the least respectable products of the common law," one which
had "never been distinguished by logic or clarity."^ Twentieth-century commentators
were rightly puzzled by the development of seduction. For want of a better solution, a
tort which most recognized (at some level) as having its basis in patriarchal rights and
shame had been grafted onto a cause of action for economic injury. Almost fi"om the
start the true dynamic underlying the action had done rhetorical battle with the formal
and mostly unrelated requirements of a case for economic injury. Such a disparity
between what everyone says and what everyone knows does not make for either "logic
or clarity." But it does provide an opportunity for gaining insight into the way in which
the courts understood, law, sex, and family relationships.
Ifthe question is whether the predictable outcomes of seduction cases changed
between 1790 and 1920 the answer would have to be in the negative. Instead,
" Kathy Peiss provided the inspiration for this analysis.
" Lord Thankerton 's comments came in Brownlee v. MacMillan, A.C. 802, 809 (1940); the second
comment was made in E. Joliffe, Canadian Bar Review 13 (1935): 331. Both are quoted in Thomer and
Reddekopp, 469.
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nineteenth-century changes in seduction law reflected an increased willingness to
recognize explicitly the real harm seduction did to fathers. In so doing, courts disposed
of the formal legal technicalities that might interfere with punishing a defendant for his
actions and eradicated the legal fictions that had bound judicial discourse.
The change in Vermont's seduction law took place amidst the upheaval following
the Civil War as the issue of female autonomy in the social, economic, political, and
sexual spheres came to the fore. These changes in the Vermont female experience are
demonstrated spatially when we compare the state's first, middle and last reported
seduction cases. In 1 819, Benjamin Hubbell's daughter had been debauched in her home
by a boarder. In 1 878, Helen Davidson had been seduced on her way home fi-om wage
labor at a local factory. In 1 91 1 , Lydia Fitzgerald had been impregnated while working
and living miles fi-om home—for all intents an independent woman. Vermont lawmakers
paid attention to these changes, but the particular modifications in the state's law were
more rhetorical than substantive, the objective measures of seduction having changed
little during this period. Those rhetorical changes reflected the perceived threat
increasing female autonomy posed to close parent-daughter relationships combined with
a desire to pimish men acting outside the bounds of sexual propriety. It is a measure of
society's concern that Vermont's Supreme Court, heretofore reticent on the issue,
reversed itself and became a rhetorical instrument for aflBrming the importance of
compensating parents for the loss oftheir daughters' virtue-the maintenance of which
became the most valuable service autonomous daughters now provided to their parents.
The Fitzgerald case was the last suit for seduction brought in the four counties
before 1920 and the last published decision involving seduction ever handed down by the
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Supreme Court. Like its sister suit, breach of marriage promise, seduction disappeared
from the Supreme Court's jurisprudence sixty years before it was formally prohibited by
statute in 1973.'^ It is possible that such suits continued to be brought in Vermont's trial
courts, but that the legal issues had been so settled by the Supreme Court that there were
no appellate issues left. Or it is possible that changes in society in the 1920s including a
liberalisation of attitudes about female sexuality, coupled with the move toward a more
direct state intervention in the sexual affairs of families, rendered such suits increasingly
ideologically untenable. In fact, the 1920s and 1930s saw increased pressure in other
states to abolish the so-called "heart bahn" causes of action-a move supported by both
conservative men and feminist women.^'* An answer to the question in Vermont would
require a review of court records after 1 920.
There are both similarities and differences between the courts' treatment of
seduction and the other civil causes examined in Chapter 1 . Success rates in all these
cases were high as were damage awards despite the feet that the suits often involved
women who had engaged in consensual pre-marital sex. The consensual sexual aspect of
these cases meant that they came with a built-in tension between condemning the
woman's behavior on the one hand and permitting her to recover compensation on the
other. When it came to the civil causes examined in Chapter 1, the courts chose to
protect a woman's right to obtain compensation for injuries. With seduction, the courts
escaped this quandary by restricting the cause of action to fathers and continuing to hold
" The last reported decision involving breach ofmarriage promise was handed down in Dyer v. Lalor,
94 Vt. 103 (1920). Seduction was eliminated by the legislature in 1973 along with the other so-called
"heart bahn" actions: alienation of affections, breach of contract to marry, and criminal conversation.
1973 (Adj.) Vt. Acts 198.
M. B. W. Sinclair, 82-93.
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the question of female consent irrelevant to the cause of action. Seduction allowed the
courts the luxury they lacked in cases where the woman was also the plaintiff. The
courts could lecture young women about the importance of maintaining their chastity
while still allowing the father to recover when they did not. In all these cases, the
consistent loser was the man who violated sexual norms or interfered with family
relationships.
Relative to other causes of action, seduction was rare in Vermont. Between
1796 and 19141 could uncover only twenty-two cases in the four counties studied. Its
rarity becomes more significant when we realize that every one of the 142 bastardy cases
uncovered during this same period was a potential seduction suit as well. By contrast,
Constance Backhouse found that seduction was the most common cause of action
involving women in Ontario during the same period. However, seduction as a popular
cause of action seems to have been the exception rather than the rule even in other parts
of Canada.'^
Several factors may explain the dearth of seduction suits. No lawsuit is a
pleasant experience, but the subject matter of seduction actions must have been
particularly diflScult for both father and daughter. After all, the suit increasingly became
explicitly grounded on the idea of mortification. The aspect of seduction that made it
" There were more seduction cases-152-brought in Ontario between 1820 and 1900 than were brought
for prostitution, rape, infanticide, abortion, alimony proceedings, or child custody litigation. Backhouse
finds almost no seduction cases outside of Ontario and speculates that Ontario's seduction statute which
permitted fathers to sue even ifthe daughter lived elsewhere, and/or was under the authority of a
different master, and dispensed with a showing of services may have been responsible for its frequency.
Though, as I have shown, the deficiencies corrected by the statute did not provide any kind of hurdle to
Vermont litigants. However, given the much larger population of Ontario during the nineteenth
century, Vermont may have actually had more seduction suits per capita than Ontario. In 1890 Ontario
had 2.l'million people, the four counties had 130,000. Backhouse, "The Tort of Seducrion," 49-50, 73,
notes 81-82 and Chart No. 2.
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such an injury to ("allicrs the damage lo their reputations and that of their lamilies may
well explain why few fathers were willing to compound the injury by bringing a lawsuit.
We have glimmers ofthis dynamic in the testimony of Thomas Fitzgerald who
(according to his testimony at least) wanted to hide from his neighbors and from Jacob
Haynes whose letters to his lawyer Lucius C'hittcnden repeatedly expressed his anxiety
about the case and explained how his daughter feared testifying.^'' The suits must have
been incredibly humiliating for both father and daughter.
Unlike bastardy suits which could be forced upon poor women by the towns,
seduction actions were entirely voluntary -and expensive, it cost Larkin Harrington
sixty-six dollars to get a jury verdict against Alfred Ladd for the seduction of his
daughter in 1 825. A year later, Benjamin 1 lubbcll .spent seventy dollars to win a verdict
against Philander Wheeler. Jonas Spencer and 1 homas Adams spent over $100 each to
win jury verdicts in their seduction suits.^ These amounts do not include most of the
costs of hiring attorneys, either, which dramatically increased expenses.'* Samuel Rollins
spent $166 in his suit against Albert (Chalmers (Chalmers's attorney's fees and costs in
defending himself in that case were over $100).^'' Under the nineteenth century system.
.lacob liayncs lo Lucius Chitlcndcn, \5 March 1849, 21 May 1849, 17 January I8.S0. Luciu.s E.
C^hitlcndcn I'apcrs, Carton 1.
^ Harhtif^lon v. UdJ, Windsor County Court, March 182.*) Term, vol. 14, p. I; Huhhcll v. Wheeler,
Addison County Supreme Court, January 1 827 Term, vol. 4, p. 230-2.3 1 ; Spencer v. Lyon, Windsor
County Court, January 1828 Term, vol. 14, p. 2.58-259; Adams v. StarlinK, Addison C;ounty Court, June
1829 Term, vol. 12, p. 104-106.
™ The parties had to pay numerous fees and costs to prosecute their suits. These included witness
fees,
filing fees for the writ, the co.sts of service of pleadings on parties. Jury fees,
and judgment fees. The
loser bore the costs. See for example, l Uzgerald v. Connors,
" Taxation of Costs," Rutland County
Supreme Court, Novemtier 1914 l erm.
Rollins V Chalmers, Orange County Supreme C:ourt, March 1879 Term, vol. 20, p. 248;
Ledger of
Farnham and Chamberlain, 1874-1892, p. 1 18-119, 270-271, I-edgcT of
Farnham and Chambcrlam,
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successful plaintiffs could collect their costs from defendants, but ifthey lost, not only
would they be out of pocket for expenses and attorney's fees, but they also had to pay
the defendant's costs as well.^^ Some courts required plaintiffs to file a thirty or fifty-
dollar bond in order to guarantee payment of costs to defendants ifthey prevailed. This
requirement would also have served as a financial hurdle.^' This probably explains why
most plaintiffs in these suits were members of the middling class, had more than one
daughter in the household, or sued defendants who had money. Not only did they have
the financial resources to bring the suit and fece the consequences of a loss, but they may
well have felt the injury to their reputation and that of their families more keenly than
members of the lower classes or families with no other daughters. At the same time,
these middling classes or families with more than one daughter also had the most to lose
from such suits. And this combination of factors may explain why they were so rare
despite their high success rate.^^
1878-1887, p. 72, 100, Roswell Famhara Papers, Special Collections, University of
Vermont.
Attorneys fees were allowable partly by statute and partly at the discretion of the judge, but awards
rarely covered the entire amount expended. See for example General Statutes of Vermont (Cambridge,
1862), § 35, 36; Earl v. Tupper, 45 Vt. 275 (1873).
^'"Proposed Rules of Practice as Adopted," Proceedings ofthe Vermont Bar Association: 1878-1881
(Montpelier, 1882), 76. For examples of cases dismissed for feilure to file a bond see LouisaM Frost v.
George Capron, Sr., Rutland County Court, March 1865 Term, vol. 40, p. 645 (bastardy); Harriet N.
Colby V, Winslow S Myers, Windsor County Court, May 1 870 Term, vol. 38, p. 572 (bastardy); Harris
Hinchman v. Lyman A. Ballou, Windsor County Court, December 1899 Term, vol. 37, p. 263-264
(alienation of affections); Fred C. Pojfv. John E. MurcK Windsor County Court, June 1901 Term, vol.
37, p. 433 (alienation of affections).
This is a different pattern than in Ontario where Backhouse found that seduction tended
to be a
working-class cause of action with defendants slightly wealthier than plaintifife, but still
members of the
working class. Backhouse, "The Tort of Seduction," 74.
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In seduction suits judges and juries were called upon to evaluate how sexual
relations between unmarried daughters and men worked an injury to fathers and other
family members. Seduction actions themselves were not common, but they were part of
an expanding category of sexual matters which came under the supervision of the
legislature and the courts at this time including adultery and rape. These criminal matters
too provide us with opportunities to observe how the trial courts, the legislature, and the
Supreme Court responded to the legal and sexual issues raised by the sexual behavior of
Vermont's citizens and how their decisions helped to define or alter that behavior.
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CHAPTER 3
VERMONT'S ADULTERY LAW, 1779-1920
Introduction: Early Statutory Development
The first laws prohibiting adultery passed by the newly-created Republic of
Vermont were unremittingly harsh. This reflected their origins in Connecticut's Puritan
legal code which was adopted almost wholesale by the men ofVermont shortly after
declaring independence fi-om New York.' The first law, passed in February 1779,
prohibited a man fi-om "committing adultery" with the wife of another man or v^th a
woman betrothed to another. In such cases both the man and the woman were to be
whipped on the naked body up to thirty-nine times and then "stigmatized" (branded on
the forehead with the letter A). They were also required to wear the letter A on the back
of their clothing at all times while living within the state. Convicted adulterers who were
caught without the letter on their clothing were subject to another whipping of up to ten
more stripes for each offense.^ The law against adultery was part of a comprehensive
scheme regulating all manner of sexual impropriety adopted by Vermonters in the
aftermath of independence. Laws passed in the next few days prohibited and punished
polygamy, lascivious carriage and behavior, incest and incestuous marriage, rape, and
illegal marriage.^ Another section of the 1779 laws made bestiality subject to the death
' Vermonters, many ofwhom had come from Connecticut, adopted the laws contained in the
Connecticut Statute Book ofl769. Allen Soule, ed.. Laws of Vermont, 1777-1780, vol. 12 oi State
Papers of Vermont (Montpelier: Secretary of State, 1964), 35.
2
"An Act Against, And For the Punishment of Adultery," 18 February 1779; in Soule, 12: 38.
^ Soule, 12:39-41.
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penalty when committed by any man or woman. The same section provided the death
penalty for men who committed sodomy with exceptions for an underage partner or one
who was forced. Interestingly, the anti-sodomy statute applied only to men and not to
women.'*
Revisions to the law in 1 783 made punishment for adultery slightly less harsh, but
brought more people within its reach and contained greater complexity. Unlike the 1779
law, the new statute combined prohibitions on adultery and polygamy in one text and, for
the first time, added fornication as a criminal offense. The new statute's preamble noted
that violations of the marriage covenant were "contrary to the Command of God, and
destructive of the Peace of Families."
The 1 779 statute had reflected the common law understanding of adultery : sex
with a married woman or sex with a woman betrothed. At common law, adultery was
not a crime, but a civil offense brought by a man for the "adulteration" of his children's
bloodlines caused by another's having had intercourse with his wife or fiance.^ It seems
clear that Vermont's first adultery law of 1779, based on Connecticut's, had simply been
an attempt to render as a new criminal violation what had been a civil infi-action.^ But
the 1783 language was less specific. It simply provided punishment for "any person"
^Soule, 12: 128.
* William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland, vol. 3 (London, 1768), 139. According to
Blackstone, adultery or criminal conversation was, as a public crime, left punishable solely at the
discretion of the church courts. At common law it was a civil wrong punishable as a trespass vi et armis
and damages were "usually very large and very exemplary [i.e. punitive]." Such damages he continued
"are properly increased or diminished by circumstances; as the rank and fortune of the plaintiff and
defendant; the relations or connection between them; the seduction or otherwise of the wife, founded
on
her previous behaviour and character; and the husband's obligation by settlement or otherwise to
provide for those children, which he cannot but suspect to be spurious."
<^ This seems likely given that statute's reference to sex with a married woman or one
betrothed-a
reflection of the fear of adulterating the man's issue.
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who "shall commit Adultery" and did not extend to sex with a woman who was
betrothed but not yet married. The law did not specify what adultery was or who could
be convicted for it—a point which would lead to much litigation on the subject later on.
The punishment was also different. Convicts continued to be lashed on their naked
bodies up to thirty-nine times, but no longer faced branding.^ Instead they were forced
to stand upon the gallows for an hour with nooses around their necks. As in the 1779
statute, adulterers were also forced to wear the letter A on their clothing and now feced
up to fifteen stripes if found guilty of not displaying the letter at all times. The act
further provided that any man and woman obtaining a divorce who then "cohabit or
converse together as Man and Wife" would be subject to the same sanctions as
adulterers.* Polygamy was treated the same as adultery and provided the same
punishments for the offenders though it was not clear whether the partner who was
unmarried at the time would also face criminal sanction.'
Also, for the first time, Vermonters enacted what would come to be known as a
"blanket act." Such acts made it illegal for a married man or woman to be found in bed
with another person ofthe opposite sex not his or her spouse. Sexual intercourse need
not be proved. Each offender was to be whipped, upon conviction, not exceeding thirty-
nine stripes. Reflecting the greater complexity of the 1783 legislation, the law contained
an exception for persons who were in the bed against their will. The language did not
' See for example. State v. Hopkins, Orange County Supreme Court, February 1794 Term, vol. 1, p.
9.
A jury found Hopkins guilty of adultery with Betsy Back. Taken out to the signpost at noon, he received
twenty lashes on his naked back and was fined twelve pounds.
« John A. Williams, ed.. Laws of Vermont. 1781-1784, vol. 13 of State Papers of
Vermont (Montpelier:
Secretary of State, 1 965), 210-212.
'Williams, 13:211.
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specify the sex of the aggrieved person, but it seems likely that this was meant to protect
women who had been sexually assaulted from conviction under the act.'°
Fornication, that is sex between two unmarried people, was treated more lightly.
Defendants charged with fornication could absolve themselves of criminal liability simply
by marrying each other. But even ifthey did not choose this route, they faced at most a
four pound fine or a whipping ofup to twelve stripes each. The punishment was left to
the discretion of the judge."
The laws on adultery, polygamy, fornication, and sodomy were reenacted in 1787
after Vermont adopted a new constitution and remained almost unchanged. The one
exception was the law against fornication. Whipping was eliminated entirely and a three
month statute of limitations enacted on the crime. This trend of treating fornication
more lightly than adultery or polygamy would continue.
Vermont joined the United States in 1 791 and adopted a new constitution and a
comprehensive scheme of statutes in 1797. The law ofMarch 9, 1797 concerning
aduhery was brief A man or woman committing adultery was subject to a fine ofup to
$500 and whipping ofnot more than thirty-nine stripes. Divorced couples who
continued to cohabit, those who committed polygamy, those who committed incest, and
those caught in bed with a married person not their spouse, were all to be punished in the
same fashion as adulterers. Prohibitions on fornication were dropped from the new law
and for the next hundred years the state never again tried unmarried, unrelated adults for
Williams, 13:210.
" Williams, 13:212
'2 John A. Williams, ed.. Laws of Vermont, 1785-1791, vol. 14 of State Papers of
Vermont (Montpelier:
Secretary of State, 1966), 165-167.
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having consensual sex—nor for that matter those having sex with children over age ten.
Nor would it again outlaw sodomy in its statutes for the remainder of the nineteenth
century.''* Prostitution too was never illegal at state law in the nineteenth century,
though keeping a whorehouse was.'^ Lewdness also dropped out of the statute books,
not to be revived until 1839.'^ Instead, the focus was, as the statute made clear, on
sexual acts destructive to the peace of families: polygamy, incest, and adultery.
" 1797 Vt. Acts 9. In 1886 the state raised the age of consent for girls from eleven to fourteen and then
to sixteen twelve years later. 1 886 Vt. Acts 63; 1 898 Vt. Acts 1 1 8. See discussion of the age of consent
laws in Chapter 5.
The absence of a law prohibiting sodomy created problems for the state in 1898 when it attempted to
prosecute a man for having sex v«th another man. After conviction for sodomy in the county court, the
defendant appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that no law prohibited his actions. The Court held
that since sodomy was always prohibited by English common law and since Vermont had adopted all of
the common law of England not repugnant to its constitution or laws, sodomy was illegal in Vermont
even in the absence of a statute. State v. Laforrest, 71 Vt. 31 1 (1899). Thereafter men accused of
sodomy or sodomy and buggery were imprisoned very intermittently (in 1896, 1900, 1912, 1916, 1920).
"Report of the OflBcers of the State Prison" and "Report of the Officers ofthe House of Correction," in
Vermont State Officers ' Reports for these years. It is possible that some were charged under the
lewdness statute instead, though I found no such cases in my survey of the four counties involving
consensual sex. In 1905, Charles Rust was charged with lewdness for placing male minors on a stool
and then inserting "the projecting part of his private parts" between their thighs and then "act[ing] until
his amorous passions were satisfied." It is not clear whether the act involved penetration or was
intercrural. Rust defaulted before trial. State v. Charles L. Rust, Rutland County Court, March 1905
Term, vol. 58, p. 69-71 . "Oral copulation" was made illegal by statute in 1937. The law was repealed
in 1977. 1937 Vt. Acts 21 1; 1 977 Vt. Acts 5 1
.
" Keeping a house of ill feme was made illegal in 1834. 1834 Vt. Acts 7. Prostitution was not illegal,
though some cities and towns with local ordinance authority did prohibit it towards the end of the
nineteenth century. Within the four counties studied, I have not found any prosecutions of prostitutes
under the authority ofcommon law. Prostitution was made illegal at state law in 1919. 1919 Vt. Acts
199.
'6 Revised Statutes of Vermont, 1839 (Burlington, 1 840), Chapter 99, § 8. "If any man or woman,
married or unmarried, shall be guilty of open and gross lewdness and lascivious behavior, every such
person shall be punished by imprisonment in the common jail, not more than two years, or by fine
not
exceeding three hundred dollars." It does not appear that lewdness was used to prosecute prostitutes.
Ofthe fifty-three prosecutions for lewdness I have documented (none earlier than 1846 the year the
Supreme Court explained, for the first time, what lewdness was in State v. Millard, 18 Vt. 574 (1846))
only fifteen, or less than one-third, were brought against women. Although the
Vermont Supreme Court
had held in 1846 that a conviction for open and gross lewdness did not require the
presence of a third
person most lewdness cases involved public displays of a sexual natur^ither public exposure
(usually
by men but occasionally by women) or actions in the nature of a sexual assault (fondlmg
women or
solicitiiJg them to have sex). In a 1927 case, the Supreme Court made clear that private
acts of
prostitution could not constitute "open and gross lewdness." State v. Franzoni, 100
Vt. 373 (1927).
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Adultery law went through several more changes in the early part of the century.
In 1806 the General Assembly retained whipping and fines, but also offered the
alternative to judges of sentencing convicts to standing in the pillory for three hours, or
imprisonment for up to two years." Violations of the blanket act continued to be treated
the same as adultery. Whipping was eliminated in 1 816, reflecting the general trend
away fi"om corporal punishment taking place throughout the nation as well as the
availability of alternative punishment made available by the opening of the state prison at
Windsor in 1809.'* The law now provided that those convicted of adultery faced a
$1000 fine and/or imprisonment at hard labor in the state prison for up to three years. It
also explicitly punished sexual intercourse between a married man and an unmarried
woman as well.'^ This would turn out to be an unsuccessful attempt to clarify just
exactly what adultery meant for purposes of criminal prosecution—an issue which would
vex the Supreme Court throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Other
than an increase in the prison term to a maximum of five years in 1839, the adultery law
1806 Vt. Acts 93.
The Vermont Supreme Court strongly condemned the use of torture and coerced confessions in an
1803 decision, declaring them totally illegal and fining the ofiBcers implicated in that case. State v.
Hobbs, 2 Tyl. 380 (1803). In 1816, Vermont prohibited its Justices of the peace from administering
whippings. 1816 Vt. Acts 128. These developments in Vermont mirrored the trend taking place
throughout the western world as governing theories of criminal punishment moved away from corporal
punishment in which the state publicly exacted its vengeance on the body of the criminal and toward
confinement and rehabilitation. Advocates for such reforms such as the Italian, Cesare Beccaria, were
known to Vermont's judges. Hobbs, 381-382. John Reynolds, a former official at the State Prison in
Windsor, discussed its development and operation noting how "Humanity too, recoiled from the cruelty
of such inflictions as the lash, and the brand; and as the effect of such severity was no argument for
its
continuance, humane legislators devised the Penitentiary system, by which criminals are confined to
labor, and should he allowed full opportunities of reflecting on their conduct and at reforming
their
lives." John Reynolds, Recollections of Windsor Prison-Containing Sketches of its History
and
Discipline (Boston, 1834), 5-6. See also, Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth ofthe
Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977).
" 1818 Vt. Acts 1.
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would remain largely unchanged for the next 150 years. The 1818 law also differentiated
between adultery and violations of the blanket act for the first time. Violations of the
latter law were now punished solely by a fine ofup to $1000. However, by 1839, the
legislature had re-imposed the option of a prison sentence ofup to three years. The
blanket act remained unchanged for the rest of the century.^"
We can make a few general observations about the statutory evolution of
adultery law. What had been merely a civil cause of action under English law had
become criminalized in America-a reflection of the merger of church and state in Puritan
colonies like Connecticut. Vermont's churches had courts of their own and the state's
government, while avowedly Christian, was self-consciously anti-establishmentarian;
nevertheless it imported adultery into its criminal law with the adoption of the
Connecticut statutes. Unlike rape laws for example, laws against adultery, fornication,
sodomy, incestuous marriage, and polygamy underwent constant tinkering during the
first sixty years of the state's existence-a reflection both of the complexity of the
behavior they sought to regulate, and, seemingly, ambivalence about the proper role of
the state in regulating consensual sexual behavior. By the 1840s the statutory law
attained stability. Fornication (unless with a family member), sodomy, and acts of
prostitution were not deemed important enough to be addressed in the law books-even if
they had been at an earlier time in the state's history. Instead, the law focused entirely
on public displays of sexuality (lewdness) or consensual sex that threatened marital and
family relations: adultery, polygamy, and incest.
Revised Statutes, Chapter 99, §§ 1-3.
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Judicial Interpretation
This statutory evolution is only half the story. The application of the adultery
laws by real judges and real juries to real people formed the other half. A successful
adultery prosecution required two elements of proof First, the state had to prove that
one of the parties was married. Second, it had to prove that sexual intercourse had taken
place. But even where both elements had been shown, it was not always clear that a
crime had occurred because of confusion over the definition of adultery itself
Defendants challenged convictions on both grounds. Initially, the Court's formalistic
instincts, hostility to defects in criminal proceedings, uncertainty over what exactly
constituted aduhery, and confusion over what evidence was necessary to prove it
provided defendants with opportunities to have their convictions overturned. And
indeed, the Supreme Court reversed four of the first five appeals it heard.^' But by 1916,
the Court had so liberalized its evidentiary requirements that any man and woman
spending time alone with someone other than their spouse placed themselves in legal
jeopardy.
The prosecution risked an appeal fi-om conviction whenever it tried to prove the
marriage ofone of the parties by evidence consisting of something other than an official
record of the marriage or testimony by one who was present at the ceremony. The
earliest published decision of any kind by the Supreme Court, State v. Annice (1789),
2' The reversed cases were: State v. Amice, 1 N. Chip. 9 (1789) (reputation evidence inadmissible to
prove the marriage of the accused); State v. Chillis, Brayt. 131(1818) (failure to charge both man and
woman with illicit intent rendered indictment defective); State v. Way, 6 Vt. 31 1 (1834) (man and
woman seen in bed together sufficient to prove violation of blanket act, but not adultery
for which actual
proof of intercourse must be shown); State v. Cooper, 16 Vt. 551 (1844) (adultery is not a common
law
offense). The fifth case. State v. Rood, 12 Vt. 396 (1840) dealt with the issue of provmg a
marriage. In
that case, the conviction was upheld.
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had made clear that reputation evidence was insufficient to prove a marriage in an
aduhery prosecution. The Court threw out convictions even where the state presented
evidence that the marriage had been registered but failed to produced the actual marriage
certificates or produced copies that were defective.^^
Ifthe Court was willing to reverse convictions where technical formalities had
not been complied v^th, it was also willing to place as much of the burden on the
defendant as the law would allow. Adultery indictments and informations charged the
defendant with having a husband or wife 'then living" for example. But the Court ruled
that it was not up to the state to prove that the spouse was living as an element of the
crime, but instead it was up to the defendant to prove that the spouse was dead.
Similarly, the Court ruled that it was not the state's job to prove that the marriage
complied with all the formalities of state law, instead the defense had to prove that it had
not.^^
In a similar vein, in 1913 the Court provided the state with an altemative method
to proving marriage by making the spouse competent to testify to the existence of a valid
marriage. This violated the spirit ifnot the letter of the marital privilege law which
prevented spouses fi-om testifying against one another. As we will see however, it was
not unusual for adultery prosecutions to transgress the boundaries of the very marital
institutions they were intended to protect.
State V. Annice, 1 N. Chip. 9 (1789); State v. Colby, 51 Vt. 291 (1878); State v.
Brink and Gibbs,
Vt. 659(1896).
^ State V. Way, 6 Vt. 3 1 1 ( 1 834); Slate v. Rood, 1 2 Vt. 396 ( 1 840).
State V. Nieburg, 86 Vt. 392 (1913).
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Another related issue facing the courts was sorting out sloppy pleading by the
state's attorneys who failed to properly allege marital status in the indictments and
informations they used to initiate criminal proceedings. Vermont law contained two
different statutes meant to punish people for having sex with someone other than their
spouse. First, it punished those who committed "adultery." Second, it punished "as is
provided in cases of aduhery" (and, after 1 880, "as aduhery") any act where a married
man had "a connection with an unmarried woman which would constitute the crime of
adultery in case said woman had a husband living." This impenetrable language gave the
courts some trouble in cases where the prosecutor had failed to sufficiently allege the
marital status of the parties involved. It also raised the question of whether offenses
under the second clause were "adultery in the man" as well as the woman.
In 1 884, Chester W. Searle was indicted for having sex with a single woman.
Searle challenged the indictment before trial, arguing that was impossible for a man to
commit aduhery with an unmarried woman. Adultery under the statute only took place
when a married woman was involved and the woman in the Searle case was single. On
the other hand, the second clause of the statute provided for punishment of married men
who had sex with single women, but that was not aduhery-and Searle had been charged
with "adultery." The Court held that the indictment was defective. It believed that it
was wrong for a married man to have sex with another woman, single or not. And Judge
Wheelock Veazey made clear that if it were up to the Court, such an offense would be
included in the definition of aduhery on grounds of both "authority and
reason." But the
language of the statute tied its hands."
25 State V. Searle, 56 Vt. 516 (1884).
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In 1903, the Court reversed another adultery conviction on the same grounds.
Don Bisbee had been indicted for adultery and convicted by a jury. The indictment had
failed to allege either that his partner Emma Waterman was married, or that she was
unmarried. It was therefore impossible to know whether he was being tried under the
first clause or the second. The prosecutors argued that all that was necessary was that
they prove that Bisbee himselfwas married to get a conviction. The Court, citing Searle
as precedent, disagreed, setting the verdict aside and ordering that Bisbee be acquitted.^^
Finally, in 1915 the Court heard its last case on the question. Bert Bigelow had
been charged and convicted of adultery for having sex vsdth a married woman. The
indictment identified him as a single man. Bigelow challenged his conviction on the
grounds that a single man could not commit adultery. Unlike the Searle and Bisbee
cases which had been constrained by statutory language, this case permitted the Court to
determine once and for all what "adultery" meant. The Court's decision depended on
whether it would adopt a common law definition ofthe term or an ecclesiastical one.
Since the common law definition hinged on the sexual interference with another man's
woman, the Court reasoned that the marital status of the man was irrelevant. But if the
ecclesiastical definition was followed, a single man could not commit adultery because
that model punished violations ofthe marriage vow rather than interference with another
man's sexual rights in his wife.^^
State V. Bisbee, 75 Vt. 293 (1903).
" Thus, under an ecclesiastical model, the unmarried partner was charged with fornication rather than
adultery. State v. Bigelow, 88 Vt. 464 (1915).
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The Court delermined that Vermonrs law had its origins in the common law and
thus the definition of adultery should be established under common law precedents.^* It
thus concluded that the marital status of the man was irrelevant to a determination of
whether or not he was an adulterer. It noted that this had been the practice in Vermont
for over one hundred years and the issue had never before reached the Court. This was
"a strong indication that the profession has not seriously doubted the view we now
adopt." Bigelow's conviction was upheld.^^
It remains for us to determine the meaning of this confusing jurisprudence.
Though the Searle court's decision might leave one with the impression that the adultery
law contained gaps which permitted the guilty to avoid punishment, it was actually the
legislature's 1818 attempt at thoroughness that created opportunities for defendants to
attack the language of indictments. Vermont's adultery law took a belt and suspenders
approach, punishing adultery in both its common law and ecclesiastical forms so that
neither spouses who had sex in violation of their marriage vows nor their partners could
escape the criminal law's sanction. The two clause approach, utilizing both a common
law and ecclesiastical definition respectively, was an inartful solution, and had provided a
trap for a few sloppy prosecutors. While the courts in Searle, Bishee and Bi^elow had
struck down the convictions oftwo of three defendants, in doing so they had defined the
2« Curiously, it did so by resort to religious sources: Deuteronomy and Leviticus. The Court
held that
common law adultery had its origins in Deuteronomy and Leviticus. "If a man be
found lying with a
woman married to a husband, then they shall both of them die, the man that lay
with the woman and the
woman
" Deut 22- Lev. 20. The Court held that the Mosaic model reflected the common law
because
the common law punished the man not for violating his marriage vow,
but "because he hath humbled
his neighbor's wife." Deut. 22: 24.
2" State V. Bigelow, 88 Vt. 464 (1915).
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adultery law so broadly that it was illegal for any adult to have sex with another if either
ofthem was married.
Marriage was always key of course. No matter how the Court interpreted the
adultery laws, one thing was certain, a marital relationship was required. The existence
of a marriage was the key triggering state action. Without it, the state had no statutory
authority to regulate the consensual sexual behavior of unrelated Vermonters through its
criminal laws.
However, so long as the prosecutors pleaded properly, once a marriage was
proved, its existence "contaminated" both parties, rendering them vulnerable to
prosecution. In fact, the law required that both partners be prosecuted.^*^ The unmarried
partner faced identical penalties despite the feet that he or she had not violated a
marriage vow. Obviously this was intended to deter people from engaging in intercourse
with married people.
What happened when one ofthe parties claimed that he was ignorant of the
marital status of his partner? The Court faced this vexatious question in a 1908 case,
State V. Audette. The defendant, a twenty-four year-old Vermonter, had met a twenty-
two year-old woman at a party. After a five-month courtship they married. The woman
represented herself as single and stated that she had never before been married on the
license application. In fact she had been married before and had a husband living in
Massachusetts. When the information was discovered, the defendant was charged with
'° State V. Searle, 56 Vt. 5 1 6 ( 1 884).
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adultery. He opted for a bench trial,^' argued ignorance as a defense to the charge, but
was convicted.
On appeal, the Court noted the potential for abuse in allowing an ignorance
defense. The state argued for what we would today call a strict liability standard—that
is all that was necessary to convict was the act itself, without any inquiry into the
defendant's mental culpability or fault. The Court dealt with the issue by distinguishing
the facts of the case before it with other possible scenarios in which sexual intercourse
took place as a result of an "illicit connection." That is, if a man had sex with a woman
whom he thought to be single, or above the age of consent, or not within the confines of
the consanguinity laws and he turned out to be mistaken, that could not prevent a
prosecution for adultery, statutory rape, or incest. The man deserved what he got for
having sex outside of marriage. "In such a case there is a measure of wrong in the act as
the defendant understands it, and his ignorance of the fact that makes it a greater wrong
will not relieve him from the legal penalty." But the only tiling for which Audette could
be faulted was that he had failed to meet the young woman's parents before marrying
her. Other than that, he had fulfilled the expectations that society held for a young
man—courting the woman, introducing her to his parents, marrying her, and only then
having sexual intercourse with her. Given this, it would be unjust not to allow him a
defense of ignorance."
" That is, a trial without a jury with the judge serving as both finder of feet and law.
State V Audette 81 Vt. 400 (1908). The Court's distinction between
sex resulting from an "illicit
connection" and the case at bar was legally questionable. Vermont law
simply did not make sex
between unmarried men and women illegal. The use of the term "illicit
connection" reflected m.stead
the Court's moral objections to such behavior rather than an accurate
characterization ol the legal status
of sexual acts between single adults.
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Proving Intercourse
The issue which most preoccupied the Court during this period was proof of
intercourse. Early on, the Court made clear that proof of actual intercourse was required
for a conviction—setting a high bar for state's attorneys by requiring pregnancy,
confession, or observation by a third party for a successfiil prosecution. The blanket act
was much easier to prosecute since one merely needed to show a married person in bed
with another not his or her spouse "under such circumstances as to afford presumption
ofan illicit intention between them." But, as with the adultery clauses, prosecutors
sometimes charged one crime then tried to prove another, resulting in reversals by the
Supreme Court.
In 1 834, a prosecutor charged Ebenezer Way, a married man, with carnal
knowledge ofNancy Wilson under the analog to the adultery statute discussed above.
At trial, the prosecutor showed (by way of a third party witness) that Way and Wilson
had presented themselves as "man and wife," had lived in the same house together, and
had been seen in bed together with their clothes on the floor by the bed. The trial judge
had instructed the jury that they had to be convinced beyond a rational doubt that
intercourse had in fact taken place between them, and that that "connexion" could be
inferred by circumstantial evidence. The jury convicted. But the Supreme Court
overturned the conviction because the state had provided no evidence of actual
intercourse. The prosecution was really one for violation of the blanket act, not the
adultery statutes, yet it had been charged as adultery and gone to the jury as adultery.
The Court explained that the offense must always be proved in a case. Circumstantial
evidence could be relied upon to convict a particular person of the offense,
but not tha
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the ofTense had taken plaee. In other words, the state liad not proven tliat a erime had
taken place, only that circumstances were such tliat it could have. I he Court was greatly
troubled by this Ibrm of prosecution since it allowed the state to convict men of crimes
solely because they had the opportunity to commit them."
The Court's strictness on matters of proof as evidenced by Way and other cases
would be modified as the century progressed. As with several of the other areas of
sexual regulation we have examined, adultery law too underwent a transformation in the
second half of the century at the hands of the Supreme Court. Beginning in 1876, the
Court departed from its earlier adherence to legal formalism and instead took a far more
instrumentalist approach in the application of adultery law. This approach greatly
expanded the evidence available to the state in proving an adultery case, and, as we shall
see, was accompanied by a surge of adultery prosecutions.
The Way precedent set a high hurdle for prosecutors since it seemed to require
actual evidence of sexual intercourse either by confession, pregnancy, or witness
testimony, none of which was necessarily available in such cases. Instead, prosecutors
sought to introduce evidence of an "improper familiarity" between the man and woman
prior to or even after the alleged adulterous act which formed the basis of the charge.
Just as defendants in rape cases sought to show prior or even subsequent lack of chastity
to call the woman's credibility into question on the issue of consent, so too, prosecutors
tried to prove adultery beyond a reasonable doubt by showing past or subsequent acts of
familiarity between the man and woman.
State V. ^Fay, 6 Vt. 311 (1834).
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In State v. Bridgman (1 876) a married man had been tried for having sex with a
married woman named Chastina Warren. The state presented testimony that Chastina's
husband repeatedly went to her shop looking for her, only to find himself locked out for
reasons he could not understand. The state put two witnesses on the stand who had
testified at the divorce hearing brought by Chastina's husband that they had seen
Chastina and the defendant in the act of intercourse. Another man. Drew, testified that
he had seen the two inflagrante delicto several months later. The witness testimony was
supplemented by what was in efifect character evidence: "a great many acts of familiarity,
and several acts of adultery" between Chastina and Bridgman, some ofthem going back
six or seven years before the act alleged by the prosecution. As was usual in adultery
cases, the defendant had been convicted.^''
The case raised a host of issues on appeal, but the Supreme Court devoted its
greatest attention to the issue of past and subsequent acts of familiarity and adulterous
behavior between the defendant and the perhaps misnamed Chastina Warren. The Court
noted at the outset of its opinion that the general rule in criminal and civil cases was that
evidence had to be restricted to that which proved the alleged illegal act. But in specific
cases the general prohibition gave way and evidence of other instances of illegal activity
could be admitted to help prove the likelihood that the crime alleged in the indictment
had also been committed by the defendant. It went on to show that even prior and
subsequent acts which were not illegal were admissible to prove a criminal offense.
3" Overall in the four counties studied, 63 percent of all defendants going to
trial for adultery were
convicted; 31 percent were acquitted; in 5 percent ofthe cases the jury hung.
When we include guilty
pleas in these figures, we find that 82 percent of all defendants
facing trial ended up being convicted
Ahnost all who were convicted went to prison. These numbers will be discussed
in greater detail below.
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The Court's assumption, based on highly-regarded treatises on evidence such as
that of Simon Greenleaf, was that married men and women did not easily commit
aduhery. Instead, the immoral groundwork had first to be laid.
The ofifense charged in this case cannot, ordinarily be committed till the
restraints of natural modesty and the safeguards ofcommon deportment
and conventionality have been overcome by gradual approaches, and the
relations of the parties have been changed fi-om those usually existing
between the sexes, to the most intimate. On trial for it, the prosecutor
has to overcome the presumption that those restraints and safeguards
have not been broken over. To do this it is always proper to show what
is spoken of [in Greenleaf s Evidence] as an adulterous disposition and as
a habit of adulterous intercourse.^^
The Court's explanation for how adultery happens sounds very similar to the Victorian
notion of seduction. It presumes marital fidelity as the normal condition and displays a
belief that familiarity between the sexes is necessary to wear down a spouse's resistance
to the lure of an adulterous tryst. Given its similarities to seduction what is interesting is
that none of the authorities state the rule in gendered terms. The development of an
adulterous familiarity was required of both sexes before they could fall into iniquity—and
legal jeopardy.
Where, as in Bridgman, there was evidence that the parties had actually engaged
in intercourse prior to the act that was the subject of the charge, this was even more
probative of their adulterous disposition, and thus, even less open to debate as to its
admissibility. "[T]here could be nothing more potent, to show that no barrier of modesty
or manner was remaining between the parties, and to show the real relation between
them, than the fact that they were in the habit of committing the act fi-om time to time."^^
" State V. Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202 (1876).
Bridgman,2\\.
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The Court did not comment on the similarity between its explanation ofhow
adultery unfolds and the language of Victorian seduction. But neither did it ignore the
similarities between the evidence in adultery trials and that in other cases involving
sexual transgressions. In defending its position, it noted that in a bastardy case, it had
allowed evidence of intercourse between the plaintiff and defendant occurring some three
years prior to the birth of the baby as tending to show the likelihood that the defendant
was in fact the putative father.^^
In rape cases too, past evidence of intercourse between the defendant and the
alleged victim were also admissible, the Court pointed out, but not those between the
woman and other men. Evidence of sexual relations between the defendant and the
woman prior to the rape did not excuse it, but went instead to the issue of whether it had
in fact been carnal knowledge accomplished by force and against her will. "Not because
it is in any wise more lawful for a man to commit rape upon a woman v^th whom he has
had such intercourse, but because from the relations between them, it is less likely that
the intercourse was forcible."^^ The Court concluded that because the past sexual
relationships between the parties in bastardy and rape cases were admissible, it made
perfect sense that such evidence also be applied in an aduhery proceeding. Trial judges
even permitted the admission of evidence of subsequent adulterous disposition-even
when the acts were outside the jurisdiction ofthe state. Again, this use ofwhat amounts
" Thayer v. Davis, 38 Vt. 163 (1865). "The previous familiarity or intimacy existing between the
parties, was a circumstance bearing on the probability of the alleged sexual intercourse that is the subject
ofthe prosecution. It tended to illustrate the relations ofthe parties to each other at the time
when, as is
claimed by the prosecutrix, the child to which she gave birth was begotten; and this relation has always
been considered proper evidence, as well for one party as the other."
^ Bridgman, 212.
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to character evidence was not gender sensitive, but applied to cases involving both male
and female defendants.''
The Supreme Court had taken great care in delineating the circumstJinces under
which the state could use past or subsequent acts of familiarity in an adultery trial.
Nonetheless, that evidence was always a supplement to evidence of the actual act of
intercourse lying at the heeirt of the criminal charge. That is, evidence of the act of
intercourse was still required. However, that formulation went completely out the
window in an opinion by Judge James Barrett for the Supreme Court just three years
later in State v. Potter (\S79). In that case the Court greatly loosened the standard for
proving adultery. From then on, almost any evidence of even an opportunity for
intimacy would be sufficient to sustain a conviction.
Lyman Potter, aged fifty-eight, and a farmer, was married to fifty-year-old Laura
Potter. For several years, Lyman had been sleeping in the same room as his step
daughter. Laura slept in a separate room in the house and eventually moved out
altogether. The daughter was unmarried, but had had three children. Potter arranged for
a doctor and nurses to attend the delivery each time, had himself attended the births and
held one of the newborns in his hands afterwards, and encouraged the children to call
him father. Other witnesses testified that Potter had told them he had not slept with his
wife since the second child was bom; and that he could have sex with the step daughter
''Statev £a/o«, Windsor County Court, SpecialJune 1917 Term, Transcript
of Trial, p. 37. Eaionv^as
a prosecution against an unmarried man for having sex with Mrs.
Rena firittell. Brittell had already
been convicted in a separate trial. The prosecutor inquired about the
living arrangements of the two m
Ticonderoga, New York after the alleged adultery had taken place in Vermont.
The defense objected,
arguing that Ticonderoga was out of the jurisdiction of the court and
that anything happenmg between
the two there was inadmissible. The judge disagreed. "It isn't introduced
here for the purpose of
conviction, but to show that there was an adulterous disposition
between these people. It .s not relied on
for a conviction. We can't convict for an ofTcnce in New York." But
he admitted .t all the same.
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even if his wife was just six feet away. Other witnesses testified that they had seen the
two together in the grass five and seven years before in a position that indicated
intercourse had taken place. Potter was indicted for adultery. He could also have been
indicted for having sex with a partner within the confines of consanguinity, but was not.''°
Potter's lawyers objected to the admission of aU this evidence. They argued that
the state had to prove a particular act of intercourse and none of the evidence did so.
Witness testimony of alleged post-coital sightings were all more than three years old, and
so outside the three-year statute of limitations. None of the other evidence satisfied the
requirement that the state prove that an actual crime had taken place. This principle,
known as corpus delicti was required in all criminal prosecutions.'" In effect, the case
raised the same problem State v. Way had forty-five years before: how could the state
prove adultery cases if it could not rely on circumstantial evidence alone? In Way the
Court had simply declared that it could not. In Potter it changed its mind.
Judge Barrett, writing for the Court, brushed all of the defendant's objections
aside. As far as proving the corpus delicti was concerned, he admitted that evidence of
the actual crime of adultery had to be proven, but held that the step daughter's three
illegitimate children were sufficient for that purpose. "The crime consists in the fact of
the alleged intercourse by the respondent with the girl. She was unmarried.
Intercourse
of a man with her must be proved, whether he be the respondent or some one
else.
«
It was illegal for a man to have sex with his wife's daughter. See e.g.
General Statutes of Vermont
(Cambridge, 1862) Chapter 1 17 § 9.
^' Criminal law requires proof that a crime has actually been committed
before a person can be convicted
of it For example, a person cannot be convicted for murder
unless the state can show that the victim
was actually killed. A person cannot be tried for arson unless the state can
show that a building has
been burned. This principle is known as the corpus delicti or
"body of the crmie." State v. Potter, 52
Vt. 33 (1879).
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Unless that should be proved, the fact of crime could not be imputed. She had three
children. That demonstrated there existed corpus delicti on her part and on the part of
some man."^'^ Once the corpus delicti had been shown, circumstantial evidence proving
that Potter had been the father was thus appropriate. Barrett's conclusion on this point
was very dubious. The step daughter's out-of-wedlock births were not necessarily the
corpus delicti of the crime of adultery. Had they been the result of intercourse with an
unmarried man, they would not be evidence of any criminal act, let alone of adultery.
Thus, the children were not, as Barrett had argued, evidence of the corpus delicti.
In this opinion, Barrett lived up to his reputation as a judge who was unprepared
to let the law get in the way of his personal sense of right and wrong."^ Still, he was
speaking for sbc other members of the Court as well as himself. It seems clear that the
factual circumstances presented by the Potter case were simply too horrifying to allow
for a reversal. Potter had abandoned his wife for a sexual liaison with her daughter. His
wife first moved out of the marital bedroom and then out of the house completely,
supplanted by her daughter. The step daughter had assumed all of her mother's
domestic duties including her sexual and procreative functions. Potter's apparent public
flouting of legal, social, and sexual convention, and the numerous witnesses presented at
trial meant that the relationship had been a local scandal The Court was not going to let
this case get away even if it had been dubiously prosecuted and even if a dubious legal
precedent would be set by it. Rather than remand the case to the county court, the
« State V. Potter, 52 Vt. 33, 40 (1879).
See Chapter 1.
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Supreme Court itself passed sentence. Potter got jSve years in prison, a maximum almost
never imposed by the courts.''^
As time went on, the Court continued to loosen the evidentiary requirements for
proving adultery, implicitly overruling State v. Way each time. In 1 896 the Court
decided State v. Ida Brink and George Gibbs, an appeal from an adultery conviction.
There was no direct evidence of adulterous intercourse-only that the two had showed up
at a boarding house representing themselves as husband and wife, had shared a room
with one bed in it for one night, after which George departed never to return. The Court
recognized the precedent of the Way case with its admonition against convicting for
adultery in cases where the corpus delicti had not been shown. But like in Potter the
Court could not allow adulterers to slip through its fingers on such a technicality. It
noted (wrongly) that if the requirement of showing the corpus delicti were adhered to,
the crime could not be proven independently of the persons on trial. It then cited
numerous authorities and decisions from other jurisdictions which argued that such a rule
would prevent adulterers from ever being brought to justice. The Court concluded that
the admission of circumstantial evidence of adultery actually established the corpus of
the crime, rather than serving merely as corroboration of direct and positive testimony of
adulterous intercourse. It held that Judge Barrett's decision in Potter had in effect
overruled Way without explicitly saying so. The Court admitted that convictions based
on such evidence were only "probable" or "uncertain," but it was willing to risk it, for
^ For example, out of 175 prison sentences handed down in adultery convictions in the four
counties
between 1794 and 1920, only two were for the maximum of five years.
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without such a ruling, a conviction "can rarely be had on account of the secret nature of
the crime."^^
In 1902, the Court loosened the standard of proof for adultery even more. State
V. Kimball was an appeal from an adultery conviction in Orange County. The
prosecution had shown that the defendant John F. Kimball had been married to Lillian
Stoddard, but was living with Alice Reed. Alice had married John not knowing about his
first marriage to Stoddaid. She had had two children with him; Kimball referred to Reed
as his wife and she referred to him as her husband; he called himself one of the children's
"papa" and said Reed was the "mama." But the prosecution had not been able to prove
intercourse between the two on the date charged in the indictment (or on any other
occasion) or even that the two had slept in the same room together in the house where
they boarded. Following the close of the state's case, Kimball's attorney had sought a
directed verdict because the state had failed to prove that any crime had taken place,
much less that Kimball had committed it. The trial judge refused the motion and the jury
convicted.
The Supreme Court began its decision by stating the general rule that a person
cannot be convicted of a crime unless the state first shows that one has been
committed—that is the corpus delicti. But the Court then noted that in some cases it
was hard to figure out what, exactly, constituted the body of the crime. Thus, in a
perjury case, it was not necessary to prove first that someone had lied under oath, but
only that the defendant in question had. In a blanket act proceeding the
Court reasoned,
it was not necessary to show that two people had been found in bed together,
only that
''State V. Brink andGihbs, 68 Vt. 659 (1896).
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the two people in question had been. The Court's reasoning was quite odd, because in
both examples, the prosecution would still have to prove that the individuals in question
actually committed the crime charged (i.e., that they lied under oath, or were found in
bed together, one ofthem being married to a third party). In such a case, the corpus
delicti and the actions of the defendants merged into the criminal act. The purpose of
the corpus delicti rule was, after all, to avoid prosecuting people simply because they
had the opportunity to commit a crime without any proof that they had in fact done so.
State V. Way had made it clear that in aduhery prosecutions, opportunity was insufiBcient
grounds to prove adultery—and in that case the two defendants had actually been found
in bed together.
In Kimball there was simply no evidence that a crime had taken place—^the crime
in question being intercourse between the married Kimball and Alice Reed. And the
Court admitted as much. As in Potter and Brink, the Court adopted a result-oriented
approach. It argued that if proof of actual intercourse were necessary for a conviction
no one would ever be found guilty, citing the ubiquitous Greenleaf for this proposition.
It is not necessary to prove the direct fact of adultery; that if it were,
there is not one case in a hundred in which that proof would be attainable.
It is very rarely, indeed, that the parties are surprised in the direct act of
adultery. In every case, almost, the fact is inferred from circumstances
that lead to it by fair inference; and, unless this were the case,-unless this
were so held,-no protection whatever could be given to marital rights."^
In other words, as in Brink, the Court overruled State v. Way, because the requirement
ofproving that a crime—aduherous intercourse—had taken place was simply too
difficult and got in the way of protecting "marital rights." Not only did the Court do
^ State V. Kimball, 74 Vt. 223, 227 (1902) quoting Simon Greenleaf, On
Evidence (Boston, 1860), §
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away with the requirement that actual intercourse be proved, but even the obligation to
prove the particular time or date of the crime. All prosecutors now needed to show was
that the opportunity for intercourse was present at some point within the three years of
the statute of limitations for the crime. It was up to the jury to decide whether the
evidence presented by the prosecutor such as living in the same house, the presence of
illegitimate children, acknowledging the partner as a spouse to third parties, etc., was
sufficient to prove adultery beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, what had been
questions of law for the judge to answer had now become questions of fact for the jury.
This represented a shift in judicial authority totally at odds with the trend ofjudicial
usurpation of the jury's authority which had taken place in Vermont and elsewhere
throughout the nineteenth century.'"
In justifying its decision, the Court argued that circumstantial evidence was
always admissible as evidence of the crime.
While the respondent is not to be presumed guilty of the crime from the
mere fact of his opportunity to commit it, yet, where an adulterous
disposition is shown to exist between the parties at the time of the alleged
offense, then mere opportunity, with comparatively slight circumstances
showing guilt, will be sufficient to justify the inference that criminal
intercourse has actually taken place.''*
The Court then quoted from a string of out-of-state cases in support of its position.
After reciting the circumstantial evidence against Kimball it held "these are facts
sufficient to bring the case within the rule without proof of the parties having occupied a
Vermont was quite late in declaring that juries could only decide questions of fact
and not law. In
1849 it reasserted the right ofjuries to decide questions of law in criminal
cases over a strong dissent by
Judge Milo Bennett. State v. Croteau, 23 Vt. 14 (1849). The Court did not
bring its law mto
conformance with the rest of the country on this question until very late,
but still ten years before
Kimball. State v. Burpee, 65 Vt. 1 (1892).
Kimball 229
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room together at any time; and it is enough if the circumstances lead to the conclusion
that the act was committed at sometime, not definitely shown, during the term of the
cohabitation, without pointing to any particular time and place."^^ The decision in ejBFect
amended Vermont's adultery statutes. Instead ofoutlawing intercourse where one of the
parties was married, Kimball now made Vermonters susceptible to an adultery
prosecution even though only cohabitation had been shown and even though sharing a
room, much less a bed had not been proven at all.
Despite the Court's radical reforming of adultery law in the late nineteenth
century, there were some lines it would not allow the state to cross in pursuing alleged
adulterers. Allen Sanderson was seen having intercourse with his hired girl on a highway
in 1907 and again in 1909. Against the defendant's objection, the state was allowed to
show that she had given birth to a child in 1908. The Supreme Court held that acts of
intercourse showed an adulterous disposition, and the fact of their living in the same
house was evidence "of the existence of opportunities available to persons thus
criminally intimate and inclined." The Court ruled that the birth was admissible without
really saying why then held it proper to show that upon the death of the child the
respondent obtained a burial permit, and buried the body in a cemetery located on his
farm, and that no one else was present.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court reversed the decision because the state had
introduced evidence that the defendant had been arrested for bastardy on another
occasion. Since the defendant had not put his character in issue, this amounted to
Kimball, 23 1 (emphasis in the original).
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character evidence intended to prove the disposition ofthe defendant to commit crimes
of this nature. The Court reversed on these grounds alone.^°
The Court further expanded the amount of circumstantial evidence permitted in
1913 when it allowed the state to introduce evidence of the adulterous partner's
reputation for chastity in both civil and criminal proceedings. In cases where there was
"evidence of conduct tending to establish the charge," the Court held that "the bad
reputation for chastity of the person v^dth whom the offence is alleged to have been
committed may be shown, as tending to render the occurrence of the adulterous act more
probable."^' The Court reiterated its holding in another one of the four adultery cases it
decided that term. While noting that the character of the defendant could not be inquired
into unless he or she first put their good character in evidence as a defense, the Court
held that the character of the other partner could be. It held that the bad character of the
woman "if it exists" was singly a circumstance like any other bearing on the probability
that the ofiFense was committed." Prosecutors were quick to add this line of inquiry to
their arsenal."
The final case of the era shows how close the Court was willing to skirt the line
between character evidence and evidence of adulterous disposition. State v. Fairbanks
(1928) was a case heavily fi-eighted by politics since it involved accusations against the
sheriflfof Windsor County, Wallis N. Fairbanks. Fairbanks had taken young Irma
^ State V. Sanderson, 83 Vt. 351 (1910).
5' State V. Nieburg, 86 Vt. 392 (1913).
*2 State V. Snyder, 86 Vt. 449 (1913).
" Such testimony figured prominently in State v. Mathews and State v. Fairbanks discussed below.
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Stoodley under his wing at the request of her parents who were worried about her
adulterous carryings on with a married man named Dan Barney. Stoodley continued to
pine for Barney and the two met on several occasions and had sex while she was under
Fairbanks' s supervision. She later accused Fairbanks of having sex with her too.
The defendant and the state were both represented by future governors (Stanley
C. Wilson and Deane C. Davis, respectively). At trial, the defense objected to evidence
that Fairbanks had gone out driving with Stoodley and another girl, Minnie Rushford.
First he and Stoodley had tried to have sex, but since she was "unwell" at the time, he
had desisted and instead had sex with Rushford. In his charge to the jury, the judge
made clear that the evidence was material solely to the extent that it demonstrated an
adulterous disposition between Fairbanks and Stoodley. The defendant objected to this
charge, arguing that it showed that disposition toward Rushford, and not Stoodley. The
Supreme Court disagreed, holding that ifone could have sex with another woman, in
front of the adulterous partner, that in itself showed a breakdown in the "restraints of
modesty and conventionality between the parties" necessary before adultery could take
place and was thus competent evidence and could be admitted. The Court ultimately
reversed the conviction of Fairbanks on other groimds and remanded the case for re-trial,
but not before stating how it felt about Stoodley and Rushford; describing Stoodley as "a
young woman ofabandoned character, apparently oblivious to all claims of morality and
decency." Rushford, the Court wrote, was "another young woman of almost equal
depravity."^'' It had nothing to say about Fairbanks's character however.
^ State V. Fairbanks, 101 Vt. 30 (1928).
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An Adultery Trial in Action
The discussion has so far focused on the law of adultery-the legal framework
within which Vermont tried, convicted, and punished adulterers. The Court's
liberalization ofthe evidentiary requirements necessary to convict after 1876 coincided
with a surge in adultery prosecutions with 90 percent coming after 1 870. Prosecutors
could always bring adultery prosecutions by information rather than indictment since the
maximum sentence was five years. Some were initiated by complaints of aggrieved
spouses, others by local police or grand jurors."
The Court's liberalization of evidentiary requirements in these cases had
increasingly given juries almost total control over convictions. Regardless ofthe
sentiment to go after adulterers, however, prosecutors still had to convince jurors
beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts of a particular case fit within the legal
fimnework of adultery as defined by statute and the Supreme Court. The state and
defense thus constructed their cases to appeal to the values of the all important male
jurors.
Trial transcripts provide important detail in understanding how lawyers and
judges perceived these matters and how they constructed their cases to win juries over to
their side. In cases where direct evidence ofthe sexual act was unavailable or lacked
credibility, prosecutors relied on circumstantial evidence. The state and defendants
fought running battles with one another as each side sought to introduce evidence (often
of questionable admissibility) besmirching the parties and witnesses so as to discredit
« For examples, see State v. Eaton, Windsor County Court, Special June 1917 Term,
Transcript of Trial
(husband makes complaint); State v. Comstock, 86 Vt. 42 (1912) (local officers witness sexual
activity
and obtain an arrest warrant).
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their testimony. In so doing, they tried to get away with as much as the other side and
the bench would allow. Much of this evidence referenced appropriate gender and
domestic relations and focused on the ways in which the parties did, or did not, comply
with them. Adultery trials were also rife with frank sexual talk and evidence detailing the
intimate lives ofthe parties and witnesses.
In 1905, the state brought aduhery charges against George Jelley and Alice
Daniels. The Deputy Sheriff of Windsor County had knocked on the door of their rented
rooms at ten at night and found the two in varying states of undress. Allowed to dress,
they were escorted to jail where Alice spent six weeks until she was bailed out by her
husband. The transcript provided only glimmers of the events that had led Alice to leave
her husband and go off with Jelley in the first place. We know that her father took both
her and Jelley to the train station and we know that Jelley was staying with his uncle and
aunt when they were arrested. There are also hints that it was Alice's husband who
initiated the prosecution.^^
Because of the nature of an aduhery proceeding, the evidence dwelt at length on
the couple's intimate domestic relations. The prosecution was keen to show that they
had been living together as a sexually intimate couple and introduced evidence toward
this end. The deputy sheriffwho arrested the couple testified that they had been sharing
two rooms in Jelley's uncle's house for several days. A bedroom had been separated
from the sitting room with a shawl tacked up in the doorway. Deputy Frank Hayden
When they showed up at the house where the two were staying, deputies had a warrant for Jelley, but
not for Daniels. They arrested her anyway. Later, apparently under pressure from her husband, Alice
signed a request for the filing of an information against Jelley for adultery, pleaded guilty herself
and
testified against him. State v. Jelley, Windsor County Court, June 1905 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 3,
30-31,43.
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testified that he found Alice Daniels in the bed." Because the sitting room had a lounge
in it, the prosecutor had to preemptively disprove the anticipated defense that George
had been sleeping in the other room. He therefore elicited testimony that the bed looked
like two people had been sleeping in it. The prosecutor then asked about the lounge in
the other room.
Q: How did it appear?
A: There was a sort of quilt over it of some kind and a pillow, feather
pillow, the same as they use on a bed; that was placed on the top
of the head of the lounge.
Q: In what conditions was that pillow?
A: It lay on the head of the lounge, as though for omament-
This last statement drew an immediate objection. Deputy Hayden then ofifered that
"there was no marks on it."^^ The inquiry continued. What had George been wearing
when the men came for him? Only a pair ofpants and a shirt. Did he get dressed? Yes.
Where did he get his clothes? From both rooms.
The defense attempted to rebut the implications of this testimony. Was the door
to their rooms locked or merely fastened? Only fastened, the latch had been replaced
with an old pewter spoon. Was it a shawl that separated the two rooms or a curtain?
Deputy Hayden was fairly sure it was a shawl. Did the bed look like two people had
been in it or did look like one person had been rolling around on it? The deputy was not
sure. In which room was Jelley's hat hanging? The deputy was not sure. DidJelley
" Hayden does not say how the sight of a woman in bed afifected him, but it caused some mortification to
the other deputy sheriff John Ballard who testified: "There was a woman, abed in there; I whirled
around and come back out into the kitchen where Mr. Hart sat." Jelley Transaipt, p. 15.
Jelley Transcript, p. 4.
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have stockings on? The deputy did not think he did. Were the clothes JeUey retrieved
from the bedroom closet his every day clothes or his best outfit? The deputy did not
know. Was there a fire in the stove in the sitting room? Yes, there had been, but it had
bumed down and had to be rekindled. How many pillows were on the bed? Only one.^^
George's Aunt testified that the bed had only been slept in by one person and that the
couple had taken their meals at her table and later cooked their own, but on her stove in
the kitchen.
Jelley's case was made quite difficult by the fact that Alice had already pleaded
guilty to the charges and served as the state's star witness. She testified that the two had
had intercourse repeatedly including on the night that they had been arrested.^^ This was
important since the defense put pressure on the state to declare the specific act of
adultery for which it was seeking to convict Jelley,^' The defense put on several
witnesses who testified that Alice had denied ever sleeping with Jelley. Several of these
witnesses had been in jail with Alice when they heard her make these statements-a fact
brought out by the prosecution. We know that at least one of these women was in jail
on adultery and lewdness charges when she met Alice.^^ JeUey himself testified and
denied ever sleeping with Alice. Family members who lived in the various houses
George and Alice had occupied before their arrest supported his testimony. But the
Jelley Transcript, p. 4-1 1
.
^ Jelley Transcript, p. 24.
Apparently the Supreme Court's decision in Kimball which seemed to dispense with this requirement
was not relied on by the state.
The witness was Ethel Burroughs who was convicted of aduhery and sentenced to one and one half to
three years imprisonment. Windsor County Court, June 1905 Term, State Cases, vol. 5, p. 507-508;
Windsor County Court, December 1905 Terra, Docket No. 1076. The lewdness charge was dropped.
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defense never even tried to explain what the two ofthem were doing together. This,
coupled with Alice's testimony, was fatal and George was convicted. He received a
fifteen to sixteen month prison sentence." In exchange for her cooperation, Alice's guilty
plea was later dropped and the case against her entered as a nolle prosequi.^
Rena Brittell and Edward Eaton were tried separately for adultery in 1917. Rena
had left her husband William in Bristol where they had been living with their two young
children, Hoyt and Hazel. By agreement, Rena took half the ftimiture with her. She
traveled to North Hartland where she ran a boarding house and took in laundry. After
her mother got sick, she went to stay with her in Ticonderoga, New York. Hazel went
to stay with her father, who was now living in Rutland and Hoyt stayed with his mother.
During her perambulations, Edward Eaton showed up, Zelig-like, at every house Rena
lived in: appearing first in Bristol, then North Hartland, then, finally, in Ticonderoga.
They had been arrested as a result of a complaint filed by William.
Brittell and Eaton were convicted largely on the strength of the testimony of
Rena's teenage daughter Hazel. She testified that her mother held herself out as "Mrs.
Eaton," that she and Eaton had shared a bed together, and that she had seen them in a
state of undress in the bed.
Other than to call it coincidence, the defense, like in the Jelley case, was never
able to explain what BritteU and Eaton were doing together in four different houses in
two different states. Instead, it presented evidence through other v^tnesses that the two
" Windsor County Court, June 1905 Term, State Cases, vol. 5, p. 505-506.
^
"will no further prosecute." Windsor County Court State Cases, June 1905 Term, vol. 5, p. 505-506;
Windsor County Court, June 1906 Term, Docket No. 2987.
" State V. Eaton, Windsor County Court, Special June 1917 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 4.
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had not shared a room in North Hartland and that BritteU had gone by her married name.
Beyond that, the defense focused on Rena's outstanding qualities as a parent, William
Brittell's total failure in this regard, and daughter Hazel's poor character.
The defense attempted to paint Rena as a good mother who had had to leave her
husband due to his unreasonable jealousy, his drinking, and his refusal to support her and
the children-rather than an aduherous woman who left home to go with another man. In
defending Rena, he highlighted the washing she had taken in, the clothes she had
purchased for her children, and her struggle to put a roof over all their heads. Thus for
example Eaton's uncle, in whose home they had stayed temporarily before taking over
the boarding house, testified under cross-examination about Rena's parenting skills.
Q: You understand she was supporting her boy and girl?
A: Yes.
Q: You understand she was to earn money to support them?
A: I know they was with her.
Q: And while there they attended school?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And attended church?
A: Yes.'*'^
The defense was only marginally successful in this effort. The evidence was not
particularly relevant to an aduhery trial and was resisted at every turn by the prosecution.
Finally, the judge put an end to it when Rena's attorney cross-examined one of her
boarders on the matter. "Q: What was her conduct toward the children-did she look
^ State V. BritteU, Windsor County Court, Special June 1917 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 25.
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after the children? A: Yes sir." The state objected and the judge agreed, ruling that the
testimony was 'Hmimportant. She's not charged with neglect of her children."^^
Eflforts to smear her husband were also contested by the state and rejected by the
court, though not before being repeatedly brought to the attention of the jury. These
efiforts focused on William Brittell's failure to support his family and his drinking. First,
Rena's lawyer sought to elicit testimony from Rena herself.
Q- How had you been-how did you happen to go over to
Ticonderoga?
A: Mr. Brittell refiised to pay house rent or support us.
Attorney: Object.
The Court: Let it stand. Exception. Be careful about these things. That was
immaterial. Brother Taft.
Taft: Fm just doing it to show why she was living there; he refused to
support her.
The Court: Never mind. Go on.
Rena then described how their fiimiture came to be divided, sneaking in another
reference to William's "refus[al] to support us,"*^^
Brittell' s attorney tried one more time.
Q: Why didn't you stay down in Rutland when you went dovm there; When
he met you at the station?
A: Because he didn't provide for us.
Sfc ]|C 3)c Sfc 9|e ^
Q: While you were down there, how did he act toward you?
Brittell Transcript, p. 71.
^ Brittell Transcript, p. 106-107.
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Attorney: Just a minute; Object. Along the same line being an attempt here
to justify the charge the State's brought against this respondent,
by the conduct of her husband toward her or hers, which is
entirely irrelevant.
The Court: How's that material?
Taft; Why it is to show, Your honor, why Mrs. Brittell was going away
from Mr, Brittell; that he was using intoxicating liquors, and
couldn't support her.
The Court: You've shown that.
Taft: And wouldn't stay-
The Court: I think you've gone far enough in that 69
On cross-examination of William Brittell, Rena's lav^er sought testimony about his
drinking.
A: Her ftimiture was sent in my name and I paid the freight on it
from Ticonderoga to Rutland-moved it into the house in Rutland.
Q: Are you a man that uses intoxicating liquors?
Attomey: Just a moment. Object to the question.
The Court: Excluded.
Q: When you were at Rutland there, and your wife came there, did
you meet her at the station?
A: I did.
Q: Were you drinking that day?
A: I had a glass of beer.
Attomey: Just a moment. Object to the question; have no bearing.
Brittell Transcript, p. 113.
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The Court: I don't think it has bearing on the issue in this case, even ifhe was
a drunkard it didn't give this woman any license to go with
another man.
A: Not to go-well Til v^thdraw the question, then/^
Fmally, Rena's attomey tried one more time to bring the fact of his ill-treatment ofher to
bear on the charges by springing the question in the middle of another inquiry concerning
the reputation ofher daughter Hazel for honesty.
Q: What kind oftreatment did you receive from your husband?
A: Absolutely none-no sir,-
The state objected to the line of questioning.
The Court: What bearing has that-she had no right to commit a crime on
account of it, if she did.
Taft: Still, it would probably show what she was avoiding-his kind of
treatment-she was getting away from his kind of treatment he was
dealing out to her as his wife.
The Court: It may be excluded.^^
Finally, the judge, in his charge to the jury made clear that William Brittell's
actions were not relevant to the aduhery charge. In a confiising instruction, he told the
jury to consider all they had heard about William's ill-treatment of Rena, his
jealousy-whether he had any ground for it. However, the judge made clear that whether
he was to blame for the separation or not, "it gave no Ucense for the commission of a
crime" by the defendant, because "she was still duty bound to be a law-abiding citizen."^^
™ 5r/rre// Transcript, p. 16.
Brittell Transcript, p. 137.
^ Brittell Transcript, p. 146.
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The truly damning testimony in the case came from Rena's fourteen year-old
daughter, described in one court document as "very large for her years ... a girl of
unusual ability ... and mentally
. . . much more mature than most girls ofher age."''^ As
with many of the adolescent girls who appear in the transcripts as witnesses, Hazel's
testimony was delivered articulately and with great self-confidence. She was, like many
girl witnesses, quite unflappable. Hazel provided the most direct testimonial evidence of
Rena and Edward's aduherous disposition towards one another. She testified that her
mother held herself out as "Mrs. Eaton," that her mother and Eaton shared a room
together both at the Briggs's and in the boarding house run by her mother in North
Hartland. Hazel testified that her mother would come up to tuck her in at night before
returning to the room she shared vsdth Eaton. That she saw them in bed together in their
night clothes in the room. Under a questionable cross-examination. Hazel elaborated
that she and Hoyt called Eaton "papa" and that he spoke ofthem as his children.
Rena's lawyer went after Hazel in the typical way: by questioning her motives
and attacking her credibility. He did so by showing her animosity toward Eaton. Eaton
had accused her ofmaking faces at him behind her back. She claimed that he had been
"grouchy for a long time," but denied making faces. He had knocked her down anyway
at which point she had called him a "son of a bitch." He knocked her down again, and,
according to Hazel, had kicked her in the face (Eaton testified rather that he had spanked
" Affidavit of William S. Pingree, State's Attorney, in State's Answer to Respondent's Petition for a
New Trial, State v. Brittell, Supreme Court, Windsor County, January 1918 Term.
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her at the behest of her mother). Hazel admitted that she had been mad at Eaton ever
74
smce.
Rena's lawyer thus sought to discount the adultery charges brought by William
Brittell as the product of his jealousy and disregard for his wife's well-being coupled
with Hazel's animosity toward Eaton. When cross-examining William, the defense
sought to fiirther prove its theory by introducing a letter from him to Rena about
prosecuting Eaton for adultery and, through William's language, demonstrating
William's hatred for Eaton. The state objected, but the defense argued it showed
William's animosity toward Eaton, his v^dllingness to make a "martyr" out ofRena to get
him, as well as his influence over Hazel who hated Eaton too. The court excluded the
letter, ruling that Eaton was not the one being tried and that if the facts of the adultery
allegation were true, William would be wdthin his rights to call Eaton names.'^ Rena was
convicted and sentenced to two to three years at hard labor, the usual sentence for
adulterers ofboth sexes and the same sentence Edward received at his trial.'^
But the case did not end there. Soon after the conviction, Rena's lawyer
appealed to the Supreme Court for a new trial, citing newly-discovered evidence-Hazel
had recanted. In her petition to the Court Rena submitted several sworn affidavits
including one from her daughter. Hazel stated that she had not seen any "improper
relations" between her mother and Eaton while living with them, but that her father and
uncle had later convinced her that they had had an adulterous affair and pressured her to
Brittell Transcript, p. 36-37.
" Brittell Transcript, p. 78-79.
Windsor County Court, June 1917 Term, State Cases, vol. 7, p. 303-306.
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testify against her mother and Eaton. She swore that she had been pressured into
testifying against her mother by her father and uncle in order to get Eaton thrown in
prison and that her uncle and the state's attorney had told her her mother would only get
probation and would not go to jail. Now she claimed that she had slept with her mother
every night, had never seen the two ofthem in bed together, and that her mother had
never referred to herself as Mrs. Eaton. Two of Hazel's co-woricers at the local hotel
also swore in affidavits that she had told them she had lied at the trial.'^
In its answer, the state fired back, relying on affidavits of its own. WHliam
Brittell swore that he had never tried to influence his daughter or pressured her to testify
falsely. He also submitted a letter written by Hazel to her mother while Rena was
awaiting trial. Brittell claimed that the letter had been found in Hazel's room by the
landlady and turned over to him, so it is unclear whether it was ever sent to Rena. In it.
Hazel chastised her mother for pressuring her to testify falsely at the trial and blamed her
for getting into the situation in the first place.
Mother, I do not like the idea of testifying against you, but 1 can't help it
now. You should never have told your lawyer about me and 1 never
would have been called. Mother I have always lied for him [Eaton], but I
was asked to tell the truth and did so. I never will lie for him again.
sfc sfc 3|t sjc 3^ )Jl
Now Mother you speak ofme being to blame for all this trouble. You
say if I had never come to Rutland it would never of happened. Now let
me tell you something. If E. R. Eaton had stayed away fi-om you and if
you had never have stayed out with him that night before you came down
here and ifhe had stayed awayfrom you after you did get here this would
never have happened.^^
" Affidavits of Hazel M. Brittell, William W. Holmes, and Dora Holmes, Petition for New Trial, State v.
Brittell, Supreme Court, Windsor County, January 1918 Term.
™ Affidavit of William D. Brittell, State's Answer to Respondent's Petition for a New Trial, State v.
Brittell, Supreme Court, Windsor County, January 1918 Term. Emphasis in the original.
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The state's answer also contained yet another aflBdavit from Hazel, this time recanting
her previous sworn testimony in her afiBdavit. Hazel claimed that the prior affidavit had
been made under the "persuasive influence and pleading" of her mother while she had
been in jail in Woodstock. Hazel had seen her nearly every day and each time her mother
had "begged ofme to change my story to help her out ofjail. That during these talks my
mother cried and so did I , and I was much stirred and my sympathy was aroused to
assist her if I could . . , ." Hazel went on to state that she had not been influenced by her
father and uncle and that her original testimony was true. She had only lied in order to
prevent her mother from going to prison.^' Affidavits from William Brittell, his brother,
and the state's attorney were also submitted by the state in opposing the petition for a
new trial. The Supreme Court denied Rena's request for relief and she went to prison.
It is impossible to teU who was telling the truth in this case. But the Supreme Court's
willingness to uphold convictions based solely on opportunity or adulterous disposition
allowed trial judges and juries to convict and imprison on very shaky evidence.
The last adultery case of this era for which we have a transcript took place in
Orange County in 1924. This case too demonstrates the importance that "aduUerous
disposition" evidence had now assumed as well as the incredible surveillance members of
Vermont's rural communities were subject to. William and Emma Mathews had settled
on a farm in Union Village after a lifetime spent in New York and New Jersey. They had
lived there for eight years. Their grown son resided in nearby White River Junction.
™ Affidavit of Hazel M. Brittell, State's Answer to Respondent's Petition for a
New Trial,
Brittell, Supreme Court, Windsor County, January 1918 Term.
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William and Emma had been married for thirty-three years. The trouble started when
William, aged fifty-four, began spending a lot of time with Angie Wilmot, a thirty-
seven year-old married woman also living in the village. Angie worked in Hanover. In
exchange for using William's team to get there every day, she carried William's milk to
the creamery.
Witness after witaess for the state testified that Angie and William were seen
together, alone, and in the company of others, around the village. William's daughter-
in-law Ruth testified that she had seen William and Angie enter the bam separately and
that the door had been locked. On another occasion she had seen William hand Angie
the milk tickets and at the same time he had reached up and squeezed her hand. She
testified that when she had raised the issue with William he had denied it and told her
he did not want her coming around to his house anymore. Roy Stowell testified that
while picking ginseng he saw William and Angie meet on the road (she with the team
and he in his car). Peering at them from the woods, Roy said he saw the two lie down
in the bushes together. School teacher Minnie Randall saw Angie and William driving
in his car with "some sort of traveling man" in the back seat. On another occasion she
saw William pick Angie up in his car and drive off with her. In addition, she testified
that she had seen Angie come out of her house and talk with William "many
times."
Luther Roberts testified that he had seen Angie and William together in
William's bam
and also one time down in the covered bridge. They had been talking
together. Upon
Luther's entering, they stopped and headed in opposite
directions. Etta Barstow, a
neighbor of Angle's saw William pick her up in his car
and another time saw Angie
driving the car with William in the passenger seat.
The local doctor, L. B. Jones, saw
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two talking on the road, William in his horse-drawn cart and Angie in her buggy. They
were drawn up equal with each other, both heading in the same direction. Angie moved
her buggy so the doctor could get by in his car. Finally, Angle's husband Melville
testified that he had told William he did not want Angie at his house anymore and he did
not want William coming around to his house. Under examination by the state Melville
testified that William ignored his entreaties, and, at a later date, came around to his
house, picked Angie up in his car, and drove off v^th her alone.*"
Both Angie and William had their character attacked. Every witness for the
state who knew Angie was asked about her reputation for chastity. Everyone asked said
it was bad.*' Nor did William's character escape scrutiny. He decided to testify on his
own behalf. Under cross-examination by the state, it was revealed that he had been
convicted ofbigamy in IndianapoUs three or four years after his marriage to Emma,
though it was not clear whether Emma was his first or second wife. The defense
demanded a limiting instruction to the jury. The court obliged, informing the jury that
the bigamy conviction was admitted "solely for the purpose of impeachment of the
witness, intending to affect his credibility as a witness, and gentlemen, you will consider
it for no other purpose,"*^
The truly explosive evidence was that provided by WilUam's wife, Emma. At
sixty-four, Emma was ten years older than her husband. She testified that for four years,
»° State V. Mathews, Orange County Court, June 1924 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 69-72, 77-78, 89-90,
95-96, 111, 115-116, 118.
Four different state witnesses variously described Angie's reputation as "bad," "none too good,"
"rather bad," and "bad." Mathews Transcript, p. 86, 100, 101, 1 1 1.
^ Mathews Transcript, p. 226.
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her husband had periodicaUy joined Angie in the bam when she came to hitch up the
horses for the drive to Hanover. Emma would go down to the bam and pull on the door
only to find it locked. Finally on April 16, 1924, Emma broke the door open. She found
her husband William on top of a feed bin, with a horse blanket rolled up for a pillow
under his head and his trousers unbuttoned. Angie Wilmot was standing over him with
her skirts up. Then, according to Emma, it got ugly. She started to "holler" and William
covered her mouth with his hand. He was so rough with her that her false teeth fell out
of her mouth. All the while, Angie Wilmot stood there grinning at her. Then William
tried to force his wife out of the bam. The two tussled and both ended up falling in the
manure pile. William finally managed to carry his wife into the house.*^ Emma also
testified seeing them standing close together one other time before April 1 6. The
prosecutor asked her how close they were standing together. Emma replied, tellingly,
"So close you couldn't put a knife blade between them."*^
Emma's testimony had to be taken with a grain of salt for several reasons. For
one thing, Angie and William would both testify that it never happened-William had
never had sex v^th Angie, never been intimate with her, never knocked his vdfe's teeth
out, never ended up in a manure pile with her. Second, Emma had filed an alienation of
afifections lawsuit against Angie seeking $3000 in damages. She therefore had a motive
to lie. Third, she seemed to be a little crazy. On cross-examination she testified that she
had seen Angie and William go dovm to the bam together and had found the door locked
anywhere fi-om five hundred to eight hundred times in four years. She refused to admit
Mathews Transcript, p. 14-15.
^ Mathews Transcript, p. 18.
183
that this was anything but a guess.*^ Given this evidence it seems that without the
evidence of Angie's bad reputation, William's prior bigamy conviction, and the various
"adulterous disposition" testimony of hand holding, driving out together, and covered
bridge conversations, it would have been hard to convict on Emma's testimony alone.
A final transcript comes not fi-ora an adultery case, but instead describes a trial
for attempted murder motivated by an adulterous liaison between EfiBe Spaulding and
Solomon James. It was the ultimate nightmare of marital relations gone wrong, and a
lesson about where adultery could ultimately lead. In 1 894, EfiBe and Solomon went on
trial in Windsor County for poisoning Wilbur Spaulding' s lunch with arsenic. Solomon
was an itinerant laborer whom Wilbur had met when Solomon was plastering the
unfinished house he and EfiBe were living in. Wilbur, believing that Solomon and EfiBe
had become too intimate toward one another, protested their relationship. EfiBe told him
if he did not like it he could find another bed. Wilbur retreated to his in-laws for several
weeks. When he returned home he found Solomon living in his house where EfiBe had
been tending him because he was sick.
The Spauldings moved to Bentley Fisher's house and Solomon came with them.
Wilbur asked him to help on a chopping job in the woods. On the first day of chopping
wood, EfiBe made up separate lunch pails for the men, Wilbur wanted their potatoes
combined so they could cook them on the fire at the forest site, but EfiBe refused. Both
EfiBe and Solomon had given up cofifee a few weeks before, but Wilbur still took it. At
mid-day, the men ate their dinner. Wilbur became violently ill and was stricken with
vomiting and diarrhea. He continued to work but felt awfiil. On the way home, he
Mathews Transcript, p. 55-56.
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asked Solomon to cany his pail for him. He was bedridden for days and no one called a
doctor until Wilbur himself went to see one several days later. He announced to the
doctor that he believed he had been poisoned. The doctor, not particularly helpfully,
told him he better be careful in that case of what he ate m the future. The doctor
refused to analyze the vomit Wilbur had brought with him, saying that he did not have
the expertise to do so and it would cost a great deal to have an expert do it.
Much ofwhat happened in the house during the episode was witnessed by its
owner, Bentley Fisher, who seems to have spent a good deal of his time with ear
pressed against various closed doors.*^ He testified that he heard Effie and Solomon
talking about poisoning Wilbur as well as Solomon telling EfFie on another occasion
that they needed "to go slow."^^ This occurred before the date of the alleged poisoning
incident. He also testified that Effie had told him after Wilbur got sick that he was not
going to live very long. The defense counsel for Solomon tried to impeach Fisher by
asking why he had been alone with Effie for so long and whether he had sought to take
liberties with her; just one more example of the opportunistic use of sexual character
evidence by Vermont's trial lawyers.**
Fisher's testimony, like that found in the other trials we have examined, also
demonstrates how little privacy rural Vermonters had and the extent to which they were
under constant surveillance. It also shows how living conditions for working people
«^
In response to this snooping, on cross-examination, James's attorney
snidely asked when he had begun
"to listen to the conversations of the family you had let into your house."
Fisher, apparently oblivious to
the sarcasm, admitted it had begun the day after they moved in. State v. James
andSpauldmg, Wmdsor
County Court, May 1 894 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 92.
" Spaulding Transcript, p. 85.
" Spaulding Transcript, p. 96.
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(living with family or boarding with strangers) were quite different from the middle-class
Victorian ideal-a situation which provided opportunities for misadventure for young
girls and wayward spouses-as well as the mechanisms for policing and punishing
transgressions involving them
We also see in this case the ultimate nightmare of those worried about
extramarital intimacy-a temptation which led not just to the breakup of the family, but to
murder. As with seduction, rape, and adultery trials, much of the prosecution's evidence
served to symbolize the serious violations of social, sexual, and gender norms which led
to the criminal act, and, at the same time, explained why it had happened. The testimony
elicited by the state was rife with evidence of disturbed marital and gender relations
played out spatially in other people's houses. The Spauldings had been living in an
unfinished house in the village of Bethel. Wilbur came in one day to find Effie and
Solomon engaged in conversation, alone, a situation the state's attorney described as
'talking and carrying on." Wilbur told Effie he did not think it was right for her to be
involved so personally with Solomon. Effie's response was blunt:
Q: What answer did she make when you spoke in that way?
A: She says I could take another bed.
Q: Had you been sleeping with her up to that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you sleep with her afterwards?
A: No sir.*'
Spaulding Transcript, p. 4.
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Wilbur departed thereafter for several weeks, staying at Efifie's parents' house, doing
some part-time work, and returning only twice during that time and never staying
overnight. When he finally returned he found that he had been supplanted by Solomon,
who had taken sick, become bedridden, and had been tended by EfiBe. Solomon stayed
wdth them for several more weeks and fully recovered, at which time Wilbur invited him
to come live with them in a new house and work with him on a chopping job. If events
had happened as Wilbur testified, the reader is left wondering why Wilbur would invite
Solomon to continue to be a member of his household. The answer to that question
would shape Solomon and Efifie's defense as well as the judge's charge to the jury.
Other witnesses testified to the ongoing intimacy between EfiBe and Solomon and
the extent to which Wilbur seemed to play the cuckold. Neighbors testified that Efifie
and Solomon were behind a curtained ofifbedroom in the unfinished house while Wilbur
sat in the kitchen. Wilbur ofifered to give Efifie her medicine, but she refiised it fi-om him
telling him James would give it to her. She also refiised his ofifer of ice, again telling him
that James would get the ice for her. At that point, Wilbur having left the room,
Solomon called him a "damned fool."^° After moving to another house, domestic
relations continued to be disrupted. Solomon and Wilbur shared a bed in one room
while Efifie slept in another.
For the judge, one of the difficulties in the case was making clear to the jury just
how evidence of skewed domestic relations could be used by them in assessing guilt or
innocence. After all, this was not a trial for adultery or aUenation of afifections, but
instead for attempted murder. Judge Laforrest Thompson made clear that the trial was
'° 5/)o«Wmg Transcript, p. 145-148.
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not one for adultery and that the state need not prove adultery in order to sustain its
burden of proof. Rather, if the evidence tended to demonstrate "an intimacy, a
friendship, between them such as would naturally turn the mind and the affections of this
woman from her husband towards this James" and if James encouraged this condition of
affairs, 'lhat is evidences-such a disposition and feeling-is a circumstance proper for you
to consider upon the question of motive and upon the question of probability of whether
there was anything likely to move these parties to act against Mr. Spaulding."**'
The judge then explored the evidence presented in detail on this point explaining
to the jury that it was up to them to decide whether Effie's decision to kick Wilbur out
of her bed showed an adulterous disposition on her part or merely reflected her
"righteous indignation" at Wilbur's "imputation on her womanhood and her fidelity to
her husband." On the other hand, instead of severing her relationship with Solomon, she
had him stay at the house and when she was ill "called upon him to perform those acts
which the wife would naturally turn to the husband in case of sickness, to have
performed, and which the husband would naturally perform." The judge explained that it
was up to the jury to make sense of it all "the court can give you no light on it, you are
to settle it."
In the alternative, what was to be made of Wilbur's behavior? Did the fact that
the two men continued to work, live, and even sleep together, that Wilbur "was willing
to have this man remain a member is his family," show that there was nothing to the
claims that he had been suspicious ofthem before the alleged poisoning? If not, then
what did it say about Wilbur's behavior as a man and husband?
" Spaulding Transcript, p. 183.
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[I]t is also proper for you to enquire just what kind of a man this husband
is-just what his feelings, and his attitude were towards his wife and it is
for you to say whether he did what a man of his kind ofmake up would
naturally do, or would be apt to do-or might naturally do if it were as
claimed by the state, or whether being as he was, the fact that he did not
assert his manhood and expel this invader, as the state claims, of his
domestic peace, from the house, being the man he was, and likely to
assert his rights and do what any husband, as intelligent high minded men
as men go-would be likely to do ....
This portion of the judge's charge to the jury amply demonstrates the gendered context
in which the case had been presented and would probably be decided. The judge had
synthesized the varying gendered strands of evidence introduced by the state and the
defense into an explicit paradigm to be utilized by the jury. While the judge made clear
that it was completely up to the jury to decide the meaning of the evidence, he did
provide them with an irresistible model for assessing credibility based on appropriate and
inappropriate domestic behavior. And this is no surprise.
But there was a tension in this case between gender expectations and the
evidence. If EfiBe and Solomon were guilty, than Wilbur had behaved in a manner
subversive to ftmdamental gender expectations. If Wilbur's testimony was to be
believed, he had tolerated an "invader . . . of his domestic peace" to continue to live in
his home. Thus, in order to find Solomon and Effie guilty, the jury would also have to
find that Wilbur acted outside the boundaries of behavior demanded ofmen and
husbands.
If the judge was willing to leave it up to the jury to determine the meaning of the
evidence, he was not shy about explaining what was at stake in the case. The charges, il^
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, were the most serious offense that could be
^ 5/7awW/>Jg Transcript, p. 183-186.
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committed in the stale since they struck at the very core of Vermont^s society, the
relationship that kept it ghied together- marriage.
This olTence charged is a grave ofTence. It is an olTence that under the
circumstances and conditions in which it is claimed to have arisen in this
case that strikes at the very safety of society. I here is no relation known
to the law more sacred tluui that of husband and wife bound together by
the laws of CJod and man as husband and wife cannot rely upon the
protecting care and fidelity the one of the other in matters alVecting their
life and safety it strikes at the very roots of society as it exists to-day.
And il you believe that these respondents are guilty, it is your duty not to
withhold your hand, but it is your duty to say "guilty." On the other hand
you should give both of these respondents the benefit of every
presumption of law which I have explained to you, and you should not
convict because they are charged with an atrocious and revolting crime;
they should only be convicted because their guilt is established in the way
the kiw provides."^*
One hour and twenty minutes later, the jury came back with guilty verdicts for both Ffiie
and Solomon. Solomon was sentenced to ten years at hard labor and l-tlie got eight.
When they began their sentences, ten of their fellow convicts were serving time for
adultery. A decade later, there were thirty-seven,^'*
The Increase in Adultery Prosecutions
The development of this adultery jurisprudence took place in the context of a
great surge in adultery prosecutions by the state aller 1870. To what extent the ('ourt's
loosening of the standard of proof in such cases is related remains unclear, liut the
(\>urt's decisions did imke it far easier to convict people engaging in inappropriate
intimacy in Vermont's towns, villages and farms. Fvidencc of the increase can be found
Spauhiin}^ Transcript, p. 198-1 W.
^
"Report of the Oflicers of the State Prison" and "Report of the Officers of the House of
C\)rrections" in
Sfnfc OOu crs ' Reports (Montpelier: Secretary of Slate, 1906). Wilbur was granted a divorce on
grounds
of Etfie's confinement at the May 1895 term of the Windsor County Court. Docket No.
372.
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almost anywhere one chooses to look. The Supreme Court issued five adultery decisions
between 1789 and 1844, but issued twenty decisions on the same subject between 1876
and 1916. In 1870, no Vermont man or woman sat in prison on account of an adultery
conviction. In 1916 there were fifty-nine. In that year there were more men and women
serving sentences for adultery at the state prison than for any other serious crime except
burglary.'^ The move to prosecute and imprison adulterers took place state-wide. State
records indicate prisoners hailing fi-om all over the state and appeals in adultery cases
were brought fi-om most of the state's counties between 1876 and 1916.^^
Trial court records fi-om the four counties studied fiirther highlight this increase.
Between 1 794 and 1 920, at least 463 men and women were charged under the adultery
or blanket act statutes. As noted earlier, this docketing information is not consistent
firom county to county. Thus, the figure of463 prosecutions is a floor and the actual
number was certainly higher. Ifwe simply add up the number of prosecutions brought
fi-om the 1890s to 1920, a period for which we have consistent docketing for all four
counties, we find that 362 prosecutions were brought during this brief period alone.
^ The figures in 1916 for the State Prison were: Burglary (46); Adultery (39); Manslaughter (17);
Murder in the Second Degree (16); Rape (16). After rape, the numbers for other offenses dropped off to
less than ten per category. The figures are even more astonishing when one considers that the serious
crimes of manslaughter, rape, and murder led to long sentences, thus persons convicted of these crimes
tended to accumulate over time in prison. This w^s not true of adulterers whose sentences were typically
two to three years. The House of Correction opened in 1878 and closed in 1919. Convicts were housed
at both facilities. Number ofmen and women incarcerated for adultery or blanket act offenses: 1868 (0);
1869(0); 1870 (0); 1871 (0); 1874 (2); 1876(5); 1878 (3); 1880 (2); 1884 (8); 1886 (4); 1888 (5); 1890
(7); 1892 (12); 1894 (10); 1896 (21); 1898 (24); 1900 (16); 1902 (27); 1904 (19); 1906 (45); 1908 (22);
1 9 1 0 (22); 1 9 1 2 ( 1 3); 1 9 1 4 (59); 1 9 1 6 (59); 1 9 1 8 (47); 1 920 ( 1 5). See the "Reports of the Officers of
the State Prison" and "Reports of the Officers of the House of Correction" in Vermont Legislative
Documents and Official Reports and the Vermont State Officers ' Reports for these years.
^ For example, in 1914, the last year in which the prisoners' county of conviction is ascertainable fi-om
the records, the breakdown was as follows: Chittenden (17); Franklm (5); Caledonia (3); Orange (3);
Rutland (2); Lamoille (2); Windham (2); Windsor (1); Addison (1). Rural Caledonia County led with
four appeals, Chittenden, Windsor and Washington County each had three. Franklin County had two,
and Orange, AddisOT, Rutland and Windham Counties had one apiece.
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In Windsor County the number of prosecutions for adultery increased from four during
the 1850s to seventy-five in the 1910s. In rural Orange County between 1880 and 1920
the number of prosecutions per decade increased from nine to thirty-two. In Addison
County during the same time the number increased from one to twenty-seven. All three
counties saw their populations decline during these periods. In Rutland, the only county
which actually gained population during this period, the number increased from four in
the 1890s to seventeen in the 1910s.
The absence of consistent docketing information from county to county does not
affect the statistics for convictions and acquittals for adultery, since all ofthese were
recorded in the clerks' record books. Thus, information concerning cases actually going
to trial or verdict is very reliable. Conviction rates for all cases going to trial were very
high. Overall, 81 jjercent of all cases going to trial resulted in a finding of guilt either by
verdict (33 percent) or plea (49 percent).^^ Thirty-nine cases ended in an acquittal (16
percent). In seven cases, the jury hung.^*
Sentences were harsh. Out of 190 convictions,^ all but fourteen received prison
sentences.'^ The average sentence was between two and three years at hard labor either
at the state prison at Windsor or, once it opened in 1878, at the House of Correction in
"
I assume that in cases where defendants pled guilty the alternative would have been trial.
I documented 463 adultery cases in the records ofthe four counties. Two hundred and forty-two of
these went to trial or verdict. The remainder ended up as defeults or were nolle pressed or not carried
forward by the courts.
^ One hundred and ninety-seven defendants were found guilty, but because of reversals after appeal,
only 1 90 received sentences.
'0° Eight received large fines-most assessed early in the century. One received a whipping-again, at the
beginning ofthe study period. One received probation only and the punishment of four convicts was
not recorded
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Rutland. Sentences were occasionally suspended and the convict placed on probation,
but the first use of probation was not until 1901 and was quite rarely applied to
adulterers. An overall breakdown by sex shows that 62 percent of defendants were
male and 38 percent were female. However, towards the end of the study period, the
gender gap decreased and for the last decade of this study, it had been reduced to 55
percent males versus 45 percent females. In Orange and Addison Counties, the ratio of
male to female prosecutions was essentially 1:1 throughout the entire period. Windsor
and Rutland were more biased towards men during the same time. In Windsor County
for example, the ratio of male to female prosecutions was 3:2 during the last three
decades of the study.
Not all those accused of adultery were tried or convicted by plea. Of all cases
brought during the period when reliable docket entries exist, between 28 and 44 percent
of cases were not carried forward or were nolle pressed (that is, the prosecutor decided
not to proceed with the prosecution). The figure was lower in Addison, Orange, and
Rutland Counties, and considerably higher in Windsor.'"^ There were many reasons why
cases were not carried forward or nolle prossed including the death of the party, the
acquittal of the other partner, or the conviction of the defendant on other grounds.
Although no direct proof exists of deal making, it is highly likely that some defendants
See for example, State v. Edward D. Kennedy, Windsor County Court, December 1901 Term, State
Cases, vol. 5, p. 263-264. in only 20 cases did the courts suspend prison sentences and award probation
to convicted adulterers.
'"^ The figures for cases not carried forward or nolle prossed reflect only cases brought and not
prosecuted. Some cases were dropped after defaults, successftil appeals, or after hung juries. I am only
interested in cases which were never brought to trial .so I have omitted these cases from the figures.
Addison County (June 1883 Term -December 1920 Term) (28 percent); Orange County (June 1860
Term-December 1920 l erm) (32 percent); Rutland County (September I89.S Term September 1919
Term) (37 percent); Windsor County (May 1851 Term-June 1920 Term) (44 percent).
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had charges dropped in return for their cooperation in convicting their partners. We
can also assume that prosecutors also dropped cases when proofwas difficult or
witnesses disappeared. Nonetheless, if one-third of adultery prosecutions overall were
dismissed prior to trial, two-thirds were not. And, as we have seen above, a person
charged with the crime faced a strong likelihood of trial and conviction or conviction by
plea.
Adulterous couples were increasingly prosecuted in pairs with those found guilty
receiving identical prison sentences to be served at Windsor and Rutland respectively.
Given this, and the fact that the system's bias ran against men, it is clear that Vermont's
legal system did not condone the sexual double-standard by which men were forgiven
their extramarital sexual escapades while women were not. Nor did its society condone
the practice of killing a man found in bed with one's wife-a coordinate practice in areas
where the double-standard was in place.
It remains for us to try and understand the dramatically increased role of the
courts in policing extramarital sexual activity. First of all, the adultery phenomenon is
similar to the other causes of action we have studied in terms of chronology and legal
We know that some Vermonters thought the possibility of such deals existed from one transcript in
which the particeps and her daughter claimed the prosecutor had made such an offer in return for her
testimony. Nonetheless, she was tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison. Affidavits of Rena Brittell
and Hazel M. Brittell, Petition for New Trial State v. Brittell, Windsor County Supreme Court, January
1918 Term.
The double-standard and honor killings existed both in large urban areas and in the south and west.
John D'Emilio and Estelle Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History ofSexuality in America (New York:
Harper & Row, 1988), 82; Robert M. Ireland, "The Libertine Must Die: Sexual Dishonor and the
Unwritten Law in the Nineteenth-Century United States," Journal ofSocial History 23 (1989): 27-44.
Relatedly, Vermont law did not condone a violent response to abusive and insulting language, even to
one's wife, no matter how gross and did not permit such words to form the basis of a reduction in
compensatory damages. Again, this was in contradistinction to die practice in most other states,
including die New England states. Goldsmith's Admr v. Joy,6\ Vt. 488(1889); Willeyv. Carpenter,
64 Vt. 212 (1 89 1) (defendant had called plaintiflPs wife a whore).
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dynamic. Beginning in the 1 870s and 1 880s, the Supreme Court and the Legislature
made changes in the law governing the cause of action-either expanding its application
(as in the case of statutory rape) or making successful civil or criminal prosecutions
easier (breach of marriage promise, seduction, and adultery). It is possible that the
changes to adultery law made the prosecution easier and thus encouraged state's
attorneys to bring more suits. But why would the Court make it easier? What explains
the increased emphasis on catching and punishing adulterers?
Before offering some hypotheses specifically with regard to the increase in
adultery prosecutions, the data in the four counties can help us rule certain explanations
out. One possibility to explain the adultery craze was that there was simply more
adultery taking place and hence more adultery prosecutions. It is difficult to quantify the
true incidence of a phenomenon like adultery. Nonetheless, the evidence we do have
indicate that this is a highly unlikely explanation for the increase in prosecutions. First,
most ofthe increases came in counties at a time when populations were both declining
and aging. Second, if the true incidence of adultery was increasing, one might expect to
see an increase in the percentage of divorces granted for adultery. But the data does not
support such a hypothesis.
Beginning in 1866, the state began including elaborate statistical data on divorces
in Vermont in its annual reports. This data included a break-down of the number of
divorces granted by county, the causes for which the divorces were granted, and the sex
ratios for that information. What we find is that overall, adultery did not increase as a
cause for granting divorces. In fact, it declined precipitously as a cause for granting
divorces between 1862 and 1920 as a percentage of all divorces granted. Between 1862
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and 1867 for example, 30 percent of all divorces in Vermont were granted on grounds of
adultery. Fifteen years later, the percentage had declined to 18 percent. It would hover
around 15 percent for the remainder of the study period. (See Figure 5.)
The data for the four counties shows a similar dynamic. During the 1860s,
adultery as a percentage of divorces granted ranged from 20 percent in Orange County
to 36 percent in Rutland County with Windsor and Addison falling in between. In the
next decade the rate declined by almost half in Addison, Rutland, and Orange Counties,
but rose sUghtly (to 32 percent) in Windsor. The decline stabilized and by the end ofthe
study period, all four counties had rates of divorces granted for adultery hovering in the
mid-teens to 20 percent of all divorces granted (see Figure 6).
Observing the number or percentage of divorces granted for adultery does not
tell the whole story as to the real incidence of adultery in Vermont society. The data
only tells us how many divorces were granted for adultery, and not how many petitions
were brought which alleged it. This data is more difficult to get at because each
county's divorce records presented the information differently. Only in Orange County
do the records consistently indicate both the grounds alleged in the petition as well as the
grounds for which the divorce was granted for the whole period. That data indicates
that many more allegations of adultery were brought in divorce cases than were
recognized by the court.
Between 1794 and 1920, for example, a total of 1264 divorce petitions were filed
in Orange County. Overall, 3 1 5 petitions cited adultery as one of the grounds for the
divorce (25 percent). In the vast majority of cases, aduhery was listed along with other
causes (most typically intolerable severity or desertion). However, despite the higher
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number of petitions alleging adultery (as opposed to divorces granted for that cause),
they also declined as a percentage of all divorce petitions brought. The percentage of
petitions alleging adultery in Orange County declined by the middle of the century to 16
percent in the 1850s, spiked to about 25 percent of all petitions during the decade ofthe
Civil War, declined back to its pre-war rate in the 1870s and then climbed into the mid
twenties and stabilized there from 1881 to 1920*^^ (see Table 4). The use of divorce
data to measure the actual incidence of adultery in the population is a crude device. To
the extent it does have value, this measure, and the declines in population, seem to rule
out an increase in the true adultery rate as an explanation for the surge in prosecutions.
Another possible explanation for the increase in the rate of adultery was its use as a
surrogate charge in place of prostitution. As we will recall, prostitution itselfwas not
made illegal in Vermont until 1919. Thus, one could argue that communities and
prosecutors were using aduhery in order to go after prostitutes and their partners. There
are examples of aduhery prosecutions which arose out of encounters with prostitutes.'^
The use of court records such as divorce petitions to determine the actual incidence of adultery is
quite problematic. First, most divorces wctc uncontested, which means that while the petitioner O^nown
as the libellant) had to prove his case, he did so in the absence of cross-examination or rebuttal
testimony. Thus even in divorce cases ^^4^ere adultery was '"proved," this '"proof was not reliable.
Furthermore, when multiple grounds for reliefwere alleged in the petition (which was the normal case)
courts often granted the divorce on a ground other than adultery. It was easier to prove desertion or
intolerable severity-both legally and socially. Given its difficult fectual requirements (particularly
before 1876), overt sexual nature, and the potential for criminal penalties on the offending spouse and
partner, most lawyers avoided proving adultery when they could obtain a divorce for their clients on
other grounds. This was particularly the case whoi petitions alleging multiple grounds including
adultery were contested. In such cases, the court almost never granted the divorce on grounds of
adultery. In Orange County, the court chose to grant the divorce on a ground other than adultery in 79
percent of such cases. Sometimes the court even found a ground other than adultery when it was the
only cause alleged. So again, merely because adultery is asserted in a petition does not mean that
adultery actually took place. The opposite is also true, just because it was not cited as a cause did not
mean it did not take place. Furthermore, lawyers and judges understood divorce procedure to be tainted
by collusion and fraud-further calling into question the value of this data as a measure of
actual
adultery. These issues are discussed in greater detail later in this chapter,
Neiburg v. Cohen, 83 Vt. 281 (1914).
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Table 4
Number of Divorce Petitions Filed and Number Alleging Adultery As a Cause in Orange
County by Decade, 1794-1920
Decade Total For Adultery' Percentage of All Petitions
1794-1799 10 6 60%
1800-1809 18 12 67%
1810-1819 28 11 39%
1820-1829 32 11 34%
1830-1839 34 8 24%
1840-1849 35 6 17%
1850-1859 50 8 16%
1860-1869 85 21 25 %
1870-1879 191 31 16%
1880-1889 154 39 25%
1890-1899 246 66 27%
1900-1909 206 49 24%
1910-1919 175 47 27%
Total 1264 315 25%
Includes petitions alleging multiple causes including adultery.
But this explanation seems unlikely as well. First, it would seem much easier to simply
pass a state law prohibiting prostitution than to force prosecutors to meet the higher
elements ofproof required in an adultery prosecution. Second, cities which prohibited
prostitution by ordinance still went after people for illegal cohabitation-albeit
unsuccessfiiUy.'^^ Third, two to three year prison terms for prostitution would have been
harsh-especially in light ofthe lesser sentences imposed on those convicted of violating
'^^ Rutland City arrested people engaging in prostitution, lewdness, and keeping a house of ill fame
under an ordinance passed in 1 893. "Report ofthe Chief of Police," and "Ordinances of the City of
Rutland" in Report ofthe City ofRutlandfor the Year Ending December 31, 1906. Nonetheless , it
also arrested people for illegal cohabitation too in 1896, 1899, 1901, and 1903. The convictions for the
latter charge were all nolle prossed on appeal to the county court-probably because Rutland City had no
authority to prosecute people for such an offense. See Rutland County Court, Docket Nos. 3361, 3716,
3717, 3839, 3925, and 3930.
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local prostitution ordinances. Fourth, there are very few instances of repeat
prosecutions ofwomen or men for adultery which one would expect if the adultery laws
were being used in this way.*^ Finally, the state could pursue prostitutes or prospective
clients by use of the existing law against lewdness if their solicitations included any
sexually demonstrative behavior.*'^
One last explanation that may be discounted is the use by prosecutors of divorce
petitions alleging adultery as a means to generate criminal adultery prosecutions. While
the percentage of divorces granted for adultery did not increase significantly as a
percentage of all divorces granted during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century,
the enormous increase in the rate of divorce meant a large increase in the raw number of
petitions alleging adultery. Thus, it is possible that prosecutors simply combed divorce
petitions in order to generate adultery prosecutions or waited for a court to grant a
Rutland punished prostitutes and those who solicited them with a maximum of sixty days in jail or a
$50 fine. Rutland, Ordinances Chapter 25 (1893). When prostitution was made illegal state-wide, the
statute imposed a $100 fine and up to one year in prison for a first offense and up to three years for a
second offense, but it provided for probation as well. 1919 Vt. Acts 199.
There are a few such cases. This data does not prove that these men and women actually engaged in
prostitution. State v. Caleb B. Williamson, Windsor County Court, Docket No. 96, May 1867 Term and
State Cases, vol. 2, p. 293-294, December 1871 Term (adultery); State v. Melissa Wyman, Windsor
County Court, State Cases, vol. 6, p. 29-30, 35-36, December 1906 (adultery with two different men);
State V. Mattie Ryder, Addison County Court, vol. 35, p. 167-169, December 1907 Term and State v.
Fred Whittimore, Addison County Court, vol. 35, p. 170, December 1907 Term (charged with adultery
with one man and particeps in prosecution of another); State v. Lucy Bland, Windsor County Court,
State Cases, vol. 5, p. 583-584, June 1905 Term (adultery with Frank Danforth); vol. 6, 303-304, June
1910 (with Henry Turner); State v. Minnie Cox, Windsor County Court, State Cases, vol. 5, p. 235-236,
Dec. 1 90 1 Term (adultery with Ed Matot) and Windsor County Court, Docket No. 2 1 5 1 , December 1 903
Term (nmning a house of ill feme). Minnie Cox shows up in the records one more time. Ironically, in
1919 she was the plaintiff in an alienation of affections suit against Anne Linehan in the Addison
CountyCourt. Docket No. 2151, December 1919 Term. The suit was discontinued.
State V. Seymour Bush, Rutland County Court, vol. 42, p. 876-877, March 1870 Term (exposed
himself to a married woman and solicited sex fi-om her); State v. Charles Garvey, Addison County
Court, vol. 33, p. 344-345, June 1889 Term (exposed himself and solicited intercourse); State v. Mabel
TwcA, Rutland County Court, vol. 61, p. 187-188, September 1914 (having sex in view of men, women
and children, soliciting a man for sex and grabbing his privates).
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divorce on grounds of adultery and then brought criminal charges. If this were the case,
one would expect to find a high incidence of overlap between divorce and adultery cases,
but the divorce data indicates that this is not the case. In fact, there are only fifteen cases
in Orange County for the entire period in which divorce petitions alleging adultery were
brought against men and women convicted of adultery. And even in those fifteen cases,
it is difficult to determine whether the petition or the prosecution came first. In Addison
County, which after 1 877 recorded only the grounds for granting a divorce, rather than
the cause stated in the petition, only nine people were involved in divorces granted for
aduhery and prosecutions for adultery. Again, it is difficult to tell which came first, the
prosecution or the divorce proceeding. In Rutland County five cases overlapped over a
sixty-year period. In Windsor County, which saw the greatest number of adultery
prosecutions, there were only ten overlaps between divorces granted for adultery and the
240 prosecutions for adultery between 1850 and 1915. During the same period, there
were over 250 divorces granted for aduhery. The percentage of petitions alleging
adultery which were also accompanied by criminal prosecutions is minuscule compared
to both the overall number of petitions alleging adultery and the number of adultery
prosecutions both overall and by decade.'"
None of these hypotheses explains the increase in the number of adultery cases.
The most obvious explanation is that prosecutors and juries were responding to the
unprecedented wave of divorces which swept the county courts beginning in the 1 860s.
'"A decade by decade breakdown of divorce/prosecution overlaps for Orange, Addison, Rutland, and
Windsor Counties reveals the following: 1790s (1); 1800s (0); 1810s (2); 1820s (0); 1830s (1); 1840s
(1); 1850s (2); 1860s (1); 1870s (2); 1880s (3); 1890s (10); 1900s (8); 1910s (10). During the last three
decades of the period under study the number of adultery prosecutions in the four counties was: 1890s
(78); 1900s (128); 1910s (152).
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All four counties showed dramatic increases in the rate of divorce as the century
progressed-doubling and tripling between 1862 and 1921 . This increase in the rate of
divorce mirrored both state and national trends which saw the overall divorce rate almost
quadruple during this same time.'^^ (See Figure 5)
The Problem ofDivorce
InitiaUy, the process for obtaining a divorce had followed the English model with
the Governor and Council substituting for parliament. By 1779 jurisdiction over
divorces had been transferred to the Supreme Court, though the Council continued to
meddle, sometimes overruling the decisions of the Court. Unlike neighboring New
York, Vermont's divorce law followed a liberal model, providing a broad range of
causes for termination of marriage."'* Testimony was submitted by sworn affidavit rather
Paul H. Jacobson and Pauline F. Jacobson, American Marriage and Divorce (New York: Rinehart &
Co., 1959), 92-93.
Soule, 12:142. For a discussion of Vermont's early divorce law and experience therewith, see Betty
Bandel, "What the Good Laws ofMan Hath Put Asunder . .
.
," 46 Vermont History (Fall 1978): 221-
233. In its first meeting, in 1786, the Council of Censors rebuked the Governor and Council for
overruling the courts, specifically mentioning that it took "the extraordinary step of divorcing Laurania
M'Clane and Ruth Chamberlain, fi-om their respective husbands, and declaring their right ofmarrying
again." "Address of the Council of Censors," in Paul S. Gillies and D. Gregory Sanford, eds., Records
ofthe Council ofCensors ofthe State of Vermont (Montpelier: Secretary of State, 1991), 60.
Adultery was one ofthe six causes for which divorce was available in VeraiOTt. The others were
confinement for three years or more, willful desertion for three years, absence fi-om the state for seven
years, intolerable severity, and husband's feilure to support. See e.g. Revised Laws of Vermont, 1880
(Rutland, 1 88 1 ) § 2362. A marriage was void ab initio where the couple was related within the degrees
prohibited by statute or where one or both were already married. Revised Laws, §§ 23 14 and 2346.
Marriages wctc voidable for lack of age (eighteen for a woman, twenty-one for a man), idiocy or lunacy,
physical incapacity, or where the marriage was accomplished through force or fraud. Revised Laws, §
2349
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than in person and, based on my review of the records, uncontested petitions (which
comprised the vast majority submitted) were granted as a matter of course.*'^
After 1 860, the state's annual reports began detailing the number of divorces by
county as well as the cause for which they were granted and breakdown ofmen and
women awarded divorces. Evidence of legislative concem with the growing number of
divorces came in 1866 when it added divorces to the list of statistics required to be
reported to the Secretary of State on an annual basis.*^^ Thereafter, divorce was the
focus of continuous action on the part of the legislature which sought to stem the tide of
broken femilies.*'^
In 1870, jurisdiction over divorces was transferred to the county courts, with the
Supreme Court retaining only appellate jurisdiction/'^ The procedure changed as well.
Instead ofthe Supreme Court hearing and deciding petitions once per year in writing, the
county courts were now hearing divorces at two terms per year, and taking live
testimony.
The switch to county court jurisdiction had been motivated at least in part by the
desire to reduce the number of divorces by cracking down on fi'aud and collusion in the
petition process. But the use of the uncontested divorce continued and now couples had
Vermont, along with Rhode Island, and New Hampshire had the most liberal divorce laws in the
North during the early republican period. Norma Basch, Framing American Divorce: From the
Revolutionary Generation to the Victorians (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 47.
^'M866Vt. Acts 58.
This data can be found in the Registration Reports issued by the Secretary of State until 1896. After
this date the data was included in the annual reports of the State Board of Health. Complete sets of
these important sources are located at the State Library in Montpelier and in Special Collections at the
University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont.
1870 Vt. Acts 27.
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two terms per year in which to seek dissolution of their marriages rather than one. The
numbers of divorces had been increasing during the 1840s, 1850s, and 1860s, but began
swinging Avildly after the change in 1870. Reflecting legislative attempts to reduce the
number of divorces, the rate would rise and fall during the next fifteen years, sometimes
dramatically, but it never fell below the 1865 level and the trend was clearly upward. At
a time of stagnant population growth, the rate of divorce increased 25 percent during the
decade ofthe 1870s."^
Attempting to discourage divorce, particularly by people fleeing New York's
jurisdiction which granted final divorces only for adultery, Vermont passed a law in 1878
prohibiting the granting of divorces to people who had resided in the state for less than a
year. It also prevented the person at fault fi-om remarrying for three years. In 1884,
the legislature passed "An Act to Diminish the Frequency of Divorce." An efifort to
prevent collusive, uncontested divorces, it required all divorces to be continued to the
next term as a matter of course and mandated the presence of both parties in court unless
the petitioner could show that he or she had made a good faith efifort to procure the
attendance ofthe spouse. It also gave the court authority to try the case in the absence
of the other spouse or to continue the case if it felt that the attendance ofthe other
spouse might be obtained in the fiiture.'"^' Two years later, the legislature took more
active measures, by designating the local state's attorney a party in every divorce case
filed in his county and authorizing him "when the public good shall so require" to enter
Vermont's population increased by less than 2000 people during this decade,
'2° 1878 Vt. Acts 16.
'2' 1884 Vt. Acts 94.
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evidence in the case on the part of the state. The act also authorized payment to the
state's attorneys of five dollars for every divorce case they participated in. It also
repealed the section of the 1 884 act requiring the presence ofboth spouses at the divorce
hearing. In 1 890, the whole experiment ended when the legislature passed a law
forbidding the participation of state's attorneys in divorces. '^^
The Legislature intervened yet again in 1 894. It extended the residency
requirement for parties seeking a divorce for causes accruing in another state to one year
before bringing their petition. In 1 896 it increased the period to two years and also
expanded the ability of couples to separate without formally divorcing.'^'' As is clear
from Figure 5, legislative intervention in 1878, 1884, and 1894-1896 always resulted in a
dramatic decrease in the number of divorces. But the drop was always short-term and
illusory, since the legislation did not prevent divorce, but simply delayed it. Pent up
demand invariably caused the rate to surge after each attempt at restriction.
The increase in divorces was the topic of debate not just in the legislature, but in
all segments ofVermont society during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
Most people in Vermont understood that the divorce rate was increasing and most found
the phenomenon worrisome and worthy of condemnation, if not action. Vermonters
knew who was getting divorced and why because local newspapers dutifiiUy reported the
1886 Vt. Acts 69.
1890 Vt. Acts 76.
1894 Vt. Acts 50; 1896 Vt. Acts 50, 51.
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names of the broken families churned out by Vermont's courts at every term along with
the reasons for their destruction.'^^
Newspapers ran frequent articles on the problem of divorce with local and
national worthies weighing in on the causes of the phenomenon and offering solutions.
In 1883 the Burlington Daily Free Press ran a lengthy summary of an article on divorce
by Chicago Judge John A. Jameson which had appeared in the North American Review.
The editors noted that Jameson's opinions were coincident with their own. Jameson
argued that divorce was common in pre-Christian societies and that the rise of
Christianity had led to severe restrictions on it. The colonists, reflecting their reformist
instincts, had liberalized the divorce laws-a reflection, according to Jameson of "a step in
the general movement for greater social freedom IfNew England has become
distinguished for it [i.e. divorce], it is because she has reverted farthest toward the
original type." Singling out Vermont, the judge noted that Vermont "an old State, with a
fixed population of nearly pure American descent" had a very high rate of divorce which
he blamed on lax divorce laws.
As for solutions, Jameson weighed the pros and cons of greater or lesser
restrictions on the granting of divorces. Ifthe laws were too strict then the discontented
would either abscond or "defy law and religion and sink into flagrant immorality." On
the other hand, too lenient a divorce law would render every marital difference
irreconcilable. While Jameson believed that divorce ought to be available for other than
adultery (or "the scriptural cause" as it was often referred to) in order to protect women
See e.g. "Chittenden County Court Divorces, September 1871 Term," Burlington Daily Free Press,
24 October 1871, p. 3 and "Addison County Court Divorces, December 1876 Term," Burlington Daily
Free Press, 21 December 1876, p. 3.
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and children from brutal, drunken, or deserting husbands, legislatures and courts had to
clamp down on the collusion and fraud which characterized, by his estimate, four-fifths
of all divorces. '^^
Jameson's analysis formed the paradigm of almost all fiirther connnentary on the
matter in Vermont in the nineteenth century. It included an assessment that divorce rates
were increasing and that this was a problem. It argued that most people getting divorces
were working class people rather than the middle class. Divorce was too easy to obtain,
was available for too many causes, was characterized by fraud and collusion, and
legislative and judicial action should and could solve the problem. Vermont
commentators regularly cited all of these reasons for the increase. What is particularly
interesting is that almost all commentators, whether lay or clerical, trained as scientists or
lawyers, agreed that the most effective response to a climbing divorce rate was a legal
one. Though commentators often made reference to the importance ofreligion and
moral training (or the "command ofGod" as the early adultery law had put it) they were
unwilling to rely on religious institutions alone as the answer. Almost all ofthem looked
to an interventionist state as the engine of reform.
'^^
One example of this is the comments of Lucius Butler, an Essex physician and
secretary ofthe Vermont State Medical Society. It fell to Butler to write the summary
"Judge Jameson on Divorce," Burlington Daily Free Press, 25 April 1883, p. 3.
"Divorce Reform: Opinions of Burlington Thinkers upon the Subject," Burlington Daily Free Press,
16 February 1884, p. 1; "Women's Views of Divorce," Burlington Daily Free Press, 4 January 1890, p.
4; "A Report of Progress," Burlington Daily Free Press, 24 January 1890, p. 4; "Easier Divorce,"
Burlington Daily Free Press, 1 March 1895, p. 4. A few looked to cultural explanations. Vermont's
most famous lawyer, Edward Phelps, blamed the problem of divorce on women's reading habits. Their
husbands failed to live up to the standards of their fictional heroes. They then began to cast their eyes
towards their fi-iends' husbands. "The Age of Words" in Orations and Essays ofEdwardJohn Phelps,
ed. J. G. McCullough (New York: Harper & Bros., 1901), 462.
208
which accompanied the annual state statistical report beginning in 1867. At &st casual
about the rate of divorces in Vermont, by the 1870s, Butler's reports on the divorce
statistics began to reflect a growing agitation as the rate increased-an increase he, like
others tracked by comparing the ratio of divorces to marriages. Butler attributed the
increase to a laxity of morals, the ease of obtaining a divorce, and the number of grounds
available. To Butler, petitions sought on grounds of desertion or intolerable severity
were "put up jobs" and "frivolous." If something was not done, Butler warned that the
marriage ceremony would become "a mere farce and mockery." Eventually, he began to
advocate each year that the number of causes available for divorce be reduced to just
one-the scriptural ground of adultery. Since adultery as a cause was rare compared to
intolerable severity and desertion, Butler advocated this as a means ofreducing divorce.
While he approved of the 1878 law which prohibited the guilty party in a divorce from
remarrying for three years (thus cutting down on collusive suits), he complained that it
did nothing to reduce the number of causes available. According to Butler, Vermonters
viewed the marriage contract as merely a matter of convenience to be dissolved
"whenever interest or caprice or lust shall dictate."'^^
With Butler's departure in 1882, the simimaries of the divorce data were
presented without an accompanying editorial. By the early 1 900s, however, Henry
Holton, a physician and secretary ofthe Board of Health, began writing the summaries
and the editorializing began anew. The see-saw pattern in the rate ofdivorce which had
characterized Butler's tenure had become an unmistakable surge in divorces accelerating
Butler's comments appear in the summaries to the data contained in the state's Registration Reports
from 1867 to 1882.
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ever upward. Holton saw this development not only as a threat to the institution of
marriage, but to the very stability of the state. Tying home to government, Holton
argued that major disruptions to the former threatened the stability of the latter. He
noted that the ratio of divorces to marriages had been 1 in 20 in 1 886 but by 1907 it was
1 in 8. Holton believed that the causes of the crisis were many including lax discipline in
families. This resulted in children failing to render obedience to parents and then
entering into ill-conceived marriages. Hohon argued that children needed to learn early
on to control their impulses better, that the legal causes for divorce needed to be
reduced, and the church be more actively involved in teaching the sanctity of marriage.
A year later, his report was no less urgent. While calling again on the church to
intervene, it was a decidedly secular intervention he advocated. The church, according
to Holton should teach that "the welfare and stability of the State depends upon the
character of its homes." He claimed that the greatest menace to the republic was the
decadence of its homes. As "the fountain head of public morals," if a large number of
homes were "disrupted, torn and annihilated" the children of these homes would have
their characters "dwarfed and ruined" and, as a result, the state "crumbles and anarchy
ensues."
Hohon's direct tie between domestic order and the security of the state was not a
new idea. Republican motherhood and the role of the liberal family in ensuring the
survival of the nation was a common enough part of early republican rhetoric. But
Holton' s language was situated in the context of a state far more willing to intervene in
private life and increasingly more able to do so. The statistics Holton commented on
themselves reflected both a new commitment and greater ability by the state to exercise
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centralizing authority. And Holton's language is less the persuasive moralizing of an
earlier era than it is almost a caU for a fascistic conception of the role of family and state.
In entering the marriage state, the man and the woman assume not only
obligations to each other, but to the state and to their children who are
wards of the state. These responsibilities cannot be laid aside without the
consent of the state, hence the duty of the state to iself [sic] before
allowing an action to take place which strikes at its permanence, which if
multiplied, will cause its destruction, is not only to demand that the
guarantee given by persons who enter the marriage relation shall continue
"until death do them part," and that the vows shall be faithfully fulfilled.
Holton called on the high schools to teach students about the model home and its
relation to the state and its citizenship and for the state to require the publication of
marriage banns and to adopt a non-support law to go after people who deserted their
families. A year later he expanded the zone of damage caused by divorce asserting that
it destroyed not only the state, but the nation itself He called for a return in the home
"to what is essential in all governments, obedience to constituted authorityy^'^^
Though most found the trend in divorces worrisome, not all did. A fascinating
example of this latter opinion was expressed by the president ofthe Vermont Bar
Association, Charles Heath, at its annual meeting in 1886. Heath, a Montpelier lawyer,
sought to explain the increase in divorces. He began by asserting that no law had been
the object ofmore attention and criticism since 1850 than Vermont's marriage and
divorce law, noting the attention given to it by the secular and religious press and the
formation of societies to draw the attention of the public, lawmakers, and the courts to
the issue. Heath confirmed what the records had shown-that divorces had increased
greatly in the past twenty-five years. But he was unwilling to agree that this was
Holton's comments appear in the summaries to the data contained in the annual reports of the State
Board of Health for the years 1907-1910.
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unquestionably a bad development. He asserted that a laxity of morals was neither the
cause of the increase, nor a result of it. The shift to county court jurisdiction had
increased the number of divorces granted because the court met more frequently and,
because it now took live testimony, it tended to be more sympathetic to those seeking
divorces. He also (correctly) ascribed some of the increase in the 1 860s and 1 870s to
the Civil War, which had taken so many men from their homes and placed them in camp
"where the irregularities ofarmy life" had caused some men to go astray in various ways.
By 1 875 however, this no longer explained the increase. Finally, he noted that it had
been "obscurely hinted" that public morals had declined, and that some had pointed the
finger at recent immigrants. Heath rejected this explanation too, noting that a larger
percentage of divorces took place among the members of the old Yankee stock. In fact,
Heath claimed that the "condition of the family" was far better than it had been during
the earlier part of the century and that laxity of either public or private morals could not
explain the increase in divorces.
Instead, Heath argued that the increase in divorces was a result of women's
greater autonomy. He noted that a majority of petitions were initiated by women and
explained the rapid advances women had made in obtaining equal rights to schooling,
possession and use of property, and personal rights. The higher divorce rate, was not,
according to Heath, "an evil per se'' but merely a symptom of a revolution in women's
rights-a revolution of which he approved. As a result, the tide of divorces was inevitable
as society adjusted to the new realities of this revolution-and nothing could stop it.
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Restrictive legislation would not work and neither would resistance from judges who
refused to grant divorces, nor the exhortations of others.*^^
Few commentators shared Heath's sanguine attitude toward female autonomy or
the impact ofa rising divorce rate. The Legislature tried, repeatedly, to reduce the
number of divorces through legislative intervention, but such solutions could not hold
back the tide. After 1 896, the state gave up attempting to prevent divorces by restrictive
legislation. And it could do little about the most common causes of divorce in the state:
intolerable severity and desertion.*^' But it could go after behavior which it believed led
to a significant proportion ofthose divorces-adulterous activity.
Conclusion
Adultery law was meant to protect the security of the family by protecting the
marital relation that was at its core. The family was defined by tightly drawn
boundaries-boundaries legally recognized and defined by the state. But that publicly
defined family was also supposed to be private and shielded from public view.
Appropriate family life depended on clear-cut roles for men and women. It presumed
parental authority and its antipode: children's obedience and loyalty. Heterosexual
"Address of President Heath Upon Marriage and Divorce," Proceedings ofthe Vermont Bar
Association vol. 2, no. 1 (1886), 74-82; Hiram Carleton, "Charles Henry Heath," in Geneological and
Family History ofthe State of Vermont (New York: Lewis Publishing, 1903), 280.
It was illegal to beat one's spouse and the state tried, convicted, fined, and jailed men who did so. I
documented 1 1 1 crimmal assault cases in which the defendant and the victim(s) had the same last name.
Of those, eighty-four involved men charged with assaulting women identified as their wives or charged
with assaulting women wdth the same last name. I assume that most ofthose cases involved wives,
though we know that assaults of daughters and mothers were also occasionally prosecuted. Domestic
assault cases extend all the way back to the first decade ofthe nineteenth century. Fines were the most
common punishment throughout the period under study. However, imprisonment as a punishment
became increasingly common toward the end of that period.
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physical and emotional intimacy too was to be confined within the marital union.
Adultery transgressed all these boundaries. Men and women had sex with partners other
than their legally sanctioned spouses. Unmarried couples waved "marriage licenses"
around. Women who were not wives were called "Mrs." Men who were not fathers
were called "papa" by children who did not belong to them. In several cases, spouses
found themselves physically replaced by invaders: left out and locked out of places they
were entitled to occupy: beds, bams, and automobiles. The substitution of another man
or woman for the spouse lawfiilly entitled to hold that position was understood as a
serious moral, cultural, social, and legal transgression and prosecutors did what they
could to highlight this fact to the men of the jury. The prosecutor in the Eaton case
criticized Rena Brittell for allowing her partner in adultery to spank her daughter Hazel.
This was a job for parents and not the sexual "stranger" Edward Eaton.
Q: And v^th that condition that she didn't like him, you told him to whip her
at that time, did you?
A: When she was so saucy to him I certainly did.
Q: Why didn't you whip your daughter yourself?
A: Because she fought me when I touched her.
Q: So you sanctioned this man who was a stranger to your daughter so to
speak, to whip your daughter on this occasion, did you?
A: Yes sir.'^^
It is somewhat ironic that the more the adulterous couple fulfilled the fianctions of a
traditional family, the more evidence of an adulterous disposition they compiled against
themselves.
Eaton Transcript, p. 137.
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Yet, criminal prosecutions for adultery held within them the seeds of a far more
terrible irony. The process of a criminal prosecution shattered the values of the family
ideal in almost every way. It pierced the veil of privacy and intimacy surrounding
Vermont marital life. Criminal prosecutions revealed the flaws in Vermonters'
marriages, turned family members against one another, forced husbands and wives to
testiiy against one another in violation of their vows and the spirit of a law which
ordinarily prohibited such testimony. In short, it was a traumatic public airing of private
life which further shattered the family ideal.
The intervention ofthe state prevented marital reconciliations and took children
from mothers and fathers. Though passed with the intention of "preserving the peace of
families," adultery law in action did just the opposite. The transgressing ofboundaries
which characterized adultery was multiplied and magnified by the prosecutions
themselves. Imagine fourteen-year-old Hazel Eaton being questioned in her mother's
presence about the intimate details of her mother's sexual life at the lock up in White
River Junction, or, maybe even worse, on the stand in a crowded Vermont county
courtroom. Adultery trials reversed traditional lines of authority, placing the fate of
adults in the hands of children who must have felt the tug and pull of femily loyalty very
intensely.
To prosecutors and juries however, the sacrifices must have been worth it in
order to stamp out the behavior in the future. Adultery, like seduction and statutory
rape, was a dagger pointed at the heart of the standing domestic order. It led to
disruptions in that order, to divorce, to violence, and perhaps to murder. Vermonters
were aware of both the sky-rocketing divorce rate as well as the tie between adultery and
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divorce. Furthermore, the amount of adultery ''in the air" was enormous between 1870
to 1920. Ifwe combine divorce petitions and criminal prosecutions alleging adultery,
thousands and thousands of Vermonters faced the accusation, made publicly and under
oath, that they had engaged in adulterous sexual intercourse/^^ Local communities
could follow the sad trajectory of an adulterous affair, a divorce, a femily ruined,
neighbors imprisoned, and, in some cases, a tawdry suit for alienation of affections. ^^'^
We do not know for certain why Vermonters went after adultery in the late nineteenth
century, or even if that effort was part of a conscious plan. But the changing language of
adultery law by the Supreme Court after 1875 explicitly designed to protect marital
rights, the availability of divorce statistics, the fevered talk of the threat of growing
divorce rates and of declining morality add up to an explanation.
For example. Orange County, one of the least populated counties in Vermont during this period, had
a combined total of 340 prosecutions for adultery and petitions for divorce alleging adultery between
1 870 and 1 920. Multiplied by fourteen (the total number of counties m the state) we get a total of4760
adulterous allegations for this period state wide. The total was probably much higher than this. Rutland
County, which had very few adultery prosecutions during this period had 366 divorce petitions granted
for adultery between 1870 and 1920. Obviously, many more petitions alleged it as a cause but were
granted for other grounds.
See for example, the newspaper coverage of the adulterous aflfeiir between Ellen Hall the wife of the
Bennington County Clerk John Hall and daughter-in-law of Hiland Hall, the governor of Vermont. Hall
had an affair with John Beebe, a local lawyer. After John Hall obtained a divorce, Ellen ended up
running off with Beebe, both abandoning their children in the process. 'The Bennington Scandal,"
Vermont Gazette, 12 July 1878 and "The Bennington Scandal," Bennington Banner, 5 December 1878.
Interest in the scandal was so high that the Gazette republished its story the follovmig week. See also
Shackett v. Shackett and Shackett v. Hammond, Addison County Court, June and December 1872
Terms, vol. 29, p. 276-290. Susan Shackett sought a divorce on grounds of failure to support,
intolerable severity, and adultery. Her husband Marshall opposed the petition alleging that Susan had
committed adultery. The court agreed and dismissed Susan's petition. Marshall then sued George
Hammond for alienation of Susan's affections and won a $5000 jury verdict. At a retrial after a
successfiil appeal, the award was reduced to $500. See also Loretta Burr v. Edward Burr, Addison
County Court, December 1905 Term, Docket No. 2967 (divorce granted for adultery) and Loretta 1
Burr V. Gertrude Kimball, Addison County Court, December 1905 Term, Docket No. 2947 (criminal
conversation).
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Historians have long argued that prosecutions for consensual sexual offenses like
adultery dropped off in the nineteenth century and that other remedies-such as
vengeance killing-thereby increased. Indeed, beginning in the late 1860s, numerous
highly publicized instances ofmen killing their wives' paramours rocked the nation. '^^
Vermont, however, went a different way. Vermonters were never tolerant of such
violent self-help and remained deeply committed to the rule of law. Faced with a
perceived adultery problem, they used the courts to go after those committing the act.
Historians have also argued that the problem of divorce and responses to it were largely
a product of the Progressive Era.'^^ But, in Vermont, a recognition of the threat posed
by divorce, and legislative solutions to that threat were already developing by the 1 870s.
The impulse to harness the power ofthe state to solve a social or moral problem was
nothing new and was reflected in both of these approaches. But legislative fixes did not
work and prosecuting adulterers simply uncovered even more adultery. By the 1 880s,
the idea of state intervention now became coupled with increasingly powerfiil
administrative techniques and an eagerness to use them. The comments ofHenry Holton
demonstrate an urgent acceptance of the idea that intimate family life was a vital area of
concern for the health of the modem state. As a result, the traditional impulse to harness
governmental mechanisms to solve the problem of divorce and adultery by legislative and
judicial action would be re-directed toward a modem and far more direct state
Ireland, 29-31.
Elaine May argues that the first systematic attempts to explain the skyrocketing divorce rate came in
the late nineteenth century from the new profession of social science, citing an 1897 example which
placed the blame on the "emancipation ofwomen." As we can see however, attempts to explain the
phenomenon, develop solutions, and even to point to the emancipation ofwomen as a cause arose two
decades before this in Vermont. Elaine Tyler May, Great Expecations: Marriage and Divorce in Post-
Victorian America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 2.
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intervention into the intimate lives of many Vermonters. A judicial intervention of the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries became the precursor to eugenics,
institutionalization, and sterilization of "degenerate Vermonters" in later years.
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CHAPTER 4
RAPE
Introduction
Many historians and scholars have been highly critical ofAmerican rape law.
They have argued that female complainants were treated more like criminals than victims
by the court process. Women who complained of sexual assault had their reputations
dragged through the mud, were accused of inviting the assault by their dress or behavior,
or were simply not believed. The law encouraged this kind of treatment by imposing
special evidentiary requirements on rape prosecutions that did not apply to other kinds of
violent crimes. This formulation of rape law promoted highly gendered models ofproper
and improper sexual behavior for men and women. The values both reflected and
reinforced a sexual double standard discouraging and even punishing women who
transgressed the bounds of female modesty, while excusing or even promoting male
sexual promiscuity and aggression. Some have argued that courts did not take women's
sexual safety seriously at all. Judges and juries either did not view women's need for
protection as important or sought to use rape as a means to dominate women through
the use of sexual terror practiced with impunity. As a result, the law offered little
protection to women from sexual assault or offered it selectively, protecting middle-class
women or girls to the exclusion ofmembers of the working class, ethnic minorities, or
women with immodest reputations.
Though some of this work has relied on local studies, most has been based on
national surveys of appeUate decisions in rape cases. As with other parts of this study,
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the experience in Vermont allows us to examine the development and application ofrape
law in the larger legal context in which it existed. That examination reveals a far more
nuanced inter-play of law, sex, and gender than earlier work has led us to understand.'
Statutory Development
Rape was the most serious sexual infraction regulated by Vermont's courts in the
19* century. The earliest rape laws, adopted in 1779 from the Connecticut Statute Book
of 1 769, made rape a capital crime, as it did other sexual violations such as sodomy and
bestiality. This earliest law carried with it the hallmarks of the traditional rape
prosecution dynamic. In addition to penetration accomplished by force and without
consent, the complaining witness had to make her allegation immediately after the assault
(or "forthvsdth" in the language of the original statute) and she had to show that "in time
of distress" she did "make an out-cry on the occasion." Although the law provided the
death penalty for those convicted, apparently no man was ever executed for rape during
the twelve years the law permitted this ultimate punishment.^
' The most frequently cited works are Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975); Catherine MacKinnon, "Feminism, Marxism, Method and
State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence," Signs 8 (Summer 1983): 635-658; MacKinnon, "Reflections on
Sex Equality Under Law," Yale Law Journal 100 (1991): 1281-1328; Susan Estrich, "Rape," Yale Law
Journal 95 (1986): 1087-1 184. Historical studies making such arguments include Lyle Koehler, A
Searchfor Power: The "Weaker Sex" in Seventeenth-Century New England (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1980); Terry L. Chapman, "Sex Crimes in the West, 1890-1920," Alberta History 35 (Fall
1987): 6-18; Constance Backhouse, Petticoats and Prejudice: Women and Law in 19"' Century Canada
(Toronto: Women's Press, 1991), 1 1 1, 331.
2 Allen Soule, ed.. Laws of Vermont, 1777-1780, vol. 12 ofState Papers of Vermont (Montpelier:
Secretary of State, 1964), 12: 40-41. Capital punishment was rare in Vermont. Between 1777 and 1987
fifty-five people were sentenced to death, but of those only twenty-seven were actually executed, hi any
case, as a rule, Vermont did not execute felons who did not kill. Randolph Roth, "'Blood Calls for
Vengeance!' The History of Capital Punishment in Vermont," Vermont History 65 (Winter/Spring
1997): 10, 13.
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In 1791 the legislature amended the law, removing the earlier requirements of
out-cry and immediate prosecution. As with the amendments to the bastardy law which
took place at the same time, the Vermont legislature cast offthe more antiquarian
aspects of these laws that had been the legacy of Connecticut's Puritan legal code.^ The
new law also removed the death penalty and left the punishment indeterminate. Instead,
it was now left to the Supreme Court to decide on the appropriate fine, imprisonment,
and corporal punishment. Imprisonment in Vermont was rare at this time because local
jails were the only option available for holding convicted criminals. Thus the penalties
for most consensual sexual crimes relied on fines and whippings." Rape, being coercive,
was treated more seriously, with provisions for imprisonment in addition to whippings
and fines. Despite the indeterminancy of the statute, it seems clear that the legislature
contemplated severe punishment for rape. For one thing, the statute required all those
convicted of rape to sew a large cloth letter "R" on their outer garments "fi-om the
expiration oftwenty four hours after [their] imprisonment." Those caught without the
letter were to be whipped up to ten stripes at the order of any justice of the peace.
Furthermore, in cases where whipping was part of the original sentence, the statute
limited the number to one hundred lashes-by far the most severe corporal punishment
imposed by any criminal statute and easily enough to kill a man.^
^ In Vermont, the amount of a woman's resistence and speed with which she reported the assault were
simply factors for the jury to take into account when determining the credibility of her allegation rather
than dispositive facts foreclosing prosecutors' attempts to bring charges. State v. Wilkim, 66 Vt. 1
(1892); State v. Niles, 47 Vt. 82 (1874).
" See for example the laws of 1787 which imposed whippings, brandings, and fines for consensual
sexual violations such as adultery and fornication. John A. Williams, ed., Laws of Vermont. 1 785-1 791
,
vol. 14 of State Papers of Vermont (Montpelier, Secretary of State, 1966), 165-167.
' John A. Williams, ed.. Laws of Vermont, 1 791-1 795, vol. 1 5 of State Papers of Vermont (Montpelier,
Secretary of State, 1967), 20; George Ryley Scott, The History ofCorporal Punishment (London:
Torchstream Books, 1954), 59, 83.
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Despite the potentially rigorous penalties available, I could find no instance of
any man being convicted, much less punished in the four counties for rape during the
earliest part of this study. Of the four rape cases I could locate in the four counties
between 1 794 and 1 807 aU resulted in not guUty verdicts. In the two attempted rape
cases brought during the same period, one defendant defaulted and the other was found
guilty of the lesser offense of assault and merely fined. It is not until 1809 that we begin
to see convictions and imprisonments for rape and attempted rape. This coincides with
the opening of the State Prison at Windsor. Thereafter, the number of convictions for
rape, attempted rape, and other kinds of sexual assaults increased dramatically. While no
men were found guilty of rape or attempted rape among the known cases between 1794
and 1 807, the situation becomes reversed fi-om 1 809 onward. For example, between
1 809 and 1 820, of the ten men tried for rape, attempted rape, or statutory rape (which at
the time meant sex with a girl under eleven), seven were found guilty by juries. All seven
were sentenced to lengthy prison terms (three received ten years, two received seven
years, and two received six years). Three others defaulted. None were acquitted. It
may well be that the opening of Windsor State Prison in 1809 created an appropriate
remedy which judges and juries could now rely on when deciding sexual assault cases.^
In 1 8 1 8, the law of rape was again amended. The discretionary sentencing and
the requirement that rapists wear the letter "R" on their clothing after release were both
discarded. In their place, the legislature imposed a ten-year prison sentence and a $1000
fine (or either at the discretion of the judge) for rapists. It set the penalty for attempted
rape at seven years' imprisonment and a $500 fine (or either also at the discretion of the
* Roth, "History of Corporal Punishment in Vermont," 13.
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court). And finally, it wrote the common law's eleven year-old age of consent into the
statute law, treating sex between men over age fifteen and girls younger than eleven as a
rape, regardless of whether it was "with her will or against her will."''
'
The law remained unchanged by statute until 1 849 when the maximum penalty
for rape was doubled, with convicts now facing up to twenty years in prison, a $2000
fine or both. Those convicted of attempted rape faced a maximum sentence often years
and a $1000 fine or both. Other than an increase in the age of consent (to fourteen in
1 886 and sixteen in 1 898), the statute remained unchanged for the rest of the study
period.*
During most ofthe period under study, a rape or attempted rape charge had to be
brought by an indictment handed down by a grand jury. This meant that it was up to
local people to decide whether a man would face a prosecution for rape or attempt.
Prosecutors did not get the right to prosecute by information in serious cases like rape or
attempt until 1898.^
Under Vermont law, a rape occurred when a man had sexual intercourse with a
woman by force and without her consent. '° The simplicity of the prohibition was
deceptive. For rape, while the most serious sexual ofifense, also posed the greatest
evidentiary difSculties for both the prosecution and the defense. For one thing, rape
rarely occurred in the presence of a third party. Thus, corroboration was difficult. Other
' 1818 Vt. Acts 1.
» 1849 Vt. Acts 7; 1886 Vt. Acts 63; 1898 Vt. Acts 188.
' See the discussion of the development of prosecutions by information in the Introduction.
"If any person shall ravish and carnally know a female of the age of eleven years or more, by force and
against her will . . . ." 1849 Vt. Acts 7.
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sexual offenses left a more complete evidentiary record. Seduction and bastardy cases
were brought to light by pregnancy-obviously someone had had intercourse with the
woman in question. Abortion cases typically had at least three potential witnesses: the
pregnant woman, the man who impregnated her, and the abortionist. Physical evidence
was also available in the form of a fetus, bloody clothing, and medical examination.
Adultery typically came to light on account of third party witnesses, divorce
proceedings, or illegitimate pregnancy. But evidence was often lacking in an
unwitnessed rape and such physical evidence as there might be-tom clothing, bruises,
body fluids-while bearing a resemblance to the physical proofmentioned above, did not
carry with it the same evidentiary weight because it did not in and of itselfprove the
elements of the crime. Unlike adultery for example, it was not enough merely to show
that intercourse had taken place in order to prove the criminal act. This was because the
question of whether or not the crime had taken place was contingent upon the mental
understanding of the alleged victim. Had force been used to accomplish the intercourse?
Had it been accomplished without her consent? Resolution of these issues typically
depended entirely upon the perceptions of the woman. As a result, rape cases, more
than other sexual infractions were, for the most part, decided by the jury's weighing of
the testimony of the alleged victim (usually referred to as the "prosecutrix").
Typically, to prove an unwitnessed rape, the state had to put the woman on the
stand to testily." A defendant having no alibi had two choices: argue that he had not
had sexual relations with the woman or that the sex was consensual. Either way, the
"
"Usually the prosecutrix is the only witness upon the question of whether the act was by force and against her
will, and without her testimony no conviction can be expected. It is all important to the respondent that he discredit
her testimony, and usually his only means of doing this is by cross-examination. If he cannot cross-examine the
prosecutrix with a view to disaediting her story, he is deprived of the substantial benefits of a aoss-examination."
Slate V. Hollenbeck, 67 Vt. 34, 37 (1894).
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woman's credibility often lay at the heart of the case and in the nineteenth century,
credibility depended on character. But how was character to be assessed? What role, if
any, could past sexual behavior play in that assessment?
Character and Consent
Those who would be witnesses in Vermont's eighteenth and nineteenth-century
courts &ced a raft of exclusions and challenges to their credibility based on beliefe and
assumptions that are now alien to us. Some were excluded because they had an interest
in the case. Thus, plaintifife and defendants in civil cases could not testify because the
temptation to lie on their own behalfwas deemed too great to trust their testimony.'^
Criminal defendants could not be compelled to testify against themselves of course, but
they could not voluntarily testify on their own behalf either until 1866,'^ Others were
excluded because of social policy considerations. The sanctity of the marital relationship
outweighed the search for truth. Therefore, husbands and wives could not testify for or
against each other in any civil or criminal proceeding. Those who did not believe in
God could not testify. Nor could people who had been convicted oftreason, any felony,
or any crime involving dishonesty. These latter two disabilities were removed in 1851,
but those who had been convicted of crimes involving perjury were still prohibited from
This disability was removed by statute in 1852. 1852 Vt. Acts 13.
" Vermont Constitution, Chap. I, Art. 10 (1793); 1866 Vt. Acts 40.
Subject to exceptions Vermonters retain the right to prevent their spouses from testifying as to
confidential statements made between them in criminal cases or in civil cases in which the husband
wife are not adverse parties. Vt. R. Evid. 504.
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testifying and those whose past crimes had involved moral turpitude could have their
credibility impeached as a result.'^
In addition to these exclusions and grounds for challenging credibility, Vermont
courts also allowed lawyers to attack witnesses in civil and criminal cases based on their
reputation for honesty. In general, nineteenth-century law carefiilly limited the admission
of character evidence in civil and criminal trials. The rules governing the introduction of
such evidence were complex both because they varied depending on the use lawyers
sought to make of this kind of evidence and because of the conflict between finding the
truth and protecting parties fi^om unfairly prejudicial testimony.
In criminal cases including rape, reputation evidence could be used to impeach a
witness (including the alleged victim or the defendant if he chose to testify). In general,
lawyers could impeach the testimony of a witness only through the use of evidence of
their general reputation for honesty. The lawyer would place someone on the stand who
lived in the witness's community and ask him about the Mdtness's general reputation for
truth-telling. Impeaching witnesses could not make reference to specific acts by the
impeached witness nor express their own opinion. All they could do was testify as to
what they believed the general reputation of the witness was for truth-telling in the
community.'^
'5 The religious and criminal conviction disabilities were removed by statute in 1851. 1851 Vt. Acts 12.
The Court did not define "moral turpitude" until 1963 in State v. Foumier, 123 Vt. 439, where it
declared that such acts had to be "base or depraved" in addition to being criminal. Other authorities
define moral turpitude as behavior "that gravely violates moral sentiment or accepted moral
standards of
a community." Black 's Law Dictionary, 6* ed.
Milo L. Bennett, The Vermont Justice (Burlington, 1864), 343; Henry A. Harman, The
Vermont
Justice and Public Officer (Rutland, The Tuttle Company, 1905) 366-369.
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We have already seen how lawyers in some civil or criminal cases sought to
attack the sexual reputation of a witness or party in order to impeach credibility and that
such efforts were generally prohibited by the Supreme Court. During the 1830s and
1 840s, the Court repeatedly held for example that a woman's history as a prostitute
could not be used to impeach her credibility in civil or criminal cases. In so ruling, the
Court, as it had done in bastardy cases, expressly rejected Massachusetts holdings which
were to the contrary. In an 1835 prosecution for assault and battery, the Supreme Court
upheld the trial court's refusal to permit the defendant to impeach two of the state's
witnesses by introducing his ovm witnesses who would testify that they were common
prostitutes. The Court repeated the rule that only evidence of a general reputation for
truth-telling was admissible. It acknowledged that the practice ofmost vices tended to
"impair the moral sense, and weaken the force of the obligation to speak or act v^th due
regard to truth." It likened prostitution to intemperance or thieving in this respect, but
noted that if such behaviors did lead to dishonesty, it was easy enough to limit the
testimony to the effect of such vice on the witness's general reputation for truth-telling
without having to delve into the cause of such reputation. The Court asserted that to do
othenvise would introduce a new rule of evidence and it was unprepared to take such a
step. "We apprehend the inquiry proposed would be entirely new in our courts of
justice, dangerous, and some cases slanderous, and no equivalent benefit would be
derived fi-om permitting such an inquiry.'"^ The Court adopted this position in two other
cases arising out of bastardy suits {Morse v. Pineo (1832) and Spears v. Forrest (1843)
discussed in earlier chapters).
State V. Smith, 7 Vt. 141 (1835).
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Because the testimony of the alleged victim was so crucial in most rape cases,
defense lawyers were particularly keen to impeach the credibility of the woman. To do
so they often sought to introduce evidence about the woman's sexual morality. But they
came up against the law's general prohibition of such evidence as a means of gauging
credibility. As a result, Vermont's judges were repeatedly called upon to determine the
nature of evidence the state and the defendant could enter about women who charged
rape. In attempting to resolve these disputes, judges found themselves facing a dilemma.
On the one hand, the limited evidence available in most rape trials and the importance of
the woman's testimony was a strong temptation to permit the admission of character
evidence. On the other hand, it seemed unfair to the aUeged victim to judge the
credibility of her allegations based on behavior prior to and sometimes even following
the alleged rape. Some judges were well aware that such evidence could be used to
punish a victim, both by humiliating her and preventing conviction of her rapist. Perhaps
most importantly for Vermont's conservative judges, its introduction ran contrary to the
general rules governing the admissibility of character evidence.
Beginning in the middle ofthe 19* century Vermont's Supreme Court was asked
to sort out the question of character evidence with regard to the prosecutrix. The
question that arose in rape cases was this: to what extent could her testimony be
impeached by questions concerning her moral character? Could one simply inquire of
her general moral reputation? Or could one delve farther either by putting her past
sexual behavior into question or even by inquiring about past specific sexual encounters
with other men?
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The leading case was State v. Johnson, an 1855 prosecution against Levi Johnson
for rape and incest committed on his sixteen year-old daughter Sarah. This was the &st
reported rape case in Vermont. The state alleged that Johnson had had sex with Sarah at
least three times and that she had gotten pregnant as a result. On cross-examination,
Johnson's lawyers had asked Sarah whether she had had sex with other men, naming
them and specifying the particular times and places. These occurrences were alleged to
have taken place both before and after the time she claimed her fether had raped her and
before she became pregnant. The trial judge had refused to allow the cross-examination.
In reversing the trial court, Supreme Court Judge Pierpont Isham, writing for the two-
judge majority, ruled that a defendant could not introduce evidence ofthe woman's past
sexual experiences with other men. However, ifthe state put on the prosecutrix (which
it typically had to do in order to prove the case) the defendant, on cross-examination,
could inquire about her sexual experiences. Judge Isham based the opinion on his
interpretation of several English cases which had considered the matter. He justified his
decision on the relevance of such testimony to the issue of consent, arguing that it was a
purely mental act and that in determining whether it took place or not one could inquire
into a woman's previous habits. If she was immoral, then consent would be "the natural
result of her mind," but if she was not immoral then such consent would be
inconsistent with her previous life, and repugnant to all her moral feelings.
. . .
Such habits as are imputed to this witness by this inquiry, have a
tendency to show such consent, as the natural operation of her
propensities, and rebut the inference or necessity of actual violence.
In other words, whether she was sexually immoral went to the credibility ofher claim
that she had not consented and that she had resisted. While Isham's opinion held that a
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woman could be asked these questions if she testified, he did not claim that she could be
made to answer them. Ifan aflBrmative answer would subject her to prosecution for
engaging in adulterous acts, for example, she had a right to claim the privilege against
self-incrimination.
Judge Isham's opinion drew a strong dissent fi-om fellow judge Milo Bennett.
Bennett absolutely rejected the proposition that past immoral acts should be used to
discredit the testimony of a prosecutrix. While he agreed with the proposition that a
general reputation for lack of chastity was admissible in rape cases, he denied that
specific past bad acts could be used. In the first place, it was contrary to authority.
Simon Greenleaf s influential treatise on evidence had made clear that such specific
evidence of immorality could not be used. Instead, the defendant could only rely on
general reputation evidence of immorality. Second, Bennett was troubled by the logic
and morality of the leap from one illicit action to the next,
A general want of chastity may fiimish a basis for a presumption that the
illicit connection was by consent, and thus it becomes material to the
issue. But no such presumption should be allowed to arise from a
particular instance of an illicit connection with another person.
Presumptions cannot rest upon mere suggestion or surmise. They must
have some ground to stand upon, some facts upon which they can arise.
Bennett's criticism was more than a critique of Isham's faulty logic, it reflected a view of
human nature influenced by his known evangelical view of redemption.
The error ... in my view is, in assuming that a presumption ofconsent
might arise from the fact of a previous illicit connection with some other
person, and when JUDGE COWEN undertook to dispose of the cases of
" State V. Johnson, 28 Vt. 512, 514 (1856). Consent would not have been an issue on the incest count,
but incest was punished the same as adultery which allowed a maximum sentence of only five years (as
opposed to twenty years for rape). 1 797 Vt. Acts 9. On re-trial, Johnson was acquitted by a jury. He
was later tried that year for an assault on his wife, pled guilty, and was sentenced to four months in jail.
State V. Johnson, Windsor County Court, December 1860 Term, State Cases, vol. 1, 538, 596.
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Rex V. Hodgson and Rex v. Clark [English cases cited by the majority], as
being overruled by the laws ofhuman nature, I think he undertook too
much. Though we may concede, so far as our moral convictions are
concerned, to use the language ofJUDGE COWEN, that "one who has
akeady started on the road to prostitution, would be less reluctant to
pursue her course, than one who still remained at her home of
innocence," yet courts ofjustice cannot act upon evidence addressed
simply to their moral convictions. It might, no doubt, have an effect upon
our moral convictions, to show on a trial for theft, that the defendant was
given to stealing, yet courts ofjustice could not act upon such a fact, and
why should we presume that a female continues in a voluntary course of
lewdness, because she has had, at some previous time a sexual connection
with some other man. If the law will not allow such evidence to be the
basis of a presumption, it should not be received.'^
Bennett lost this battle. But he waged a guerilla war on the decision in a way typical of
mid- 19''' century jurists—^he wrote a treatise. Nineteenth-century jurists who opposed
the ideological direction ofthe state or federal courts wrote law treatises in an effort to
sway legal opinion to their side. These authors sought to exploit the fact that many
lawyers and judges had limited access to reported decisions or little inclination to do
legal research. By authoring a treatise and directing it at these individuals and
particularly at students or young lawyers, they could hope to inculcate their perspectives
into the next generation. The most famous example of this is Joseph Story's four
volume treatise on constitutional law written in order to blunt the threat state's rights
jurisprudence posed to John Marshall's nationalist legacy.^" Bennett's Vermont Justice
(1864) became one of the most widely-used legal authorities in the state during the
second halfofthe 19* century.^' Though marketed as a guide to Vermont's non-lawyer
" Johnson. 5 19. On Bennett's evangelical outlook, see "Remarks at the Funeral of Mile Bennett," The
Daily Free Press [Burlington], 10 July 1868. My thanks to Crocker Bennett for this citation.
^°
R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman ofthe Old Republic (Chapel Hill:
University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1985), 181-195.
^' S. Crocker Bennett II, Judge Milo Bennett: Puritan in an Industrial Age (paper presented at a
symposium of the Vermont Judicial Historical Society, Burlington, Vermont, June 1997), 18. Copy in
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justices ofthe peace, both its title page and Bennett's preface made expUcit his hope that
it would be used by the junior members ofthe bar. Its contents went beyond matters
strictly within the jurisdiction ofjustices of the peace—in short, it was Bennett's attempt
to have a lasting influence on the law.
Thus it comes as no surprise that Bennett would attempt to undo the Supreme
Court's ruling on evidence in rape cases set down on the Johnson decision nine years
before. In the section on rape, Bennett ignored the Johnson ruling, arguing, based on
citation to Greenleaf, that:
The respondent may give in evidence the general bad character of the
female, for want of chastity, as furnishing a basis for a presumption that
the illicit connection was by consent; but we apprehend the true rule is,
that no such presumption can arise from a particular instance of prior
illicit connection with another person, other than the accused.^^
Furthermore, any woman could be raped, regardless ofher station in life or her
reputation: "It is no defence that she was a common strumpet, if a rape was actually
committed upon her." That is, the law did not immunize men against rape charges when
their victim had a bad reputation for chastity. Rather, that reputation went to her
credibility in determining "if a rape was actually committed upon her."^^
The influence of Bennett's treatise was reflected almost immediately in the case
of State V. Reed (1867). Amaretta Marcott claimed that Albert Reed had raped her.
the possession of the author.
^ Milo Bennett, The Vermont Justice, 574-575.
^ This comported with Blackstone. "The civil [i.e. Continental] law seems to suppose a prostitute or
common harlot incapable of any injuries of this kind: not allowing any punishment for violating the
chastity of her, who had indeed no chastity at all, or at least hath no regard to it. But the law of England
does not judge so hardly of offenders, as to cut off all opportunity of retreat even from common
strumpets, and to treat them as never capable ofamendment. It therefore holds it to be felony to force
even a concubine or harlot; because the woman may have forsaken that unlawfixl course of life."
William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland, vol. 4 (Oxford, 1769), 213.
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Reed, thirty-three and a ferm laborer, was the Marcotts' neighbor. On cross-
examination Reed's lawyers asked Amaretta if she knew one Eleazer Harwood, a
conductor on the railroad. She had denied knowing him, but offered that she might have
seen him. Reed's lawyer then asked her whether she had had sex with Harwood the
previous spring when he walked her home along the railroad track. The state objected
and the trial judge, James Barrett, upheld the objection. The defendant then entered
general evidence that Marcott's character for chastity was bad and the state gave
evidence that she had a good reputation for chastity. Reed was convicted.
On appeal, the state cited Bennett's treatise and argued that Johnson was bad law.
According to the state's brief, Johnson was "rejected by a large majority of the
profession of this state, as a wide departure from the ancient land marks ofthe law; in
fact a perversion of the principles that have received approval of the best legal minds in
the past and present."
The Court's defensiveness over its opinion in Johnson was obvious. Judge
Benjamin H. Steele noted that it had been the result of a divided court and was legally
questionable, but felt it could not overrule so recent a decision. "Before the decision was
made the question was, at least, debatable both upon reason and authority, and it was
perhaps more important that the point should be settled, than how it was settled." Steele
did not note something else which distinguished the Johnson decision-it had only been
decided by a three-judge court. Between 1850 and 1 857, Vermont experimented with a
permanent three-member Supreme Court and trial courts overseen by circuit judges who
did not hear appeals. Thus, the Johnson decision was particularly vulnerable to criticism
as the product of not only an experimental (and short-lived) court, but a divided one
at
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that. Steele justified the admission of past sexual experience evidence on the ground that
such evidence was extremely valuable to the defendant in the case before it given general
testimony presented as to the prosecutrix's bad general reputation for chastity. "The
jury would be less ready to conclude that a woman who had once improperly yielded
afterwards properly resisted, than they would if she had been a woman of unquestioned
virtue." The Court held that the matter of the admissibility of such evidence was now
settled in the state of Vermont. Tried again. Reed was found guilty a second time. He
appealed again and his case was continued for four years before the prosecutor finally
entered a nolle prosequi}^
The Court's decision on this issue was one ofthe few in which Vermont law was
potentially more hostile to women than that of other states in matters concerning sex and
sexual injury. We have seen that in bastardy cases and on the issue of the effect of
prostitution on a witness's credibility, Vermont tended to be more accommodating
toward female complainants and witnesses. But on the question of past reputation,
Vermont was distinct from neighboring New England states. Both Massachusetts and
New Hampshire had declared that only evidence of general reputation for chastity could
be introduced to impeach the credibility of an alleged victim on matters of consent. Both
cited Greenleaf for the proposition and neither decision displayed any of the agonized
soul searching of the Vermont cases."
State V. Reed, 39 Vt. 4 1 7, 4 1 8-20 ( 1 867); State v. Reed, Windsor County Court, May 1 867 Term, Docket
No. 233; State v. Reed, Windsor County Supreme Court, February 1871 Term, Docket No.
1.
" State V. Forshner, 43 N.R 89 (1861); Commonwealth v. Harris, 131 Mass. 336 (1881). The Harris
decision consisted of only one paragraph.
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Despite the Court's decisions in Johnson and Reed resistance continued. In an
appeal from an adultery prosecution in 1 876, Judge Hoyt Wheeler stated that in a rape
case evidence of prior sexual intercourse with the defendant was admissible, but
"evidence of like acts of intercourse between her and other men is not."^^ In his notes to
the second edition of the annotated reports of the Vermont Supreme Court, published in
1 890, editor Charles L. Williams observed that the rule in Johnson had been approved in
State V. Reed, but then went on to state the rule promoted by Greenleaf and Bennett that
specific acts with others were inadmissible and that "her general reputation for chastity in
the community before the alleged rape is all that can be shown." Williams cited Nevada,
Alabama, and Michigan cases in support."
In 1 894 Judge Russell Taft had refused to permit a rape defendant to introduce
evidence that the alleged victim had had intercourse with another man. Mary Oilman, a
fourteen-year-old servant girl, was living in the home of George Hollenbeck when, she
claimed, she was raped by Hollenbeck' s brother Eddie. Eddie, aged 26, was a brass
finisher. He and his wife had been staying temporarily with George. Hollenbeck'
s
lawyer cross-examined Mary, asking whether at the time she claimed to have been raped,
she had had intercourse with a man named Billett. Upon objection. Judge Taft excluded
the question. Hollenbeck was convicted. On appeal. Judge Henry R. Start held that the
question had been proper, citing Johnson and Reed for support. "Usually the prosecutrix
is the only witness upon the question of whether the act was by force and
against her
will, and without her testimony no conviction can be expected. It is all
important to the
State V. Bridgman, 49 Vt. 202 (1876).
"
Note to State v. Johnson, 28 Vt. 512 (1856) in Charles L. Williams,
ed.. Reports ofCases Argued and
Determined in the Supreme Court of Vermont (Minneapolis, 1 890).
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respondent that he discredit her testimony, and usually his only means of doing this is
by cross-examination. If he cannot cross-examine the prosecutrix with a view to
discrediting her story, he is deprived of the substantial benefits of a cross-examination."
Re-tried, Hollenbeck was again convicted and sentenced to ten years.^*
Despite their differences about the nature of sexual reputation evidence that
could be admitted in rape cases, all the jurists involved in the debate treated rape cases
differently than others. All agreed that the alleged victim's sexual reputation was fair
game if she testified. This was a departure fi^om the general rules of evidence which
normally allowed only a witness's general reputation for honesty to be admitted. The
un-selfconsciousness with which they accepted this departure is worth thinking about.
In no other criminal or quasi-criminal case was such evidence permitted. We have seen
that in bastardy and assault cases, the Court repeatedly held that such evidence was
inadmissible and that only general reputation for truth could be used to impeach
witnesses who had not been convicted of committing crimes involving moral turpitude.
Just two years after Hollenbeck, for example, the same Supreme Court ruled that a
murder defendant could not impeach witnesses for the state by cross-examining them
about their operation of a brothel. The author of that opinion, Russell Taft, had served
as the trial judge in the Hollenbeck case. It had been his refusal to permit specific
sexual reputation evidence in that case that had led to its reversal. In State v. Fournier
(1896) he cited the long line of cases discussed above and held that only a witness's
general reputation for truth could be tested. None of the other Supreme Court
judges
"
<:tnte V Hollenbeck 67 Vt 34 (1894); "Report of the Superintendent
of the State Prison for 1895-1896,"
JveZnt^L^^^^^^ Reports fir 1895.1896 (Rutland, 1896) 31;
Records of the State Pnson at
Windsor, vol. 4, p. 292, Special Collections, University of
Vermont, Burlmgton. Vermont.
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dissented from Taft's opinion, including Judge Start who had written the opinion in
Hollenbeck allowing such evidence (and more) in rape cases.^'
Why then did jurists so easily accept the departure from the general rules of
evidence when it came to rape cases? Some men mistrusted women, believing that rape
was an easy charge for a woman to make and extremely hard for a defendant to
disprove.^" Sexually promiscuous women were seen as particularly untrustworthy, and
given the morality of the times, it would be surprising if they were not so perceived.
As a result, the Supreme Court permitted a woman's reputation for chastity as
well as past specific acts of sexual immorality to be used against her if she testified.
This was an exception applied only to rape cases and was not permitted even in other
criminal and civil cases of a sexual nature where there were female witnesses or
victims. Technically, its use in rape cases was quite limited. The evidence was
admitted solely to impeach the alleged victim on the question of consent and only if she
testified. Since the crime's existence rested on the woman's perceptions, and successfril
prosecution depended on her testimony, her credibility was all important on the issue of
consent. The rule was not intended to immunize men from the risk of prosecution by
raping unchaste women. The limited purposes for which such evidence was to be
admitted may seem like a distinction without a difference, however. The admission of
sexual reputation evidence might well prejudice a conservative, all-male jury against
the female victim since Vermonters were intolerant of
non-marital sexual activity.
2' State V. Fournier, 68 Vt. 262 (1896).
30- Judges sometimes referenced Mathew Hale's comment, later
quoted m Blacks one, tiiat rape i a most
detesmble crime, and therefore ought severely and impartially
to be punished with deatfi; bu " must b
remembered, that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard
to be proved, but harder to be defended by the
p^tcusei, though imiocent." Blackstone, vol. 4, 214-215. See for example.
State v. Bedard, 65 Vt.
278 (1892) in this respect.
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If the woman's sexual reputation could be called into question, could the sexual
reputation of the male defendant be used against him as well? Technically, the answer
was no. It is important to remember that the issue of the woman's reputation came up
only if she testified, and then only went to the question of consent. Until 1 866, criminal
defendants were not permitted to testify on their own behalf and thereafter, they could
not be forced to testify against their will (unlike the alleged victim who could be
subpoenaed by either side). After 1 866, a rape defendant who took the stand could be
impeached based on his general character for honesty just like any other witness.
Prosecutors often went after defendants seeking to show that they were ofbad character.
They could not be impeached by reference to sexual matters however. But we have to
ask ourselves what the effect would be if such inquiries were permitted. Ifa woman
could be asked whether she had consented to sex with others in the past, what would a
prosecutor ask of the rape defendant? Presumably he would ask if he had ever had sex
with a woman before without her consent. No defendant would admit to such an act and
his refiisal to incriminate himselfwould be honored by the court-just as female witnesses
had the right to decline to answer questions about their past acts where a positive answer
might place them in jeopardy of an adultery charge.^' However, evidence that a
testifying defendant had been previously convicted of a crime involving perjury or moral
turpitude could be introduced as a means of impeaching him and, as we will see below,
this included past convictions for sexual assault. And lastly, prosecutors sought to
introduce character evidence (including sexual character evidence) every chance they
got-regardless of its legality.
3' Throughout the nineteenth century the statute of limitations for both offenses
was three years. Lam o
Vermont (Rutland, 1798), 594.
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1 hus in State v. Gile (1918) a statutory rape prosecution, the state sought to
introduce evidence that the delendiint had had iui illicit relationship with another woman.
The prosecutor iirgued that the testimony was to be used only to fix a particular date in
the mind of the complainant. I he court warned the prosecutor to focus solely on the
intimacies committed with the complainant herself, but the prosecutor's next question
specifically niuned the other wi)man. t he state also examined a witness about the
delendant's general reputation lor morality in the commimity (rather thim his reputation
for honesty). The witness responded that it was bad. I he defendant was convicted and
raised the admission of this clwacter evidence on appeal. I he Supreme Court recited it
without comment and upheld the conviction. Ciile was sentenced to three to five years in
the state prison.^^
There is no question that the exception to the general rule regiu^ding character
evidence rellected gender conceptions. If a woman engaged in sex with one man in the
past, some judges at least believed that it was likely that she would consent to do it with
another man in the future. But even these judges reiiised to extend this exception
beyond rape cases. Only in cases where consent was lui issue was this evidence
permitted. I hus, in statutory rape cases where consent was not ixn issue, the Supreme
C'ourt refused to permit cross-exiunination of the girl victims on issues of past sexual
activity except where such evidence showed that cmothcr person had committed the
" Staie V. GiU\ Vermont Reports Br icts, 93(2). no. 2 1 ( 1 9 1 8); State v. Gile. 93 Vt . 1 42 ( 1 9 1 9); Records
of the State FYison, vol. 9, p. 59.
Lawyers in statutory rape aises sought to raise the issue of past sexual activity as a test of general
credibility. I he Court refused to allow an expansion of the narrow rule it had created in adiill rape aiscs
where consent was in issue. State v. Simpson^ 78 Vl. 124 (1905). I his issue is discussed in detail in
Chiipter 5.
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What efifect did the Court's jurisprudence actually have on rape prosecutions? It
is difBcult to know how many women never came forward because they feared having
their past sexual experiences aired in court. We also do not know how many cases were
not prosecuted by the state because of this issue, or how many men might have been
acquitted after the alleged victim had been impeached by the use of such testimony. But
I do not believe that jurists, in allowing such evidence, were motivated by any desire to
make it easier for Vermont men to rape women and girls. We know that in some cases
admission of this evidence did not prevent convictions. For example, in the HoUenbeck
prosecution discussed above, after ruling that the defendant had a right to ask the alleged
victim if she had had sex with another man the Supreme Court remanded the case for a
new trial. On retrial, Hollenbeck was again convicted and sentenced to ten years in the
state prison.^"* Furthermore, at the same time that the Court was carving out its
exception to the character evidence rule, it also developed a parallel line of cases which
placed men on notice that it was the woman's perception of events that mattered in a
rape prosecution rather than the man's.
Rape Law and the Female Perspective
I have shown that Vermont society in general and its courts and juries in
particular had little tolerance for anyone who engaged in sexual deviance, violence, or
self-help." Instead it valued the rule of law, communal peace, and the right to be left
"Report ofthe Superintendent of the State Prison for 1 895-1 896," in Vermont State Officers ' Reports
for 1895-1896 (Rutland, 1896), 31.
"
"Self-help" means taking an action with legal consequences, whether legal or not-in efifect taking the
law into one's own hands. Black 's Law Dictionary, ed.
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alone. At the same time that the courts were carving out an exception to the rules of
evidence that applied only to women in rape cases, they were also developing a parallel
line of cases carefully defining the right of a woman to control male access to her body.
In so doing they made it clear that a determination of whether a woman's legal rights had
been violated depended on her perceptions of events rather than those of the male
defendant.
Four years after the Johnson case was decided in 1856, John Hartigan was tried
for the rape of Orilla Vincent, Orilla, aged twenty-one, had been a servant in the home
of the Rockwell family. John Hartigan, aged thirty, was their newly-hired hand. One
Sunday morning while the Rockwells were at church, Hartigan came in and started
flirting wdth Orilla. He propositioned her, asking if she wanted to have a baby. She told
him she would not have one for $300. Hartigan grabbed her, pushed her against a flour
barrel, then forced her to the floor and raped her. After thirty minutes, Hartigan got up
and left. Orilla then locked the door. Hartigan went around to a window, but she told
him that if tried to come in, she would tell Rockwell. Later, he begged her not to tell
what had happened, offering to pay her money and give her a silk scarf. She testified
that she would not take his money and he threw it on the floor. She later gave the
money-twenty-five cents-to Mrs, Rockwell.
Rockwell testified that Orilla was silent at first about the incident, but once she
asked her what was wrong, she told her what had happened and showed her marks and
bruises fi-om the assault. Orilla was described as being "a woman of good health and
strength, ofmedium size," Hartigan was described as being "of medium size, and
apparent strength." Two doctors testified that as Orilla had described the assault "it was
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practically impossible that sexual connection or penetration could have taken place'"
presumably because she should have been able to physically Irustrate Uartigmrs attempt.
Harligan faced two counts in the case, one for rape, the other for attempted rape.
The trial judge, John Pierpoint, instructed the juiy on the law of rape, then turned to the
second count for attempt. lie told the jury that if they found that Vincent had resisted
Ilarligan's attempt for a lime, "but ultimately yielded," it could find him guilty of the
second count for attempt, even if it Ibund that she had later consented to the intercourse.
Based on this instruction, and perhaps on the testimony of the doctors concerning the
likehliood of actual penetration, the jury acquitted llartigan of the rape, but found him
guilty of attempt.
On appeal, Ihirtigan's lawyers argued that if Vincent had consented to the later
intercourse, that consent "related back" to retroactively condone the initial assault.
Judge I.oyal (\ Kellogg rejected this argument. Writing for the Court, he held that a
woman could never retroactively consent to a sexual assault not even if she later forgave
her attacker. "It has never been regarded as a legal excuse Ibr the consummated olVence
that the woman consented aHer the fact, and we regard this principle as IxMUg applicable
to the case of an assiiult with an intent to commit a rape as well as to the higher olTence."
If llartigan had used force against Orilla Vincent with the intent to rape her, he had
committed a criminal act. It did not matter if she had later consented to the sexual
intercourse. He had no right to assault her in the first place. The Court upheld the
conviction and remanded the case for sentencing.^^
Slate V. Hartif^an, 32 Vt. 607 ( I K60).
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There are several ways to read Hartigan. On the one hand, the notion that a
woman could be sexually attacked, resist, and then end up consenting to intercourse is
the bete noire of feminist rape critiques. This narrative of resistance then capitulation
leaves women extremely vulnerable to sexual attack and serves as an excuse for men
unwdlling to take "no" for an answer. On the other hand, the Hartigan decision reflects a
finely honed technical sense of the right to bodily autonomy. First, despite Judge
Kellog's doubts that Orilla Vincent was assaulted at all, he refused to impose his opinion
on the trial court. Second, the legal schema imposed by the appellate court allowed
women to control access to their bodies on a minute by minute, second by second basis.
She could refuse and then consent or, as we will see, she could consent and then refuse.
The issue of consent was dependent on the female's perspective and men attacked
women at their own peril. Even assuming that Orilla Vincent had had consensual sex
with the hired hand, that had not immunized him for punishment for past bad acts—even
those which led to the supposedly consensual sexual encounter.
Fourteen years later, the Court was confronted with the mirror image of the facts
ofHartigan. In State v. Niles (1 874) the Court heard an appeal of the conviction of
David Niles, aged fifty-five, for the rape oftwelve-year-old Lillian Gray.^* Gray was
Niles' s step-daughter. She testified that she had left the house with Niles in late January
and walked two miles with him up to a nearby sugar house. On the way, Niles told
Lillian that they were going to have sex when they got to the sugar house. She testified
" Hartigan himself did escape punishment in the end.
sentencing, he was pardoned by the governor instead.
1 860 Term, Docket No. 84.
Remanded back to the county court for
State V. Hartigan, Addison County Court, June
At the time, the age of consent in Vermont was eleven. 1 8 1 8 Vt. Acts
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that he made no threats nor used any violence towards her. Lillian explained that when
they got to the sugar house, Niles took off her under clothes, put her on some boards,
and climbed on top of her. She tried to get away from him, but he held her down. She
made no outcry. After fifteen minutes they walked to a nearby village where he bought
her a dress. They then returned home. On the way, Niles threatened her and told her
not to tell anyone about what had happened. Several months later, Lillian's mother left
Niles and took her with her to the home of a friend. The friend, a Mrs. Ladd, who was
characterized as "unfriendly" toward Niles, asked Lillian if she had been abused by him
and Lillian told her that she had. She told Ladd that she had not told anyone because
Niles had threatened to kill her and her mother if she did. Medical testimony showed
that Lillian had had sex, probably more than once.
The trial judge, Jonathan Ross, charged the jury that if Lillian had consented to
the sexual act, but then withdrew her consent after it had begun, and the defendant
thereafter forcibly continued it, knowing she objected, it was still rape. The jury then
convicted Niles of rape.
On appeal, Niles argued, among other things, that once she had consented, she
could not then withdraw her permission in the middle of the act. "When a woman
exposes her person, invites sexual intercourse, rouses a man's passions and allows him,
in pursuance of such invitation, actually to penetrate her person, the mere fact that the
animal passions which have been roused by her own act, reftise to submit to her
commands-instantly to cease-has no resemblance to the high crime of rape." The state
on the other hand argued that "rape implies violation of the woman's person;
and it
occurs at any time during the carnal intercourse when the woman withdraws her
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consent." The Supreme Court agreed with the state. Judge Homer E. Royce held that
there was no rule of universal application on the subject. Instead, the Court could take
into account the physical strength of the alleged victim, her relationship to the defendant,
and all the other circumstances disclosed by the evidence. Based on the facts of the case,
Royce wrote that the trial judge's instruction was not error and that Lillian's resistance
and Niles's continued action rendered him guilty of rape. The Court reversed on other
grounds.^^ On retrial, the prosecutor changed tactics and tried the married Niles for
adultery instead. Found guilty, he was sentenced to four years in prison.'*"
The Court spoke again on this issue, this time in a decision stemming from a civil
ravishment case which feU between Hartigan and Niles and was decided in 1872. The
defendant. Royal Blodgett, worked for Charles Alexander and had been living with the
family. Charles's daughter, Mary Alexander, aged fifteen, claimed that she had been
sexually assaulted by Royal Blodgett in her father's bam. Blodgett exposed himself to
her then grabbed her shoulders and tried to lift her dress. Mary told him to "desist" and
that if he did not she would tell her father. A few days later, while her parents were out,
Blodgett told her he wanted to do the same thing to her again. He chased her around the
kitchen, held her, exposed himself and again tried to lift her clothes. Mary told her
mother who told her father. Blodgett continued to work and live in the household for
State V. Niles, 47 Vt. 82 (1874). Vermont law allowed a witness to testify that the alleged victim had
told her of the assault and named the perpetrator. The witness was not however permitted to give the
name of the perpetrator or the particulars of the crime. Mrs. Ladd had done just that in Niles and this
was the ground for reversal.
For Niles's 1 875 conviction for adultery see "Report of the Superintendent of the State
Prison for
1876 "in Vermont Legislative Documents and Official Reports {K\i\.\B,nd, 1876), 15. Prosecutors
sometimes hedged their bets and brought counts for both rape and adultery against
defendants in the
same prosecution. State v. Shedrick, Windsor County Court, December 1896 Term,
State Cases, vol. 4,
p 286 (statutory rape and adultery); State v. Sterlin, Windsor
County Court, May 1866 Term, Docket
Nos. 107-109 (rape, adultery, lewdness); State v. Bridgman, Windsor County
Court, December 1857
Term, State Cases, vol. 1, p. 543-544 (rape and adultery).
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another year before being fired. He went to work for a business rival of Alexander's and
it was then that Charles Alexander brought suit against Blodgett for the assault on his
daughter. Blodgett denied that the assaults had ever taken place.
After the evidence had been presented, the trial judge, the same Judge Ross who
instructed the jury in the Niles case two years later, charged the jury on the law of
assault and assauU and battery. In the case of the first incident in the bam, Ross told the
jurors that if Blodgett had merely exposed himself and "went towards her, supposing it
was in accordance with her wishes, and laid hands on her supposing it was not against
her wishes and desire, that would not amount to any assault there." As for the second
incident in the kitchen Ross instructed the jurors that:
when he pursued her, (which would evidently indicate that she didn't
desire him to come near her and take hold of her,) if he did take hold of
her, it would amount evidently to an assault and battery. On the second
occasion if he exposed himself, and she knew what his desire was, and he
went towards her, and she did not flee fi-om him, and evidently gave him
license, perhaps it would be virtual consent, (emphasis in the original)
The jury then returned a verdict for the defendant and Alexander appealed.
Judge Hoyt H. Wheeler began his opinion with a ringing endorsement of the right
of persons to be fi-ee fi-om fear of an assauh. "The plaintiffhad a right to absolute
security against any attempt to violate her person," he wrote, and "any invasion of that
right was unlawfiil, and ifproceeded with so far as to interfere with her person was
actionable." Though the trial judge had correctly stated the law for assaults generally,
according to Wheeler, he had failed to take into account the sexual nature of the case
before him. Wheeler focused on that part of Judge Ross's instruction that so long as the
defendant thought Mary desired his attentions his exposing himself, coming towards her,
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and putting his hands on her could not be an assault and battery. He rejected this, noting
that for a 'Virtuous woman or girl" there could be no more grievous personal injury than
what the defendant attempted to do to her and what mattered was not what Royal
Blodgett thought, but what Mary Alexander perceived.
If the defendant exposed his person and went toward the plaintiff in her
sight at all, it was unlawful. If he did so when he was near enough or
proceeded in that manner till he got near enough to her to indicate a
purpose to violate her person, and to justly put her in fear that he would
do so, he was guilty of an assault upon her. What he supposed about her
wishes or desires would make it none the less an assault unless she
directly gave him the right to suppose so. He had no right to make any
attempt in that direction without her express and direct consent, and
that, too, first had and obtained. Ifhe proceeded at all without suchfi-ee
andfull consent, it was at his own risk, (emphasis added).
No touching was required to prove the sexual assault according to the Court because the
mere "imposition of the fear and the influence it would have upon her movements and
feelings would constitute an actionable injury to her." Further, she had no obligation to
flee from him in order to sustain her claim since she might stay without consenting "and
if she did so it should not be taken against her." The Court reversed the defense verdict
and returned the case to the trial court/'
Rounding out the Court's jurisprudence on the issue ofmale intent in sexual
assault cases was an 1890 decision. State v. Hanlon. James Hanlon had been charged
with the attempted rape ofAnna Thompson. He claimed intoxication as a defense,
testifying that he had been so drunk at the time that he had no memory of the events in
question. As a result, he argued that he could not have formed the requisite mental
" Alexander v. Blodgett^ 44 Vt. 476 (1872). The Courts' emphasis on the issue of consent in Blodgett is
odd given the fact that the defendant never raised a consent defense. We do not have the transcript of
this case, but it is possible that Blodgett argued consent as an alternative defense to nan estfactum.
This
may explain why the issue vk^as raised at all.
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intent necessary to commit a criminal act. Courts were split as to whether intoxication
was a valid defense to a criminal act. Vermont, a dry state since 1 852, had little
tolerance for this defense, and the Court ruled in 1878 that voluntary intoxication was
not a defense to a crime."^ The trial judge refiised to instruct the jury that intoxication
was a defense and in fact told them aflOrmatively that if Hanlon was drunk, it made no
difference. Instead, the jury was to focus on what Hanlon did and said at the time of the
assault to determine what his intent had been, rather than what might have been in his
mind. The jury convicted. The Supreme Court, on appeal, upheld the trial court noting
that both the victim and the others present at the time of the assault all agreed as to what
had taken place.''^
Thus, at the same time the courts were carving out this gendered exception to the
rules of evidence permitting specific sexual character evidence to reftite a claim of
consent, they were also creating another line ofcases making it clear that in Vermont,
the question of civil and criminal culpability for sexual assaults depended on the female's
perspective. The courts rejected attempts by defense lawyers (and some trial judges) to
create a subjective male-centered standard for determining consent. Men were not
permitted to escape punishment because they "thought" the woman consented. Instead,
they were on notice that they had to be sensitive to the woman's desires, as she
perceived them, at all times-not just before the act-but during it as well. And it did not
matter if they were mentally impaired by alcohol either. It was their actions that
State V. Tatro, 50 Vt. 483 (1878). Tatro was a prosecution for the axe murder of a woman, Alice
Butler, by her husband's hired hand. An example of the Vermont courts' attitude toward alcohol is the
1890 sentence of John O'Neil of Whitehall, New York to fifty-four years imprisonment for mailing
liquor into the state c.o.d. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the sentence, mostly on federalism grounds.
State V. O'Neil, 58 Vt. 140 (1885); aff'd 144 U.S. 323 (1892).
State V. Hanlon, 62 Vt. 334 (1890).
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mattered and the eflfect of those actions on women, not what they thought the woman
wanted.
Corroboration
While some legal rulings might appear to work a hardship on rape complainants
at first glance, sometimes the opposite was true. Take for example another exception to
the general rules of evidence which at least one judge believed applied to rape
cases-corroboration. In State v. Bedard (1892) a Supreme Court judge stated for the
first time that a man could not be convicted for rape solely on the testimony of the
woman. Judge Loveland Munson, taking a page fi-om Mathew Hale, noted that rape
complaints were "easily simulated" and that proofof the complaint was received "in
disregard of the general rules of evidence, because of the peculiar nature of the charge,
and ofthe suspicion with which the law regards the testimony of the prosecutrix."
Judge Munson' s statement was not supported by any authority and I can find no
precedent for it in any Vermont materials which preceded the decision. In fact, Vermont
judges imposed the corroboration requirement only in criminal cases where the state
relied solely on the testimony of an accomplice or particeps criminis such as the partner
in an adultery case and even that was not law, but simply a rule ofpractice-and one not
closely adhered to at that.'" At first glance such special requirements (and the attitude
reflected by them) might lead one to believe that this new line of reasoning would work a
hardship on alleged rape victims and prosecutors-after aU, Munson' s rule seemed to
conceive of the female complainant as an accompUce to a crime rather than as an alleged
^ State V. Potter, 42 Vt. 495 (1869).
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victim. But instead of using the law to shield rape defendants, it was a sword in the
hands of the state. For in making the statements as he did. Judge Munson was justifying
the introduction of stale's evidence harmful to the defendant, and not normally
permitted. In Bcdard the trial court had allowed the state to show that while returning
home aller the alleged assault, the woman cried continuously. Judge Munson, citing the
special need for corroboration, upheld the admission of such evidence in order to bolster
the state 's case. I 'urthermore, evidence of a woman's physical or mental distress
following the alleged assault could be used to explain "what might otherwise be deemed
a suspicious delay in making complaint." The Supreme Court upheld Bedcird's
conviction and sentenced him to ten years in prison."*^
Just as the Court's belief that consent was hard to prove had allowed exceptions
to the general rules governing the admission of chtiracter evidence, the corroboration
handicap meant that courts allowed prosecution evidence which was generally
inadmissible in other criminal cases. For example, the courts allowed testimony by
witnesses that the woman had complained to them of being assaulted and had mmied the
assailant. This was a clear exception to the hearsay rule-one which aided prosecutors
and harmed defendants. Challenged repeatedly, the Court upheld the admission of such
evidence each time, finally declaring in 1918 that the matter was settled for good."'' And
Slate V. Ik'darJ, 65 Vt. 278 (1892); "Biennial Report of the Superintendent of the State I*rison for
1893-1894" in Vermont State Officers' Reports for IH93-IS94 (Rutland, 1894), 28.
*^
"Hearsay" is an out of court statement intended to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Davis v.
Fuller, 12 Vt. 178 (1840); Henry A. Harmon, The Vermont Juslice and Public Officer (Rutland, 1906),
350. Vermont law permitted witnesses to testily that the woman or girl had reported an
assault to them
and to allirm that she had named an assailant. It did not permit the witness to name the man but
the
alleged victim could do that. Slale v. Carroll, 67 Vt. 477 (1895); Slate v. Niles, 47 Vt. 82 (1874).
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lastly, despite MunsoiVs belief that corroboration was required, defendants were
convicted solely on the uncorroborated testimony of women and girls/^
Conviction Rates in the County Courts
Assessing the impact of character evidence, corroboration requirements, and
woman-centered perceptions of sexual assault on ctTorts to enlorce rape laws is dillicult.
We caji never know how many rapes actually took place as compared to those
prosecuted. Thus we cannot know how many women refused to bring such charges
because they feared being cross-examined about past actions. Nor can we know whether
a woman's past history may have inlluenced grand juries or prosecutors not to go
forward with a prosecution because of the prosecutrix's past history. Many rape and
attempted rape cases did not go to a verdict, but tiie records do not allow us to qu;uitify
this data beyond knowing how many cases were ultimately not pursued. And even then,
we can only do so Ibr certain periods in the various counties.
Between 1794 and 1920 I identified 1 1 1 prosecutions Ibr rape and assault with
intent to commit rape (hereinaller "attempted rape") of women above the age of consent
which went to trial or plea. In addition, another thirty-three cases went to verdict for
assaults ol'a sexual nature (including lewdness). 1 he number of cases actually going to
verdict was probably slightly higher than this since the figure rellects data from Addison
County beginning in 1827 and from Rutland (\)unly beginning in 1838.
Sec for example. State v Stimpsofu "IJricflbr Slate," 3 and ^XYTlificalioii of Appeal," 2; Vermont
Reports liriefs, 78(1), no. 19 ( l<)().S) where the defense argued that there was no corrolx)rating testimony.
I he Supreme t\nirt never addressed tliis point in its opinion upholding the conviction. State v.
Stimpson^ 78 Vt. 124 (1905).
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When a prosecutor did decide to go forward with charges, defendants faced the
likelihood of conviction either by jury verdict or plea."* In the fifty-two rape cases which
went to trial or verdict, thirty-four (65 percent) resulted in a guilty verdict by jury
(twenty-five) or by plea (nine). Out of these thirty-four convictions, six were convictions
for lesser offenses (four for attempted rape and two for simple assault). In fourteen
cases (27 percent) the jury acquitted the defendant. In three cases the jury was hung and
in one case the prosecution dismissed the case while at trial. In addition to the fifty-two
cases going to trial or verdict, another four prosecutions ended in defaults with
defendants forfeiting their bonds (see Table 5).
A prison sentence was imposed in twenty-five rape cases. The average sentence
for those convicted of rape was 8.6 years."^ Those convicted of the lesser offense of
attempt received an average sentence of 7.6 years. Fines in lieu of prison were extremely
rare where the defendant had been convicted of rape. Only one instance of this was
recorded.^*'
One way to put these figures in context is to compare them to another serious,
non-sexual crime like homicide. During the same period, eighty-four prosecutions for
homicide went to trial or plea. Fifty-six cases (67 percent) resulted in guilty verdicts
(fifty-two for murder or manslaughter and four for assauh). Twenty-seven cases (32
percent) resuhed in acquittals (including five by reason of insanity). One case resuhed in
1 assume for purposes of this study that a plea bargain was an alternative to trial.
In cases where judges imposed a sentence falling between a range of years, 1 used the lower figure.
Thus, in a case in which the judge imposed a sentence of from eight to ten years, I used the eight-year
figure.
In 1 882, George Bowker pled guilty to the rape of Susan Smith. Payment of a $225 fine within
twenty-four hours was imposed as an alternative to a sentence in the state prison. State v.
Bowker,
Windsor County Court, May 1 882 Term, State Cases, vol. 3, p. 181.
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Table 5
Outcomes of Cases Going to 1 rial or Verdict'
Cause Total Guilty Guilty (Jury) Guilty (Plea) Not Guilty Avr. Sent Avr. Fine
Rape 52^ 34 (65%)' 25 (48%) 9(17%) 14 (27%) 8.6 years" n.a.
Homicide 56 (67%)' 42 (50%) 14 (17%) 27 (32%) n.a. n.a.
Alt. Rape 51 (86%)* 34 (58%) 16(28%) 7(12%) 4.6 years'' $37/88
Att. Murder 138" 123 (89%)'^ 60 (43%) 63 (46%) 14(10%) 5.4 years'' $73/81
Sex. Assault 33" 31 (94%) 8 (24%) 23 (70%) 2 ( 6 %) 2.0 years"" $75
' Data covers Orange County (1794-1920); Windsor County (1790-1920); Addison County (1827-1920);
Rutland County (1839-1920).
^ This figure includes 3 cases ending in hung juries and 1 case nolle pressed during trial.
^ Includes 4 verdicts for attempted rape and I lor simple assault.
^ N=25. Average sentence for a rape conviction (8.6 years) and for attempt (7.6 years).
^ One case ended in a hung jury.
* Includes convictions for first and second degree murder, manslaughter, and assault.
^ One case was nolle prossed during trial.
* Includes 15 verdicts for assault.
^ N=30. Average sentence tor an attempted rape conviction (4.6 years) and for assault (3.25).
The first figure is average tine in attempted rape verdicts (n=9); tlie second is for assault verdicts
(n=9).
One case resulted in a hung jury.
Includes 59 verdicts for attempted murder and 64 for assault.
" N=83. The average sentence for an attempted murder conviction (5.4 years) and for assault (1 .6
years).
The first figure is average fine for attempted murder verdict (n=15); the second is for assault (n-27).
Includes 29 cases for lewdness and four for assault.
>*N=18.
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a hung jury and three more defendants were not prosecuted at all because they were
found to be insane. The data shows that conviction rates for rape and homicide were
within two percentage points of one another (67 v. 65 percent). The acquittal rate for
homicide was 5 percent higher however, perhaps because, unlike in rape cases, homicide
defendants feced a possible death penalty (see Table 5, above).
Fifty-nine cases for attempted rape went to trial or plea. Fifty-one cases (86
percent) resulted in convictions. Thirty-four men were convicted by juries (58 percent)
and sixteen more pled guilty (28 percent). Out of the fifty-one cases resulting in
convictions, sixteen were for the lesser ofifense of assault. Seven cases resulted in
acquittals (12 percent). In addition, there were another nine cases in which defendants
forfeited bonds and defaulted and one in which the prosecutor dismissed the case during
trial. Thirty defendants convicted of attempted rape and assault received confinement as
punishment. The average sentence for those convicted of attempt was 4.6 years and
3.25 years for those convicted of assault. One of the convicts was sentenced to the state
hospital and four received probation. Fines in lieu ofprison were more common for
those convicted of attempted rape than for rape convictions. The average fine in the nine
cases when this occurred was $37. Interestingly, the average fine in nine cases in which
attempted rape defendants were found guilty of the lesser offense of assault was far
higher-$88 (see Table 5, above).
Again, we can try to get some perspective on these figures by comparing them
with another violent, but non-sexual crime, attempted murder. One hundred thirty-eight
cases for attempted murder went to verdict. One hundred and twenty-three (89 percent)
resulted in convictions (sixty-three by plea bargain, sbrty by jury verdict). Sixty-four
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verdicts were for the lesser offense of assault. Fourteen cases (10 percent) resulted in
acquittals (four of which were by reason of insanity). The jury was hung in one case and
one defendant was not prosecuted because he was found to be insane. As with rape and
murder, we see very close similarities in conviction patterns when we compare attempted
rape and attempted murder prosecutions. Attempted murder conviction rates were
slightly higher than those for attempted rape (89 percent versus 86 percent respectively)
and acquittal rates for attempted murder were slightly lower (10 percent versus 12
percent respectively) (see Table 5, p. 253).
One last category of sexual assaults were those in which rape was not an element
of the charge. I uncovered thirty-three cases of assaults that were explicitly sexual and
lewdness prosecutions which went to trial during this period. Punishable by two years in
jail and a $300 fine (increased to five years in jail in 1888), lewdness ran the gamut Irom
public exposure to sexually assaultive behavior including fondling and lifting clothing."
Of the thirty-three cases which went to verdict, thirty-one (94 percent) resulted in
convictions. Eight convictions were by juries (24 percent) and twenty-three convictions
were by plea (70 percent). Only two cases (6 percent) resulted in acquittals. Another
five cases resuUed in defaults. In eighteen of the thirty-one cases resulting in a
conviction the defendants were confined. The average prison sentence was two years.
Two other convicts were confined to the industrial school. Eight other convicts paid
fines averaging seventy-five dollars (see Table 5, p. 253).
" Lewdness, prohibited in 1779, dropped out of the legal code in 1797, but then reappeared in the
statute law in 1839. Soule, 12: 39-41; Revised Statutes of Vermont. (Burlington, 1840), Chapter
99 § 8; 1888 Vt. Acts 138.
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Another way to place the figures for rape and attempted rape in context is to
compare the results when defendants were found guilty (or pled guilty) to the lesser offense
of simple assault. Courts treated convictions for assault arising out of a charge ofrape or
attempted rape much differently than they treated an assault which was not related to sexual
assault. For one thing, in no case was a man tried for rape found guilty ofthe lesser offense
of assault. In only two cases was a man accused of rape permitted to plea to assault.
Defendants convicted of the lesser offense of assault in a rape or attempted rape
proceeding either by plea or verdict received disproportionately harsher sentences than
defendants foimd guilty of assault where the charge was not a lesser offense in a sexual
assault case. The vast majority ofthe 570 assault cases which went to a guilty verdict
(73 percent) were resolved by payment ofa small fine averaging twenty-six dollars.
Only 1 16 (20 percent) of assault cases resulted in a jail term of any kind. The average
sentence was a little under ten months. Interestingly, while men who assaulted women
were just as likely to be found guilty as men who assaulted other men, men who attacked
women were more likely to be jailed for the assault" (see Table 6).
In contrast to assault cases, assault convictions arising out ofrape or attempted
rape prosecutions had more serious consequences. Five out ofthese eighteen
convictions resulted in jail or prison sentence (28 percent as opposed to 20 percent for
simple assault cases) and those sentences averaged far longer (3.45 years versus 9.75
months). The average fine in assault convictions arising out of rape and attempted rape
prosecutions was also far higher than the average for assault prosecutions (ninety-six
dollars versus twenty-six for assault). Thus, judges punished men implicated in sexual
« Out of the 149 men convicted of assaulting female victims, 27 percent were confined. Out of the 431
men convicted of assaulting other men, 1 8 percent were confined.
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Table 6
Penalties for Assault Convictions Compared to Assault Convictions Arising out of Rape
and Attempted Rape Cases
Cause Total Confinement Avr. Sent, Avr. Fine
Assault 570 116(20%) .8 years $26
Rape/Att. 18 5 (28%) 3.4 years $96
assaults more harshly even if the evidence could only sustain a conviction for the lesser
offense of assault.
Not all cases in which a rape or attempted rape was alleged ended up in court.
Prosecutors had the discretion to decide whether or not to prosecute a given criminal
case by having the court enter a "nolle prosequr in the docket book. Gathering this
information allows us to determine the percentage of sexual assault cases that were
brought but never prosecuted. Clerks in the different counties began keeping track of
nolle prosequis by specific criminal cause of action at different times. They rarely
differentiated between statutory rape and ordinary rape in these entries so non-
prosecution rates combine these two criminal causes of action. The rates ranged
between 14 and 25 percent depending on the county. The total non-prosecution rate for
the four counties combined was 22 percent^^ (see Table 7).
" Windsor (1851-1920) (27 percent for rape, attempted rape, statutory rape, and attempted statutory
rape combined); Orange County (1880-1920) (16 percent); Addison County (1883-1920) (18 percent);
Rutland County (1893-1920) (25 percent).
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Table 7
Comparative Non-Prosecution Rates in the Four Counties'
Cause Total To Verdict Nolle Prossed Other^
Sexual Assault^ 209 146 (70%) 47 (22%) 16(8%)
Homicide 69 58 (84%) 8 (12%) 3 (4%)
Att. Murder 111 91 (82%) 11 (10%) 9 (8%)
Simple Assault 470 341 (73%) 103 (22%) 26 (6%)
Although the conviction and acquittal rates for rape and homicide compared very
favorably, the non-prosecution rates show important differences. Prosecutors chose not
to prosecute more often in sexual assault cases than they did in murder and attempted
murder cases. Prosecutors failed to pursue cases in only 12 percent of homicide cases
and 9 percent of attempted murder cases. The combined non-prosecution rate for these
two crimes was 10.5 percent, or half the rate for the sexual assault cases (22 percent).
On the other hand, the non-prosecution rate in simple assault cases was almost
identical to that of sexual assaults. The non-prosecution rate for assaults ranged from a
low of 12.5 percent in Addison County to a high of26 percent in Rutland. The overall
rate for aU four counties was 22 percent or equal to the overall non-prosecution rate for
sexual assaults (see Table 7, above).
' Windsor County (1851-1920); Orange County (1880-1920); Addison County (1883-1920); Rutland
County (1893-1920).
^ Includes cases not carried forward by the court and defaults.
^ Includes rape, attempted rape, statutory rape, and attempted statutory rape.
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Comparison with Other Jurisdictions
Another way to place the Vermont data in context is by comparing it with the
findings of other scholars working in other jurisdictions. The most analogous study is a
1993 doctoral dissertation by Kathleen Parker. Parker examined the outcome of every
rape, attempted rape, statutory rape, and indecent liberties case (the analog to attempted
statutory rape in this study) brought in Ingham County, Michigan between 1 850 and
1 950. The county represents a demographically more diverse and dynamic jurisdiction
than that ofVermont. The population of the county grew rapidly during this period,
fi-om 25,000 in 1870 to over 50,000 by 1910 and 130,000 by 1940. Encompassing the
state capital at Lansing, it represented a diverse economy centered around three
economic engines: the state government, automobile manufacturing, and a large
imiversity. By the 1920s, the expansion of the automobile industry began attracting poor
whites and blacks fi-om the South.
Parker found far fewer forcible rape cases in Ingham County. She documents
only forty cases during a hundred-year period (Vermont shows a minimum of one
himdred rape prosecutions and the number was presumably higher given the incomplete
data in some coimties). Between 1850 and 1897, she documents only fourteen rape
cases of which only one resulted in a conviction. Almost all of these were intra-family
rapes. From 1 872 onward, Michigan law required victims to prove utmost resistence.
Of the twenty-six cases brought between 1897 and 1950, nine were brought in the
1940s. It is obvious that there were significant dififerences between Vermont rape law
and its application and the experience of Ingham County, Michigan.
^ Kathleen Ruth Parker, "Law, Culture, and Sexual Censure: Sex Crime Prosecutions in a Midwest
County Circuit Court, 1850-1950" (Ph.D. diss.. University of Michigan, 1993), 7, 26, 58.
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Comparing Parker's data with mine is diflScult because of differences in
methodology and analysis. Parker lists the outcome of large percentages of cases as
"unknown" and calculates conviction rates as a percentage of the total number of
prosecutions initiated rather than as a percentage of cases which went to trial or would
have gone to trial had they not resulted in a plea bargain. When she calculates this way,
her conviction rates for rape are quite low (37.5 percent convicted, 12.5 percent
acquitted, 32.5 percent nolle prossed, 17.5 percent unknown). Since we do not know
the outcome in 17.5 percent of her cases it is hard to have a good understanding of the
actual conviction rates based on this method. Based on the lower overall numbers for
rape and what she understands as low conviction rates she argues that "there was a
remarkable disinclination to prosecute cases of forcible rape." And this may very well be
true given the low numbers overall. However, she also claims that the figures "reveal a
greater reluctance ofjuries to find a man accused of raping an adult woman guilty" than
to find a man guilty ofraping a child. But when we calculate conviction rates for men
who actually went to verdict in Ingham County, we find that seventy-five percent were
convicted and twenty-five percent were acquitted. The high conviction rates and low
acquittal rates show instead that prosecutors were carefiil to bring cases they knew they
could win. Even so, the overall low numbers and the utmost resistence requirement
surely meant that women were less likely to report rapes and prosecutors less likely to
pursue them than in Vermont.^^
Parker's data for attempted rape is also subject to the same caveats. Of seventy-
four cases for attempted rape (versus a minimum of eighty-five in the four counties), she
" Parker, 77-1 12, 472, Table 5.
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shows 64.8 percent convicted, 4.1 percent acquitted, and 13.5 percent unknown.
Recalculated to show conviction rates for cases going to verdict the percentages change
to 94 percent convicted and 6 percent acquitted. Once again, her low acquittal figures
show prosecutors very carefully choosing cases they could win when going to trial.
When Parker's figures are adjusted to show conviction rates for cases going to
verdict, her conviction rates are higher than Vermont's (8 percent higher than Vermont
for rape and 10 percent higher for attempted rape). Both states showed high rates of
conviction for cases going to trial or verdict and in both states sentences for convicts
were fairly severe. Though the conviction rate for Vermonters going to trial was ten
points lower, those who were convicted faced longer sentences than those in Ingham
County. As I noted above, twenty-seven of the thirty-four men convicted in rape
prosecutions received prison sentences and only one convict received a fine in lieu of
prison (the remaining defendants were convicted of lesser offenses and fined or
convicted of rape and then fi-eed after appeals). The average imprisonment for those
charged with rape and convicted of rape or a lesser offense was about eight years. Of
the thirteen men convicted ofrape in Parker's work who received determinate sentences,
the average was five years. Two other men were sentenced to life in prison. Of the
twenty-eight men who were sentenced to determinant sentences for attempted rape,
Parker shows an average prison sentence of 3.2 years as opposed to 4.6 years in
Vermont. These lower average sentences occurred despite the fact that Michigan law
provided longer maximum sentences (up to life in prison) for both oflfenses.^^
5* As with the calculations for average sentences in Vermont, 1 used the lower
figure where a sentence
a range ofyears was imposed.
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Parker found overall rates of non-prosecution for rape, attempted rape, statutory
rape, and indecent liberties with a child (the analog to attempted statutory rape in my
study) of 1 8 percent. This compares to an overall non-prosecution rate of 22 percent for
these causes combined in the Vermont courts. In both Michigan and Vermont, the
numbers and conviction rates for sex cases involving underage girls were higher than
those cases involving adult women. In contrasting what Parker considers to be low
figures for prosecutions involving adult women with those involving girls, she argues
that the Ingham County Court was far more solicitous towards young victims than it was
toward adult women.
Three other works include systematic surveys of trial court records of sexual
assault in Canada during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. One from the
Canadian West and two from Ontario. In a survey of 125 rape and rape-related cases in
the Canadian West between 1 890 and 1 920, historian Terry Chapman found that not one
man was sentenced to prison for his crimes."
Two in-depth studies from Ontario provide a less startling record of non-
prosecution, but still represent significant differences between this jurisdiction and
Vermont. The law of rape itselfwas quite different. For one thing, only the death
penalty was available as punishment in Ontario until 1 873 when imprisonment for seven
years to life was permitted. The possibility of a death sentence may well have
contributed to prosecutors' hesitation to charge, and jurors' hesitation to convict. In
addition, the Ontario Legislature was far more involved in crafting rape law than
Vermont's General Assembly. Whereas the law in Vermont underwent little change
" Terry L. Chapman, "Sex Crimes in the West, 1890-1920," Alberta History 35 (Fall 1987): 6-18.
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during the nineteenth century, Canadians tinkered with their law radically and often. In
response, the judiciary repeatedly limited efforts to expand the reach of sexual assauU
law in Ontario. It required the Crown to prove utmost resistance (including out-cry) on
the part of the alleged victim in order to sustain its case and refused to permit a rape
prosecution where the intercourse had been accomplished on an unconscious or mentally
impaired victim.
Canadian historian Constance Backhouse reviewed prosecutions in the Ontario
courts from 1 840 to 1 892. She shows that out of 1 87 rape cases which went to verdict,
forty-nine (21 .5 percent) resuUed in a rape conviction, and thirty-three more (14.5
percent) resuUed in a conviction for a lesser offense for a total conviction rate of 36
percent. She lists 105 cases as resulting in a fmding of not guilty (46 percent). In forty-
one cases (18 percent) she could not find a record of the final disposition of the case.
Unlbrtimately, Backhouse does not explain her methodology so it is difficult to know
how she deah with cases brought but not prosecuted. She may have included them in
her "not guilty" figures or they may have comprised the eighteen percent of cases she
lists as outcome unknown. Backhouse characterizes the conviction rates for rape as
"abysmally low," and writes that 'Vomen who were raped could expect little sympathy
from criminal courts. Skeptical lawyers, judges, and jurors pored over every detail of
their background and actions, striving to ensure that only the most 'deserving' women
were granted protection. "^'^ She found typical prison sentences offrom seven to ten
years for men convicted of rape after 1873 and sentences for lesser offenses of from
Backhouse, Petticoats and Prejudice, 111,331.
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several months to several years between 1 840 and 1 890 but does not further specify this
information.
Backhouse argues (based on reported appeUate cases only) that the courts would
not extend protection to women of doubtful reputation or independent women. She
cites several egregious cases in which assaults on women resulted in acquittals because
of the victims' dubious station in life, despite obvious evidence ofthe guilt of their
attackers. She also reports that in the few cases in which independent woman made
complaint, their assailants were acquitted. All of this may explain the low number of
rape cases and low conviction rates she documents when compared to the Vermont
experience.^^
Canadian historian Karen Dubinsky surveyed the records of over twenty counties
in Ontario between 1880 and 1929. She found some 348 prosecutions for rape,
attempted rape, statutory rape and indecent assauh. The overaU conviction rate for these
crimes combined was 49 percent. The dispositions of 9 percent of the cases was
unknown. As with Backhouse's work, Dubinsky does not explain how she generated
her figures and does not differentiate between statutory and non-statutory cases. Nor do
we know whether she considered nolle pressed cases or even if she simply included them
in her "not guilty" figures, so it is hard to compare her figures with mine. Nonetheless, it
Constance B. Backhouse, "Nineteenth-Century Canadian Rape Law, 1800-1892," in Essays in the
History ofCanadian Law, vol. 2, ed. David H. Flaherty (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983),
201-247. To put her figures in perspective. Backhouse writes that between 1840 and 1892
approximately 330 cases for rape, statutory rape, assault with intent to commit rape, and indecent
assault "went to trial." Backhouse, "Rape Law," 212. In 1891 the population of Ontario was 2.1
million. During the same period, almost 100 such cases went to trial or verdict in the four counties
which had a combined population in 1890 of 121,481 people.
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is worth noting that in the four counties between 1 880 and 1920, 247 cases for rape,
statutory rape, and lewdness were brought in four small counties ofVermont.^
Again, it would seem that Vermonters brought far more cases of this type than
did people in Canada and Michigan. Two conclusions are possible. First, Vermont had
much higher rates of sexual assault than these other places. This seems very unlikely
given the state's historically low rates of violent crime. The second possible explanation
is that prosecutors, victims, or both were much more likely to bring charges against men
who sexually assaulted women. This could reflect a legal culture unwilling to tolerate
sexual violence against women in particular or violence of any kind in general. The
development ofVermont's rape law indicates that this was in fact true.
This review of rape law provides us insight into the legal elements of proof as
they developed and changed at the hands ofVermont's appellate judges. The figures
fi-om the trial courts allow us to get a sense of the overall conviction rates for rape
prosecutions compared to other major offenses in the state and in comparison to other
jurisdictions as well. But what did a rape trial actually look like? How did abstract
principles of the law play out at the local courthouse? What do these cases look like
once a human face was put on the actors in these dramas?
Rape Trials in Action
Transcript evidence fi-om both adult and statutory rape cases indicates that
despite the appellate decisions' focus on women (for better or worse), juries and judges
focused on the men—seeming to ignore the character, circumstances, and veracity of the
^ Karen Dubinsky, Improper Advances: Rape and Heterosexual Conflict in Ontario, 1880- 1929
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), Appendix, Table 3.
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aUeged victims—as weU as the plausible defenses of the accused. Take the case of Slate
V. Danforth, an 1894 prosecution for rape and attempted rape brought in Windsor
County. Mary Josephs was a forty year-old Syrian immigrant who spoke almost no
English. Married with three children, she lived with her family in Burlington. She had
taken the train down to South Royalton where she had been peddling door-to-door,
carrying her goods with her in a vaUse as she walked the back roads of the rural town. A
judge would later note her "forelom and friendless condition." Danforth was a thirty-
eight year-old shoemaker who lived in the village of Royalton Center. When work was
slow he did odd jobs for local women. On Saturday afternoon, Danforth was returning
from a visit to his elderly mother at his brother's house in Tunbridge. Seeing Mary
walking along the road, he offered to drive her the rest of the way to the depot at South
Royalton.
Mary told the jury that Danforth then turned off the main road. After traveling
about a quarter of a mile, Danforth stopped the wagon and asked her to marry him.
Alarmed by this and the fact that he had turned off the main road, she jumped from the
vehicle. Danforth pinned her to the ground, put his hands around her neck and tried to
rape her. She struggled against him and he took out a knife telling her he would kill her
if she continued to resist, actually pricking her chest with it. At that moment, two more
wagons came by. Danforth got up and Mary ran to the second one driven by a local
woman, begging for a ride. The woman, Susan Litchfield, refiased, and drove away.
Mary then walked the rest of the way to South Royalton where she told two men what
had happened to her. Danforth was arrested that evening.
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Mary s (csJmioiiy was given Ihroiij-h an Arab translator who hiniscll" spoke
impcrlcct Iwiglish. On (wo occasions, she expressed her eniharrassnK-nt at teslilying U)
the events in open court. When asked alioul the actual rape slie said she was ashamed of
it and that they did not otlcn have these kinds ofcases in Syria. Slie then asked il she
could explain what happeneil "in secret" but the court relused. On cross-examination,
Danlorth's lawyer was carclul to draw out the liict that Mary was a Syrian ininugrant,
newly-arrived in the United Slates and Vermont.
A local doctor who had examined Mary teslilied that she had bruises and cuts on
her face, throat, and breast, lie also noted the hcsh tears in her umlcrwcar and blouse
and the fact that Mary had Ixth menstruating at the time ol the assault, ex|)laiiung the
presence ol" blood in her underwear. Other witnesses teslilied that they saw the twt>
together or heard Mary lx:g Lilchlield lor a ride.
Danforth, lestilying on his own Ix'hall, told a ilillerenl story. 1 le claimed that he
took the detour in order to get some hay for his horse, explaining that the detour roail
led back down to South Royalton. lie stojiped the wagon to light his pipe. Mary,
("righlened, then leapt liom the wagon, caught her clothing on it, aiul Tell to the ground.
1 le rushed over to help her up and at that moment the two witnesses came by. lie
denied trying to rajic her.
On cross examination, the pioseculor asked detaileil i|uestions aK>ut where
Danlorth had lived prior to coming io Royalton lour years Ix-lbrc His purpose was to
get huu to ailmit that he had Ivcn incarcerateil at the state prist>n at Windsor lor lour
years. The court allowed the prosecutor to ask whether he had Ivcn conlined. Danloilh
admitted that he had Ixen I hc |)io.scculor then ipuckly added "wcie yv)U iu)l in Windsor
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for four years for an assault with intent to commit rape?" The defense objected and the
state withdrew the question, but the damage had been done.
The last key witness was Susan Litchfield, who had refused to give Mary
assistance. She explained that she did not know what was happening, could not
understand Mary, and was fiightened. Her testimony was crucial however, because she
was the only one who claimed to be able to see that Danforth's trousers were
unbuttoned indicating to her that he was up to "some foul purpose." This was new
testimony, for as the defense pointed out, at the preliminary hearing, Litchfield had
simply testified that she saw Danforth bending over Mary, attempting to help her up.
The judge's charge to the jury included the usual rambling recapitulation of the
evidence that greatly annoyed trial lawyers.^' He mentioned that the defense argued that
no proofof penetration had actually been introduced and that he did not remember any
evidence of it either. But he explained that he had not heard everything the translator
had said and that in the end it was up to the jury to decide whether the elements of rape
had been proven or not. He told the jury that they should consider whether Mary
Josephs had any interest in fabricating the story and should weigh that against the idea
that she would make up such a story, given the "minuteness of detail" of her testimony.
He also urged them to consider the other evidence concerning the condition of her
clothing and the injuries observed by the doctor.
At their 1897 meeting the members of the Vermont Bar Association passed the following resolution:
"Resolved, That the members of the Vermont Bar Association recommend to the legislature the passage
of a law requiring courts in their charges to the jury, not to argue the fects to the jury, and so far as
possible refrain from giving an opinion that may influence the jury in deciding the facts." Proceedings
ofthe Vermont Bar Association 4, no. 3 ( 1 897), 391.
268
He noted that Danforth had admitted being confined for an earlier crime and that
the\ should take the conviction into account in weighing the credibility of his testimony.
But he warned them not to use the information for any other purpose. In other words,
Danforth' s past bad acts went to his credibility rather than his desenedness for
con\iction—just as a prosecutrix's past bad acts went to the credibility of her iailure to
consent ratlier tiian to her desen edness to be raped. The jur>- was out for only tliirty-
five minutes before returning a guilty v erdict for attempted rape.
Prior to sentencing. Danforth* s lawyer spoke for liim. Danforth had done work
for several people in the village, including the lawyer's owti mother and father. He had a
problem with alcohol and an aged mother and the lawyer wanted to know what eftect a
length) sentence would have on him and on those who depended on liim. According to
liis lawyer, tliere was still a chance for Danforth to become a respectable citizen and he
sought leniency. The state reiterated Danforth* s previous conviction tor attempted ra|:>e
and added that he was a bigamist for good measure. Prior to his first conviction he had
married. Wlien he was released he married another woman, whom he soon let^. The
state's attomev- explained that he saw it has liis duty to rnake tliis infonnation knowii
"that the court ma> understand tlie character of tliis man.** The Judge, noting Danforth's
past life, and that there was no indication that he had been under the influence of alcohol
at the time of the assault, sentenced liim to eight years.^"
.\nother case of stranger rape was tried at the same term of the Windsor County
Court. This rape took place in Chester. Cora Weightman. aged sLxneen. w^s alone in the
tamilv lamiliouse when Charles Como. thirty-one. rode up in his sulky. Cora's father
w
^ State V. Danforth. Windsor Count> Coiin. December 1894 Term. Transcript of Trial, p. 103-107.
269
and brother were out mowing and her mother and sister were picking berries. Como
asked if she had any grain to sell. After finding none in the bam, he followed her into
the house. Como, who was fi-om the northern Vermont town of Franklin, told her that
there might be a war and that he was surveying the area to gather the names of men who
might be drafted. He asked her her father's name and then had her sign her name in his
notebook. Como then grabbed her, dragged her into the parlor, laid her down on the
floor and raped her. Afterward, Como told Cora that a gang of men would be around
in a few days and if she told anybody about what happened, they would rape her too
and she would be sent to prison for four years. As soon as Como left, Cora ran to her
mother and told her what had happened. Cora's mother testified that her daughter's
clothes were stained with blood and semen. She showed them to a neighbor woman
and then washed them. Cora was in great physical distress after the rape, but absolutely
refused to be vaginally examined by local doctors on two separate occasions. Como
admitted stopping by the house and asking about grain, but denied raping the girl.
However, he had thrown the book away that Cora had signed, and it had been recovered
with her signature inside.
Como is important for several reasons. First, the defense attorney's cross-
examination concerning Cora's sex life shows both the casual way in which questions
about a victim's sex life were inquired about and, despite the Supreme Court's rules
about the use of such evidence, the way in which defense attorneys could inquire about
such matters so long as neither judge or prosecutor intervened.
Q: You say he forced you?
A: Yes, sir.
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Q: What do you mean by that?
A: He had intercourse with me.
Q: What do you mean by "intercourse?" (Witness hesitates).
A: I can't explain it in any different way than I have as I know.
Q: Did you ever have intercourse with any man before that?
A: No, sir.
Q: And I suppose you never have smce?
A: No, sir."
Como's lawyer was fishing and since this was not a consent case, his questions about
past sexual activity were not relevant and should have drawn an objection jfrom the
state. But Cora's answers bolstered her credibility in any case. So no harm to the
state's case was done.
More important, the cross-examination shows how the questions of utmost
resistance and out-cry, so vital in other jurisdictions, were far less significant (or not
significant at all) to Vermont's rape jurisprudence.
Q: What did you do by way of resisting his attempt?
A: I did not do anything.
Q: Made no effort to prevent him at all?
A: No, sir I did not say anything, he told me if I said anything he would
choke me, and I didn't have much chance to help myself: he was right
down on me.
Q: Did you make any outcry when he had intercourse with you, at all?
A: No, sir.^
State V. Como, Windsor County Court, December 1894 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 17.
^ Como Transcript, p. 16-17.
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On this issue of resistance, Judge Jonathan Ross explained in his instructions to the jury
that some people confronted with an emergency will collect themselves and put up
fierce resistance while others will "seem to be in a perfectly dazed condition, and have
no power hardly to make resistance." Judge Ross told the jurors that tliat was the
condition Cora testified she was in, and it would have to be up to them to decide
whether it made sense or not. The jury convicted and Ross sentenced Como to twelve
years in prison. After a few months of confinement, Como was found to be insane and
was transferred to the State Asylum at Waterbury."
State V. Buckman was another Windsor County case brought in 1901 against
George N. Buckman for the attempted rape of Kate G. Bowen. She was tlic mother of
three teenaged boys. She had divorced her husband Charles in 1896, but tliis issue was
not brought up at trial.*'^ Bowen lived with her eighty-three year-old fatlier Jolm R. Gill
on his farm. Buckman, aged forty-three, did work for Gill. His wife and children lived
half a mile away. Sometimes he stayed over at Gill's and sometimes he slept at his
house which was also owned by Gill. Bowen testified that in the weeks leading up to
the assault she found Buckman hiding under her bed, in her closet, and peering through
her second floor window from a tree. One morning when they were alone in the house
together, Buckman attacked Bowen in her bedroom. She vigorously resisted and was
dragged through three rooms before a friend of hers, Maud Walsh, aged seventeen,
unexpectedly showed up outside with a team. Buckman told her it was just his "God
" Como, 65-66, 70; Records of the State Prison, vol. 2, p. 94.
** The divorce was granted on grounds of intolerable severity. Because Bowen's marital status was never
brought up at trial, unless it was mentioned in the closing arguments, jurors had no way of knowing
whether she was single, divorced, or widowed. Bowen v. Bowen, Windsor County Court, December
1896 Term, Docket No. 829.
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damned luck and wished that bitch would stay at home." He released her. She then
spent ten or fifteen minutes brushing her hair and completing her outfit before leaving the
house. She did not go to the authorities. The family sat down to breakfast with
Buckman the next day. He then got into a fight with eighty-three year-old Gill over
money owed to him, hit the old man, and left the house for good. Bowen then made her
allegation against him. The absence ofher husband was never explained.
Bowen claimed that she had been "confined" for four months after the assault.
The defense introduced testimony that Bowen had a long history ofmedical problems
including nervous prostration. Buckman testified that he never hid in her room, peered
through her window, or assaulted her in any way. He admitted that he had gotten into a
fight with Gill over wages owed to him. Gill had refiised to pay him on orders of
Buckman' s wife and Buckman was fiirious "the idea that man 43 years old wasn't
capable of handling his own money,-all his hard earnings." So, he slapped Gill and left.
His lav^ryer asked the court to charge the jury that, among other things, the state had not
put on Maud Walsh or Bowen' s other son to testify and that those facts should be taken
against the state. Furthermore, Buckman' s lawyer argued that no evidence ofan intent
to rape had been shown by the state. The court refiised to so charge. Despite the weak
evidence of assault with intent to rape, a delay in reporting the assault until after Gill and
Buckman had gotten into a fight, the failure to put on corroborating evidence, and
Bowen' s odd and unexplained behavior in the aftermath of the assault, the jury convicted
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Buckman of attempted rape. The Vermont Supreme Court overturned the verdict on
technical grounds, and, at a later trial, Buckman was acquitted.^'
State V. Gauthier was a 1904 prosecution for the rape of a nineteen year-old deaf
girl. Mabel Fairbanks had been working as a chambermaid at the Windsor Tavern
Hotel. One night the hotel owner's father, Nelson Gauthier, entered her locked
with a pass key, threatened her with a gun, and then raped her. She became pregnant
and delivered a child nine months later. Fairbanks testified by notes passed back and
forth between her and the attorneys. She testified that she had strongly resisted but to
no avail. Gauthier, aged fifty-one, told a different story. He testified that Mabel had
exposed herself to him and invited him to have sex with her. When they were done he
gave her three silver quarters. It was solely his word against hers. In his cross-
examination of Fairbanks, Gauthier' s lawyer attempted to impeach her reputation for
chastity:
Q. How often did you go to Mr. Spicer's room about this time?
A. I don't know what that means.
Q. Was there a man by the name of Spicer boarding at the Windsor
Tavern at this time?
A. Yes sir.
Q. What were you in his room for?
A. I did not go to his room.
State V. Buckman, Windsor County Court, June 1901 Term, Transcript of Trial; State v. Buckman, 74
Vt. 309 (1902); State v. Buckman, Windsor County Court, State Cases, vol. 5, June 1901 Term, 315-316
The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant that the woman's testimony about Buckman being in the
tree was based on statements made to her by her son, who had not yet testified, was thus hearsay and
improperly admitted.
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Q. Were you in Charley Sanders room?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever go to Fred Gauthier's room?
A. No.
Q. Do you know Lucien Trombley?
A. No.
Q. Do you mean to testify that you do not know Lucien Trombley?
A. No.
Q. Were you out evenings with him?
A. No.
Q. Do you mean to testify that you don't know "Skinny" Eaton?
A. No.
Q. Do you know him?
A. No.
Q. Did you know Wentworth when he boarded at the Windsor Tavern?
A. No.'«
This fishing expedition was typical. Defense attorneys would throw questions like this to
the witness—usually without objection fi-om courts and prosecutors. When Gauthier's
attorney cross-examined Mabel's father, who was also living in the hotel at the time of
the rape, he casually asked him if there had been a woman in his room when the
defendant had allegedly apologized to him for the assault. The witness denied it. The
defense also pointed out the fact that Mabel's parents were separated, but this was a
68
State V. Gauthier, Windsor County Court, June 1904 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 22-23.
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double-edged sword because Nelson's son was separated from his wife too—a point the
prosecutor took pains to make clear to the jury. He also asked the son about his
conviction for selling liquor. This last inquiry drew an objection and the court held that
evidence of a conviction had to be proved by the record. The state did not bother to
follow up. The defense called several male witnesses who testified that Mabel's
reputation for chastity was not good, but offered no specifics. Then, on rebuttal, the
state produced a witness who said Mabel's reputation was good. After a short time, the
jury returned with a guilty verdict.
At sentencing, Gauthier's lawyer argued that Mabel's deafiiess made it difficult
to cross-examine her and that there were indications of consent in the facts, including the
fact that the two were in bed together for several hours, engaged in a second act of
intercourse, that she delayed reporting the assault to her mother for aknost twenty-four
hours, that Gauthier had stayed in the area after the assault, and that the court should
consider his age in passing sentence. Gauthier himself simply said that he was at the
mercy of the court. The judge was unmoved and imposed a ten to twelve year sentence
onhim.^'^
One last case. State v. Bedard {IS90), reveals how complex a rape trial and
appeal could be. The case arose out of an alleged gang rape in Burlington in October
1890. Mary Pratt, seventeen, and her fiance, Albert Gonyeau, were walking home from
Burlington to neighboring Winooski. Pratt and Gonyeau were both French Canadians,
and Mary spoke no English. Deciding to take a shortcut home, they cut through the ball
park on the edge of the city. According to their testimony, Mary had sat down to rest.
^Gauthier, 90-9].
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As Gonyeau began to sit down, three men, Philip Bedard, Charles Blow, and Frank
Wilkins jumped the couple telling Gonyeau "get out ofhere you Winooski son of a
bitch." Gonyeau fought back but was hit in the back of the head with a long board.
Seeing that he could not fight all three, he ran away to get help. He ran more than a half
a mile to the home of another Frenchman and returned with a party ofmen and boys who
were unable to find the defendants or Mary.
While he was gone, Mary was thrown down, and the three men took turns raping
her. After they were done, they fled. Mary picked up her underwear and walked to her
sister's house in Burlington. Bedard and Blow were arrested the next day for assault and
battery on Gonyeau. Mary did not report the sexual assault for several days, but once
she did the men were charged with rape as well. She and Gonyeau were married a few
days later.
Bedard was tried separately fi-om Blow and Wilkins and aU three men were
convicted of rape. All three men claimed an alibi in defense. At Bedard's trial, his
lawyers drew out various pieces of evidence, but did not attempt to knit them together
until closing arguments. There was much about Pratt and Gonyeau' s story that was odd.
The couple had left the lights and easy traveling on Winooski Avenue for the darkened
park. Gonyeau testified that they intended to take a shortcut, but there was no trail at
the other end of the park and the way led down a steep wooded slope. Why had Pratt
chosen the bare ground and darkened park as an appropriate place to sit down and rest?
If Gonyeau fought face to face with the men, why was his wound on the back of his
head? Why had Gonyeau left Pratt to the mercy of the three men and why had he run
past two horse carts and several houses on his way to get help ahnost three quarters of a
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mile away? Why had not Pratt reported the rape immediately instead oftwo days later?
Medical testimony revealed that Pratt had in fact experienced intercourse within the past
few days and that it was probably her first time. But other than a torn hymen and a
bruise on her chest, she exhibited no other signs of physical injury, which was odd given
her description of the violent assault and rape.
Bedard's lawyer had intended to put this evidence together in his closing
argument and propose an alternative explanation of events. He began his summation by
arguing that Mary Pratt and Albert Gonyeau had gone to the park for "an unlawful and
wicked purpose." He got no farther. Judge Laforrest H. Thompson immediately
stopped him. He explained that there had been no evidence presented to indicate that
they went to the park for an unlawful purpose. Bedard's lawyer objected, but to no
avail. Bedard was convicted.
In their briefon appeal, Bedard's lawyers laid out the argument they had intended
to make to the jury. In breathless prose, punctuated by exclamation marks, they set the
scene ofMary Pratt's debauchment at the hands ofher fiance. Gonyeau had led Pratt
into the park in order to have sex with her. They had been discovered "/« coZ/m" by
someone and Gonyeau (alternatively referred to as "her lover") "in the position naturally
assumed for such indulgence" was struck in the back of the head.^° In order to cover her
shame at being so discovered, Pratt concocted the story of the rape.
It was a piece of masterly, though indelicatefencing in her part, to accuse
Blow, Bedard and Wilkins of rape, if she supposed they were the persons
who were at the Park and discovered her own immorality.
™ Bedard's lawyers were careful not to incriminate him along with Blow and Wilkins as the attackers,
but it would seem that they were in fact the ones. An assault conviction was certainly better than one for
rape and perhaps the lawyers thought that a jury would be sympathetic to men ttying to keep fornicating
couples out of Burlington's parks.
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Her fears of publicity which had closed her mouth for two days were now
about to be realized. The parties who witnessed her degradation had
been arrested and were about to be put on trial. She had been called as a
witness against them and must either tell a falsehood or add to her
humiliation by a public confession of lechery in the witness box.
She saw her opportunity
-seized it-and the modest charge of a breach of
the peace by an assault upon her lover was lost in the graver and more
heinous charge of rape upon herself
Bedard's lawyers argued that evidence introduced at trial supported such a story and that
a rape defendant was always entitled to introduce evidence that the victim had had sex
with another man as a defense. The prosecutor, opposing the appeal, asserted that the
evidence did not support the defense's theory "and the attempt to influence the Jury by
groundless insinuations was properly restrained."
Bedard's conviction was upheld by the Supreme Court. On the question of the
admission of the "unlawful and wicked purpose" evidence, the court found that since
Bedard's lawyers had been able to argue that medical testimony revealed the possibility
that Pratt and Gonyeau had engaged in sex prior to the assault, the jury was well able to
evaluate the possibility of this alternative explanation. Bedard got ten years.
Wilkins and Blow were tried separately at the next term ofcourt by a different
judge. The evidence offered was nearly identical. They too were convicted and
appealed at the same term of the Supreme Court that heard Bedard's appeal. Among the
many questions raised, two were successful. Both involved requested charges to the
jury. The defense asked the judge to instruct the jury that Mary's failure to report the
rape immediately was evidence that no rape had been committed. The judge had
refused. Instead, he instructed the jury that in considering the delay in reporting the
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rape, they should determine the elTeet sueh evidence had on the question of eonsent. In
reversing the trial court, the Supreme Court agreed that the defense's proposed
instruction mis-stated the law, but that since the court had undertaken to instruct on the
matter of delay, it had an obligation to do so correctly. Since the defense was based on
an alibi rather than on consent, it was erroneous to instruct the jury about delay's elTect
on the question of consent. Instead, the judge should have told the jury that they should
take the delay into account m determining the credibility of Mary Pratt's story. If she
could not explain the delay, it would weigh against her testimony.
The defense had also asked the judge to instruct the jury that the lack of marks or
bruises on Mary Pratt had a tendency to impeach her and that the rape could not have
happened the way she had described it. 1 he judge refused. Instead he told the jury that
it would have to determine the meaning of the lack of marks on Pratt. Diiferenl persons
reacted dilTercntly to a crisis. In a fire, some might do the most judicious things while
others might act foolishly. So too in a rape, ""the jury must weigh the testimony with
reference to human actions and experience and say whether this girl, being grasped and
held, as she says she was, could have done much, being frightened, overpowered, or for
some other reason, thinking it was entirely useless." The Court reversed. Since the
prosecution's case had indicated that Mary struggled for five or ten minutes with the
men, and resisted them with all her might, the judge's instruction permitted the jury to
assume an explanation that did not comport with the evidence presented at trial. 1 wo
judges dissented from the decision, including .hidge Laforrest, who had presided over the
trial of Bedard and Ixien upheld at the same term. It must have made little sense to
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uphold one conviction and strike down the other two given that they arose out of the
same events. On retrial. Blow and Wilkins were again convicted. Each received five
years.^'
Several aspects of the Pratt rape are worth noting. One must sympathize with
the juror of integrity attempting to do his job in a case like this. Although the defense
was not allowed to argue its theory to the jury in the Bedard case, all the evidence
pointing to another explanation had been laid out for them Despite the various
irregularities in their story, three separate juries believed Pratt and Gonyeau beyond a
reasonable doubt rather than Bedard, Wilkins, and Blow. In both trials, judges resisted
defendants' attempts to skew the evidentiary narrative too far to their advantage or to
adopt rigidly punishing rules of evidence by which a woman's failure to immediately
report a rape disqualified her fi-om bringing the charge at all. Instead, the judges
instructed the jury that each case was different, and they had to take into account each
woman's specific circumstances in determining the evidentiary meaning of her actions
during and after the rape. The extent to which she could be expected to resist depended
on her circumstances and personality. Her delay in reporting the rape, far fi-om
prohibiting her fi-om bringing charges, was simply a fact to be explained and might
merely reflect the shame of an afiSanced woman. In general, the Supreme Court
affirmed this individualized approach, only reversing when the judge's instructions
misstated the law, or misled the jury as to the facts in evidence. And even then, two
The facts of the Pratt rape were gleaned from several sources: State v. Bedard, 65 Vt. 278 (1892);
State V. Wilkins and Blow, 66 Vt. 1 (1892); State v. Bedard, Vermont Reports Briefs, 65 (1), no. 42
(1892); Records of the Windsor State Prison, vol. 4, p. 230-231.
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judges, including one intimately familiar with the facts of the case, dissented, arguing that
the trial judge had done nothing wrong at all.
Conclusion
During the 1850s and 1860s, the Vermont Supreme Court fashioned an
exception to the general rules of evidence permitting defense attorneys to question an
alleged rape victim about her past sexual activities with other men. The exception was
quite limited. First, the evidence was only admissible in cases where the woman testified.
Second, the evidence only went to the issue of consent and thus, could only be
introduced where the defendant offered a consent defense. Vermont's Supreme Court
explicitly refused to extend the use of sexual character evidence beyond this narrow
exception-whether to prostitutes or brothel keepers testifying in murder cases, or
underage girls in statutory rape trials. Finally, the introduction of such evidence was
hardly a guarantee of an acquittal.
So we see in our review of the five rapes described above that the issue of sexual
character came up in Gauthier and in that case its use provided no benefit to the
defendant who was convicted.^^ In Como the questions were perfunctory. Danforth,
another rape case, never raised the issue of consent and thus there was no inquiry into
Mary Josephs's sexual morality. In Bedard, the defendant attempted to introduce
testimony that Mary Pratt had been sexually intimate with her fiance, but that
^ The same was true in State v. Hollenbeck discussed above. In that case the Court reversed
Hollenbeck's conviction because he had not been allowed to cross-examine the victim about her past
sexual history. Retried, and presumably allowed to examine her on these issues, he was again convicted.
State V. Hollenbeck, 67 Vt. 34 (1894); "Report of the Superintendent of the State Prison for
1895-1896,"
in Vermont State Officers ' Reportsfor 1895-1896 (Rutland, 1 896), 3 1 ; Records of the State Prison at
Windsor, vol. 4, p. 292.
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information was not introduced as character evidence. Rather it was an alternative
explanation to reftite the medical testimony and the judge did not allow the defense to
tell its seamy story of premarital debauchment. Instead, he limited the defense to
showing the possibility that Mary had had sex with her fiance. Her assailants were
convicted-in three separate trials. Buckman was an attempted rape case. Since consent
was not an element ofproving an attempted rape the defendant did not seek to introduce
character evidence and almost certainly would not have been permitted to introduce such
evidence even if he had wanted. A series of decisions by the Supreme Court had made
clear that women could not consent to an assault in any case.
Technically, a defendant's past reputation for sexual morality was inadmissible.
But this did not prevent prosecutors fi-om going after a defendant's reputation for
honesty, morality in general, and sexual morality in particular. They sought to introduce
whatever damaging evidence they could get away with. Thus in the Danforth case, the
prosecutor, having been instructed by the judge that he could introduce evidence of
Danforth's former imprisonment, but not the reason for it, immediately blurted out that
Danforth had been convicted for attempted rape anyway. At sentencing, the prosecutor
raised Danforth's bigamy for good measure "that the court may understand the character
of this man."
Coupled with the issue of the use of character evidence was the question of
whose perspective the court would rely on in determining if a rape had occurred or not.
This last aspect is one of the more fascinating aspects ofVermont's judge-made sexual
assault law in the nineteenth century-the extent to which the Supreme Court seems to
have viewed rape fi-om the woman's perspective rather than the man's. Vermont
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allowed a woman lo consent and llien objecl or object and then consent. It was llus
solicitude toward her perceptions ofthe encounter that judges pointed lo in juslilyiiig the
admission ol specilic sexual character evidence. Since a woman held within her hands
the power to convict a man and have him imprisoned lor up to twenty years, the court, in
the absence of other evidence, Iclt it only lair lo permit a delendant to challenge her
credibility on the consent issue. That that inquiry should extend to past sexual Ix^havior
in contravention ofthe normal rules of evidence seemed so obvious to male judges and
lawyers that none of them ever questioned it. In the understanding ofthe time, a woman
who had consented to illicit sex in the past was more likely to do so again than those
who had observed the rules of conventional morality. Vermont was unusual in allowing
specific evidence rather than general reputation evidence lor imnu)rality, but that rule
laced constant challenge throughout the second half of the nineteenth century not only
because it contravened established authority, but because to some, it seemed unfair.
Critics ofthe use of sexual reputation evidence argue that the practical elVect of
such inquiries would lill the protection of rape law from women of unconventional
morality and extend it only to those who had not lx;en tainted by illicit consensual
sex particularly middle-class married women and young girls. Anecdotally we know
that Vermont courts vindicated the rights of a wide variety o I women who fell outside
the mold of Victorian respectability. Mary Josephs had numerous strikes against her as a
foreigner, stranger, non-I uiglish speaker, and peddler. The absence of Kate l^owen's
husbiuid was never explained at trial (she had divorced him for intolerable severity in
18^)6), she sullered from nervous prostration, did not immediately report the assault, and
stayed in the house for Hneen minutes following the attack while her friend waited
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outside. She never explained this oddity. Mabel Fairbanks was young, deaf, and
working class, and evidence was admitted that she had a reputation for sexual
immorality. Her parents were separated and lived in local hotels. As a young, non-
English-speaking French-Canadian, Mary Pratt was at the bottom of Vermont's social
pecking order. She and her fiance told a story of sexual assault containing many
troubling inconsistencies. The point is not whether these assaults happened or not, but
that juries would have been well within their rights to decide that the high burden of
proof required in a criminal case had not been met. But they chose instead to convict.
Constance Backhouse, Karen Dubinsky and Kathleen Parker have argued that
rape law was less protective ofwomen with poor sexual reputations or women oflow
socio-economic standing (or that it protected these women not at all). The evidence
presented here tells a more complicated story. It seems to me that judges and juries
repeatedly elevated the right to be Iree fi-om physical assault above any impulses they
may have had to make the law an instrument upholding a standing order of ethnic, class,
and gender stratification-at least with regard to its victims.
If the victims ofrape included a variety ofwomen, the same cannot be said at
least of the men in the four counties who found themselves on trial for rape or attempted
rape. A review of some fifty-one men who went to trial or pled guilty between 1876 and
1919 shows them to be overwhelmingly from what were considered the lowest ranks of
Vermont society. Sixty-five percent were unskilled workers, mostly farm laborers and a
few mill workers. Only 14 percent identified themselves as farmers and some ofthem
may have been merely farm laborers. Twenty percent were skilled workers: mechanics.
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bulchcrs, bakers, and house painters. Fhere were no professionals among them, unless
one counts a ^\|uaek doctor' ' convicted in 1 S77 (Appendix A).
Sixty-three percent of men tried or convicted were native Wnu Vermonters,
However, eight ofthese had one or more parents lx)rn outside Vermont or the three
neighlx)ring states oI New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York and another 37
percent were themselves lx)rn outside the state. Many ol tliese men or their parents were
ol Irish or lYench (^anadian descent. Native lx)rn defendants represented only 47
percent of men confined for rape or attempted rape, hut represented percent of all
men fined, placed on probation, or found not guilty. Mlly-six percent were single,
divorced, or widowed. Hieir average age was tiiirty-one and a liaif (see I'able 8).
Certainly the issue of class lx)th of victims and perpetrators is an important area
Ibr lurtiicr study. Middle and upper class men are absent Irom this data, lulher these
men did not commit rape, or if they did, they were not tried for it. 1 he issue of class did
come up explicitly in one appellate case, that of Wilkins and Hlow discussed above.
Blow's lawyer had asked witnesses alx)ut his general reputation and character and
whether it was good or bad. 1 he state, in rebuttal, showed that following the
conuiiission of the crime, lilow's reputation in the community was bad. In instructing
the jury, the judge explained that a defendant always had a right to show his reputation
for good character in order to help rebut the allegations against him. I Ic then told them
'"you will consider with reference to the young men of this class whether they would be
likely to bring tlicir good character to bear, in reference to this very crime, if an
opportunity presented itself." The defendants argued on appeal that the reference to
their class was an "invidious distinction" based on their ^Yank or station." The Supreme
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Table 8
Demographic Comparison: Men from the Four Counties Tried or Convicted on a Charge
of Rape/Attempt Versus Those Tried or Convicted on a Charge of Statutory
Rape/Attempt, 1875-1919
Cause Age Vt. Born Non Native Married Single Unskilled Skilled Farmer
Rape/Att. 31.5' 32 (63%) 19(37%) 22 (44%) 28 (56%)' 32 (65%) 10(20%) 6(14%)
Confined
Fine/Prob.
Acquitted
32.9'
27.6"
32.3'
16(47%)
8 (89%)
8 (100%)
18(53%)
1 (11%)
0 ( 0%)
15(45%)
7 (78%)
5 (63%)
19 (55%)
2 (22%)
3 (38%)
22 (67%)
5 (63%)
5 (63%)
7(21%) 4(12%)
1(13%) 2(25%)
2(25%) 1(13%)
St. Rape/Att. 33.5* 41 (70%) 17(29%) 27 (47%) 30 (53%)'' 28 (52%) 7(13%) 15(28%)
Confined
Fine/Prob.
Acquitted
33.8«
22.7'
42.6'°
30 (64%)
7 (100%)
4 (67%)
17(36%)
0( 0%)
2 (33%)
24 (52%)
1 (14%)
3 (50%)
22 (48%)
6 (86%)
3 (50%)
22 (50%)
6(100%)
1 (20%)
5(11%) 14(32%)
0 ( 0%) 0 ( 0%)
2(40%) 1(20%)
Court agreed that had this been the case it would have been error on the part of the judge.
But it held that "the court only meant to have the jury consider just what safe-guard
previous good character would be to such men as the respondents were when tempted to
commit crimes." It is hard to understand how this is different from the invidious
' N=55.
^ Includes 24 single men, 2 divorced, and 2 widowed.
' N=34.
"N=9.
' N=8.
*N=56.
' Includes 25 single men, 3 widowed, and 2 divorced.
«N=48.
'N=7.
'«N=6.
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distinction the Court said would rise to reversible error, but, as we have seen, the Court
was not always clear or consistent in its rulings. In terms of socio-economic
background, Bedard, Wilkins, and Blow were very similar to many of the men they
would be joining in prison. All were of Canadian extraction, two at least were Catholic.
All three described themselves as common laborers."
To really understand the diversity of Anglo-American law in the nineteenth and
early twentieth century one need only look across the border to New York State. The
state's rape law was heavily weighted against the alleged victim. Whereas Vermont
had rapidly discarded the ancient requirements of out-cry and immediate reporting as
prerequisites for bringing a rape charge, New York required them throughout the study
period. New York also required female victims to make the utmost resistence to their
attackers or they were deemed, as a matter of law, to have consented to the intercourse.
Victims who had not reported the rape immediately were not permitted to explain the
delay. In cases where there was no corroboration the jury had to acquit the defendant as
a matter of law. This requirement was by stattite. And evidence that a woman had told
another of the assault was not considered corroborative for purposes of the statute.
New York also wrote a marital rape exclusion into its statute law.'"
These harsh rules found their way into New York's law of civil ravishment as
well. Ravishment actions were civil rather than criminal causes of action, relying on
different standards of proof and resting on very different legal theories. Despite
this,
the out-cry, immediate reporting, and utmost resistence rules
applied, making it that
Slate V. Wilkins and Blow, 66 Vt. 1 (1892); Records of the State
Prison, vol. 4, 199, 230-231.
- People V. Morrison, 1 Parker Cr. R. (N.Y.) 625 (1 854);
Reynolds v.
^1
"^^^^^Jff
(,871V People v. Dohring, 59 N.Y. 374 (1874);
People v. Clark, 3 RY. Cr. R 280 (1885), Peop/e .
yJler 66 RY.S. 851 (1900); People v. Flaherty, 162 N-Y^ 532 (1900^
''^J'^.'^^T
(1900); People v. Carey, 223 N.Y. 519(1918); People
v. Meh, 193 N.Y.S. 365 (1922).
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more dilFicult lor New York women to obtain even civil redress for sexual assaults on
them. Unlike Vermont law, New York law specifically encouraged defendants in civil
ravishment cases to show that the woman's conduct led them to believe that their sexual
advances would be welcomed by her. Every bit of evidence of plaintifTs "lascivious
conduct designed or adopted to incite him to take liberties with her person, or induce
him to believe that such advances on his part would not be unacceptable, are
admissible."^' Clearly these choices reflected a different sense of values about sexual
assault and the role the law should play in redressing this violation. A woman raped in
New York faced a far different legal reality than a woman raped just across Lake
Champlain in Vermont.
Similarly, the experience under Canadian law and under the law of Michigan
seems to have dictated diflerent outcomes. On a per capita basis, Vermonters brought
far more prosecutions for sexual assaults of all kinds. Vermont's law was less harsh
towards complaimuits than that of Canada and Michigan since it did not require out-cry
or place other rigid limitations on the victim. While comparing data is dilficult, men
accused of sexual assault were more likely to be convicted than their counterparts in
Canada and could look forward to longer pri.son terms than their peers in Michigan and
the Canadian West.
As in other areas of law examined in this work, Vermonters in general seem to
have ameliorated the harsher aspects of the male-dominated legal regime on women
suflering sexual wrongs at the hands of men. Judges, legislators, and juries seem to have
placed the right to personal safety and the rule of law above any desire to restrict
" Crossman v. Bradley, 53 liarb. (N.Y.) 12.5 (1868).
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women's access to the courts to seek legal redress for sexual violations. And, as in other
civil and criminal actions we have studied, they used these cases less to talk about female
sexual behavior, than to make clear their expectations for men. Men, (or at least the
non-elite men who ended up in court) were not to approach women for sex, were not to
assume that their advances were welcome, were not to blame alcohol for their
transgressions.
There is no doubt that this law was the product of an exclusively male legal
system which viewed the world through a highly-gendered lens. A significant number of
women who made allegations ofrape and attempted rape did not see their alleged
attacker convicted or even tried. Yet for all that, the system seems to have made an
attempt to balance the needs ofmen and women, apply the law in a way which was
reasonable and feir, and ended up sending many men to prison for violating the integrity
of female bodies. The system reflected the gendered assumptions of the time, but also
acknowledged the tensions inherent in the rape charge. It did so without sending a
message that rape would be tolerated, that women were fair game for men who wanted
what was not theirs to take, or that men who attacked women of unconventional social
status or morality were immune fi"om prosecution.
The evolution ofrape law occurred within a complex local dynamic. Rape law
developed within the interstices created by the tug and puU ofvarious local (that is,
state) institutions: the appellate court, the legislature, trial
courts, and juries. This
process is unique to each state. This fact and the differences between
various
jurisdictions demonstrate as well as anything the necessity and benefits of studying
the
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law of sexual regulation in the nineteenth and early twentieth century as a state rather
than as a national phenomenon.
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CHAPTER 5
STATUTORY RAPE
Introduction
American common and statute law had long considered sex with girls under a
certain age to be rape regardless oftheir consent. The age at which girls were deemed
legally capable of consenting was set very low in America until the end of the nineteenth
century. Statutory ages often or twelve were typical. Beginning in 1886, activists
waged a highly effective national campaign to raise the age of consent for girls. The
campaign was part of the social purity movement, which sought to limit sexual activity
solely to married couples, eradicate a double standard which permitted men to engage in
extra-marital sex without much sanction, and to protect women, especially the young,
against the predations of men. Participants in the movement such as the Woman's
Christian Temperance Union were shocked by the low age "at which a girl can legally
consent to her own ruin." Many argued that the situation encouraged the seduction of
young girls, infected them with venereal disease, diminished their prospects for marriage,
or led them into prostitution. Furthermore, the low age meant that there were no legal
means to prevent girls from working in brothels.'
The campaign to raise the age of consent, like other aspects of the social purity
movement, grew out of the concerns of an urban, Protestant elite. The implications of
' Mary E. Odem, Delinquent Daughters: Protecting and Policing Female Sexuality in the United States,
1885-1920 (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1995), 8-16; David J. Pivar, Purity
Crusade: Sexual Morality and Social Control, 1869-1900 (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1973), 139-
144; John D'Emilio and Estelle Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History ofSexuality in America (New
York: Harper and Row, 1988), 153
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urbanization, immigration, and changes wrought by the industrialization and
commodification of society led these men and women to employ state institutions in an
efifort to intervene more directly in human sexual affairs. Scholars examining the effects
of the campaign in urban settings in California and Michigan have found that the increase
in the age of consent allowed state officials and parents to police sexual relationships
between teenage girls and young men. Criminal cases were often initiated by working
class and immigrant parents who used the system to regain control over the sexual lives
of their teenage daughters. Despite the fact that consent was legally irrelevant to these
cases, the courts often judged the teenage girls who came before them as complainants
and witnesses.^ Vermont, too, responded to the national campaign to raise the age of
consent. But it applied the law in a way considerably different than that of the more
urban areas targeted by other studies.
Statutory Rape before 1 886
Throughout most ofthe nineteenth century, the age at which Vermont law
deemed a girl capable of consenting to sexual intercourse was eleven. This age was
fixed by common law in the state until 1818. In that year, the General Assembly
explicitly declared that sexual intercourse with a girl under eleven by a man over the age
of fifteen was to be treated as a rape, regardless ofwhether the intercourse was
accomplished "with her will or against her will." This yoimg age was common
^ Odera, 6, 71 ; Kathleen Ruth Parker, "Law Culture and Sexual Censure: Sex Crime Prosecutions in a
Midwest County Circuit Court, 1850-1950" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1993), 152-317.
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throughout the country as a result of the states' early adoption of English statute and
common law which fixed the age at ten and twelve respectively.^
Very few statutory rape cases appeared in the records of the four counties during
the earlier period of this study. The first identifiable case of statutory rape going to trial
did not appear until 1814.^ Between that date and 1886 when the age of consent was
raised to fourteen, only eleven cases for rape and attempted rape of girls under eleven
appear in the records. However, in the nine cases which went to trial, all resulted in a
guilty verdict. In two other cases, the defendants defaulted. The average age of the
victim was nine years old. The average prison sentence for those convicted of statutory
rape during this time was eight years.
In addition, there were a few cases brought against men for having sex with
eleven- or twelve-year-old girls, but these were brought as forcible rather than statutory
rapes. The earliest such case in the entire state may have been brought in Bennington in
1 791
.
The trial was observed by Samuel Hitchcock, a prosecutor and later Attorney
^ Vermont had adopted both the common law of England and the English statutes under its two earlier
constitutions and had also adopted the common law of Connecticut for a brieftime as well. In 1797
under its third and most recent constitution, it adopted the English common law, but not English
statutes. While it is obvious that the age of consent came into Vermont by this process, it is not clear
why the age was established at eleven rather than ten or twelve as English statute or common law
provided. The eleven-year standard was rare. Laws of Vermont (Rutland, 1798), 71; Allen Soule, ed..
Laws of Vermont, 1777-1780, vol. 12 ofState Papers of Vermont (Montpelier: Secretary of State, 1964),
27, 35; John A. Williams, ed.. Laws of Vermont, 1781-1784, vol. 13 oi State Papers of Vermont
(Montpelier, Secretary of State, 1965), 101-102; John A. Williams, ed.. Laws of Vermont, 1785-1791,
vol. 14 oiState Papers of Vermont (Montpelier, Secretary of State, 1966), 238-239; 1818 Vt. Acts 1.
On the age of consent in England and other states see William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
ofEngland, vol. 4 (Oxford, 1769), 212; Pivar, 104-105, 141-143; Odem, 1-37.
" In several early cases involving eleven-year-old girls, prosecutors brought charges for both rape and
statutory rape probably because the sexual activity had overlapped the girl's eleventh birthday. Thus,
the first prosecution including a count for statutory rape also included counts for rape and attempt on
difiFerent specific days. The defendant was found guilty of attempt and was sentenced to seven years at
hard labor in the state prison. State v. Blood, Windsor County Supreme Court, August 1814 Term, vol.
3, p. 481-482.
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General and federal judge. A man named Turner had been charged 'Tor an infamous
abuse offered to a little Girl of Eleven years of age." Hitchcock described the trial as
"lengthy and affecting." Turner was found guilty, fined twenty pounds and jailed for six
months. In Hitchcock's opinion, he was lucky to have avoided death. Turner should
thank the "lenity of our Laws, that has saved him from the gibbet-he deserved it, if death
can be considered as a proper punishment for an actual attempt and even violence on the
body of a female of a little more than eleven years." Hitchcock remarked that the trial
was the first for such an offense within the state. There were also five cases of incest
brought in the four counties during this time against fathers for having sex with their
daughters.'
Thus, while judges, juries and commentators condemned sexual activity between
men and young girls and took it seriously when it was brought to their attention, prior to
1 886 the state demonstrated little interest in proactively regulating "consensual" sexual
activity between men and young girls.^ The small number of cases is especially
noteworthy when compared with the number of forcible rape and attempted rape
cases-seventy-five-going to trial or verdict during the same period. Prior to the late
nineteenth century then Vermont officials did not demonstrate much interest in criminally
policing non-forcible sexual activity between men and young girls-whether by use of the
statutory age law already in place, or by moving to raise that age to encompass more
consensual sexual activity.
' Samuel Hitchcock to Lucy Allen Hitchcock, 28 August 1791 in John Duffy, ed., Ethan Allen and His
Kin: Correspondence, 1772-1819, vol. 1 (Hanover: University Press ofNew England, 1998), 378-379.
My thanks to John Duffy for calling my attention to this source.
Given the enormous disparities in age and power that existed between young girls and the men who
had sex with them, the notion of consent is problematic. 1 use the term here solely in its legal sense.
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The Campaign to Raise the Age of Consent
This situation changed dramaticaUy in 1 886 when the General Assembly raised
the age ofconsent from eleven to fourteen (and then to sixteen twelve years later). The
General Assembly took this action in response to the national campaign to raise the low
age ofconsent which prevailed across most of the country. Vermont's legislature acted
in response to a petition from a group ofLyndon citizens seeking an amendment to the
statutory age law-a change the petitioners described as being "for the better protection
ofwomen." Led by Charles M. Chase, a conservative Democrat, banker, and editor of
the weekly Vermont Union newspaper^ forty-one citizens asked the General Assembly
to raise the age of consent from eleven to eighteen. Chase's petition has been lost, but
we can assume that it was like one of the thousands of petitions circulated by social
purity activists to local chapters across the nation."
The bill started out in the House, which raised the age to fourteen with little
apparent controversy. It then passed to the Senate, where it was assigned to the
Judiciary Committee. In raising the age of consent, Vermont lawmakers were faced with
the task ofmaking illegal activity which had never before come under the criminal law's
surveillance. They needed to determine the age at which unmarried teenage female
sexuality should come within the purview of the law and articulate the reasons for it.
The only evidence we have of the Legislature's deliberations on this issue is contained in
a report issued by the Senate Judiciary Committee. The report reveals the familiar
tensions that existed whenever Vermont law sought to regulate sexual activity. As we
^ Venila Lovina Shores, Lyndon: Gem in the Green (Lyndon, Vt.: Town of Lyndon, 1986), 314-315.
* Pivar, 145-146; Odem, 20; D'Emilio and Freedman, 153.
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have seen in other contexts, Vermonters struggled to balance goals which were often in
tension with one another: holding people accountable for their actions, preserving
morality, using the law to shore up a highly-gendered conception of society (including
the need for men to contain their sexual impulses), and protecting a person's right to be
fi-ee jfrom physical violence.
In recommending that the age of consent be raised to fourteen for girls rather
than eighteen as the petition had requested, the Senate Judiciary Committee reasoned
that "after people have attained the age ofmature powers and judgment, your committee
do not regard it as the proper province of legislation to treat acts and intercourses
between any two ofthem that has the mutual concurrence of their wills, as a forceable
assault of the one upon the other." Despite the rhetoric of consent and equality
contained in this statement, the report next explained that a higher age of consent would
fail to protect older adolescent boys.
The Committee noted that girls matured more quickly than did boys, both
physically and mentally. As a resuh, it would be unfair to punish the "older but less
mature boy" as a result of the "temptations thrown in his path by the more mature and
often more wicked girl." Instead, the less mature, but chronologically older boy should
have "as adequate protection as his female companion, whose finer moral nature is more
susceptible to the proper teachings ofmorality and virtue." In other words, girls
matured more quickly than boys and were thus more dangerous. This is an echo of an
earlier sexual ideology: young women as sexual temptresses. But young women could
overcome this natural inclination due to their greater susceptibility to moral instruction.
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l iic Coinniiitcc next lurncd to a more practical problem, riiere were ni:iny
Vermont marriages where women were under age eighteen. If the age of consent was
rai.sed to eighteen the law would turn husbands into statutory rapists and wives into
incompetent children, viewed by the state as incapable of consenting to sexual relations
with their husbands. The C'ommittee rejected such a notion."
I 'inally, the C ommittee returned to issues of sexual ideology. Women were
neither sexual fiends, incapable of controlling themselves, nor were they gullible dupes.
"We think the end will be better attained through proper religious and moral training,
than by a law that shall adverti.se mature womanhood as too feeble in its moral powers
and convictions to protect itself against its own indiscretions or the wiles and seductions
t)f the other sex." Hie Committee refused to institutionalize by law the notion that
women could not control their sexuality. "Alter she arrives at years of moral discretion"
it was her responsibility to police her sexuality, to protect her reputation and character
"by the uprightness of her demeanor, the purity of her heart and the strength of her
character.""'
While the Senate .settled for an increa.se to fourteen rather than eighteen, it did
oiler an amendment which distinguished between consensual sex between young
teenagers, sex with older men, and forcible sex of any kind, if a boy under sixteen had
consensual .sex with a girl under I'ourleen ix)th were guilty ol a misdemeanor and could
he committed to the l^eform School. But if a hoy under sixteen iiad Ibrcible .sex with a
"
in Vcrtnoii(, tninors could not marry without (he permission of llicir parent or guardian. A woman
readied lier tnajorily M age eighteen, a man at age twenty-one. Revised Statutes. IfiJV (lUiriington,
1840), Chapter 62.
"Report ol the Senate .hidiciary Committee," Journal ofthe Senate (Montpeiier, 1887), 71-72.
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girl under fourteen, he was to be treated as an adult. The House agreed to the changes
and the bill became law. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York moved quickly
as well and by 1 889 aU three states had raised their age of consent to thirteen, fourteen,
and sixteen respectively."
Social purity campaigners wanted a uniform national age of consent of eighteen.
After the first wave of legislation failed to accomplish this, they renewed their eflforts in
the 1890s. Reflecting this renewed pressure, in 1898 Vermont's legislature received
more petitions praying for an increase in the age of consent to eighteen. One was
submitted to the House by Reverend L. H. Bigelow and almost five hundred others fi-om
Montpelier. The other was submitted to the Senate by the WCTU's young woman's
auxiliary, the King's Daughters. The General Assembly raised the age of consent to
sixteen-a rapid, if not completely satisfying response to the prayers of the petitioners.
The sixteen-year-old standard remains the law in Vermont to this day-though it now
applies to both boys and girls.
The rise in the age of consent created an enormous expansion in the amount of
sexual activity now under the surveillance and regulation of the state. Sexual encounters
that had not even been within the purview ofthe criminal justice system were now
" Journal ofthe House ofRepresentatives (Montpelier, 1887), 46, 69, 71, 363, 373, 383; Journal ofthe
Senate (Montpelier, 1887), 53, 67, 74, 240, 253, 264; 1886 Vt. Acts 63; Pivar, 141-143. The effort to
raise the age of consent was not only national in scope, but took in all of the English-speaking world,
since all of the former colonies had inherited the low age of consent from England as well. Just one
indication of the international character of this movement was the effort in New South Wales to raise the
"age of seduction" from fourteen to eighteen. Legislators there expressed sentiments ahnost identical to
those of Vermont's senators. The effort failed. Michael Sturma, "Seduction and Punishment in Late
Nineteenth Century New South Wales," Australian Journal ofLaw & Society 2 (1985), 77-78.
Journal ofthe House ofRepresentatives (St. Albans, 1899), 83, 130, 177, 289, 305, 377; Journal of
the Senate (St. Albans, 1899), 131, 134, 147, 163, 175, 191, 232, 294; 1898 Vt. Acts 188; Vt .Stat. Ann.
tit. 13 § 3252(C)(3) (1977).
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treated as rapes and brought with them the risk of a twenty-year prison sentence. Both
the trial courts and the Supreme Court suddenly found themselves confronting the legal
issues raised by non-coercive sexual encounters between teenage girls and older men.
The Supreme Court witnessed both a quantitative and qualitative change in the
rape cases it heard. The Court did not issue its first decision on rape until 1 856 when it
decided the Johnson case discussed in the previous chapter. It then issued nineteen more
decisions between 1856 and 1922. Out of the sixteen cases decided after 1889, ten arose
out of statutory rape convictions. Of the last ten appeals heard by the Court during this
period, nine were statutory rape cases. The Court reversed six of ten convictions
involving women above the age of consent, but reversed only three of ten arising out of
statutory rape trials, and two of the reversals came in the first two statutory rape cases
brought.'^
Men facing a charge of statutory rape had few defenses. All they could really do
was deny the act. The high rate of afiBrmances by the Supreme Court reflected this fact.
Even the two reversals handed down by the Court had little to do vrith rape law at all,
but were based on general principles of criminal law and in at least one of those cases,
the defendant was tried again and convicted.'''
These last figures provide crude information at best. The burden of proof in a statutory rape trial was
lower and the issues that kept the Court most busy in rape appeals—evidence issues going to character
and consent—were absent in trials for statutory rape. Nevertheless, the high affirmance rate in these
cases further demonstrates the message emanating fi-om the courts in cases of statutory rape. A man
accused of having sex with a young girl was in serious trouble.
In State v. Carroll, 67 Vt. 477 (1895) the Court reversed the conviction because the four-and-a-half-
year-old victim's mother had said too much about what the child had reported to her. hi State v.
Manning, 74 Vt. 449 (1902) the trial judge had instructed the jury that if they did not believe the
defendant's alibi then they should find him guilty. The Court, holding that this was an incorrect
statement of law, reversed. Manning was tried again and convicted. State v. Manning, 75 Vt. 185
(1903).
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Consent
Despite the odds against them, defendants did appeal their convictions. Several
themes in these appeals are discernible. First, some defendants attempted to resurrect
consent as a defense even though the statute seemed to rule it out. All three of these
challenges came in prosecutions for assault with intent to commit rape on girls under the
age of consent. In each, the defendants argued that the girl had consented to their
attempts to have sex with them and that the statute's vitiation of consent did not apply to
the attempt, but only to the actual intercourse. The statutory rape law treated as a rape
any intercourse between a girl less than fourteen (later less than sixteen) and men over
age sixteen regardless of whether the girl consented or not. But the statute had not
explicitly amended the attempted rape law, which made illegal an assault with intent to
commit rape. In making this argument, defendants sought to exploit this fact and argue
that the consent element remained in the case of attempt, regardless of the age of the
alleged victim.
The first challenge came in State v. Wheat (1890). Henry Wheat, aged twenty-
eight, had attempted to have sex with Alice Taylor who was under fourteen. The
indictment did not state the age of either Alice or Henry, but simply noted that he had
attempted to rape her "against her will." The trial judge had instructed the jury that it
was immaterial whether Alice had consented to the attempted intercourse or not. Since
she was under age, ifWheat had attempted intercourse he was guilty. He was convicted.
On appeal, his lawyer argued that consent still applied to attempts if not actual
intercourse. The Court side-stepped the issue of consent in attempted statutory cases
because it found that the failure of the state to allege Alice's age was prejudicial to the
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defendant. He had no way ofknowing whether the state was trying the case as a forcible
rape case or a statutory one. He could not tell whether consent might be a valid defense
or not. Though the Court noted that there was evidence that the attempt was by force
and against the will of the alleged victim, the judge's charge that consent was irrelevant
prevented the jury from considering that aspect of the case. The Supreme Court
reversed.'^
The Court addressed the consent question in attempt cases more squarely in
another appeal heard six years after Wheat. In State v. Sullivan (1896), an elderly man,
James Sullivan, had been soliciting young girls to ride with him on the delivery wagon he
drove for the cash store in St. Albans. Upon arriving back at the store, Sullivan invited
the girls down into the cellar. Only nine-year-old Bessie Pomeroy took him up on his
ofiFer. Once in the cellar, Sullivan had fondled her genitals and asked her to have sex
with him. When she refused, Sullivan offered to meet her that night or the next morning
at a nearby bam for the same purpose. Bessie, looking pale, left the cellar, ran home,
and immediately told her mother. Sullivan was arrested soon after, charged with
attempt, and convicted.
He raised several issues on appeal including the argument that the indictment had
alleged that he had assaulted Bessie against her will and that that needed to be proved.
But the Court held that as long as the indictment alleged that Bessie was under age,
phrases such as "against her will" or "with force," were mere "surplusage" and irrelevant
to the charge. Sullivan also argued that the state needed not only to prove that the girl
was under age, but that the defendant was sixteen or older. The Court rejected this
'5 State V. Wheat, 63 Vt. 673 (1890).
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aiguincMU, lu>ldiii^ thai (he dcloiuliuU's age was iu>l an olciuonl oi {\\c orituc, but rather a
defense lo il, which had to Iv proven by tlie defendant himself In any ease, the (\>nrt
noted dryly that if tliere was any qnestion aU>nl the defendant^ age, it had Iven jnit io
rest by the appearanee of tlie delendant himself, whom the C ourt deserilvd as ^ a
grayheaded old man." Lastly, the ( ourt dismissed Sullivan's claim that tlie evidence did
not show an intent to have sex with the girl at the time of tl)e assault, but rather to have
sex with her at sonic later tiuKV 1 he ( ourt held that the evtdence slu>wed that Sullivan
would have had sex w ith Bessie 'Mhen and there" if she had not ^Yelused and repulsed his
solicitations."*^'
The issue of consent in attempt cases was finally laid lo rest in a sv>rdid I^H)4
case. I 'dward (Mark aged filly-lhrce and a painter, was caught with eleven-year-old
1 inma Uillideaux in the railroad engine house in Montpelier. A local police olVicer
watched as (Mark olVered the girl liquor, (hen put her hand on his genitals, and laid down
on top of her. I Ipon Iving taken into custody, Clark told the otlicer that he "couldn't do
anything" Ixvause he had syphilis, l-mma's teslinu>ny confirmed that of the police
olUcer and ailded (hat Clark had Ihreatenetl her with a knife. Aller IxMug Ci>nvictcd i^l
attempt, I lark appealed, arguing, among other things, that I 'mma consented to the
attempt, llis lawyer argued in his brief that b inma "was as willing to play and tondle
with (he responden( as was the respondent with her, and that she put forth no lorce or
elTort to assist any attempt made by the respondent, and this is not denied by the state
"
In support, (Mark's lawyer cited cases from a lew other slates which had drawn
'\SV(j/c V. SulliViW. (>X V(. >•»() (18%).
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distinctions between attempt and actual intercourse in terms of the use that could be
made of consent.'^
Unusual for a state brief, the prosecutor reviewed the law of all states on the
question, showing that ahnost all courts that had ruled on the issue had held that consent
was as irrelevant in an attempt case as it was in an actual rape case. Referring to the
only case which stood for the defendant's position, the prosecutor wrote that it
"maintains the illogical position that while the complete act of rape may be consummated
upon a child under the age of consent, with or without her consent, yet the lesser crime
for an assault with intent to commit that rape cannot be committed, if the child,
conclusively presumed by law to be unable to consent, consents." The Court dealt with
the matter in one sentence, holding that since Emma was under sixteen consent was
irrelevant. This foreclosed any further appeals along this line.'*
Changing Stories
Another issue that came up more than once in appeals from convictions for
statutory rape was a petition for a new trial based on the victim's recanting of her
testimony. We have already seen this strategy in adultery cases. Defendants sought to
introduce post-conviction evidence that the girl had changed her story. As with adultery
cases, defendants had little luck in convincing the Court to grant a new trial. In State v.
Manning ( 1 902) the defendant, who had ah-eady won one new trial based on a bad
State V. Clark, Respondent's Brief, p. 4, Vermont Reports Brieft, 77(1), no. 3 (1904), State Library,
Montpeiier, Vermont; Records of the State Prison, vol. 5, p. 437, Special Collections, University of
Vermont, Burlington, Vermont.
'« Stale V. Clark, Brief for State, p. 27, Vermont Reports Briefs, 77(1), no. 3 (1904); State v. Clark, 77
Vt. 10(1904).
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charge to the jury, sought yet another trial after his second conviction for raping thirteen-
year-old Emma Fosby.
Fosby had no mother. Her father worked a variety ofjobs and Emma had been
boarded out to many homes in town including Peter Manning. Aged thirty-three,
Manning lived with his wife and three children at the home of his father-in-law. Manning
too did a variety ofjobs including seasonal lumbering. At the time of the rape, Emma
was living with her grandmother Ursula, who when asked to describe her relationship to
Emma stated "They call me her grand-mother; my son is her father, they claim." Ursula
testified that in late July Manning showed up at her door looking for her son. When
Ursula told him he did not live there. Manning asked about Emma. Ursula, mistrustful of
Manning, whom she knew in passing, told him that Emma was not staying with her.
Manning left. After Emma did not return fi-om a trip to the neighbor, Ursula took her
adult retarded son with her and went looking. She came upon Manning and Emma just
off the road. She saw Manning get on top ofEmma and have intercourse with her.
Afterwords, Ursula testified that she heard Manning ask Emma to go into the woods
with him, but Emma refiised. When asked why she did not try to stop the assault, Ursula
explained that she was afi-aid ofManning: "there are lots of accidents, you know,
happens about such times with people like that; there was no one around, and no one at
home but myself."
Emma's story largely comported with Ursula's. She also admitted that she had
walked back to the house wdth Manning and that she had kissed him. Manning had told
her grandmother that Emma's father had offered to let Emma come back to live with him
and his family. Manning denied the whole thing. He had never been to Fosby's at all,
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never had sex with Emma, and olVcred as an alibi the fact that he had had a tooth pulled
the day before and was in bed recovering from the surgery the next morning.
At his second trial. Manning presented two letters purportedly written by Emma
in which she recanted her earlier testimony. She explained that she had been raped by a
stranger who looked like Manning. Her grandmother told her that if she refused to
identify the man, she would whip her, so Emma named Manning. After Ursula told her
father, Emma told him she was wrong and it was not Manning, but her father "sed he
wood whip me if I sed any difarnt." Emma denied writing the letters and denied that her
grandmother and father had threatened her with whippings for failing to implicate
Manning. Both her father and grandmother denied threatening her. Manning was
convicted again.^^
On appeal. Manning's lawyers sought a new trial based on new evidence:
witnesses who said they had heard Emma deny Manning had raped her, testimony from a
man who claimed to have mailed Emma's letters to Manning, and evidence that Ursula
Fosby did not have a good reputation for truthfulness. The appellate briefs revealed an
uncharacteristically nasty tone for Vermont litigation as the state's attorney and defense
counsel traded allegations of impropriety and ran dovsoi one another's witnesses.
In its brief, the state condemned the defendant's tactic of challenging Emma's
testimony. Manning's lawyers had been "lied to and cheated as to the facts, or the
Respondent and his witnesses deliberately perjured themselves." Emma had been
inappropriately pressured to acknowledge the letters as hers. The frivolous appeal was
" State V. Manning, Windsor County Court, December 1901 Term, Transcript of Trial.
State V. Manning, "Certification of Appeal," Vermont Reports Briefs, 75(2), no. 29 (1902).
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fueled by an appointed lawyer, drawing on the state treasury for his pay and relying on
"an ignorant community, with the usual attendant low state of morals, for a base of
supples [where] evidence can be found by those who cater to such work, to meet any
possible condition of facts." The state's attorney then ran down the witnesses relied on
by the defense including "poor Joe Carter a man so ignorant he cannot write his own
name," "McGibbon ... a swift witness," and Ursula Manning 'Hhe broken old
grandmother" forced to go to the scene of the assault so that she might be discredited.^'
Manning's lawyer pulled no punches either. As to the threats made by Emma's
father and grandmother, the lawyer pointed out that 'Hhose people who would be corrupt
enough to make such threats would be corrupt enough to deny them." The Fosbys,
according to Manning's lawyer, were "'way down' tramps, living in shanties or an old
school-house, and moving from town to town."^^
This kind of rhetoric was unusual in Vermont appellate practice. The state's
attorney, who was soon to retire, was clearly frustrated at the prospect of yet another
trial for Peter Manning. Similarly, if Manning was in fact innocent, he and his lawyer
must have been equally frustrated.
The Court felt that none of the new evidence warranted a third trial. The
testimony of the mail deliverer was ambiguous, Ursula Tosby's reputation had been
argued both pro and con, and Fosby "evidently a poor and obscure person" did not,
according to the Court, really have a reputation one way or the other. As for the
^' Stale V. Manning, Vermont Reports Driefs, "Brief Ibr State," p. 2, 6.
State V. Manning, Vermont Reports Briefs, "Brief lor Respondent," p. 3 and "Brief on Petition for
New Trial," p. 7.
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testimony that others had heard Emma recant, the Court found it contradictory and
unpersuasive. Manning went to prison for six years.^^
Just a year later another case of retracted testimony came before the Supreme
Court. Charles Willett, aged thirty-three, was convicted of the statutory rape of his
twelve-year-old stepdaughter Nina Papineau. Nina lived with her grandmother in
Burlington. Her mother lived with Willett, an illiterate teamster, and six other children in
nearby Shelbume. Nina had gone to Shelbume for a visit in August and claimed that she
had been raped by Willett on several occasions. She told her grandmother who then
complained to the state. Willett denied the charges, but was convicted and sentenced to
four to five years.
Nina paid a visit to her mother who had relocated to Burlington with the children
after Willett's imprisonment. As Nina entered, her mother was packing up to go with
her children to the poor farm in Williston. Nina explained to her mother that she had lied
at trial and that "she thought that as long as he [Willett] was there [in prison] and was
not guilty of anything he better be at home." Nina and her mother then went to Willett's
lawyer's oflSce where Nina gave a sworn statement. She explained that her four-year-old
stepbrother had told her grandmother that WUlett had done something wrong to her.
According to Nina, her grandmother fi-equently whipped her and told her that if she did
not accuse Willett she would whip her again. Nina said that her grandmother did not like
Willett and wanted to see him in prison and that no one had told her to recant. The state
for its part pointed out the medical testimony from the trial that Nina's hymen had been
" State V. Manning, 75 Vt. 185 (1903); Records of the State Prison, vol. 5, p. 401. Manning's first
appeal can be found at 74 Vt. 449 (1902).
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ruptured and was raw and tender. The grandmother also swore that Nina's story was
false and that since she left her house several months before, "she never darkened my
doors" again. Confronted with this testimony, the Supreme Court simply stated that a
majority of the justices believed that Willctt had been justly convicted.'"
Character
The last major issue confronted by the Court as a result of statutory rape
prosecutions was the question of character. What role, if any, could the alleged victim's
sexual character play in the prosecution? Technically, the answer was none. In cases of
forcible rape we vsdll recall that the use of sexual character evidence was quite
constrained. It could only be used to impeach the credibility of the alleged victim on the
matter of consent and then only when she testified. Wliere consent was not an issue,
such evidence was not permitted. The Court's rulings on the use of sexual character
evidence in other contexts made clear how limited the rape/consent exception was. Its
niling on the matter with regard to statutory rape is further evidence of its intent that
sexual character evidence not be a tool used by defendants to smear the state's
wdtnesses.
The question came before the Court in a 1905 case. State v. Stimpson. Stimpson,
aged thirty-five, a farmer, and married, was accused of having sex with a fifteen-year-old
girl. Stimpson denied ever having sex wdth her. At trial, his lawyer sought to cross-
examine the girl in order to show that she was six to eight months pregnant, had never
been pregnant before and that since age twelve she had had sex with "many different
2" State V. Willett, Vermont Reports Briefs, 78(2), no. 23 (1904); State v. Willett, 78 Vt. 157 (1904).
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persons." Stimpson's lawyer argued that her lack of chastity affected her credibUity and
that her promiscuity and ensuing pregnancy provided a motive for her to accuse
Stimpson "perhaps to protect her paramours." The state was willing to admit the
pregnancy, but not the fact that the girl had been with other men. The defense did not
want the pregnancy admitted unless it could show promiscuity. The trial judge sustained
the state's objection and did not allow in the evidence of pregnancy or promiscuity.
Stimpson was convicted and sentenced to four to five years in the state prison."
In its appeUate brief, the state explored the use of sexual character evidence in
rape cases, pointing out that its only appropriate use was in ascertaining the credibility of
the woman's assertion of non-consent. The defendant's brief sought to support his
position based on citation to the same cases. Recognizing that those cases involved
forcible rape, his lawyers argued for an expansion in the application of such evidence
fi-om its special use on the question of consent, to a gauge of general credibility. To the
defense, this only made sense. "Should a woman whose general character is proverbially
bad as to licentiousness and lewdness be entitled to the same credit, in a prosecution
involving her own shame, as another woman whose character is without stain?'
The Supreme Court rejected Stimpson's arguments. It believed that Stimpson
had in fact had sex with the girl and that it had been had with her consent, but it pointed
out that consent was irrelevant in a statutory case. It rejected Stimpson's attempts to
expand the use of sexual character evidence as a test of general credibility. Citing the
Morse, Spears, and Fournier cases discussed in earlier chapters, it reiterated again that
" State V. Stimpson, 78 Vt. 124 (1905); State v. Stimpson, Vermont Reports Briefe, 78(1), no. 19 (1905);
Records ofthe State Prison, vol. 6, p. 48.
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such evidence was not admissible as a test of general credibility and was limited only to
forcible rape cases where consent was at issue. The Court did leave open the question of
whether a trial judge could allow testimony of sexual activity with other men as a matter
of his discretion. But since the issue had not been raised the Court did not address the
question.
Certain general trends are apparent in the appellate cases heard by the Court
between 1890 and 1922. First, Vermonters used their statutory rape law to punish older
men for having sex with young girls. As the cases discussed above anecdotally
demonstrate, Vermont did not generally enforce the statutory rape law against teenage
boys and young men. The average age of a female victim in these cases was eleven and a
half. The average age of the defendants was thirty-nine. Second, many cases involved
girls and men living hardscrabble lives on the margins ofVermont society. Third,
statutory rape cases often took place in the context of extended families riven by intra-
family tensions and conflict.^^ Fourth, statutory rape cases placed tremendous power in
the hands of very young girls-especially since corroboration was often absent or very
limited. While judges and juries were very willing to accept a young girPs story of rape
at the hands ofgrown men, they were unwilling to believe her when she recanted. As
State's attorneys faced with sexual activity between older male relatives and young girls could
prosecute the case under Vermont's incest law or as a statutory rape. Those convicted of incest were
subject to a maximum prison term of five years, the same as for adultery. Those convicted of statutory
rape faced up to ten and (after 1 848) twenty years in prison. Since the elements of the crime were
basically the same, a prosecutor was making an important decision in choosing which statute to charge
under. While incest brought a lesser penalty, the stigma of a conviction was probably for worse than
that of a conviction for statutory rape. Those tried for incest faced very good odds of conviction and
prison. Between 1813 and 1919, twenty-two cases went to trial or verdict. Sixty-eight percent resulted
in convictions (27 percent by plea, 41 percent by jury), 23 percent resulted in acquittals by jury; one jury
was hung, and one case was dismissed by prosecutors during trial. Out of fifteen convictions, fourteen
defendants were confined. Twelve served prison sentences averaging three and a half years. Two were
confined to the Industrial School till age twenty-one. One was given probation.
311
with several adultery cases we have seen, the courts may have recognized the
tremendous pressure on these girls to change their stories after men and women, mothers
and fathers had been sent to prison as a result of their testimony. What could Nina
Papineau have felt as she walked into her mother's home to find her in the midst of
packing up the family for a trip to the poor farm? How did limma Fosby feel as she sat,
alone, at the table in the Manning household while Manning's wife and sister sought to
get her to acknowledge that the letter recanting her story was actually in her
handwriting?^' Lastly, matters of character and class permeated these cases. Even
though a girl's consent, sexual reputation, and family background were technically
irrelevant to these cases, all three issues made their way into these trials, but to little
effect.
Results in the County Courts
Records from the four counties tell the story. Sixty-six cases for statutory rape
and fifteen cases for attempt went to trial or a plea during the period under study.
Ninety percent of these cases were brought after 1886 when the age of consent was
raised from eleven to fourteen. Of the sixty-six cases that went to trial or a plea for
statutory rape, fifty-eight (88 percent) resulted in a guilty verdict by jury (38 percent) or
by plea (50 percent). Only seven men were found not guilty (1 1 percent). Of the fifty-
eight guilty verdicts in rape prosecutions, forty-four were for rape, eleven were for
attempt, and three were for simple assault. Fifty-one resulted in confinements (forty-nine
" State V. Willctt, "Petition for a New I'rial," p. 3, Vermont Reports Briefs, 78(2), no. 23 (1904); State v.
Manninf^, "Brief for State," p. 2, Vermont Reports Briefs, 75(2), no. 29 (1902).
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prison sentences and two confinements to the Industrial School). Four men received
probation and three were fined. The average prison sentence for those convicted of rape
was six years. Men convicted of the lesser charge of attempt averaged sentences of 4.7
years. Men convicted of assault got an average of six months^* (see Table 9).
There were very few trials for attempted statutory rape, but all ofthe defendants
were found guilty. Fifteen cases went to trial or plea during the study period, all but two
after 1 886. Six men were found guilty by juries and nine were found guilty by plea. Of
the fifteen convictions, nine were for the lesser offense of simple assault. In eleven of the
convictions, a prison sentence was imposed. Those convicted of attempt received an
average sentence of 3.3 years while those convicted of simple assault averaged 1.2 years
in prison. Two men received probation and two were fined or received probation.
Overall, the penalties for men convicted of statutory rape and lesser included offenses
were less severe than those convicted ofrapes on adult women. (Compare Tables 5, 6
and 9.)
The demographic difiference between men convicted of rape and those convicted
under the statutory law is more significant. When we compare the kinds ofmen
sentenced to the state prison on rape charges with those sentenced for offenses under the
statutory rape law certain factors stand out. On average, statutory rapists were two
years older than men charged with raping adult women-yet another sign that statutory
rape was enforced against older men. While statutory rapists did not come fi:om the
«
upper echelons ofVermont society, they were more established than men who had been
imprisoned for raping adult women. Overall, they were older, more likely to be married,
^ Where a range of sentence was imposed, I used the lower figure in calculating the average.
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Table 9
Outcomes of Statutory Rape Cases Going to Trial or Verdict'
Cause Total Guilty Cuilty(Jury) Guilty (Pita) Not Guilty Avr. Sent. Avr. Fine
St. Rape 66^ 58 (88%)' 25 (38%) 33 (50%) 7(11%) 6.0 years^ n.a.
St. Rape 15
(Attempt)
15(100%)^ 6(40%) 9 (60%) 0 (0%) 3.3 years* n.a.
more likely to be Vermont natives, and held a slightly higher rung on Vermont's
economic ladder than men convicted on forcible rape charges. The only college-
educated professionals found in these data were a priest and a teacher convicted of
statutory rape. Forcible rapists were more transient, more likely to be common laborers,
and more likely to have been bom outside the state and country. Ifwe consider only the
men confined for these crimes, the difFerences are even more pronounced. Sixty-seven
percent of forcible rapists who were confined were unskilled laborers, while fifty percent
' Data covers Orange County ( 1 794- 1 920); Windsor County ( 1 790- 1 920); Addison County ( 1 827- 1 920);
Rutland County ( 1 839- 1 920).
^ This figure includes I trial which ended in a hung jury.
^ Includes 1 1 verdicts for attempted statutory rape and 3 for simple assault.
4 N=51. Average sentence for statutory rape conviction (6 years), for attempt (4.7 years), for assault (.5
^ Includes 9 convictions for simple assault.
6 ]sj=l 1, Average sentence for attempted statutory rape (3.3 years), for simple assault (1.2 years).
years).
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of statutory rapists who were confined for their crimes were unskilled. (Compare Table
8 and Appendix A and B.)
Statutory Rape Trials in Action
The very high conviction rates and the number ofdefendants willing to plead
guilty to a crime as serious as statutory rape makes clear that with the question of
consent removed fi-om the case, men accused of statutory rape had very few options.
Their only defense lay in arguing that they had not committed the act. Thus, they had to
show that the child was lying and/or that someone else had committed it. Typically their
only means of doing so was to attack the credibility ofthe child and, often, her family.
Character—sexual and otherwise—^was intimately bound up in this strategy. By means
both direct and indirect, defense counsel tried to show that the child had knowledge or
opportunity, or both, to engage in sex with another or painted her family as deviant—
a
kind ofbackhanded attack on the child's morality by association. Defense attorneys tried
anything the court would let them get away with. But two could play this game, and
prosecutors often sought to introduce evidence that showed the defendant to be deviant
himself Often these efforts focused on the failure of witnesses to fiilfill their expected
roles—^roles centered on femilial and gender norms.
Almost all ofthe issues discussed in the review of appellate cases came together
in the trial of Joseph Hamel for the rape ofhis eight-year-old niece Delia in March 1897.
Hamel, thirty-three, and his wife were living with her parents, the Westovers on their
farm in Williamstown. The Westovers' daughter Linnie also lived on the farm with her
husband Frank Thrasher and four children including Delia and a halfbrother Roy Jewett.
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In addition, the town boarded out an elderly man on the farm. Hamel, a French-
Canadian from Ontario, had shown up with his wife in November 1 896 looking for
work. The Hamels went back to Ontario for a month in January, then returned in
February. Hamel did worked on the farm and intermittently at a job in Williamstown.
Delia testified that Hamel had first molested her in the kitchen in late March.
Later that morning, Hamel followed her out to the hen house where Delia said he stood
her up on a feed trough and raped her. A medical examination several days later
revealed that Delia had been partially penetrated and that her genitals were swollen and
sore.
In constructing their narrative to the jury, both the state and the defense sought
to portray the other side's witnesses as sexually deviant, unfaithfiil to expected gender
roles, or derelict in the duties expected of adults and parents. For example, the
prosecution highlighted the fact that Hamel was often in places where he did not belong.
Hamel had first molested Delia in the kitchen while the two were doing dishes. The
prosecution pointed out that dishwashing was women's work. Hamel not only denied
touching Delia in the kitchen but also denied even washing the dishes. The rape itself
took place in the hen house, a location that, like the kitchen, was marked as a female
space. This is why the testimony of Delia's grandmother, Mrs. Westover, that she saw
Hamel come out of the hen house was doubly incriminating. It confirmed Delia's story,
but also placed Hamel in a place where he was not supposed to be. Indeed, Mrs.
Westover remembered the incident because she thought it strange that he should be in
there. Delia's father had difficulty answering questions about the layout of the hen house
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under examination. Despite the iact that he lived and worked lull-time on his father-in-
law's farm, as a grown man it was simply not a place he went into. When asked if the
hen house was in the same configuration as it had heen on the date of the alleged rape
1 hrasher answered: "1 don't know, because 1 don't get the eggs, and I don't have
anything to do with the hens . . .
Similarly, when I lamel said that he remembered that Delia had a good appetite
the night of the alleged rape, the state drew out the fact that he was serving the children.
"It was a common thing, wasn't it, you waiting on them?" asked the prosecutor. Hamel
immediately backed off answering "I don't know as it was."^"
Hamcl's lawyers defended him by arguing that it was Delia's ten-year-old half-
brother Roy Jewctt who had committed the act. In order to bolster this defense, they
went after Delia's parents and grandparents in an effort to show a household in disarray
and awash in sexual deviance. In their examination of Delia, Hamel's lawyers initially
identified Jewctt as "the son of your mother by the husband who got a divorce fi-om
her."^' Hamel's lawyers later introduced evidence that Delia's mother married her father
several years before her divorce from her first husband came through. They even tried to
show that Delia's grandfather was a bigamist and had been in prison in Canada.
Roy Jewett was painted as a chronic masturbator and Hamel testified that he had
seen Roy and Delia engaging in sexual play around the farm. His lawyers drew out that
Delia's parents had been absent fi-om the farm when the rape allegedly occurred because
^' State V. Hamel, Orange County Court, June 1897 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 107,177.
Hamel, 203, 294
" Hamel, 23.
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lhe> had been attending a murder trial in Montpclier where they testified atxnit the
aduherous affair of the two defendants. After asking Delia aKnit this. Hamel's lawyers
argued that Delia had heard her parents diseussing the case and it had put ideas in her
head. They introduced or attempted to introduce other cNidence indicating the
breakdown of parental responsibilit} at the W eslover fann. Delia's underwear was filthy
because her mother had been away for four weeks attending trial and no washing had
been done. Delia had bragged in front of her parents that she had sat on a boy*s lap at
school and ^eh his jackknife move." Several boys at school had been fooling around
with her. She did not regularly attend Sunday school and her grandparents, rather than
her parents, were responsible for her schooling. In the end. the defense painted a
portrait of a household in w hich parents were failing to adliere to domestic nomis
concerning marriage, domestic responsibilities, and the supervision and correction of
their cliildren. But it did not work.
These kinds of allegations were a double-edged sword. The state and its
witnesses attacked the validity ofHamel's marriage by invariably referring to his wife as
"the so-called Mrs. Hamel" or "Mrs. Hamel, so-called." The state introduced e\idence
that Hamel's wife left her first husband to marry him, that she was not properly divorced,
and that she had been living with her first husband on and off since Hamel said he
married her in 1893.^^
Most of the evidence used to support the defense theory that Roy Jewett had
perpetrated the act came from Hamel himself. It was Hamel who saw Roy .Tewett
fiddling with his clothes in the bam stall. It was Hamel who heard Roy threaten Delia
" HameL 66, 80, 90. 113, 310-312.
318
that he was gom)> io put it to Ucvr Ami i( was I lanicl whi> saw K wcMI and Delia
supposally altcinplin^'. inlcivoniso in the outhouse. On oioss-cxanunalion the state
aiK^ueil that I hunePs inlerprelalions ol these seenes relleeted his own depraved state o(
mind or showed him io he a voyeur. {\>uld not Jewelt have simply Iven urinating in the
stall a eommon praetiee? Why diil I lainel think that the words ^ put it to her" meant
anything sexual? ^'Why do you always, when you see these little things in these two little
ehildreiu assign some wieked eause to them, something thai seems \o ilwell in yt>ur own
mind, with wiekedness ralher than with innoecnccT'*' And what, the proseeutor wanted
to know, was llamel iloing peering Ihroiigh a eraek in the outhouse lor two to tliree
minutes watehing the two ehildren at sex play? Why didifl he slop it immeilialely? Why
ilidiri he report these episodes lo the ehildreirs |>arents? IWeause, the pu>seeutt>r
argued, I lamel s purpose in peering through the eiaeks was not lor eorreetive
survcillanee, hut instead di>ne ^lor the pur|n>se ol an>using |his| own animal desires."*'
I lameTs liiilure to rept>rl what he saw was useil in three ways by tlie slate l irsl,
it raised doubts about whether it had even happened Seeond, as detaileil al>ove, il had
the elleel ofmaking I lamel seem depraved and voyeuristie. And third il raised ijuestions
about his manhood: the slate grilleil I lamel again anil again about why he had iu>t
conlronted Ki>y Jewelt or reported this behavii)r to Delia's parents. The proseeutor
repeatedly (|uestioneil his manhood. " Then won't you tell me why you, a man, was
ereeping. up there and peeking Ihroiigh eraeks into a water eloset lo see what I wo lillle
ehiklren . , . were doing theie'^" "Why didiTl you have sulHeienl manhood lo speak lo
HamrL :^^>.
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them about it?" "Why didn't you have sufficient manhood to teU the parents so they
might correct the little children?" "Don't you think it is the duty of a man, if he is a man,
when he sees another person's little girl, or little boy, doing what they ought not to do
.
.
.
to notify, or inform their father or their mother of it, so that it might be corrected?"^^
Like most men whose cases went to trial, Hamel's defense strategy was
unsuccessful and he was found guilty. At the sentencing. Judge Laforrest Thompson
noted that Hamel had received a fair trial, been defended by able counsel at state expense
who had done everything in their power to protect his rights and establish his innocence.
But the judge told him that the jury had found him guilty on evidence "so conclusive it is
hard to see how they could have found otherwise and done their duty." Hamel got
eighteen years.^^
While not all of the social conditions and strategies on display in the Hamel case
appear in transcripts of other statutory rape trials, all ofthose transcripts contain at least
some of those characteristics. Thus, we see a similar focus on proper gender and family
roles in State v. Harlow (1898). Twenty-two-year-old Herbert Harlow was married and
had a child. The Harlows were living with their in-laws Rollin and Martha Davis. The
Davises had an eight-year-old foster child Myrtle, whom they had raised from birth. One
day Harlow's wife went out berrying. His mother-in-law sent him out to find her
because the baby was fussing and she did not have time to take care of it. Harlow,
pushing a baby carriage and accompanied by Myrtie-an image that must have been
jarring to the all-male jury-set out to find her. Instead, he took Myrtie into the woods
Hamel, 244, 245, 246, 262, 265.
''Hamel, 311-372.
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and raped her. After trying to clean up Myrtie who was bleeding proftisely, he instructed
her to tell her parents that she had fallen on a stump.
In this case it was the defense who called attention to Harlow's domestic failings
in an attempt to show animus between Myrtle's parents and Harlow and thus a motive
for a false allegation. It probably backfired. Harlow's wife and child had come to live
with the Davises while Harlow worked out of town. On cross-examination, defense
counsel asked Mrs. Davis about whether she had wanted Harlow to come live with them.
Davis answered affirmatively. But she testified that Harlow had not paid anything for
the support of his family and "of course we wanted him to take care of his wife and
child."" When asked whether he contributed to household expenses, she told the jury
that "he did not pay anything at our house." The defense pursued this line of questioning
in its cross-examination of Mr. Davis. While he claimed not have any hard feelings
toward Harlow "of course his not supporting his wife, I did not feel that that was right of
him . . . ." The defense inexplicably continued this line of questioning:
Q: Some months before he came there in May, he did not do anything about supporting
his wife—was there?
A: There were a good many [months].
Q: And she lived with you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q: Did you try to get him to come live with you?
" State V. Harlow, Windsor County Court, December 1898 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 21.
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A. No, sir when he did come there I told him if he would take hold and try and do
something, and get ready to go to keeping house what money he earned he might
put into stuff to keep house with and we would get along with the rest.^^
Later, the state introduced a letter sent by Harlow from jail to his in-laws in which he
begged them to help him out and get Myrtie to recant. He mentioned keeping house
three times in the short letter. First, he wrote that he and their daughter were just
beginning to keep house before his arrest. Next he told them that he just wanted to get
out and "go to keeping house." Finally he told them again that he and his wife had
begun to keep house right before his arrest. The defendant did not object to the
introduction of this evidence. The jury was out for two and halfhours before returning a
guilty verdict. Harlow got fifteen years.^^
Other defendants focused on more general issues of character and morality, but it
did not seem to matter how sexually active was the girl or how immoral and depraved
her family was portrayed. In State v. Olney, an 1895 statutory rape case involving a
thirteen-year-old girl, the twenty-six-year-old defendant introduced testimony that the
girl had been vsdth another man after the event and that this was the first time she had had
intercourse, a fact she admitted. Furthermore, the consensual intercourse was depicted
as happening in a parlor while her father was in the next room entertaining another
woman. Because the girl's testimony was inconsistent about whether she had been
penetrated, it would have been easy for the jury to find that penetration had not taken
place, but they chose not to.'*°
State V. Harlow, 54.
State V. Harlow, 68.
^ State V. Olney, Windsor County Court, December 1895 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 5.
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We have already seen how in State v. Manning, the victim's family was described
as "way down tramps" and the girl herself had been boarded out all over the county, had
a bad reputation for honesty, was not a virgin, and had had sex with another man
foUowing the date of the alleged rape. On cross-examination. Manning's lawyer sought
to disparage the thirteen-year-old's character by focusing on the removal of her
underwear.
Q: Did you kick up your heels so that he could take them off?
A: Why he took them off.
Q: Did you kick up your heels so that you could do it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: He asked you to let him do it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you was willing that he should?
A: I was not wdlling, but I could not get away from him.
Q: You kicked up your heels so that he could take your drawers off, didn't you?
Court: She has said she did.
Since consent was not in issue in the case, one must conclude that Manning's lawyer was
going after Emma Fosby's sexual character. In other words, Emma was willing. The
judge's intervention may well indicate his displeasure at such a tactic, or at least his
impatience given the testimony's irrelevance. None of this mattered any way. Manning
was found guUty not once, but twice.'''
State V. Manning, Windsor County Court, December 1901 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 24-25
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In State v. Thorley (1913) twelve-year-old Emma Davis was a one-legged girl
whose family let her spend her nights at the movie theater in White River Junction. They
admitted that they were having trouble keeping her at home. Thorley, who worked at
the theater, would let her and her girlfriends in for free. Some weeks she went to the
movies every night. In response to a question from Thorley' s lawyer, the police chief
testified that he had never seen such a young girl out walking at night without her
parents. The defense showed that her brother was at the Industrial School for stealing.
Nevertheless, Thorley was found guilty."*^
As with the fact patterns presented by the reported decisions, the transcripts
show most prosecutions involved sex between older men and very young girls. These
anecdotal findings comport with the survey of the four county data. The average age of
male defendants in statutory rape cases was thirty-three. The average age of the victims
was slightly less than twelve. These figures changed somewhat during the three phases
ofVermont's age of consent law. Before the change from eleven to fourteen in 1886 the
average age of defendants was thirty and victims slightly less than nine. Between 1 886
and 1 898 it was thirty-one and ten. After 1 898 it was thirty-four and just under thirteen.
Based on the average age of the alleged victims, most of the girls would not even have
been physically sexually mature at the time intercourse was alleged to have taken place."*^
The average age difference between defendants and their alleged victims was twenty-two
years. Again, there were variations during the period. Prior to 1 886 the average
State V. Thorley, Windsor County Court, December 1913 Term, Transcript of Trial.
In the nineteenth and early twentieth century, the average age ofmenarche for American girls was
between fifteen and sixteen. Today it is twelve. Joan Jacobs Brumberg, The Body Project: An Intimate
History ofAmerican Girls (New York: Random House, 1997), 3-5.
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difference between defendants and alleged victim was twenty-one years; between 1 886
and 1898 it was twenty-two years; and after 1898 it was twenty-three years (see Table
10).
There are a few cases where it is clear that the law was used to break up mutual
relationships between young people that parents or authorities believed were undesirable,
but this was quite rare. The average age of the defendants-thirty-three-malces this clear,
as does the fact that very few cases appear where both parties are teenagers. Out of
sixty-sbc cases where the ages of both defendants and alleged victims are known, in only
ten cases were the defendants and girls seven or less years apart in age, but only seven of
these possibly qualify as teenage romances (1 1 percent)."" Two of the seven received
probation, one was sentenced to the Industrial School, and three others were sentenced
to prison terms of one to two, two to three, and four to five years respectively. The
oldest defendant, Bert Shotter (age twenty), got the longest sentence.
Even in the few cases which grew out of romances between teenage girls and
slightly older boys, fathers appeared hesitant to turn to the new statutory rape law to
break up romances ofwhich they disapproved-even despite great provocation on the
part of the young man. But once these cases did go to trial, as with the more typical
prosecutions of older men, lawyers in these cases constructed their narratives around the
themes of parental responsibility (or neglect), respect for the rights of parents over their
children, and adherence to expected gender roles.
Two of these cases were instances of brother/sister incest and one involved a fifteen year-old boy and
an eleven year-old girl. Slaie v. F. Clayton Bearor, Orange County Court, April 1912 Term, vol. 24, p.
255 (eighteen year-old brother's rape of twelve-year-old sister); State v. James Benjamin, Orange
County Court, December 1909 Term, vol. 24, p. 103 (fourteen year-old brother's attempted rape of
eleven-year-old sister); State v. Willie Perkins, Windsor County Court, December 1899 Term, State
Cases, vol. 4, p. 597-598 (fifteen year-old having sex with eleven year-old).
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take her out riding and Pixley would disobey him. FinaUy he sat Pixley down in the
parlor and had a talk with him.
I called him into the house, and took him into the front room, the sitting
room, alone, and asked him if this was true that he wanted to marry
Lizzie; he says "Yes" and I says "Do you love her?" He said "Yes" I
says "Irving, has there been any wrong between you have you committed
any crime with this girl? "No" he says nothing at all; he said he respected
her, and loved her. Now says I "it is a pretty hard thing—she is a child,
and you are a man, and it seems impossible to keep you apart; 1 says since
I told you to keep away from her, you have been continuously with her;
and I says "It is almost impossible for me to keep you apart; ifyou love
her, you are true to her, ifyour have committed no crime with her, I says,
you will respect her; now, I says, I don't object to your coming to the
house and seeing the girl in our presence with the family; do not take her
out to ride in these by roads, and going to walk with her in these wood-
roads away from people and houses, as you have done
—
you have done it
too much; ifyou love her, you will do as I ask you to, and you will not do
anything to make people talk and cast reflections on her character, and on
you. He says "that is right, that is right"; "I will come here" and says I
"you can come to the house and you may sit with our family, and visit
with the girl with us and in time, ifyou prove yourself all right, and
continue to be loving towards her, and wish to make her your wife, when
she is old enough, we will see later on I have nothing against you, ifyou
will be a man with the girl" That is all the talk that there was and he left,
promising that nothing had been done harmfiil, and that nothing would be
done, and he said that he would come and see her with us, and that he
would not take her to ride on by-roads, or back roads, or do anything to
hurt her character."^
Several familiar themes are discernible in this excerpt. Though George Ames was not
happy about the relationships between Pbdey and his daughter, he was willing to permit
Pbdey to continue seeing her, but only on his terms. Those terms meant that Pixley had
to court Lizzie under Ames's roof Ames reminded Pixley of his obligation to "be a
man." And he also reminded Pixley that his actions threatened the reputation of his
State V. Pixley, Windsor County Court, September 1901 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 61-62.
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daughter and he, Pixley, as well. As we have seen in seduction cases, Pbdey's behavior
threatened Ames's reputation and that of the rest of his family too.
Despite his promises, Pixley was unable to stop himself. A week after this
discussion, Ames awoke to the sound of Pixley and his daughter getting ready to ride off
together. What transpired next is, to my mind, a fascinating moment of decision in
which Ames, Uke Joseph Hamel, testified about having to choose between surveillance
and prevention/repression. In the end, he chose first the one, and then the other. Rather
than run out and stop the two, which he could have done, Lizzie's father decided instead
to follow them. He engaged in a rather mad cap chase over hill and dale with bare feet
and no hat. After more than a mile, he crept up to the couple on a wood road and found
Pbdey on top of his daughter. Ames testified that he leapt out and shouted (again,
ambiguously) "What are you doing here? I have caught you at last." He and Pbdey
brawled. Ames got on top ofhim and asked, "Are you doing as you said you would? Is
this doing as you talked v^th me on Sunday? Pbdey answered, "No, it is wrong, 1
haven't done right." Ames asked, "Irving, are you the man you pretended you were, to
me?" Pixley answered that he was not. Ames asked "are you using my girl right?"
Pixley admitted that he was not. Ames then told Pbdey that ifhe left the state, he would
drop the matter. Pixley agreed, but by then others had arrived. Despite all of this, Ames
sought to avoid turning the episode into a criminal matter. He tried to evade the
questioning of others who had arrived on the scene ("I hated to dis-honor my family" he
said) but he finally told them what happened.''^
Pixley, 62-66.
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On cross-examination, Pixley's attorney argued that Ames could have prevented
the situation but chose not to so that he could "catch them," Ames disagreed, testifying
that he had not followed them for "for crimes sake," but because "it was my duty as a
parent." But why had he not stopped them at the house "ifyou acted on your duty as a
parent?" asked defense counsel. Ames said he did not have time, but admitted he could
have yelled to them and they would have heard it. Pixley's lawyer also asked Ames
about his testimony at the grand jury hearing. At that hearing the lawyer asserted that
Ames had testified that he had seen Pixley unbutton his daughter's clothing, had waited a
while, and then ran up to them. Pixley's lawyer wanted to show that Ames had had
trouble with other men concerning other women in his family and he had used it as a
means of getting money out ofthem. That was why Ames had not stopped his daughter
and why he had engaged in voyeurism. But even Pixley testified that Ames had
demanded he leave the state and never claimed that Ames had attempted to extort money
fi-om him. No evidence was presented to support this theory and the court refused to
allow its introduction. Both the prosecutor and the defense sought to focus attention on
the notion of fatherly responsibility in the case—^the state with regard to how Pixley had
disregarded Ames's parental authority—^the defense on how Ames had abused it.
Pixley was convicted. At the sentencing the state revealed that Pixley had been
accused of having sex wdth another young girl, and that if the Ames case had not come
up, he would have been tried for the other rape instead. Pixley's lawyer denied the
state's allegations with regard to the other girl. He also argued that while consent was
technically irrelevant in statutory cases, the court should, in sentencing, take into account
both the respective ages of the parties, and the fact that Pbdey had not forced himselfon
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Lizzie. The judge was apparently moved by these arguments and sentenced Pixley to no
more than seven years in state prison-eleven years less than Joseph Hamel had
received.''^
State V. Adshad (1904) was a statutory rape prosecution of nineteen-year-old
Arthur Adshad for having sex with Meen-year-old Edna King. Edna's father Seth was a
butcher who operated his own slaughterhouse and did day work to supplement his
income. Adshad, a day laborer, had been coming around the house to see Edna. In early
winter he showed up drunk and Seth King told him to leave. The next time he showed
up drunk. King told him ifhe did not leave, he would have him arrested. Adshad called
him some names, hit him, and King had him arrested for assault. Unable to pay his fine,
Adshad served time at the House of Corrections in Rutland. It was around this same
time that the state's witness George Hutchinson claimed to have seen Adshad and Edna
having intercourse in the bushes.
The state had a difiBcult case to prove. Both Adshad and Edna King denied
having intercourse, and Edna's father was not enthusiastic about the prosecution. He
had not filed the complaint, instead it had been filed by a local attorney after another
man, A. H. Ketchum, had reported what Hutchinson had told him. Both Edna and her
father testified for the defense. As a result, the state had to impeach the credibility of
both Edna and her father-a tactically unenviable strategy for a prosecutor. The
prosecutor asked King whether he had complained to Ketchum about the intimacy
between Adshad and his daughter and whether Ketchum had told him what he needed to
do to break up the relationship. King denied it. Ketchum testified that he saw Adshad
''Pixley, 185-187.
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and Edna together every day. But King said the two were rarely together and he told the
jury that after the preliminary hearing against Adshad Ketchum had bragged: "Didn't I
tell you I would get a hook on [Adshad] sometime."
The prosecution had not presented a strong case. The only witness was
Hutchinson who had seen the couple at a distance. The state had had to discredit the
two people who were often the most efifective witnesses in a statutory rape case, the girl
and her father. The father had not made the complaint and was not interested in seeing
Adshad prosecuted. Edna and Arthur were both teenagers and they obviously liked each
other. And the defense had done a good job of raising the specter of a fi-ame up. The
jury deliberated all afternoon and then again the next morning before telling the judge
that they could not agree. The judge implored them to try again, recognizing how hard
such questions were, but telling them that twelve men would have to decide the case at
some point, and that he despaired of getting any other twelve men as competent as they.
The jury came in an hour later and found Adshad guilty of attempted rape-clearly a
compromise verdict. Adshad was sentenced to two to three years at the House of
Corrections.'*^
In spite of the existence of a few cases where the law broke up apparently
consensual teenage romances, the data makes clear that throughout the entire period, the
criminal justice system used the age of consent law to punish much older men for having
State V. Adshad, Orange County Court, June 1904 Term, Transcript of Trial. In the two other
transcripts of cases falling within the pattern of a young mutual romance, fathers appear either
powerless to stop the relationship or actually aid and abet it. Slate v. Thorley, Windsor County Court,
December 1913 Term, Transcript of Trial, (after doctor examined girl and informed father she had
venereal warts and had been having sex with the defendant, father did not make complaint, complaint
was made by state's attorney); State v. Olney, Windsor County Court, December 1895 Term, Transcript
of Trial (father repeatedly brings daughter to Olney's house, entertains another woman alone in one
room, while defendant and daughter sleep together in adjoining room).
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sex with very young girls. I'cw cases involved mutual romances Ivtween teenagers of
similar age. In the few cases we do have oi such prosecutions, fathers did not initiate the
complaints and appeared uncnthusiastic alx>ut employing the criminal law as a remedy.
Comparison with Other .Kirisdictions
We will recall that the age oi consent campaign was intended, among other
things, to protect teenage girls Irom the ciVects ofpre-nwital sex. t hese included
venereal disease, dimmed marriage prospects, and falling into a life of prostitution. But
the impetus for the social purity campaign urbanization, immigration, industriali/ation
and coiumodification, existed in Vermont in a far more muted way than in New York,
Boston, or Los Angeles. 11 the comments of the Senate Judiciary Committee are any
guide to the sentiments of the Legislature as a whole, we see that they were aware of
sexual activity between teenagers and did not wish sweep it within the rape law by
raising the age of consent too high. The committee's reasoning makes clear that it did
not wish the age of consent campaign to criminali/e the traditional rural pattern of
premarital sex. In this older model, sex between young people led to pregnancy and then
a bastardy proceeding or marriage (or lust the one, and then the other).*' I hus, in
Vermont the increased age of ci>nsent was not used to police teenage sexuality, but to
Sec for example, Shoro v. Shoro. Rutland Supreme C\nirt, Jamiary 1888 IVrm, vol. 120, p. 21(>-217.
I IcrlxMl Shoro, a minor, was in jail on a bastardy charge when he agreed to marry the complainant,
Anna, lie claimed (hat (he marriage was obtained by force and fraud and lha( Anna had a bad
rcputa(ion, (he (wo never lived (ogedier, and never had sex. The Supreme (\nir( gran(ed (he annulment.
Miirsctt V. MarscU^ Addison C\nin(y C\nirt, December 18^)2 Term, vol. 33, p. 5^2-3^)3 (peli(ion lor
annulment: forced marriage of minor by cons(able aiier bas(ardy accusation); Ralph v. Ralph, Rudand
Coun(y C\n!r(, March 1^)15 Term, vol. 01, p. 445 (pe(i(ion for annulmenC false alle^a(ion of bas(ardy,
marries (o get out ofjail); AnJrus v. Andrus. Rudand C\)un(y C\nir(, September P)l(> IVrm, vol. (>2, p.
57-.S8 (petition for annulment: false allegation of bastardy, marries lo avoid jail).
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proscculc luucli dKIci men wlu> IkuI sex wilh youwy, puis Conversely, in cities like
IJoslon, I ,os Angeles, ( )akl;nul, and I ansing, the higher age of consent and olhei
slaliiloiy lelorms allowed anihoiilies as well as working class and immigrani parents to
employ the power ol lhe stale in order to regain authority over the lives ol tcenagc
girls an autliority these people lell a modern, urban Anierican society had taken away
Irom them. Typically that intervention sought to separate teenage girls I'roni liaisons
wilh men in their teens or early twenties.
Thus, Mary Odenu in her study ol statutory rape prosecutions in Oakland and
I .OS Angeles at the turn ol the century, reveals a signifieanlly dillerent pattern of
prosecutions tlian thai demonstrated by the Verujonl data. For example, she linds (hat
delendants in these cases were overwhelmingly young men accused ol having sex wilh
teenage girls rather than the middle-aged, middle-chiss seducers Ihe purity campaigners
had had in mind when they worked to raise (he age ol consent. Seventy-three percent ol
Ihe men charged with statiilory ra|)e in Alameda County (Oakland) were between age
eighteen and twenty-nine the bulk ofwhom were between eighteen and twenty-four; 74
percent of such cases in T.os Angeles County involved men even younger, between
ndeen and seventeen. It is important to rememlxM too that the age of consent in
Calilornia al this time was eighteen lor girls. Punishment rellected this alternative
dynnniic. While conviction rales were iiigh (sixty-seven percent), sentences were lenient
with hallThe men receiving probation. In addition, according to Odem, many judges
sanctioned the use of character evidence against the girls in these eases, permitted the
issue of consent to be brought out, and allowed the girls to be treated in a punitive
lashion. I he first person to gel probation in a statutory rape case, was not, like in
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Vermont, a teenage boy, but a fifty-seven-year-old man who had had sex with a fifteen-
year-old girl. The sentencing judge took pity on him because the girl looked older than
her years and was perceived as having bad morals. Recall that when Irving Pixley, aged
twenty-one, asked for leniency on the ground that his relationship with thirteen-year-old
Lizzie Ames had been consensual, he received a seven-year sentence. Clearly the
experience in Vermont and California was remarkably different.^"
Kathleen Parker's study of sexual assault in Michigan also demonstrates how
statutory rape law could be implemented in a variety ofways. In a more urban and
diverse Ingham County, the authorities simply did not enforce the rape laws in cases of
sexual assaults on adult women. While there were only forty such prosecutions between
1850 and 1950 in Ingham County, the courts heard some 326 cases for statutory rape
between 1 880 and 1 950. As in Vermont, Michigan too reacted quickly to the age of
consent campaign, raising its age of consent fi-om ten to fourteen in 1 887 and to sixteen
in 1 897. Eighty-four percent of all cases going to a verdict resulted in a conviction,
while only 6 percent resulted in an acquittal (10 percent had unknown outcomes).
Parker's work reveals both similarities and differences with the experience in
Vermont. First, both jurisdictions showed high numbers of prosecutions and convictions
fi-om the 1 880s onward. But unlike in Vermont, the courts paid much greater attention
to consensual romantic relationships. Parker shows that at least a third of all
prosecutions arose out of such courtships, while Vermont data reveals very few such
cases. Despite the fact that the cases involved statutory rape, Parker asserts that judges
*° Odem, 20, 39, 53, 76; see also Linda Gordon, Heroes ofTheir Own Lives: The Politics and History of
Family Violence, Boston 1880-1960 (1988), 187-193 (on working class and immigrant parents' use of
stubborn child laws to gain control over teenage children).
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focused much more on the issue of character and consent in these cases-again, a pattern
different from that exhibited by the Vermont evidence.'' Again, we see that
generalizations about law and sex in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries break
down when scrutinized in the context in which they actually existed-in the courtrooms
and legislative chambers of each individual state.
Conclusion
The "he said, she said" nature ofproof in a statutory rape trial and absence of a
consent defense meant that both the state and the defense had very few options except to
discredit the character ofeach other's witnesses. That they often drew attention to their
failure to observe traditional family roles for men and women, parents and children, tells
us that they thought these failings would resonate with judges and juries—^that is, that
deviant family life was of great concern to these men. Parents were supposed to be
supervising their daughters, and taking care of their children's material, spiritual, and
educational needs. When they did not, defendants sought to exploit this. Conversely
defendants were supposed to protect children, live up to sexual norms, respect the rights
of their parents not to have their children interfered with, and in the case ofboarders and
relatives, not betray the trust that had been bestowed on them by being allowed into the
home. When defendants took advantage of this trust, lived in suspect marital
relationships, violated parents' wishes, or failed to provide for the material needs of their
families, prosecutors highlighted these failures. This was part of a larger pattern in
" Kathleen Ruth Parker, "Law Culture and Sexual Censure: Sex Crime Prosecutions in a Midwest
County Circuit Court, 1850-1950" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1993), 152-317, Table 21.
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which both sides, but especially the defense, would try anything it could get away with to
sway the jury.
Nevertheless a more important value overcame all of these moral and social
shortcomings. The transcripts from statutory rape cases, the appellate records, and the
high percentages of convictions in all statutory rape cases, show that it did not seem to
matter what the character of the prosecutrix or her family was for chastity—defendants
were found guilty of the charges. Furthermore in many of the cases the state's evidence
was very weak and defendants presented highly plausible defenses. In other words, the
juries could have found for the defendants ifthey had wanted to, but in the great majority
of cases they did not. This suggests to me a strong intolerance for sex between men and
young girls which overcame any desire to punish deviant girls.
Though this fact may not sound surprising, it is important to remember that much
of this activity had only been made illegal five, ten, or fifteen years before. And, more
important, these trials represented an extraordinary inversion ofthe social hierarchy. Almost
invariably conviction rested on the testimony of a young girl against that of an older man.
This dynamic inverted traditional roles, giving very young girls extraordinary power over
men.
At the same time it created a dramatic increase in explicit courtroom talk about
young girls and sex. In his perceptive work on pornography and obscenity law in the
nineteenth and early twentieth century, Walter Kendrick describes the creation of a
discursive foil by legislators, judges, lawyers, and commentators knovm as 'the young
person"-the person who needed protection. Sometimes female, sometimes male, she
was the invention ofthose who sought to determine what was or was not suitable for her
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gaze. She is ever present in the writings of commentators and judges-the person on
whose behalf the whole exercise was supposedly necessary; a person created from the
perspective of those regulating on her behalf and who lives only in the minds of those
people. Judges and regulators might view materials harmful to 'Hhe young person" with
impunity.
In statutory rape cases, however, the courtroom became a nexus at which
regulators and a "young person" actually met face to face. Constitutional protections.
Supreme Court precedent, and common law tradition guaranteed that evidence of an
explicitly sexual nature would be common in statutory rape trials. At a time when
increased repression of all sexual display was being pursued at the local and national
level, teenage female bodies and sexuality were to be put on display in the incredibly
public space of a county court jury trial."
Why did Vermonters so eagerly invert the gender and age hierarchy? And why
did they expand the amount of sexual talk in their criminal justice system? For one thing,
it is impossible to ignore the way in which the change in the age of consent law and the
surge in prosecutions that followed it coincided with many of the other developments
documented in earlier chapters of this study. Vermonters believed that their hallowed
culture rested on specific social and familial forms, but also felt that those institutions
were sagging. Villages and towns declined, farms failed, divorce rates skyrocketed,
adultery, abortion, and venereal disease seemed to have become common place. At the
same time, in the area of seduction law, the Vermont Supreme Court increasingly
" Walter Kendrick, The Secret Museum: Pornography in Modern Culture (New York: Viking, 1987),
123, 142-43, 156, 160, 177, 193,227.
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justified punishing men who impregnated a man's daughter out of wedlock not only for
the economic harm they caused, but also for the disruption in the father/daughter
relationship. It was at this time that prosecutors used the increased age of consent law
to go after older men having sex with young girls, convict them, and send them to
prison. Such sexual behavior, like adultery and seduction, was a knife pointed at the
heart of the institutions and values Vermonters believed defined them-close extended
families, sexual propriety, and adherence to proper gender and age roles.
I believe that the willingness of Vermonters to punish men accused of having
sex with underage girls reflected a fear that changing circumstances were disrupting
family relationships and traditional roles. The suddenness with which the state became
involved in the issue, the rapid increase in regulation of sexual relationships, and the
firmness with which juries and judges punished these violations reflects a dramatic shift
in mentality. Not only was sex between girls and older men a problem, it was a
problem that stale institutions could and should fix. But, as we have seen again and
again, that intervention focused less on girls than on men. As the Senate Judiciary
Committee's report made clear, senators understood tliat raising the age of consent
signaled a decision to no longer hold teenage girls responsible for their actions. Instead,
it shifted the onus to men, articulating expectations for male, rather than female
behavior. Thus, it is no surprise that the court proceedings took notice of the girls'
actions, but did not allow them to foil a prosecution.
By contrast, in other areas of the country where the law was used to regulate
teenage sexuality, especially of older girls, rather than protect younger girls, the law
focused much more on the behavior of the girl. This was also true ofjurisdictions that
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crimiiiali/cd seduction, liccausc these laws governed consensual sex by women iind girls
they applied only to lemales of "previously chaste character," implicating the
complainant's morality/' Vermont never adopted such a law, and civil seduction was an
action brought by lathers, not by daughters. As a result, both fathers and the state could
punish men who had sex with young girls while muting criticism or condemnation of the
girl herself (and her family) which might lead to a not guilty verdict in other jurisdictions,
furthermore, sending a defendant to prison for six years was a more elfective way to
protect all I'amilies from interference than punishing a family t)r girl who might be beyond
saving by acquitting the defendant.
We can see confirmation of these concerns in the themes that prosecutors and
judges wove into their texts narratives they used to persuade juries to find men guilty
and justify their punishment, ('onsider again the story told by (leorge Ames in the J*ixley
case. In his attempts to reason with Irving Pixley, Ames referenced manly obligation and
insistence on respect for parental authority. Rut these entreaties fell on deaf ears. I'ixley
would not olx-y him and neither would his thirteen-year-old daughter. Ames had to chase
after them in a state of undress. The image of a father chasing his daughter over hill and
dale to prevent her sexual exploitation at the hands of an older man must have lx.'en a
powerful one. That Pixlcy's actions lell (ieorge Ames stripped of the trappings of
Victorian respectability (his hat) and civilization (his slK)es) added fuel to the lire. It was
an image that had to have resonated.
Linda J. Laccy, "Introtiiiciiin I'cinini.sl Jiirispriidcncc: An Analysis ot Oklahoma's Seduction Slaliilc,"
Tulsa Law Journal 25 (1990): 775, 793-794.
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Listen to the comments ofjudge Laforrest Thompson in delivering sentence on
Joseph Hamel convicted for raping his eight-year-old niece. Thompson condemned
Hamel for his betrayal of the Thrashers' hospitaUty and for betraying his obUgations as a
man.
You were a guest in her father's house. You were a man of full age, and
every thought ofmanhood and decency made you the protector of that
child in the absence of her parents, and yet . . . instead of fulfilling that
trust imposed upon you, by virtue of your manhood, and the fact that you
had a mother, and may have had sisters, you saw fit to make this gross
assault upon this child, and to ravish her without any regard to the
consequences, simply to gratify your own animal lust
These few lines encapsulated not only the main themes presented at trial, but also the
themes echoed over and over again in the texts produced by Vermont's lawmaking
institutions: familial and parental obligation, the expectation that gender roles would be
adhered to, that male sexuality must be contained, the belief that fidelity to these models
meant the difierence between a society that was civilized, and one that was barbarous,
and a firm commitment to punish those who transgressed these rules.
//awe/, 371-372.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
On Monday, June 2 P*,! 897, in the Orange County Courthouse, in Chelsea,
Vermont, a crowd ofmen gathered around Roy Jewett in order to examine the size of
his penis. The ten-year-old was a witness in the statutory rape trial of his eight-year-old
half sister DeUa Thrasher. The accused, Delia's thirty-three year-old uncle, Joseph
Hamel, argued that it was Roy who had penetrated Delia, not he. In order to rebut the
charge, the state had had Roy examined by a doctor who testified that Roy's penis was
far too small to have caused the injuries to the little girl. Concerned that the doctor's
testimony alone was not enough to convince the jury, the state had asked the judge to
allow the jurors to see for themselves, suggesting that the examination be held in a small
witness chamber off the main courtroom.
Judge Laforrest Thompson did not feel that the inspection required the privacy of
the witness chamber and had Roy simply drop his trousers in the middle of the
courtroom. The boy exposed himself in fi-ont oftwelve male jurors, gathered fi-om all
the towns in the county, Judge Thompson, lawyers H. K. Darling and J. H. Watson for
the state, J. W. Gordon and William Lapoint for the defendant, and the defendant
himself, Joseph Hamel. The state's medical expert. Dr. J. H. Winch was there and so
were any members of the public who might have been present that day. The events were
dutifolly recorded in shorthand by Mrs. Mary Chestnut, the court reporter. And so a
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little boy's genitals became (according to the prosecutor) "an exhibit" in this the most
public, most ofiBcial space the county had to ofifer.'
This work has shown how the legal system defined, investigated, and punished
sexual transgression. But in so doing, Vermont's legal system also became the most
important site of public sexual discourse in the state. If the laws, indictments,
informations, briefe, and Supreme Court opinions we have examined were the scripts for
this discourse, the county courtrooms were stages on which those scripts were
performed. Prior to the creation of state agencies charged with regulating these
behaviors and exercising control over them just before and after World War I, Vermont's
courts were the place where the state took ofBcial notice of sexuality and sexual
deviance, classified it, evaluated and articulated its harms, and punished those who had
committed the acts.
Because this process unfolded within the civil and criminal legal system it was
highly public. The jury, unique to Anglo-American law, guaranteed a role for the public
in criminal and civil trials. The requirement that each town supply jurors to the county
court meant that after the term was over, the stories told in the court would be carried
away to every part of the county-to town, village, and hill farm.^ Historical and
constitutional traditions ofpublic trial, public accusation, right to confi-ont witnesses, a
fi-ee press, and the boredom and gossip characteristic of small-town life fiirther
' State V. Hamel, Orange County Court, June 1897 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 317-319.
2 In his remarks to the annual meeting ofthe bar association in 1901, lawyer Felix McGettrick explained
how jurors returned to their respective towns more educated than when they had left and upon arrival
there, they mingled with "their fellow-citizens, and impart[ed] to them the information they have
acquired and the experience they have received." Proceedings ofthe Vermont Bar Association 6, no. 1
(1901), 54.
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guaranteed the public nature of these events. The biannual meeting of the county court
was a major happening in each shire town and the cases brought and their dispositions
were recorded in local newspapers.' Lastly, the requirement of a record, necessary to
preserve the right of appeal to the Supreme Court, and the precedential value of that
court's decisions-again, unique to the Anglo-American system-meant that the stories
told in the county courts would be taken down, printed, digested, and circulated
throughout the state.
Vermont had one of the highest literacy rates in the world at the turn of the
nineteenth century and many of the texts created by and for this legal system were widely
available to its citizens. Legal materials had formed a significant part of family libraries
fi-om the beginning. A survey of private collections of books gathered jfrom probate
records between 1780 and 1835 for example found that Blackstone was one of the most
popular works held in private libraries in Windsor County and not only those of lawyers.
The laws and statutes ofVermont was the fifth most common book found in family
libraries, the first collection of opinions of the Supreme Court published by Judge
Nathaniel Chipman in 1 793 was twenty-fifth.''
Much of this process of dissemination was sponsored by the state itself.
Beginning in 1829, the General Assembly required that the decisions of the Supreme
Court be published annually and that five hundred copies be deposited v*nth the secretary
' See for example The Bradford Opinion, 1 1 January 1879, for listing of cases. Copy in the Roswell
Farnham Papers, Folder 21-16, Special Collections, University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont.
When the Orange County Court was in session in Chelsea for its biannual term, judges, lawyers, jurors,
witnesses, and parties descended on the the little town taking over the entire Orange County Hotel.
Proceedings ofthe Vermont Bar Association 2 no. 4 (1889), 221-223.
" William J. Gilmour, Reading Becomes a Necessity ofLife: Material and Cultural Life in Rural New
England. 1780-1835 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1989), 43, 64-65.
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of state for sale to the pubUc. By 1843, the General Assembly was requiring that the
Vermont Reports be distributed to every town in the state as well as the libraries of the
University of Vermont, Middlebury College, and Norwich University. In 1856 the
General Assembly called for the publication of a digest of cases and authorized the
production of "a cheap edition" specifically intended for private citizens. By 1874 the
Reports were being sent to every state judge and ex-judge, the U. S. District Court
judge, every court clerk and register ofprobate in addition to every town clerk. Two
years later, the Legislature increased its order to 800 copies per year and ordered that
any excess be made available to the public. By 1906 the annual print run was 900
copies.^
As we have seen, the Vermont Reports provided a wealth of information about
sexual transgressions and the social context in which they took place. This point was not
lost on Vermont's lawyers. In an address to a mixed audience at the Association's 1885
annual meeting lawyer Elisha May reviewed the Vermont Reports, commenting that the
bench and bar were mirrored in them and that they "contain much of the history,
rhetoric, and pictures of our social life. . . . They cover most every phase ofhuman life;
they sing nearly every song." After describing several decisions involving adultery and
allegations of sexual slander, May noted that Vermont's social life was depicted in these
. reports and that it was sometimes the case that "the fair fame of a family is tarnished by
the revelations before the Court."^
' 1828 Vt. Acts 3; 1843 Vt. Acts 48; 1856 Vt. Acts 59; 1874 Vt. Acts 82; 1906 Vt. Acts 215.
* Proceedings ofthe Vermont Bar Association, 1885-1886 (Montpelier, 1886), 37-47.
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The public nature of criminal and civil proceedings meant that the courts were a
singular source of frank, pubUc talk about sex and sexuality in Vermont at this time.
There was no other place, and certainly no other public and official place, where such
conversations could take place. And the volume of such cases only increased as the
nineteenth century came to an end. Vermont's newspapers might document that a rape
trial took place, but rarely went into details. They might also print the results of divorce
proceedings and even list the cause (including aduUery) or reprint stories from other
states about murderous love triangles. Such coverage never went into the sexual details
of these stories. But even this indirect contribution of the courts to sexual talk in society
was too much for some. In an essay written in the late nineteenth century, E. J. Phelps,
past president of the Vermont Bar Association, law professor, diplomat, and one-time
candidate for Chief Justice of the United State Supreme Court, complained about the
effects of the discourse churned out by the courts and reported in the popular press.
Phelps, who had served as professor of medical jurisprudence at the University of
Vermont in the 1 880s, railed against the "serious mischief to the public" caused by:
the unclean and repulsive sensational narratives with which so many
columns of papers of this class are filled: the criminal, obscene, and
demoralizing incidents, which, bad enough when merely reported as part
of the news of the day, are spun out, elaborated, and repeated with an
intimate variety of disgusting and unwholesome detail; the lives and
conduct of the criminal, the vicious, and the profligate; the most unsavory
conflicts in courts of justice, amplified and adomed-all that panders to the
morbid and depraved taste.^
The rather tame (and mostly skeletal) coverage provided in Vermont's papers aside,
other sources of sexual talk were rare and in fact illegal.
' E. J. Phelps, "The Age of Words," in J. G. McCullough, ed.. Orations and Essays ofEdwardJohn
Phelps: Diplomat and Statesman (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1901), vii-xv, 468.
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Prior to the passage of the federal customs law of 1 842, Vermont's 1 821
obscenity statute was the only one in the nation. In other states, as in England, obscenity
was prosecuted as a common law rather than as a statutory ofifense. Scholars postulate
that obscene or pornographic materials were a low priority for the state prior to the
middle ofthe nineteenth century since only the wealthy and educated had access to
them.* It is possible that Vermont, with its high literacy rates and vibrant print culture,
experienced the phenomenon of cheap, widely-circulated pornography earUer than other
places. As early as 1 81 7, for example, almost 300 copies ofMemoires ofa Woman of
Pleasure were on hand just across the Connecticut River in a printer's shop in Walpole,
New Hampshire. Fanny Hill also circulated in Windsor County at this time.^
Vermont's obscenity statute punished anyone who did "print, publish, or vend,
any lewd or obscene book, picture, or print" and assessed a fine of up to 200 dollars
upon conviction. By 1 839, the category of censored materials extended to ballads, or
any "other thing containing obscene language, obscene prints, pictures, figures or
descriptions manifestly tending to the corruption of the morals ofyouth" and increased
the penalty to include up to a year in jail. The statute punished not only those who
created and sold these materials, but anyone who purchased or possessed them and
anyone who "introduce[d] into any family, school or place of education" such materials.
The statute remained largely unchanged throughout the century, continuing to protect
youth fi"om corruption and to protect families and schools. An 1 892 statute barred the
« Walter Kendrick, The Secret Museum: Pornography in Modern Culture (New York: Viking, 1987),
77-78.
'Gilmour, 114-134, 177-178.
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iniblic posting or exhibit ol
-ol)scciic pic tures, llgurcs, prints, Ucsu iplions or languajic^'
and prohihitccl the exhibit olObseene plays, comedies or shows, providin}> up to three
months in the Mouse ol ( orreelions for the violation. Immoral movies or vaudeville
shows were added to the list in 1017 and two years later the legislature gave towns and
eilies the authority to license shows, movies, and tiances and to deny such licenses when
^^the public good requires."'*^ Ironically, the proceedings taking place in the county
courts would have subjected the participants to a potential jail sentence had they
occurred in any other venue.
Court ()roceediiigs were public, and anyone could attend. In addition to the
judges, lawyers, doctors, jurors, witnesses, and parties who appeared in court, members
of the public, too, were ordinarily in attendance. Lawntakers and comnientators
understood that the sexually explicit nature ol the court proceedings meant that a court
case had the potential to spread damage to the wider society. I hey thus sought to
balance the needs ol the justice system against the harm such displays could do to
individuals and society. In discussing the problems posed by such cases, Sinion
(ireenleafexplained how this balance should be maintained.
riie mere indecency ofdisclosures does not, in general, suirice to exclude
them, where the evidence is necessary lor the purposes ol civil or criminal
justice; as, in an indictment lor rape; or in a cpiestion upon the sex olOne,
claiming an estate entailed, as heir male or lemale; or, u|)on the legitimacy
olOne claiming as lawful heir; or in an action by the husband for criminal
conversation with the wile. In these and similar Ciises the evidence is
necessary, either for the prool and punishment of the crime, or Ibr the
vindication of rights existing before, or independent of the fact sought to
be disck)sed.
\ VI. Acts I § 2 \\ Ki'visi'd Statuh's oj Virmonl, /A'.^^ (Murlingtoii, IK-IO), Chapter § 10, 1892
Vt. Acts 88; 1*>I7 VI. Acts 240; 1^)19 VI. Acts 1*>3.
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On the other hand, in cases where the parties have 'Voluntarily and impertinently
interested themselves in a question, tending to violate the peace of society, by exhibiting
an innocent third person to the world in a ridiculous or contemptible light, or to disturb
his own peace and comfort, or to offend public decency by the disclosures which its
decision may require, the evidence will not be received." Greenleaf cited as examples a
bet between parties about the sex of a third person or whether an unmarried woman had
had a child, or a declaration by a husband or wife that they have not had sex and that
therefore their children were spurious. Such cases, according to Greenleaf are "on the
same general ground of decency, morality, and policy . . . uniformly excluded."
Commentators as far apart as Canada and Australia worried that the admission of
sexually explicit evidence, even when required for resolution of a case, was still bad for
society."
Vermonters too were worried. In November 1886, the same month that the
Legislature raised the age of consent to fourteen, ushering in a surge of sexually explicit
statutory rape prosecutions, the Legislature also gave judges authority to exclude
children and others from the court to protect them from sexually-charged trials. A bill,
entitled "An Act to Protect Minors," required justices of the peace and judges to exclude
Simon Greenleaf, A Treatise on (he Law ofEvidence (Boston, 1860), 352-353. For example, some
contemporary commentators were sensitive to the increasing sexual explicitness of legal discourse on
seduction and worried that this talk itself could undermine morality. Concerning debate on an
Australian seduction bill, the Sydney Morning Herald urged that "the less such matters are discussed the
better for public morals." In Canada a judge in an 1863 seduction case expressed concern about the
moral values of the "so-called victims" of seduction and worried that public airing of seduction cases
would lead to more immoral behavior. Michael Sturma, "Seduction and Punishment in Late Nineteenth
Century New South Wales" Australian Journal ofLaw & Society 2 (1985), 80; Martha J. Bailey,
"Servant Girls and Masters: The Tort of Seduction and the Support of Bastards" Canadian Journal of
Family Law 10 (1991), 159; Constance Backhouse, "The Tort of Seduction: Fathers and Daughters in
Nineteenth-Century Canada" Dalhousie Law Journal 10 (1986), 71.
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imiiors li 1)111 the court whenever a "cause of scandalous or obscene nature is on trial"
unless their presence was necessary as a witness or party. It further authorized justices
and judges to exclude "all persons" not necessarily present as parties or witnesses in such
cases at their discretion.'' The extent to which judges made use of this statute is not
known. The transcripts reveal that judges did sometimes order witnesses to leave the
courtroom prior to the giving of their teslimony-a standard precaution to prevent their
stories from becoming tainted by heai iiig the testimony of others. But I have found no
evidence on the record ofjudges excluding members of the public under the 1886 law.
These attempts to limit the reach of the sexual talk taking place in Vermont's
courts could not keep pace with the sheer volume of cases with sexual implications heard
there. From the 1 860s onward, the volume of cases which dealt with errant sex
increased dramatically. Skyrocketing divorce rates and an accompanying increase in the
raw number of adultery allegations along with the increased number of adultery
prosecutions and statutory rape charges ai\er 1880 meant that deviant sex had a far
larger presence in the courts than ever before. That these narratives were contained
within an officially sanctioned setting may have provided some comfort to observers.
But in fact, they were not contained there because so many ordimiry Vermonters were
active participants in the process.
Between 1860 and 1920 for example almost two hundred criminal cases for rape,
statutory rape, adultery, and lewdness were heard by juries in the four counties (as
opposed to the many more decided by plea or by a bench trial). Assuming twelve jurors
heard each of these cases, and eight witnesses testified at each trial, that means that some
'2 1886 Vt. Acts 60.
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four thousand people either observed a whole trial or participated in a portion of it.
Hundreds more people participated as parties, lawyers, judges, and court officers. We
can only guess at the numbers of public spectators in attendance including those who had
other business before the court. During the same period as many as two thousand
divorces were heard which asserted adultery as a cause in the petition. These hearings,
while not jury trials, also would have had witnesses in attendance and were open to the
pubUc unless a judge decided to close them. The law also required the parties to pubUsh
their petition in the local newspaper in cases where the other spouse no longer resided in
the state.
Thus perhaps ten thousand people participated in or witnessed the creation of the
discourse examined in this study and that is only in the four counties studied. Because
the rate of statutory rape, aduhery, and divorce proceedings accelerated towards the end
of the period of study, the number of explicit trials and thus the number of participants,
witnesses, and spectators would have also been on the increase with each successive
decade. In the first decade of the twentieth century for example there were fifty-six such
trials. Ifwe count only jurors and witnesses, more than 1 100 people participated in
these proceedings in nine years-approximately one percent of the entire population of
the counties. And this figure does not take into account others who participated in these
cases as judges, lawyers, court officers, or who witnessed them as spectators. These
figures also do not take into account the many other proceedings in which this sexual
1870 Vt. Acts 27 and 28. The judge had discretion to exclude all persons from a divorce hearing
except the parties and the court officers if he chose. For an example of a petition published in a
newspaper in a divorce/adultery case, see Fannie Mae Elson v. William E. Elson, Windsor County
Court, June 1901 Term, Docket No. 1201 (motion seeking to amend divorce petition by adding adultery
as a cause; court orders amended petition to be published in the local newspaper. The Spirit ofthe Age).
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talk might also have played a role, including bastardy cases, civil suits for breach of
marriage promise, alienation of affections, seduction, civil assault, and obscenity. We
have seen that many of these case also created an explicit sexual narrative. Taken all
together these suits add several hundred more cases to those filtering through the courts
during this period.''*
Lawyers and the law were mainly responsible for constructing this discourse, but
an altemative center ofpower began to grow in Vermont beginning in the middle of the
century. Vermont's regular physicians became an increasingly powerfiil source of
authority in the state. These two voices increasingly came together in the legal system as
the century drew to a close. With their "scientific" approach and clinical descriptions,
they helped lawyers create astonishingly fi-ank and public discussions of sex and sexuality
in the public space that was the county courthouse.
This process had several different effects. It explicitly demonstrated the sexual
deviancy that existed in some of Vermont's households. It showed how violations of
sexual norms disrupted families and society. It engaged the court and participants in the
re-imagining of these sexual narratives and played out new ones before their very eyes.
Finally, it forced judges and juries to come to terms vsath the meaning of these acts, and,
in so doing, to articulate the sexual and gender expectations they held for the parties
appearing before them.
For qualitative examples, see Proceedings ofthe Vermont Bar Association vol. 1, no. 2 (1899)
(Supreme Court judge tells a mixed audience at bar meeting of prosecution of two women for running a
brothel in Barre); Proceedings ofthe Vermont Bar Association 6, no. 1 (1901), 54 (lawyer explains that
juries return to towns and relate what they have seen at court); Hamel, Transcript of Trial, p. 18-19
(testimony of witnesses at a murder/adultery trial discussed in front of family members).
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To citizens steeped in the twin rhetorics of Victorian propriety and homespun
Vermont morality, the ugly reality revealed by the civil and criminal business of the
courts must have been deeply disquieting. I have already highlighted many cases which
graphically described sexual misbehavior: young girls fondled and raped by old men;
daughters impregnated by their fathers and step-fathers; wives stumbling in upon
husbands and paramours. Many of these cases created images that were truly horrifying.
In 1898, Almira Cushman of Hartland sought an uncontested divorce from her
husband E. W. Cushman on grounds of adultery. At the hearing, their son William
testified on behalfof his mother. He told how he, his brother Guy, and their father were
at the family home in Hartland one afternoon during sugaring season in 1 897. Two
women. Belle Strong and May Sturtevant, showed up and the five played cards. William
took Belle Strong upstairs while his father took May Sturtevant into a bedroom. After a
while, William and Strong came back dovmstairs, his father and Sturtevant re-entered the
room shortly thereafter. "Soon after that my father went to the sink, unbuttoned his
pants, took out his private parts and showed them in the presence ofmy brother Guy and
myself, and said to us, 'You see what you get when you have been doing what I have,'
His private parts were covered with blood and he washed them at the sink." AJmira
Cushman' s divorce was granted.'^
'5 Cushman v. Cushman, Windsor County Court, May 1898 Term, Docket No. 1073. E. W. Cushman
was charged with adultery as a resuh ofthe allegations. But William Cushman was accused ofmaking
up the testimony and charged with perjury. A jury found him not guilty, but it found E. W. not guilty
too. They could not both have been telling the truth, but the juries apparently thought so. State v.
William E. Cushman, Windsor County Court, State Cases, vol. 4, p. 549; State v. Edward E. Cushman,
Windsor County Court, State Cases, vol. 4, p. 519-520. Sturtevant and Strong had aduUery charges
brought against them in 1901 (Sturtevant for having sex with Cushman) but both defaulted and the
prosecutor entered a nolle prosse in their cases. State v. Sturtevant, Windsor County Court, June 1901
Term, Docket No. 1046; State v. Strong, Windsor County Court, June 1901 Term, Docket No. 1058.
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These cases not only contained descriptions of sexual immorality, but also
demonstrated how that activity corrupted family and home. In seduction and breach of
marriage promise cases the defendant's actions left the relationship between father and
daughter "broken and dishonored" or harmed the woman's chances for folfilling her own
destiny as a wife and mother. In Cushman, the father had aduUerous sex, uncovered his
nakedness in his sons' presence, then contaminated the kitchen sink with the blood of his
partner.'^ The attempted murder trial of EfiBe Spaulding and Solomon James discussed
in an earlier chapter with its tale of the defendants' adultery also filled the courtroom
with images of contamination and corruption. Forced out of his v^e's bed and even his
home by Solomon James, Wilbur Spaulding then consumes a meal prepared by his
wife-coffee and potatoes laced v^th poison.'^
Proving or disproving these stories engaged participants in a process of imagining
the acts or provided opportunities for the performance ofnew ones. This led to
powerful and sometimes bizarre displays, akin to the burlesque shows prohibited by
Vermont law. The Hamel case with its public inspection ofRoy Jewett's penis was one
such example. Pity the poor boy. The defendant's lawyer, faced with evidence that the
boy's penis was too small to have committed the act, sought to show by the doctor that
the boy's chronic masturbation had since caused his organ to shrink so that it was now
smaller than it might have been. Thus, he might in fact have been able to injure DeUa as
the defense claimed.
All three actions were also affronts to Mosaic law. Lev. 20:10 (adultery); Gen. 9:21-27 (Noah's
nakedness before his sons); Lev. 15:33 (lying with a woman during her period).
" State V. Spaulding and James, Windsor County Court, May 1 894 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 134.
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Q: Isn't it true that the male organ is apt in course of time to diminish in size if there
has been masturbation,-tend to wither?
A: No sir.
Q: You think it would not?
A: No sir.
Q: It wouldn't injure it so that it would tend to diminish in size?
A: No sir.
Q: You had experience in that class of cases?
A: Yes, somewhat.
Q: Of children of this age?
A: Of this age, but not of this size, perhaps.
Court: If that has no effect upon the male organ in respect to size, what is its tendency?
A: The excitement caused by masturbation would tend to abnormally increase the
size.
In this examination. Dr. Winch was bucking the common Victorian wisdom that
masturbation caused the penis to wither. Roy Jewett simply had a small penis for a boy
his age and Dr. Winch knew, because over the years, he explained: "I have seen a good
many." Exhibited yet again to the jury, again in open court, the doctor pointed to the
boy's penis, stating "There is the organ I examined,-abnormally small."'*
Jewett aside, lawyers and doctors mostly helped tell stories in court involving
intimate discussions about female bodies. In rape cases, the female body was the main
piece of physical evidence. Observers ofrape trials could almost always expect to hear
'« State V. Hamel, June 1897 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 319-320.
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graphic accounts from the woman herself about how her body had been acted upon by
her male assaUant. Had he lifted her skirts? Had he put his hands on her genitals? Had
he penetrated her? If so, how much? They could also expect a clinical description ofthe
female genitals from doctors as prosecutors sought to corroborate the female's story.
These descriptions were extremely graphic, detailing the presence of fluids, bruising,
whether the hymen was intact and what it meant if it was not. Had the girl or woman
had sex before? How long before? How many times?'
^
In the Hamel case, lawyers and doctors grappled with each other about the
position of the vulva on an eight-year-old compared to that of an aduh woman. Was the
appearance of the organ different while standing than while sitting? While standing, was
it opened or closed? Could Hamel have penetrated her from behind given their
respective ages and size? The question forced every person in the courtroom to visualize
the act in their mind. The discussion grew so complicated that the state's expert had a
detailed medical illustration taken from Gray's Anatomy circulated among the jury.
Given Victorian notions of female modesty and the lack of lighting in most Vermont
dwellings, one wonders whether many of the male jurors had ever seen human female
genitals in such detail. Technically at least, it was illegal to possess such illustrations or
to display them in public. But these exhibitions and stories were legitimized by virtue of
being contained in the courtroom and were produced, preserved, and disseminated by the
command of the state.
" See for example, the testimony of Dr. O. W. Peck in State v. Bedard, "Respondent's Exceptions,"
Vermont Reports Briefe, 65(1), no. 42, p. 35-37 for a lengthy and graphic account of his gynecological
examination ofthe victim.
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Some women and girls resisted attempts by the medico-legal process to write
stories with their bodies. Cora Weightman, a sixteen-year-old rape victim, repeatedly
refused to aUow a vaginal examination by two different doctors. When asked about it,
her mother said that no doctor ever could get her to aUow it. Cora's story was
corroborated by her mother and a neighbor who testified about underwear containing
blood and semen, or, in her mother's words "what there would be jfrom him."^'' In the
statutory rape trial ofAmos Ohey, the victim, thirteen-year-old Edna Severance, battled
the defense lawyer over several pages of transcript as he questioned her on the legally
vital question of penetration. Severance refiised to elaborate on the sexual encounter.
The judge finally had to threaten her. "Ifyou do not answer, the court will have take
measures to make you, and I advise you to answer it, without the court having to resort
to any methods." Despite the threat, Severance continued to resist the efforts ofboth
the defense attorney and the judge to force her to elaborate on exactly what she and
Olney had done.
Q: Go on and tell what he did. Do you remember that there was any penetration of
your person that night with his?
A: Yes, sir; I think there was.
Q: You are positive about it, are you not, on that occasion?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And willing to swear to it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Tell just what happened-just how much-just how far it was? (Not answered)
State V. Como, Windsor County Court, December 1894 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 27, 39.
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Court: Well, can you tell?
A: Well, I don't remember.^'
Other women resisted, before finally telling the courtroom everything it needed to hear.
Mary Josephs repeatedly asked the judge if she could describe the attempted rape "in
secret," but the judge said no.^^ There could be no sexual secrets in a criminal trial in
Vermont.
I undertook this project with the hope that a comprehensive local study of law
and sex would provide useful insights into an important new sub-discipline. I believe
that this work has demonstrated both the methodological and substantive advantages of
such an approach. Rather than having to resort to generalities about a particular cause
of action, we can have a good idea ofhow often it was brought and how judges and
juries responded to it. This method allows us to make useful comparisons of the courts'
treatment of various civil and criminal causes of action over time, compare them with
other causes of action where issues of sex or gender were not implicated, and contrast
them with data from other jurisdictions. It also allows us to understand the decisions of
trial and appellate judges in the context of a broader state-wide jurisprudence rather than
in the isolated manner that national surveys of specific criminal or civil causes of action
provide. And lastly, we see by examining the actual operation of the trial courts how
specific statutes and precedents become subjected to the forces of broader legal
imperatives, the particular facts of a case, the needs of the parties, and the personalities
2' State V. Olney, Windsor County Court, December 1895 Term, Transcript of Trial, p. 9-12.
^ State V. Danforth, Windsor County Court, December 1894 Term, Transcript of Trial.
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ol judge and jury. Law, even in a small rural slate like Vermont, was a eomplex
interplay of texts and emotions.
The methodology provides important substantive results. It demonstrates the
diversity that existed in the Anglo-American legal system during the nineteenth and early
twentieth century. The difTcrences between jurisdictions in terms ol law and its
application are too obvious to be ignored. It seems clear that generalities about
particular causes of action such as rape, statutory rape, seduction, or adultery are no
longer tenable. Relatedly, studies of law and sex in rural America, where so many
people continued to live their lives during this period, can provide valuable insight into
the process of the legal regulation of sex. Local studies offer us a better understanding
of how decisions in one area of law fit into a broader state scheme of sexual regulation.
Thus, examining a raft of civil and criminal causes of action has allowed us to see that in
Vermont at least, the theme running through the Supreme Court's jurisprudence was the
containment of male sexuality-particularly as it threatened traditional family and gender
expectations. Finally, this study, by focusing on the courtroom process itself, has
revealed how very important the county courts themselves were as a site (perhaps the
site) for the discussion of sexuality in Vermont in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century. It was here that thousands of Vermonters came together, talked about sex,
articulated its dangers, and punished transgressors. Thus, the steepled courthouses
dotting the rural landscape of Vermont were a source of power far beyond anything we
may have imagined.
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APPENDIX A
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA ON MEN GOING TO TRIAL
OR PLEA FROM THE FOUR COUNTIES FOR RAPE OR
ATTEMPTED RAPE, I876-19I9'
' Combined data from convicts at the State Prison, Records of the House of Correction and manuscript
census. Data is more complete for those sentenced to the State Prison or the House of Correction than for
those fined, placed on probation or acquitted. Every man at the State Prison (after 1 875) and House of
Correction (after 1 898) had data compiled on him, while those not sentenced to the State Prison or House
of Correction had to be located by census. Between 1876 and 1920, Socio-economic data was available
for
84 percent of convictions in rape and attempted rape cases and 85 percent of acquittals.
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Year Charge Age Nativity 1 ather/Mother Married Literate Schooling Occupation Religion
Confined^ ^
1876 94 IV #1 4^ OOMass. Vt./N. Y, No Yes Common Laborer N.A.
1 O / W JZ Vi. Vt. No No N.A. Farmer N.A.
1X77 '^7 Mich. XT AIN .A. Yes Yes N.A. Quack Doctor N.A.
1 X7X1 o / o IN. Y
.
XT AN.A. N.A. Yes N.A. N.A. N.A.
1 OOV/ 49HZ VI. Vl./N.H. Yes Yes Limited Farmer None
1 OO 1 Att/All. 99zz Vl. XI LI /\/*IN.H./ Vt. Yes Yes ¥
* 1
Limited Fanner Meth.
1 RR'^1 OOJ Att ^93Z Vl. Vt. Div. Yes N.A. Laborer N.A.
Att/All. 9Xzo ^l. Ireland No Yes Limited Laborer Cath.
1 OOJ I\a|JC 9SZJ VI. Vt./N. Y. No Yes Common Laborer Cath.
1 ooo Att/All. 90zy ire. Ire. X INo X INo None Laborer Cath.
IXQO Att/All, 99zz VtVI. Vl No Yes Common Laborer Meth.
1 oyj Att/All. JO iviass. Mass. No Yes Common Painter None
1 RO^ Att/All. 1H
1
c.an. Can. X 1No X 1No Limited Laborer Cath.
1 XQ41 O 7^ J 1 Vtv I. Can, Yes Yes Common Laborer Cath.
1X041 O ^RJO VI. Vl. Uiv. Yes Common Shoemaker Meth.
1 X041 o Att 97Z / ire. ire. Yes Yes Common Blacksmith None
Att 99ZZ VI. Can. No Yes Common Laborer None
1 OVJ Att/\ll. 99Zz XI VIN. Y IN. Y Yes Yes Common Laborer Bapt.
1 OVO AHAU. 47 Vl. XT AiN.A. No X I _No X TNone Farmer None
1 XOO 1^ n r\Aivape '^9JZ ire. ire. Yes Yes Common Laborer None
1 oni
1 1
AtfAll. HJ iN.n.
•
Amer. Yes No XI AN.A. Laborer Cong.
1 vuz AHAU. 1 71 / vt. lOwr^^ /X I ALng./JN.A. No Yes XT AN.A. XT AN.A. N.A.^
1 QCiA AHAll. 9^ Vl. VI. Yes Yes Common Marble Rubber Cath.
1 OHA
1 VU4 rvdpe c 13 1 Can. Can. Wid. Yes Common Laborer Cath.
1905 Att. 22 Vt. Vt. No Yes N.A. Laborer N.A.
1906 Att. 34 N.Y. N.Y./Ire. Wid. Yes Common Mill Hand None
1907 Att. 34 Me. Me. Yes No Little Lumberman Meth.
1907 Rape 39 N.Y. Can./N.A. Yes No None Laborer Cath.
1908 Rape 54 Vt. Vt. Yes Yes Common Farmhand Meth.
1909 Att. 24 N.Y. Vt./N.Y. Yes Yes N.A. Fireman Meth.
1912 Rape 57 Germ. Germ. No Yes Common Butcher/Labor. Cath.
^ Includes men confined to the State Prison, the House of Corrections, the State Hospital, and the Industrial
School.
^ Not guilty by reason of insanity, confined to state hospital.
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Year Charge Age Nativity Father/Mother
Confined, cont'd.
1912 Att. 35 vt. Amer.
1913 Att. 17 Vt, vt.
1916 Att. 33 Eng. Eng.
Fine or Probation
1882 Rape 24 Vt. M.A./Ire.
1884 Rape 32 Vt. Vt.
1885 Att. 32 Can. Can.
1901 Att. 17 Vt. M.A./Vt.
1907 Att. 27 Vl. VI.
1914 Rape 21 VI. Vl./lN.rl.
1917 Att. 29 VI. L.an./iN. Y.
1917 Att. 44 VI. for* A/fL^an./ Vl,
1919 Att. 23 \/tVI. XT V A/fIN. I ./ Vl.
Not Guilty
1879 Rape 21 Vt. Ire.
1884 Rape 33 Vt. Vt.
1885 Rape 31 vt. N.H.m.
1888 Rape 27 vt. Vt.
1897 Rape 24 Vt. Can.m.
1898 Rape 23 Vt. Vt.
1910 Att. 49 vt. vt.
1911 Att. 50 vt. Vt.
Married Literate Schooling Occupation ReHgion
Yes No N.A. Fanning None
No No N.A. Laborer N.A.
Yes Yes Common Baker/Clerk Prot.
No Yes N.A. Mill Worker N.A.
Yes Yes N.A. FannerA %4A N A
No No N.A. Laborer N.A.
No Yes N.A. Laborer N.A.
No Yes N.A. Laborer N.A.
No Yes N.A. N.A. N.A.
No Yes >i.A. Laborer N.A.
Yes Yes N.A. Farmer N.A.
No Yes N.A. Trainsmith N.A.
No Yes N.A. Laborer Cath
Yes Yes N.A. Laborer N.A.
No Yes N.A. Laborer N.A.
Yes Yes N.A. Asst. Cashier N.A.
Yes Yes N.A. Painter N.A.
No Yes N.A. Laborer N.A.
Yes Yes. N.A. Marble Worker N.A.
Yes Yes N.A. Farmer N.A.
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APPENDIX B
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DATA ON MEN GOING TO TRIAL
OR PLEA FROM THE FOUR COUNTIES FOR STATUTORY
RAPE OR ATTEMPT, 1875-1919^
* Combined data from convicts at the State Prison, House of Correction and manuscript census. Data is
more complete for those sentenced to State Prison or the House ofCorrection than for those fined, placed
on probatiOT or acquitted. Every man at the State Prison and House of Correction had data compiled on
him, wiiile those not sentenced to the State Prison or House of Correction had to be located in the census.
Socio-ecOTomic data was available for 84 percent of all defendants convicted by jury or plea for statutory
rape or attempted statutory rape. Six of seven defendants acquitted of statutory rape had socio-economic
data available (86 percent). No defendants charged with attempt were acquitted.
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Year Charge Age Nativity Father/Mother Married Literate Schooling Occupation Religion
Confined^
io/j Rape L
1
vt. XT TT /VT X7N.R/N.Y. Yes Yes Limited Laborer Epis.
lo/O Rape Z9 XT IJN.H. XT AN.A. Yes Yes Common Painter N.A.
loo / Rape zi Vt. A 7*Vt. Yes. No None Laborer None
1 001 Alt. o cZj Vt. Vt. V, T AN.A. Yes N.A. N.A. N.A.
1 QO< Rape ^(\j\j Vt. \7*Vt. VTNo Yes Limited Fanning Meth.
1 oVD Rape ZD vt. XT AN.A. No Yes V T AN.A. N.A. N.A.
loV7 Rape 55 Can.. Can. Yes Yes Common Laborer Cong.
loVo Rape OU XT UN.H. XT IJN.H. Yes Yes Common Farmer None
1 ono1898 Kape oo Vt. Vt. Yes Yes Common Laborer Univ.
1 Ann Alt. 1 Q1 O Vt. \7*Vt. VT _No Yes VT AN.A. Laborer N.A.
Rape Z / vt. Vt./Can. Yes Yes Common T 1Laborer Chris.
1901 Kape 21 vt. A 7aVt. No Yes CommcMi Farmmg Univ.
1903 Rape A A44 \ 7*vt. A 7*Vt. AA 7* JWid. V TNo V TNone Farmer Bapt.
1904 Rape Ita. Ita. Yes Yes Common Stone Cutter Cath.
1904 Rape 1 c\19 Can. Can. (Eng.) No X 7Yes "V T AN.A. Laborer Bapt.
1906 Att. 46 Vt. A 7aVt. XTNo V TNo 1 ' *A JLimited T T A 1Hotels Cath.
1907 T% - —
-
Rape 63 Vt. V T T T /A 7aN.H.A^t. Yes Yes Common Harness/Carp. A JAdv.
1907 Rape 40 A 7*Vt. A 7aVt. Yes Yes Common Farming M _A.t_Meth.
1907 Rape 1 o18 N.Y. VT A7N.Y. XTNo xrYes VT AN.A. Labors V M aI-Meth.
1909 Rape 33 XT AN.A. XT AN.A. VT _No Yes Seminary TA_IPriest Cath.
1909 Rape 1 o18 Vt. A 7*Vt. VT_No Yes Common Millwright Cath.
1 ono t\ape VI. VtVi. VacI es ViaeI es V-'OmmuD roiuivr T^m clipiS.
1909 Rape 31 Wales Wales No No None Slatemaker "Welch^
1910 Rape 33 Vt. N.H. Yes Yes N.A. Hired Man N.A.
1911 Rape 33 Vt. VtTlre. Yes Yes Common Farmer Meth.
1911 Rape 30 Vt. Vt. Yes Yes Common Teamster Meth.
1912 Rape 18 Vt. Can.m. No Yes N.A. N.A. N.A.
1912 Rape 36 Vt. Vt. Yes Yes Common Farmhand N.A.
1912 Rape 43 Vt. Vt. Yes No Poor Farmer None
2 Includes men confined to the State Prison, the House of Corrections, the State Hospital, and the
Industrial School.
' Fined one thousand dollars in lieu of prison because of tuberculosis. State v. Hickey,
Windsor County
Court, June 1909 Term, Transcript of Trial, 95-96.
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Year Charge Age Nativity Father/Mother
Confined, cont'd.
1912 1 o Vtvx. Vt. No
1912 Rane 1 on Can. XTNo
1912 Ranp lid. itai. Yes
1913 Ranp M VIN. I . IN. Y. Yes
1913 Ranp I-" n (1eng. Eng. XT _No
1913 RaneVOL/
V
20 VtV I. bng./ Vt. Yes
1914 Ranp 2^ lie. ire. No
1914 Ranp VtV I. ^^an./ VI. Yes
1914 Rane 64 VtV I. IN.rl. Wid.
1914 Rane 2S VtV I. VI. No
1915 Rane R 1IV. 1
.
Vt /KI VVI./ IN. I
.
No
1915 Rape 46 Russia Russia Yes
1917 Rape 26 Vt. Can. Div.
1917 Rape 48 Vt. Vt. No
1917 Rape 19 N.Y. N.Y. No
1917 Rape 40 N r Yes
1917 Att. 23 VtV I. NI V A/tIN. I ./ VI. IN.A.
1918 Att. 46 Pan vjer./i_an. Yes
1918 Rape 40 VtV I. VtVI. Yes
Probation or Fine
1897 Att. 31 Vt. N.H./N.A. Yes
1899 Rape 23 Vt. Vt./Me. No
1899 Att. 15 Vt. Can. No
1901 Att. 25 Vt VtV I. INO
1910 Rape 28 Vt Ire11 w. NnINU.
1916 Rape 18 Vt Vt No
1919 Rape 19 Vt. Vt No
Not Guilty
1896 Rape 28 N.Y. N.Y. Yes
1903 Rape 48 Vt. Vt. Wid.
1903 Rape 17 vt. CanA^t. No
1905 Rape 35 vt. Vt. Div.
1907 Rape 61 Vt. N.H./Vt. Yes
1915 Rape 67 N.H. N.A. Yes
Literate Schooling Occupation Religion
Yes Common Laborer Cath.
Yes Common Laborer Cath.
No N.A. Merchant Cath.
No None Farmer Meth.
Yes Common Bell Hop None
Yes Common Laborer Meth.
Yes Common Farmer Cath.
Yes Common Farmer Salv/
Yes Common Farmer Meth.
Yes Common Laborer Prot.
Yes Poor Farmer Prot.
No None Laborer Cath.
Yes Common I alllllll^ 1 Cain. i^am.
No Poor Farmer Meth.
Yes Common Laborer Meth.
Yes College Preach/Teach. Quak.
Yes N.A. N.A. N.A.
No None Farmer Ch.Sc
Yes Highschool Plumber Meth.
Yes N.A. Hostlpr N AIN ./\.
Yes N.A. Farmhand N.A.
Yes N.A. Mill Worker Cath.
Yes N.A. Laborer N.A.
Yes N.A. Lumper Cath..
Yes N.A. Laborer N.A.
Yes N.A. N.A. N.A.
Yes N.A. Laborer N.A.
Yes N.A. Farmer N.A.
Yes N.A. Student N.A.
Yes N.A. N.A. N.A.
Yes N.A. Auto Repair N.A.
Yes N.A. Candy Maker N.A.
'
"Salv." = Salvation Army
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TABLE OF PUBLISHED CASES
365
Alexander v. Blodgett, 44 Vt. 476 (1872)
Bailey v. Chesley, 10 Cush. (Mass.) 284 (1852)
Barbour V. Stephenson, 32 F. 66 (Cir.Ct.KY, 1887)
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Bray v. Wheeler, 29 Vt. 514 (1857)
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Commonwealth V. Harris, 131 Mass. 336 (1881)
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Howlandv. Day, 56 Vt. 318 (1883)
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Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)
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